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Foreword 
Major projects are a vital source of Australia’s future prosperity. They lift national 
income, create employment opportunities, raise productivity and generate revenue 
for governments. However, they can also have negative impacts on community 
amenity, the environment, public health and our heritage assets. Australian 
governments regulate major projects through development assessment and 
approvals processes to promote an appropriate balance between economic and other 
impacts on a community’s wellbeing. 
In this study the Commission has been asked to review and benchmark assessment 
and approval processes for major projects in Australian jurisdictions. Our study has 
found that there is substantial scope, without relaxing the stringency of regulations, 
to improve their efficiency so that regulatory goals are achieved at a lower cost to 
both proponents and communities. 
The study was undertaken by a team in the Commission’s Melbourne office, led by 
Phillip Chindamo. The study has benefited from discussions and submissions from 
many stakeholders in the government and business sectors and from diverse peak 
bodies and community groups. The international insights drawn from practices in 
Canada, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and New Zealand were 
informed by our conversations with regulators, proponents and experts in these 
countries. We are very grateful to all those who have given their time and shared 
their experiences and expertise with the Commission. 
 
 
Jonathan Coppel 
Presiding Commissioner 
Dr Warren Mundy 
Commissioner 
November 2013 
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Terms of reference 
STUDY TO BENCHMARK AUSTRALIA’S MAJOR PROJECT 
DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT PROCESSES 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 
I, David Bradbury, Assistant Treasurer and Minister Assisting for Deregulation, 
pursuant to Parts 2 and 4 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998, hereby request 
that the Productivity Commission undertake a study to benchmark Australia’s major 
project development assessment processes against international best practice. 
Background 
Major projects in Australia are subject to a wide range of government regulations 
and development controls applied at the local, state and/or Commonwealth 
level.  These controls are intended to serve the public interest by delivering 
desirable regulatory outcomes in a variety of ways including protecting the public 
from health and safety risks and managing environmental, social and other 
development-related impacts that may arise from a project.   
While the regulations and controls are intended to deliver specific benefits and 
avoid undesirable impacts, they add a layer of cost to doing business and may be 
particularly burdensome if they involve unnecessary duplication, or are poorly 
designed.  To the extent that they lead to longer than expected construction times, 
such processes may impact on the commercial viability of some projects.  
The mining boom in Australia has led to a large increase in the number of major 
projects seeking approval, which has highlighted the need for efficient and 
streamlined approvals processes.  The Business Council of Australia has argued that 
‘one of the key factors impacting on successful investment in Australia is the 
efficiency of government development approvals processes, and the related impact 
of red tape imposed by permits and regulation’.   
This was discussed at the Business Advisory Forum (BAF) and it was agreed to 
further test the premise about the efficiency of the development approvals processes 
across a broad range of development categories (for example, in industries such as 
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construction and resources) and across a range of locations (including urban and 
regional areas).  
In response to a request from the Council of Australian Governments, Heads of 
Treasuries have considered the scope of the BAF’s proposal to benchmark 
Australia’s major project development assessment processes finding that it would 
be beneficial to undertake further work to measure Australia’s performance relative 
to international best practice.  In conducting further work, there is merit in assessing 
the effectiveness of approaches to streamline and coordinate development approvals 
processes which have been adopted by governments, such as a one-stop shop or 
Lead Agency Framework, as a means for coordinating interaction with the 
proponent.   
Given the broader concerns in the community around the delivery of planned 
projects, this provides an appropriate time to consider the extent to which 
development assessment processes across all levels of government affect the costs 
incurred by business, deliver good regulatory outcomes for the public and provide 
appropriate transparency and certainty to facilitate business investment. 
Scope of the research study 
In undertaking the study, the Commission should: 
1. examine the regulatory objectives and key features of Australia’s major project 
development assessment processes at all levels of government, including the 
interactions between levels of government, the role of facilitation, the capacities 
and resources of the institutions involved and significant variations between 
jurisdictions  
2. examine the regulatory objectives and key features of comparable international 
systems with respect to major project development assessment processes 
3. identify critical elements of development assessment processes and compare 
these to assess the extent to which different decision-making approaches in 
Australian jurisdictions and alternative investment destinations overseas 
(including other federations) have a material impact on costs, timeliness, 
transparency, certainty and regulatory outcomes 
4. examine the strategic planning context for major project approvals in Australia 
and in comparable international systems (including for example, the pursuit of 
urban and regional development policies, or broader strategic resource 
development plans)  
5. identify best practice and against this benchmark evaluate jurisdictional 
approaches, such as one-stop shops and statutory timeframes, to make 
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recommendations to improve Australia’s processes, both within and between 
jurisdictions, by reducing duplication, removing unnecessary complexity and 
regulation, and eliminating unnecessary costs or unnecessarily lengthy 
timeframes for approvals processes 
6. assess mechanisms for ‘scaling’ regulatory requirements relative to project size 
and the expected benefits against the potential environmental, social, economic 
and other impacts 
7. compare the efficiency and effectiveness with which Australian approvals 
processes achieve the protection of social, economic, heritage, cultural and 
environmental assets compared with comparable international systems. 
In undertaking this study, the Commission should take into account the work being 
led by the Commonwealth Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to agree 
bilateral arrangements for accreditation of state/territory environment assessments 
and approvals processes.  The Commission should not seek to duplicate this existing 
work, which COAG has agreed be finalised by March 2013. 
In conducting the study, the Commission will also take into account evidence from 
benchmarking studies and other relevant studies, including the Infrastructure 
Australia ‘Principles for Assessment’, the COAG Reform Council’s review of 
capital city strategic planning systems and work on development assessment 
processes by individual jurisdictions, such as the NSW Planning System Review.   
In conducting the study, the Commission should also examine relevant domestic 
case studies to inform its findings.   
The Commission should consult with industry, non-government stakeholders and 
governments in conducting the study.   
The Commission will publicly release a draft report and seek submissions prior to 
finalising the Report.  The final Report should be provided within 12 months of the 
receipt of these Terms of Reference.   
 
DAVID BRADBURY 
Assistant Treasurer 
[Received 7 December 2012] 
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Key points 
• While Australia already has in place the building blocks of a sound development 
assessment and approval (DAA) regulatory system, there is substantial scope to 
comprehensively overhaul the framework in Australia for major projects.  
• The DAA processes of Australian jurisdictions and select countries were 
benchmarked for this study. A number of leading practices were identified which 
should be implemented by all Australian jurisdictions. 
• DAA areas that require attention include:  
– unnecessary complexity and duplicative processes 
– lengthy approval timeframes 
– lack of regulatory certainty and transparency in decision making 
– conflicting policy objectives 
– inadequate consultation and enforcement  
– regulatory outcomes falling short of their objectives. 
• Specific reforms proposed include: 
– a five-point plan to move towards a ‘one project, one assessment, one decision’ 
framework for environmental approvals, that includes strengthening bilateral 
assessment and approval agreements between the Commonwealth and the 
States and Territories 
– limiting the use of ‘stop-the-clock’ provisions  
– States and Territories improving coordination between their regulatory agencies  
– institutional separation of environmental policy development from regulatory and 
enforcement functions  
– enshrining the principle that Ministerial approval — unless a deemed approval — 
should not be reviewable by review bodies other than on judicial review grounds 
– establishing statutory timelines, together with appropriate safeguards, for key 
decision points in the DAA process  
– expanding the use of Strategic Assessments and Plans where practical to do so 
– requiring that approval authorities publish reasons for their approval decisions and 
conditions 
– improving third party opportunity for compliance actions. 
• Any regulatory system is only as good as its weakest link. Partial reform efforts are 
unlikely to achieve meaningful improvements.  
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Overview 
Major projects can bring substantial economic benefits. They contribute to national 
income; they create employment opportunities during their construction and 
operation; and they can raise productivity and generate revenue for governments 
through royalties and taxation, thereby helping to fund government programs.  
Major projects also have wider impacts on community wellbeing, which are not 
reflected in economic performance measures, such as national income. These 
impacts can include damage to the environment and heritage values, the loss of 
community amenity, and have consequences for public health. Governments 
regulate major projects through development assessment and approval (DAA) 
processes to manage the risks of these impacts and to promote an appropriate 
balance between economic and other impacts on a community’s wellbeing.  
The costs of developing major infrastructure, natural resources projects, and 
commercial and public-purpose buildings in Australia are high and rising. This is 
driving concerns about Australia’s competitiveness, productivity and future 
prosperity. The sources of higher costs include: wage and other labour costs; 
restrictive work practices; competition for construction services from elsewhere in 
the economy; skilled labour shortages; the increased complexity of projects; the 
higher community valuation placed on protecting amenity, heritage and 
environmental assets; and the efficiency of DAA regulations. 
It is the last of these that the Commission has been asked to review. The problems 
that have been highlighted include: poorly articulated or inconsistent regulatory 
objectives; lengthy approval timeframes; duplication of assessment processes; lack 
of regulatory certainty; unnecessary and poorly constructed conditions and offsets; 
low transparency; inadequate consultation and compliance; and regulatory 
outcomes falling short of their objectives (box 1). 
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Box 1 Participants’ contrasting experiences with approval processes  
The Commission received 106 submissions from governments, project proponents, 
industry bodies, environmental and community groups, and individuals. These outlined 
experiences and perspectives about different aspects of Australia’s development 
assessment and approval regulations and processes for major projects.  
Proponents argued that onerous environmental impact statement requirements, 
regulatory duplication, lack of coordination and poorly crafted offsets and conditions 
are causing an excessive regulatory burden. For example: 
We estimate that approval timeframes for projects has increased from ~7 months on 
average (2002) up to ~18-36 months (2012). (Xstrata Coal, sub. 50) 
Regulatory approvals systems suffer from unclear roles, confused accountabilities and a 
lack of expertise and commercial acumen. The result is unnecessary cost, time delays and 
uncertainty in investment decision making. (Business Council of Australia, sub. 43) 
… Australia’s environmental regulatory framework contains numerous overlapping, 
excessive and inconsistent requirements that are causing unnecessary project delays and 
costs. The legislation does not always clearly define or achieve its objectives, or add any 
additional benefit to the Australian economy. It imposes additional costs on the industry and, 
in some cases, delivers conflicting outcomes that extend project timeframes and costs. 
(Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, sub. 17) 
When major projects are routinely having twelve hundred or more specific conditions 
imposed on them — which collectively require hundreds of subsidiary assessment 
processes, such as the preparation of a social impact management plan — the case could 
be made that regulations are being made by stealth. In many cases, these quasi-regulations 
are blurring the boundaries of the Government’s responsibility to provide basic services for 
growing communities by seeking to shift these costs onto major projects. (Queensland 
Resources Council, sub. 19) 
Environmental and community groups focused on regulatory outcomes falling short of 
objectives and attributed this to the inadequacy of baseline environmental data; 
perceived consultant bias; governance and procedural gaps; and lack of appeal rights 
and consultation in DAA processes. Environmental groups were also concerned about 
the potential for changes to current processes resulting in worse environmental 
outcomes. For example: 
There are five broad problems with environmental impact assessment (EIA) for major 
projects in Australia: Lack of independent assessment approaches, or comprehensive 
baseline data; poor cumulative impact assessment … EIA is not linked to 
state-wide/catchment [natural resource management] targets, limits and requirements; 
inadequate consideration of greenhouse emissions and climate change impacts; limited 
government oversight and quality assurance of EIA. (Australian Network of Environmental 
Defender’s Offices, sub. 14) 
Across all Australia what is required of any planning system is the capacity to produce 
ecologically sustainable outcomes. This requires comprehensive environmental impact 
assessment and genuine public consultation. Fast approvals that deliver poor quality, high 
risk or unsustainable development are not in the public interest (Nature Conservation 
Council of NSW, sub. DR94)  
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About the study 
The Commission was asked to benchmark Australia’s DAA processes for major 
projects against international and domestic best practice. This is not the first report 
to examine aspects of DAA processes (box 2). In accordance with the terms of 
reference, this study examines specific regulatory practices and provides 
recommendations on how to improve Australia’s DAA processes. The regulatory 
practices under examination include: the role of lead agencies and one-stop shops; 
the use of Strategic Planning and Assessment; statutory timeframes, and risk-based 
and outcome-based approaches to regulatory design. The full terms of reference are 
set out in the preliminary pages of this report.  
To avoid any misconception, this study is not about whether the stringency of 
environmental and other regulations should be tightened or relaxed. It is squarely 
focused on identifying ways to improve the efficiency of DAA processes so that the 
current regulatory goals of protecting environmental, heritage and cultural assets are 
achieved at a lower cost to both proponents and the community.  
 
Box 2 Earlier reports on development assessment and approval 
regulation 
Over the past decade there have been a number of public inquiries, committees of 
parliaments, studies and departmental reviews that have examined development 
assessment and approval regulation in Australia. These include but are not limited to: 
• Infrastructure Australia, Building Australia’s Future: A Review of Approval 
Processes for Major Infrastructure (2009) 
• Productivity Commission, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business 
Regulation: Planning, Zoning and Development Assessments (2011) 
• COAG Reform Council’s review of capital city strategic planning systems (2011) 
• individual jurisdictions’ work on development assessment processes, such as the 
New South Wales Planning System Review, the South Australian Expert Panel on 
Planning Reform, and the Western Australian Department of Planning’s Planning 
Makes it Happen: Blueprint for Planning Reform 
• work in 2012 led by the Commonwealth Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet to negotiate bilateral arrangements for accreditation of State and Territory 
Government environmental assessment and approval processes 
• the Independent Review of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (the ‘Hawke Review’) (2009).  
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The Commission’s approach to benchmarking 
There are practical challenges in benchmarking DAA regulations and processes. 
These challenges relate to the very limited availability of data, which makes 
comparisons and drawing inferences problematic when jurisdictions have different 
regulatory objectives, preferences, institutional frameworks and political systems. 
Controlling for particular characteristics of major projects is also needed to put 
benchmarking results in proper context. 
In light of these challenges, the Commission has adopted a pragmatic approach that 
involves, as far as possible, the comparison of ‘like with like’. This is achieved by 
using largely qualitative benchmarking techniques to compare DAA processes 
against a set of criteria (or principles) that has been drawn from the literature 
relating to the good governance and conduct of regulators (box 3). Leading 
regulatory practices were identified, as well as ‘lessons learned’ from case studies 
of specific DAA experiences of major projects in Australian and international 
jurisdictions. 
Box 3 The Commission’s criteria for benchmarking regulatory 
practices 
Regulator governance 
• clear, well-defined regulatory objectives  
• clarity in roles and responsibilities  
• accountable decision makers 
• appropriately independent regulators 
• suitably skilled and resourced institutions 
• opportunities for public participation and review of decisions 
• consistency with other regulations and higher-level planning strategies 
• regular review and evaluation 
Regulator conduct 
• clear and predictable processes 
• regulatory outcomes that are consistent with objectives 
• open and transparent processes 
• proportionate and flexible regulatory requirements 
• no unnecessary costs  
 
For international comparisons, the Commission focused on DAA processes in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand. These countries 
have similar political systems, are at roughly equivalent stages of development, and 
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face broadly equivalent challenges in making tradeoffs between commercial, 
environmental, societal and heritage concerns. The study has not focused on 
low-income countries in which the policy objectives and preferences differ greatly 
and the institutional arrangements are less comparable.  
Importance of major projects to Australia 
In Australia, major projects are typically natural resource developments, 
infrastructure projects, big hotel and resort developments, and large commercial or 
public-purpose buildings, such as hospitals or stadiums. They are characterised by 
their cost, size, complexity and long lead times. How these characteristics are used 
to distinguish a major project from a regular project varies, and in some 
jurisdictions developments of relatively small value qualify as major projects.  
There are no comprehensive and consistent data on the number, value, composition 
and location of major projects in Australia. However, rough proxies include: data 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics on new engineering construction spending; 
estimates from Deloitte Access Economics of the stock of committed large-scale 
projects; and information from the Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics on 
current and forthcoming projects in the resources sector that are above an arbitrary 
capital expenditure threshold of $50 million.  
These measures all show a surge in the value of major projects over the past decade 
(figure 1) and the size of the largest developments is unprecedented in Australia’s 
history. This growth in major project investment is one of the reasons why Australia 
was able to weather the recent global recession and its aftermath better than other 
advanced economies.  
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Figure 1 Investment in major projects has surgeda  
 
a These data are used as rough proxies for investment in major projects.  
Rationale for government intervention 
Managing the risk of adverse impacts is the main reason why governments regulate 
the approval of major projects. Such projects have the potential to directly damage 
sites of environmental and heritage significance. They may also have effects beyond 
the site itself and impact on the regional environment and nearby communities. An 
important role for government is to define planning systems and legal rights to 
allow project proponents and affected parties to achieve better outcomes for the 
economy, the environment and the community. The government also has a 
responsibility to enforce these arrangements.  
Governments use DAA regulations and processes to provide a way for formal 
consideration of the project’s risks before significant capital investment takes place. 
This is important because some of the risks in major projects may have irreversible 
outcomes. Typically governments require the proponent to obtain various permits, 
authorisations and approvals — for example, in relation to land acquisition; use and 
access of land (including zoning); planning; environmental regulations (covering 
pollution, waste management, habitat and biodiversity, and threatened species); 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous heritage; native title; and public health and safety. 
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Scope of government intervention 
The Australian and State and Territory Governments share powers for granting and 
determining the conditions that are attached to the approval of a major development. 
The States and Territories have the primary role, while the Commonwealth is 
responsible for matters of national environmental significance under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (the 
EPBC Act), as well as for projects on Commonwealth lands and in Commonwealth 
waters (box 4). Local governments also have a role to play through planning 
legislation and ‘secondary approvals’, although State and Territory Ministers can in 
certain circumstances call-in or declare a development to be a major project, which 
effectively curtails local government planning powers. 
Box 4 Matters of national environmental significance 
The matters that are protected by Part 3 of the Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) are: 
• world heritage values 
• national heritage values 
• ecological character of wetlands of international significance  
• listed threatened species and ecological communities 
• listed migratory species  
• nuclear actions (including uranium mines) 
• Commonwealth marine areas 
• the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
• water resources impacted by a coal seam gas development or a large coal mining 
development 
• actions on Commonwealth land 
• actions by Commonwealth agencies.  
 
Major projects are, by their very nature, complex developments. Further complexity 
arises due to the vast quantity of legislation and the number of regulatory 
instruments that may apply to a project, depending on its size, type, and location. 
Moreover, processes vary within and between jurisdictions and across the stages of 
the regulatory system (figure 2). Typically, a project will require multiple 
approvals. 
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Figure 2 Regulatory stages of the DAA process for major projects  
 
Navigating the regulatory system can be daunting, for example: 
• there were 79 policies or pieces of legislation that were pertinent to the Port 
Phillip Bay channel deepening project 
• AngloGold Ashanti required 66 different approvals for its Tropicana Gold 
Project in Western Australia. 
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In addition, major projects are subject to different regulatory pathways depending 
on a variety of ‘triggers’ (box 5). 
Box 5 Triggers for major project assessment pathways 
• In some jurisdictions, special assessment pathways are triggered by the capital cost 
of a major project. For example, in New South Wales a project will be declared a 
‘state significant development’ if it falls into one of 24 development classes and has 
a capital value greater than $30 million.  
• Other jurisdictions adopt the subjective criterion of whether the project is sufficiently 
‘significant’, ‘important’ or ‘complex’. In South Australia, a project may be declared a 
‘major development’ if it is of major environmental, social or economic importance. 
In Queensland, a ‘coordinated project’ will be declared if it has complex approval 
requirements; strategic significance to a locality, region, or the state; or significant 
environmental effects or significant infrastructure requirements. 
• Some pathways are triggered by projects of a particular type. For example, in 
Victoria, a project will be declared a ‘major transport project’ if it comprises road, rail 
or other infrastructure that can be used for the movement of persons or goods; or is 
a port or a facility where goods can be transferred or temporarily stored. 
• Ministers play a role in many of these triggers. They can determine whether certain 
criteria are met, and also whether a development is to be declared a major project 
when it meets (or even if it does not meet) the set criteria.   
 
Substantial opportunity to improve current regulation 
The building blocks of a sound regulatory system are already in place in Australia. 
Indeed, when the Commission compared Australia’s DAA processes with practices 
in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, none of these 
countries stood out as a better performer overall than Australian jurisdictions, 
although in each system there were leading practices. In fact, in some aspects of 
DAA regulation, other nations look to Australia as a model. 
While the building blocks are sound, there is still substantial scope to improve 
Australia’s DAA processes. This report proposes a reform agenda that, if 
implemented, will help Australia secure the benefits of major projects and remain 
an attractive destination for international investment, while at the same time protect 
the nation’s environmental, heritage and cultural assets. The Commission’s 
proposals build on previous efforts and aim to strengthen the DAA regulatory 
framework by:  
• achieving better outcomes against regulatory objectives and improving strategic 
decision making 
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• reducing regulatory overlap and duplication 
• improving regulatory certainty, transparency and accountability 
• improving timeframes and coordination  
• better targeting and enforcement of approval conditions. 
Achieving regulatory objectives and improving strategic decision 
making 
Clear and consistent regulatory objectives that encapsulate the preferences of the 
community are a pre-requisite for a well-functioning regulatory system. They orient 
regulatory agencies in their day-to-day administration of DAA processes and ensure 
that all stakeholders understand the intended goals. In the absence of clear 
objectives, decisions may lack consistency, create unnecessary regulatory burdens 
on proponents and ultimately erode the community’s confidence in the integrity of 
the system. 
The Commission recommends that governments take stock of their DAA processes, 
identify where objectives are vague, inconsistent or ambiguous and, where 
deficiencies are found, set about making them clearer. Where policy objectives 
compete with each other, governments should provide clear and publicly available 
guidance on how decision makers should weigh conflicting objectives. The need for 
guidance on how to put the principles of ecologically sustainable development into 
operational terms is a pressing and longstanding one, due to the divergent 
formulations and interpretations of its meaning. 
Making greater use of Strategic Assessments 
Australia’s DAA regulations are largely organised around the evaluation of one 
project proposal at a time. This means that governments consider the incremental 
impacts of a project, but not the cumulative impacts of a series of developments. 
This limits the ability of the regulatory framework to meet policy objectives, as can 
be seen from the challenges that are developing in the Pilbara and the Great Barrier 
Reef. 
Strategic Planning and Assessment can take into account the cumulative impacts 
that arise from multiple projects and other activities on landscape-scale ecosystems. 
In turn, this can result in subsequent project assessment and approval processes 
being less resource intensive and time consuming, since some of the issues have 
already been handled. 
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Despite these advantages, and even though Strategic Assessments have been 
available under the EPBC Act since 1999 (and under some state laws for lengthy 
periods); the use of this approach has only recently started to become more 
frequent. Most have been used for urban areas where the pattern of future 
development is reasonably predictable, the environmental risks are well understood 
and existing planning and assessment frameworks are well established. These few 
examples have been successful in significantly reducing the need for subsequent 
Commonwealth approvals. Indeed, the benefits of this approach in relation to land 
release on Melbourne’s urban fringe are estimated at more than $500 million over 
30 years. 
There is wider scope to tap efficiency gains and improved environmental outcomes 
through the expanded use of Strategic Assessments. However, governments should 
first draw on the ‘lessons learned’ from the successful experiences to date and 
ensure agencies are equipped and ready to embrace a different approach. Without 
the proper groundwork, the benefits that can be derived from considering 
cumulative impacts could easily be outweighed by the costs of multiple layers of 
regulation.  
Reducing regulatory overlap and duplication 
The overlap and duplication of similar regulatory processes is one obvious source of 
unnecessary burden for proponents of major projects. Australia’s federal system of 
government, where responsibilities for matters (such as environmental protection) 
span all levels of government, gives rise to overlap and duplication, which the 
Commission considers can be greatly reduced without lowering the quality of 
environmental outcomes.  
Proponents of major projects, for example, are required to undertake some sort of 
broadly interpreted ‘environmental assessment’ for the State or Territory 
Government in which the proposed project is located and often also for the 
Australian Government. Regulatory overlap and duplication arise from this 
cross-jurisdictional process, and the Commission has heard a range of views on its 
incidence (box 6). 
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Box 6 Views on regulatory overlap and duplication 
A number of participants in this study offered what they considered to be examples of 
overlap and duplication in the development assessment and approval regulations 
governing major projects. The Urban Taskforce Australia argued: 
… for certain activities (controlled activities) the EPBC Act may require an environmental 
assessment and approval from the Commonwealth Minister. These activities are often also 
subject to state planning legislation and similar assessment and approval requirements 
apply … This duplication in assessment and approval is an inefficient use of resources and 
adds unnecessary time delay to the approval process for no real benefit. (sub. 15) 
The Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association suggested that there 
are inconsistencies between Commonwealth and State and Territory agencies in 
relation to seismic surveying: 
A recent seismic survey required extensive environmental planning with a state government 
agency to demonstrate that all environmental risks were managed to a level as low as 
reasonably practicable and acceptable. … The approval process required the proponent to 
submit two environmental plans for the same activity, one for the onshore component and 
one for the offshore component. (sub. 17) 
The Minerals Council of Australia expressed concerns about diverse approaches to 
biodiversity conservation: 
Significant failings of the current regulatory arrangements for land use decision-making 
include … the fractured nature of biodiversity conservation arrangements — Australia 
currently has at least six layers (Commonwealth, Interjurisdictional bodies, State government 
agencies, regional Nature Resource Management bodies, local governments and finally the 
landowner) which overlap in different ways depending on land tenure and which aspect of 
biodiversity is of interest … . (sub. 33) 
In contrast, environmental NGOs argued that problems of regulatory overlap and 
duplication are overstated and, in any case, having both the Commonwealth and 
States and Territories involved acts as an additional safeguard to protect 
environmental assets. The Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices 
stated: 
Contrary to industry claims and some media reports, State and federal environmental 
regulation is not duplicative; instead, environmental regulation by both State and Australian 
governments is part of the shared responsibility for the environment set up by the 1992 
Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment. … Federal environmental regulation 
therefore provides a critical role in Australia’s national environmental protection regime and 
achieving our international obligations. (sub. DR92) 
Lock The Gate Alliance questioned the ability of State and Territory Governments to 
adequately assess matters of national environmental significance: 
There are matters of national environmental significance which state government authorities 
are not equipped to assess, and the assessment of which they have demonstrated they are 
not capable of adequately conducting, including the World Heritage Great Barrier Reef, for 
example, and threatened species that are not listed at the state level. Checks and balances 
are needed to ensure that assessment is rigorous and fulfils our international obligations. 
(sub. DR97) 
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Renewing efforts on bilateral assessment and approval agreements 
The Commission regards bilateral agreements for assessment and approval on 
matters of national environmental significance under the EPBC Act as the best way 
to address directly overlapping and duplicative processes, while ensuring 
progressive environmental outcomes. Such agreements would go some way to 
promoting a ‘one project, one assessment, one decision’ framework for 
environmental matters. In 2012, COAG agreed to embark on this route, but the 
negotiations subsequently broke down for a range of reasons, including community 
concerns about how environmental standards would be maintained and the 
accreditation standards themselves. An overly ambitious timetable arguably did not 
make it any easier.  
The Commission sees merit in renewing efforts to reach accord between the 
Commonwealth and the States and Territories on bilateral approval agreements, and 
it supports the Commonwealth Government’s recent efforts and staged approach to 
this end. In this context, and acknowledging the difficulties encountered in the 2012 
negotiation process, the Commission has developed a five-point plan, which it sees 
as one way to move towards achieving a framework of broad based bilateral 
approval agreements (box 7). 
Box 7 Five-point plan for achieving bilateral approval agreements 
1. Increase the number of State and Territory assessment procedures with 
Commonwealth accreditation.  
2. Strengthen State and Territory approval and enforcement processes, through other 
reforms proposed in this report.  
3. Initially target concluding agreements in areas that are less environmentally 
sensitive and where there is better information about impacts, such as urban 
environments, rather than trying to secure a comprehensive nationwide agreement. 
The Commonwealth Government could maintain control over matters where it would 
be unlikely that the community would accept it exiting the field. In such cases, the 
States and Territories should accredit Commonwealth processes where they 
address the same matter. 
4. COAG should publish a timetable of agreed reforms and have the COAG Reform 
Council report annually on key milestones and barriers to reform, together with ways 
to address the latter. 
5. The outcomes of bilateral approval agreements should be monitored. To facilitate 
opportunities for learning, governments should report on the operation of the 
agreements.  
 
The plan favours a targeted or staged approach, rather than trying to secure a 
comprehensive nationwide agreement. This might initially involve the 
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Commonwealth Environment Minister delegating responsibility for the assessment 
and granting of environmental approvals in urban areas under the EPBC Act to 
particular States and Territories. Urban areas have relatively mature assessment and 
decision-making processes in place and strategic planning tools have already been 
used successfully. The Commonwealth could subsequently transfer responsibility to 
the States and Territories for approving controlled activities in non-metropolitan 
areas. 
The Commonwealth Environment Minister would retain the right to withdraw 
accreditation if national standards were not being met. The Commonwealth 
Government could also maintain control over matters where it would be unlikely 
that the community would accept it exiting the field. In such cases, the States and 
Territories should accredit Commonwealth processes where they address the same 
matter. It is recommended that this proposal be properly scoped to identify the 
necessary steps and appropriate safeguards. It should then be reviewed by the 
jurisdictions and a timetable set.  
The Commission also sees substantial scope for strengthening existing bilateral 
assessment arrangements as an interim step towards the reforms described above. 
Currently less than 30 per cent of projects are assessed under bilateral assessment 
arrangements. By building on existing (or expired) agreements, there are a number 
of areas where improvements could be made. These include: agreement on 
standards and procedures for assessment; better utilisation of existing legislative 
procedures; and extending, where relevant — for example in South Australia — the 
number of regulatory processes that are accredited under current bilateral 
agreements.  
The Australian Parliament’s decision to exclude the option for bilateral approval 
agreements when it introduced a ‘water trigger’ into the EPBC Act is not conducive 
to the cooperation that the Commission regards as necessary between the 
Commonwealth and the States and Territories to progress reforms. The Commission 
has recommended that if a properly conducted regulatory impact assessment cannot 
demonstrate that the trigger delivers net benefits to the community, it should be 
repealed. 
Reducing duplication within jurisdictions 
A further source of overlap and duplication can be the number of regulatory 
agencies involved in assessing and approving a major project within a jurisdiction. 
For example, regulatory responsibility for oil spill contingency plans in 
Commonwealth waters near Western Australia is shared by the National Offshore 
Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA); the 
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Australian Maritime Safety Authority; the Australian Government Department of 
the Environment; the Western Australian Department of Environment and 
Conservation; and potentially the Western Australian Department of Transport and 
the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum.  
Despite agencies’ differing areas of responsibility, there are opportunities to work 
more closely together and to coordinate regulatory activities. A recent example is 
the Commonwealth Government’s announcement that NOPSEMA will be 
accredited to assess and approve certain petroleum activities as meeting the 
environmental requirements of the EPBC Act. The Commission supports these 
changes and expects that, when implemented, they will materially reduce 
compliance costs for affected businesses.  
State and Territory Governments should take a similar approach by encouraging 
their agencies to work together to share assessments or to accredit the processes of 
one agency as meeting the requirements of another agency. Memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs) could be used to facilitate this.  
Regulatory certainty, transparency and accountability 
Having predictable regulatory processes builds confidence in the regulatory 
agencies and reduces compliance costs for proponents. It also helps to establish trust 
in, and the legitimacy of, the regulatory framework. This is especially important for 
major projects, which usually involve stakeholders with strongly held and disparate 
views on the impacts of proposed developments.  
A common concern raised in this study by both proponents and community 
stakeholders was a lack of regulatory certainty and transparency in the DAA 
system. However, the nature of their concerns differs: 
• For proponents, the cost of undertaking assessments is lower when all the 
requirements are known in advance. Late requests for additional information can 
add to costs and lengthen the approval process.  
• For community stakeholders, doubts about the rigour and legitimacy of the 
approval process arise when public consultation is insufficient and ministerial 
powers to call-in a project are exercised arbitrarily.  
Importance of early stakeholder participation and guidance  
Study participants frequently stressed the importance of early stakeholder 
participation in DAA processes and the need for guidance for project proponents on 
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regulatory requirements. Consultation before a project is submitted for formal 
approval allows regulators to explain the objectives of the regulatory framework 
and the broad requirements that are placed on proponents. Consultation also gives 
the community the opportunity to raise issues about how a development might 
affect them and for proponents to establish a ‘social licence’. Moreover, community 
feedback allows proponents and regulators to give early consideration to design 
modifications that avoid or limit undesirable impacts. 
Given these mutual benefits, it is not surprising that consultation is often initiated 
by proponents. Furthermore, it is a prescribed feature at some stages of the DAA 
process. For instance, Queensland and South Australia organise pre-application 
consultation meetings between regulators and proponents. Sometimes, however, 
consultation is only undertaken once the process is well underway, which means 
that any substantive changes to the project design are potentially expensive and 
community views may have hardened in the interim. 
The Commission considers that early engagement between regulators, proponents 
and community stakeholders should be undertaken more systematically than is 
currently the case. Pre-application meetings between proponents and a ‘Major 
Projects Coordination Office’ (MPCO) would improve upfront clarity around 
regulatory requirements. A practical way to enshrine a culture of early participation 
is for jurisdictions to publish draft terms of reference (TOR) for the primary impact 
assessments that are related to major project proposals (such as environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs)) and to provide an opportunity for meaningful input by 
key stakeholders (including local governments, the public and proponents) to 
inform the final TOR.  
To bolster transparency and accountability, governments should also ensure that 
regulatory agencies provide guidance to proponents on the type of information that 
is required, together with the reasons for the chosen assessment pathway and the 
rationale for the TOR. Limiting the scope of, and setting precise criteria for 
ministerial discretion to call-in and intervene in DAA processes, as well as being 
transparent in the exercise of that discretion, would also bolster the legitimacy of 
approval decisions. 
Separating environmental policy and regulatory functions 
Good regulatory practices can only go so far in promoting certainty and 
transparency. Changes to regulatory governance and institutional arrangements also 
have a role to play. In particular, public confidence, competitive neutrality and 
impartiality are more likely to be established through independent regulatory 
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agencies. This is one of the lessons from jurisdictions that have already established 
such agencies.  
The Commission proposes that jurisdictions pursue the institutional separation of 
their environmental assessment and enforcement functions from their environmental 
policy functions. Given similar arrangements already exist in Western Australia and 
Tasmania, jurisdictional size seems not to be an important consideration. The 
least-cost institutional form should be determined by each jurisdiction having regard 
to existing structures. This institutional separation should not alter the authority of 
the relevant Minister to make primary environmental approval decisions. For the 
Australian Government, this means transferring the assessment and enforcement 
functions required by the EPBC Act from the Department of the Environment to a 
new independent agency.  
Review of decisions  
Having review mechanisms in place helps to ensure that approval decisions are 
made in a robust, transparent and accountable manner, and in accordance with 
regulatory objectives. Reviews can seek to determine whether a decision is lawful 
(judicial review) or to determine whether it is the best decision (merits review).  
The challenge is to deliver the right to robust and accessible review procedures, 
while avoiding vexatious review applications and unwarranted delays. While abuse 
of review processes by both proponents and opponents of major developments 
arises on occasion, overall the existing system works reasonably well. Nonetheless, 
the Commission believes that there is scope to improve current review procedures 
and the access to review. Such changes need to be considered in the context of the 
entire DAA system and also take into account their costs and benefits. 
The decision to approve a major project involves the balancing of competing 
interests and the negotiation of trade-offs. The relevant Minister, as an elected 
representative accountable to the Parliament (and through Parliament to the wider 
community), is the most appropriate decision maker to grant primary approvals for 
major projects. Regardless of the applicant, it is not appropriate for a tribunal to 
second-guess such decisions through merits review; however it is important that 
their legality is safeguarded through judicial review. 
This said, there is a tension between elected representatives making delicate 
balancing decisions and the efficient use of ministerial time. While the Commission 
considers it preferable for Ministers not to delegate decisions for primary approvals, 
if delegation does occur, provision should be made to allow for the decisions of the 
delegate to be personally reconsidered by the Minister. The result of such 
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reconsideration is the equivalent of the decisions being made by the Minister. In 
these circumstances, judicial review of the Minister’s reconsideration would be the 
appropriate type of review. 
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions the Parliament has decided that a separate or 
independent body will make certain DAA decisions. These might be ‘preliminary’ 
decisions, which are made throughout the DAA process by an assessment manager, 
or primary approval decisions for major projects, which are made by someone other 
than the Minister — for example, the Planning Assessment Commission in New 
South Wales. In cases where the primary approval decision is not made by a 
Minister, it is appropriate to allow a more expansive review, such as a limited form 
of merits review. 
Standing to bring merit and judicial review applications should be given to: the 
project proponent; persons and organisations whose interests have been, are or 
could potentially be directly affected by the project; and those who have taken a 
substantial interest in the assessment process. The review body should also be able 
to grant leave to other persons in exceptional circumstances — for example, in 
order to prevent a denial of natural justice.  
Improving timeframes and coordination  
No comprehensive information is available on the timeliness of the assessment and 
approval process for major projects. However, there is some evidence that there has 
been an increase in the average time taken for approval (box 8). It is likely that the 
extraordinary and sudden rise in the number of major developments over recent 
years, together with their scale and complexity, has put pressure on regulatory 
agencies’ capacity to process approvals and thus contributed to the extended delays. 
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Box 8 Approval timeframes can be long and variable 
Administrative data and proponents’ experience indicate that approval timeframes can 
be long and variable. 
The Business Council of Australia noted that the variation in the time taken for projects 
to progress through the approvals process is a source of uncertainty: 
One of the problems with the long time taken to make a decision and its variability is the 
inherent uncertainty for investors — not knowing how long the approval process will take is a 
deterrent to business investment. (sub. 43) 
The Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (2012) analysed mining 
approvals data in that state to determine: 
It takes an average of 28 months to gain approval for a mine in Western Australia. This 
timeline includes the time taken by government, the proponent and required public 
consultation processes.  
The Commonwealth Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities (now the Department of the Environment), based on a sample of 17 
projects of varying type and complexity, found average approval times of 37 months: 
In most cases, for major projects, most of the assessment time can be attributed to the 
proponent undertaking studies and preparing assessment documentation. For example, 
proponents spent an average of 20 months (from an average of 37 months from referral to 
approval) preparing environmental impact statements and collecting public comments. 
(sub. 55)  
 
Cost of an unnecessary delay to a major project 
The efficiency of DAA processes affects the viability, location and timing of major 
project investment decisions. Even small changes in the process can make 
significant differences to the viability of a project. There may be circumstances 
where delays in the process — that is, beyond those that were reasonably expected 
— may be necessary to properly assess the project impacts and to determine the 
appropriate mitigation strategies. However, an unnecessary delay to the approval of 
a major project can cost a proponent, and the community, several hundred millions 
of dollars or more, depending on the size of the project and the nature of the 
unnecessary delay.  
To improve the timeliness of approvals, the Commission proposes a greater use of 
statutory timeframes and institutional arrangements that can coordinate the 
multitude of required approvals. Furthermore, it recommends that the time taken be 
made transparent. Other measures, such as those that have already been discussed in 
relation to the reduction of overlap and duplication, would also assist in improving 
timeliness.  
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Design and setting of statutory timelines 
The Commonwealth and some State jurisdictions, including Western Australia, 
have established statutory timelines for certain decisions in the approval process — 
for example, the timeframe for the government to respond to the proponent’s 
environmental impact assessment. Statutory timelines have proven to be a useful 
device that focuses regulatory agencies’ attention on critical decision points and 
provides certainty to proponents. However, such mechanisms typically have, for 
legitimate reasons, procedures that allow the process to be suspended if further 
information is sought  the ‘clock is stopped’.  
The Commission favours the wider use of statutory timelines in DAA processes and 
believes that any perverse incentives that they create can be limited through good 
design. Specifically, once a proponent’s assessment documentation is lodged, 
maximum times should be set for: the assessment agency to provide its report; a 
recommendation on the decision to be made to the relevant Minister; and the 
Minister to make a decision. If the Minister does not make a decision within the 
specified time period, then the recommendation by the assessment body (along with 
their reasons and any conditions) should be deemed to be the decision. Limited 
merits review should be available where a Minister is not the ultimate decision 
maker. 
To provide some flexibility, rules should be set that govern when regulators can 
‘stop the clock’ and for how long. To avoid unnecessary delay and cost, such 
arrangements should only be available when matters emerge that were not contained 
in the terms of reference or could not have been reasonably anticipated. To 
encourage regulators to seek time extensions only when absolutely necessary, it is 
proposed that they be required to disclose when they have activated a stop-the-clock 
provision and the reason(s) for doing so. Regulators should also specify when the 
clock restarts and when the assessment is deemed to be complete. This information 
should be provided and published in formats that allow for meaningful comparisons 
across jurisdictions and through time. 
These principles apply to both the assessment and approval stages. However, given 
that there will have been an extended assessment process before the matter reaches 
the decision maker, it is sufficient that there is only one further opportunity to ‘stop 
the clock’ before a determination is made about whether the project should proceed 
(and if so, on what conditions).  
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Is there a role for a lead agency, one-stop shop or coordination office? 
For most major projects, the complexity and number of approvals that are required 
from multiple agencies invariably involves considerable time and resources. It also 
calls for close coordination among regulatory agencies, as small delays by one 
agency may prevent another agency from advancing. To guide and facilitate a 
proponent through the regulatory system, some jurisdictions have established 
dedicated institutional structures for specific developments.  
There are a variety of models and the coordination, assessment and approval 
functions can vary as well (table 1). Under a one-stop shop model, a number of 
(otherwise separate) statutory assessment and approval functions are undertaken by 
a single agency or Minister. This approach can be applied to all DAA processes for 
major projects (meaning only a single approval is required), or to a particular subset 
of major project approvals — for example, the Australian Government has 
committed to establishing one-stop shops for certain federal and state-level 
environmental approvals. 
Another approach is the lead agency model, whereby a single agency is responsible 
for coordinating the major project regulatory processes across government, as well 
as providing guidance to proponents. Lead agencies have some responsibility for 
assessment and approval but cannot override the responsibilities of other agencies. 
Western Australia and South Australia have lead agencies for resources and some 
other types of major projects. The Coordinator-General arrangements in Queensland 
are limited to state-level environmental impact assessments (not major project DAA 
processes in the broad), and are therefore distinct from the lead agency model. 
A further option is a coordination office (or similar) to coordinate and facilitate 
DAA processes. These offices perform similar functions to a lead agency; however, 
they are independent of the major projects regulatory system, which means that they 
are not a proponent and do not have any assessment or approval responsibilities. 
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Table 1 Major project coordination modelsa 
Model Coordination of regulatory 
processes 
Assessment and approval 
Major projects coordination 
office   
Lead agency   
One-stop shop (single 
approval) n/a  
One-stop shop (for 
environmental approvals)b   
a One tick () indicates that the entity has partial (but not full) responsibility for particular functions; two ticks 
() indicate that the entity has exclusive responsibility for relevant function; and () cross indicates the entity 
has no responsibility for the relevant function. b This is the Australian Government’s policy of jurisdictional 
one-stop shops for environmental approvals and involves establishment of bilateral approval agreements with 
States and Territories under the EPBC Act. 
The Commission considers that the one-stop shop approach for all regulatory 
approvals is impractical for the broad class of major projects in Australia. Major 
projects are not limited to a single sector or activity and a vast amount of legislation 
would need to be modified to give authority to a one-stop shop. Moreover, 
establishing a single agency with the requisite skills and expertise to assess and 
approve a diverse range of project types and impacts would be very challenging. It 
would also create overlap with agencies that regulate regular-sized developments 
and risk ‘regulatory capture’.  
However, the Commission sees merit in each State and Territory Government 
establishing a MPCO, similar to Canada’s Major Projects Management Office, 
where it can be demonstrated that the benefits exceed the costs from a 
community-wide perspective. The roles of the MPCO would be to: advise 
proponents on their statutory requirements; coordinate and facilitate assessment and 
approval processes; and electronically track and report on progress against agreed 
timelines.  
Access to MPCOs should be limited to large-scale developments. It should also be 
based on the development’s significance to the jurisdiction’s economy, geographic 
footprint and complexity. The existing capital expenditure triggers for major project 
assessment pathways (box 5) are generally low and should not be used alone to 
determine which projects are to be MPCO-managed. In practice, a MPCO is likely 
to manage a handful of projects at a time, while in some periods it may have none. 
The costs and benefits of the MPCO approach will depend on jurisdiction-specific 
circumstances, such as the level and nature of major project activity, and any 
(similar) coordination mechanisms that are already in place. Accordingly, the 
Commission recommends that jurisdictions assess the case for establishing a 
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MPCO, or, where similar arrangements already exist, the case for refining those 
structures (in terms of functions and resources). 
Better targeting and enforcement of conditions 
The main compliance costs of DAA regulations relate to the fulfilment of approval 
conditions and offsets, and the administrative costs that are associated with 
monitoring and enforcement. In these areas, the Commission sees opportunities for 
risk-based and outcome-focused regulation to reduce unnecessary costs.  
Approval conditions and offsets 
In almost all cases, the granting of major project approvals is subject to conditions. 
Regulators impose conditions to avoid and mitigate any adverse project impacts that 
are not fully addressed by the project proposal. In principle, even after compliance 
with the approval conditions, a development may have significant residual impacts. 
Offsets are a special form of condition that counters or compensates for the adverse 
residual impacts of a development — for example, enhancing the condition of an 
area of native vegetation to compensate for clearing vegetation on the development 
site. 
The Commission is concerned that some conditions and offset arrangements are not 
directed at mitigating project risks, but rather at pursuing other, often tangential, 
policy, individual officer or agency objectives. For example, the Commonwealth 
Government approval of the South of Embley mine project required that the 
proponent ‘provide information detailing Traditional Owner employment 
opportunities and mechanisms for reporting the number of local Indigenous 
person(s) actually employed in the implementation of this strategy’. While 
encouraging Indigenous employment is a legitimate policy goal, this condition did 
not relate to the project impacts that needed to be mitigated or to any identified 
matter of national environmental significance. 
The number and prescriptiveness of conditions that are attached to approvals is also 
increasing. While it is not possible to draw conclusions just from the number of 
conditions, it is fair to say that prescriptive conditions are generally more onerous 
than conditions that are formulated as outcomes — for example, meeting a noise 
standard. This is because an outcome-based approach allows the major project 
proponent some flexibility with regard to how the constraint is met and also 
provides an incentive to find innovative ways to achieve the constraint at lower 
cost. 
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In many cases, setting outcome-based conditions is not feasible because 
well-established standards do not exist or are not appropriate for the specific project 
in question. However, where they are feasible — for example, the quality of waste 
water that might be discharged from a site — the Commission considers that they 
should be the default approach and advised to proponents in the early stages of the 
regulatory process. 
Other measures that would help reduce unnecessary compliance costs and/or 
improve outcomes include: 
• publishing all conditions that are attached to approved major projects, with an 
explanation of how they mitigate a risk  
• refraining from imposing conditions where legislation already exists to achieve 
an outcome  
• undertaking public consultation on the assessment agency’s draft 
recommendation, including proposed approval conditions 
• providing scope to remove, alter or add conditions when a strong case to do so 
exists — for example, if evidence shows that conditions are no longer meeting 
objectives, or that compliance with a condition would have unintended adverse 
consequences.  
Offset policies are a useful tool to manage significant residual impacts of proposed 
major projects. However, the Commission is concerned by their inconsistent usage 
across jurisdictions and by the number of examples where the application of the 
instrument appears to give greater weight to environmental impacts than to social, 
cultural and economic matters — and hence possibly contradicts principles of 
ecologically sustainable development. Since environmental offsets policies have 
implications far beyond major projects, the Commission is recommending that 
COAG initiate an independent national review of offset policies and practices to 
assess: whether their objectives are clear and workable; the methodologies for 
identifying suitable offsets; the merits of a single, national offsets framework; and 
the role of market-based offset approaches. The review should seek to report back 
to COAG by the end of 2014. 
Efficacy of monitoring of compliance and enforcement 
Confidence in the integrity of DAA processes is influenced by how well both the 
regulatory requirements are applied and the approval conditions are enforced. Some 
participants in this study expressed concerns about inadequate enforcement, while 
others argued that rigid approaches to enforcement impose unnecessary compliance 
costs. 
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Several reports from Auditors General have found considerable room for 
improvement in Australia’s environmental compliance processes — for example, 
regulators could better articulate how compliance with conditions will be assessed 
and produce annual reports that detail how proponents have complied with 
conditions. The Commission supports the use of such measures. 
In view of the importance of compliance with approval conditions, and the potential 
difficulties faced by even the most diligent and well-resourced agencies in dealing 
with all compliance matters, the Commission also proposes that all jurisdictions 
legislate (where this has not already been done) to enable third parties to bring 
enforcement cases on primary approvals to courts or tribunals. 
Making it happen  
The Commission’s proposals, summarised in table 2, put forward a suite of changes 
that build on previous reform efforts. Each of the Commission’s recommendations 
alone would only deliver a limited benefit, as a regulatory system is only as good as 
its weakest link. Partial reform efforts, as a rule, will not achieve meaningful and 
sustained improvements in DAA processes. An implementation strategy is therefore 
needed to prioritise and deliver the reforms. 
The Commission has outlined a roadmap for implementation of its 
recommendations and to enhance the ongoing performance of DAA systems. The 
roadmap involves governments taking leadership to: 
• prioritise the reforms and set timeframes and key milestones for their 
implementation: regulatory process reforms identified by the Commission could 
be implemented quite quickly, provide some ‘early wins’ and help establish 
momentum for further reform 
• work closely with regulatory agencies in their jurisdictions, including addressing 
gaps in regulators’ resources and capabilities: the day-to-day administration of 
DAA processes is important for achieving a well-functioning DAA system: 
– the capacity of regulators to implement reform and manage new DAA 
approaches will depend on their ability to develop the expertise, skills and 
professional judgment of regulatory staff. The culture of regulatory agencies 
should be conducive to efficient administration of regulations, with a service 
orientation 
– in an environment where additional funding of regulatory agencies may not 
be forthcoming, the agencies should focus on the efficiency of their 
operations. Some of the Commission’s recommendations — for example, 
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taking a risk-based approach and better utilisation of Strategic Assessments 
— are related to improving the efficiency of regulatory practice 
• work together with other governments to address interjurisdictional matters, such 
as duplication of assessment and approval requirements: previous efforts at 
working together have stalled and renewed impetus is required 
• agree on monitoring and public reporting of the reforms’ progress to ensure that 
all stakeholders have confidence in the system. 
The Commission considers that there is merit in the COAG Reform Council being 
tasked to monitor and report on jurisdictions’ progress in implementing these 
reforms. Furthermore, given that community preferences evolve over time, a 
periodic (for example, decennial) review, which examines the rationale for policy 
interventions and whether they are continuing to produce net benefits, is worthy of 
consideration. Such a review should include extensive consultation with the 
community and all levels of government, and could occur as part of a broader 
review of planning or regulatory systems. 
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Table 2 Summary of key reformsa 
Issue Proposed response Expected benefits 
Achieving 
regulatory 
objectives 
and strategic 
decision 
making 
Review of legislative objectives and 
guidance on weighting objectives.  
Decision making consistent with 
regulatory objectives. 
In-principle support for further integration of 
Strategic Planning with DAA processes for 
individual projects. 
Less costly and time-consuming 
DAA. Better alignment with 
environmental and social objectives. 
Increased use of Strategic Assessments. Less costly and time-consuming 
DAA. Better alignment with 
environmental and social objectives. 
Reducing 
regulatory 
overlap and 
duplication 
Strengthen bilateral agreements on 
assessment and pursue bilateral 
agreements on approval processes for 
matters of national environmental 
significance under the EPBC Act. 
Reduced duplication and faster 
decisions, through an integrated ‘one 
project, one assessment, one 
decision’ system for environmental 
matters. 
Cooperative arrangements between 
regulators within a jurisdiction for joint or 
substitute assessment processes. 
Reduced duplication, faster and 
better coordinated decisions, and 
lower compliance costs. 
Regulatory 
certainty, 
transparency 
and 
accountability 
Enhanced engagement of stakeholders and 
public participation in DAA processes. 
Confidence that regulatory 
objectives are being addressed. 
Greater transparency in the process for 
setting terms of reference for primary impact 
assessments and in-principle support for 
pre-application meetings. 
Greater certainty for proponents on 
processes and requirements. 
Binding criteria for regulatory pathway 
determination. Limited ministerial discretion 
on pathway determination and call-in. 
Greater certainty, transparency and 
accountability. 
Separate environmental policy from 
regulatory functions.  
Enhanced independence and 
confidence in integrity of decisions. 
Establish separate levels of assessment 
that match the level of regulatory scrutiny to 
project risks and impacts, accompanied by 
strong transparency requirements. 
Reduction of unnecessary 
compliance costs. 
Publication of guidance for proponents, 
including factors taken into account in 
approval decisions and conditions.  
Greater certainty and accountability. 
Judicial review for approval decisions made 
by Ministers and limited merits review for 
decisions by others. 
Greater certainty and accountability. 
Improving 
timeframes 
and 
coordination 
Support for MPCOs at the State and 
Territory level. Enhanced roles for these 
offices in jurisdictions where they already 
exist provided the benefits exceed the costs.  
Greater certainty of process for 
proponents, reduced costs in 
seeking approvals, faster decisions. 
Time limits at the assessment and approval 
decision stages. 
Improves timeliness and certainty. 
Clear triggers and limits for ‘stop the clock’ 
provisions for regulatory decisions. 
Improves timeliness and certainty. 
Better 
targeting and 
enforcement 
of conditions 
Better-targeted and administered conditions 
and offsets, including enhanced reporting of 
compliance and enforcement procedures. 
COAG national review of offsets in 2014. 
Proportionate and well-targeted 
conditions and offsets, reducing 
compliance costs. 
a A full list of the reforms is provided in the following section to the Overview. 
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Recommendations and findings 
FINDING 1.1  
None of the jurisdictions whose development assessment and approval (DAA) 
processes were benchmarked for this study stood out as performing better overall. 
However, leading practices were identified both domestically and internationally 
that could be replicated across Australia to improve outcomes from DAA processes. 
Achieving regulatory objectives and improving strategic 
decision making 
RECOMMENDATION 4.1 
Governments should review legislative and regulatory objectives across major 
project development assessment and approval processes within their jurisdiction 
to ensure that they are clear, consistent and coherent. 
RECOMMENDATION 4.2 
Where conflicting objectives are unavoidable, parliaments and governments 
should provide public guidance to their regulators with regard to the priority and 
weighting to be given to different objectives. A range of approaches may be 
appropriate, from the inclusion of an overarching policy goal in objects clauses, 
to the provision of guidelines on how tradeoffs are to be made between objectives. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.1  
Governments should ensure that agency responsibilities and strategies for the 
monitoring of compliance and enforcement in relation to project conditions are 
clearly specified and communicated to stakeholders. 
RECOMMENDATION 11.1 
Drawing on the lessons learned to date from the use of Strategic Assessments, 
governments should employ the tool in circumstances where it is likely to produce 
a reduction in the costs of project approval, while delivering environmental and 
other regulatory outcomes that are equal or superior to those achieved under 
other processes. 
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RECOMMENDATION 11.2 
State and Territory Governments should make more use of strategic planning, so 
as to reduce the number of issues that need to be considered at the project level, 
by: 
• expanding the scope of decisions about development at the strategic level  
• using more effective public consultation techniques 
• collecting and disseminating baseline environmental and heritage data 
• using Strategic Assessments to analyse plan impacts. 
Reducing regulatory overlap and duplication 
RECOMMENDATION 6.1  
The Australian and State and Territory Governments should continue to 
strengthen and expand the scope of existing bilateral assessment agreements 
under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cwlth). Areas for improvement include agreements on standards and procedures 
for assessment, and extending the number of regulatory processes accredited (in 
full or part) under current bilateral agreements. 
RECOMMENDATION 6.2 
Regulatory agencies should establish cooperative arrangements — for example, 
memorandums of understanding — for joint or substitutable assessments to 
minimise unnecessary duplication between major project assessment processes 
within a jurisdiction.   
RECOMMENDATION 6.3 
The Australian Government should undertake and publish a regulatory impact 
assessment of the ‘water trigger’ amendment to the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth), including the exclusion of water 
trigger-related actions from bilateral approval arrangements. If the assessment 
shows that there are no net benefits to the community, the amendment should be 
repealed. 
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RECOMMENDATION 7.1 
Governments should aim to establish a ‘one project, one assessment, one 
decision’ framework by restarting negotiations on bilateral approval agreements 
between the Australian Government and the States and Territories. Such 
agreements must ensure that environmental standards are not compromised and 
rights of appeal are no less than those in the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth), and provide for periodic reviews of 
the agreements’ effectiveness. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.2 
To facilitate the successful negotiation of bilateral approval agreements, 
governments should consider a strategy that involves: 
• increasing the number of State and Territory assessment processes with 
Commonwealth accreditation 
• strengthening the approval processes of States and Territories through the 
implementation of other reforms proposed in this report 
• targeting ‘easy wins’ — for example, by giving priority to approval 
responsibilities for activities in urban areas (other than on Commonwealth 
land) 
• scoping the task of negotiating the agreements between the Commonwealth 
and other jurisdictions, including a published timetable of key milestones  
• tasking the COAG Reform Council to monitor progress of development of 
agreements. 
Regulatory certainty, transparency and accountability 
RECOMMENDATION 5.1 
Governments should provide clear, upfront information and guidance on the 
development assessment and approval pathways that apply to major projects, 
including details about the processes, the generic information requirements, the 
assessment criteria, the standard and model conditions and the statutory timelines 
that apply under a given pathway. 
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RECOMMENDATION 5.2 
Governments should establish statutory criteria that identify which projects have 
access to designated major project pathways. Limited ministerial discretion 
should be available to ‘declare’ or ‘call-in’ a project that does not meet the 
criteria (thereby making it subject to a major project pathway). In exercising this 
power the Minister must: 
• follow guidelines on when and how the power can be used  
• publicly report the reasons for any declaration against the guidelines. 
RECOMMENDATION 5.3  
To achieve greater transparency, accountability and certainty in the process for 
setting the scope of major project primary assessments, governments should 
ensure that key stakeholders (including local governments, the public and 
proponents) have input to the draft terms of reference for primary assessments 
and that such input, and how it has been addressed, should be made public.  
RECOMMENDATION 6.5 
Where not already the case, the Australian and State and Territory Governments 
should institutionally separate regulatory assessment and enforcement functions 
from environmental policy functions, provided that the expected benefits exceed 
the costs. 
RECOMMENDATION 6.6 
Where it is not already the case, regulators should establish measures that ‘scale’ 
aspects of the major project assessment requirements based on the risk and 
significance of expected impacts. Criteria for determining the level and scope of 
assessment should be identified and publicly available. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.5 
Ministers should be the decision makers for major project primary approvals. 
Governments should consider whether this is better achieved through 
administrative or legislative means. Legislation should establish the types of 
decisions that Ministers can delegate. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.6  
Legislative guidance should be provided for decision makers to follow when 
making approval decisions. The guidance should include:  
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• the factors that decision makers need to take into account when reaching 
decisions 
• the best ways to consult with other decision makers, agencies and interested 
parties, and to take account of community concerns. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.7 
Decision makers should be required to publish assessment reports and statements 
of reasons (including identification of the risks being mitigated) for their 
approval decisions and conditions for all major projects.  
RECOMMENDATION 9.1 
Judicial review is appropriate for major project primary approval decisions where 
a Minister is the decision maker. For decisions not made by a Minister, including 
those that are deemed because a Minister has not made a decision, limited merits 
review is appropriate (along with judicial review). Jurisdictions that do not have 
statutory judicial review for these decisions should provide for it in legislation. 
RECOMMENDATION 9.2 
Standing to initiate judicial or merits reviews of approval decisions should be 
limited to: 
• proponents 
• those whose interests have been, are, or could potentially be directly affected 
by the project or proposed project 
• those who have taken a substantial interest in the assessment process. 
In exceptional circumstances, the review body should be able to grant leave to 
persons other than those mentioned above to bring a review application if a 
denial of natural justice would occur if they were not granted leave. 
RECOMMENDATION 12.1 
Governments should undertake periodic reviews to ensure that regulatory 
agencies have the necessary governance frameworks, resources, capacity and 
skills to efficiently administer the development assessment and approval processes 
of major projects.   
   
36 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
Improving timeframes and coordination 
RECOMMENDATION 6.4 
Where they do not exist, State and Territory Governments should establish a 
major projects coordination office (or similar) to:  
• advise proponents of complex, large-scale projects of state or territory 
significance on regulatory requirements 
• develop project agreements that document the agreed working arrangements 
among regulators and the timeframes for the completion of processes 
• electronically track and publicly report on progress against statutory and 
regulator-determined timeframes 
• facilitate interactions with relevant Australian Government regulators and 
local governments. 
A public assessment of the expected benefits and costs of this reform should be 
undertaken to determine the functions and resources of these offices. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.3 
Governments should develop statutory timelines that specify the maximum time 
that may elapse between a proponent’s assessment documentation being lodged 
and when the assessment agency provides its report and decision recommendation 
to the relevant decision maker.   
Legislation should also set the maximum time for the decision maker to make the 
decision. If no decision is made within the time period specified, the 
recommendation (along with the reasons, advice regarding the decision and any 
conditions and offsets) made by the assessment agency should be deemed to be the 
decision by the decision maker and in the public domain. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.4 
Governments should provide guidance, preferably in statutory form, for the use of 
any ‘stop the clock’ mechanisms. Such arrangements should only be available to 
assessment agencies when significant matters emerge that were not contained in 
the terms of reference or could not have been reasonably anticipated. Decision 
makers should only be able to stop the clock once. Proponents should be allowed 
to stop assessment and decision processes at any time. Any party that stops the 
clock should be required to disclose when these triggers are activated and the 
reason(s) for activation. 
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Better targeting and enforcement of conditions 
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 
Governments should ensure that regulatory agencies only set conditions that: 
• are directed at the impacts of the development to be consented 
• are consistent with relevant regulatory objectives and broader environmental 
and natural resources management policies 
• are outcome-based wherever possible 
• deliver outcomes that are not assured by other legislation  
• are cognisant of, and do not duplicate, the conditions imposed by other 
regulatory agencies  
• are public, and identify the type of impact that the condition is seeking to 
address  
• are enforceable, precise and reasonable in all other respects. 
RECOMMENDATION 8.2 
COAG should commission an independent and public national review of 
environmental offset policies and practices to report by the end of 2014. The 
review should: 
• survey the consistency of offset policy objectives against the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development  
• critically assess the methodologies used for measuring and valuing offsets 
• examine the role of market-based offset approaches, including offset funds 
• consider the case for greater national consistency and linkages between offset 
regimes, including the potential for a single national scheme. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.2 
Governments should ensure legislation enables regulatory agencies to amend 
conditions and offsets, provided that there is a strong case, the proponent is 
consulted and the proposed change is publicly announced. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.3 
Regulators should produce an annual major projects compliance statement that 
reviews monitoring and compliance activities and identifies redundant or 
ineffective conditions on approvals. 
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RECOMMENDATION 10.4 
Governments should ensure that third parties are able to initiate legal action to 
enforce the conditions that have been placed on primary approvals, and that legal 
costs do not present a barrier to legitimate actions of this type being brought by 
individuals or bona fide community groups. 
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1 About the study 
 
Key points 
• Governments regulate the approval of major projects to achieve an appropriate 
balance between the economic benefits they bring and the protection of the 
environment, heritage, amenity and the rights of citizens. 
• This study focusses on how the design and implementation of major project 
development assessment and approval (DAA) processes can be improved so that 
regulatory goals are achieved at a lower cost to proponents and the community. 
• The study does not define a ‘major’ project by the size of capital expenditure alone, 
but rather through their characteristics that include physical size, complexity, long 
lead times and potential for significant economic, environmental and social impacts 
on the local and broader community. 
• Conclusions on the overall efficiency of the DAA system cannot be drawn solely 
from the patchy information on timelines and the costs and benefits of DAA 
processes. 
• Benchmarking Australia’s DAA performance against international best practice is 
demanding since countries have different regulatory objectives, institutional 
frameworks and political systems. The Commission has compared DAA processes 
against a set of criteria (or principles) that relate to the good governance and 
conduct of regulators.  
• None of the jurisdictions benchmarked for this study stood out as performing better 
overall. However leading practices were identified, both domestically and 
internationally, that could be replicated in Australia to improve outcomes from DAA 
processes.  
 
1.1 Why look at major project DAA regulations and 
processes? 
Major projects contribute to national income, create employment opportunities 
during their construction and operation and raise productivity. Major projects also 
have wider impacts, which can be detrimental to environment, heritage and cultural 
values, as well as impinge on local communities through a loss of amenity. 
Although hard to quantify, the cumulative impact of major developments can be a 
significant source of increased pressure on environmental assets. 
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Governments have a role to play to promote an appropriate balance of economic 
and other impacts from large developments on community wellbeing. The key 
instruments to do this are development assessment and approval (DAA) regulations 
and processes of the Australian and State and Territory Governments. 
The Commission received the terms of reference for this report at a time when the 
costs of developing major projects in Australia are high and rising. This is driving 
concerns about Australia’s competitiveness, productivity and future prosperity. 
Suggested sources of higher costs of major project development include labour 
costs and rigid work practices; the increased complexity of projects; higher 
community valuation placed on protecting amenity, heritage and environmental 
assets; and the unnecessary regulatory burden of DAA processes. 
It is the last of these that the Commission has been asked to review. Accordingly, 
the report focusses on how the design and implementation of regulations and 
processes can be improved, without weakening regulatory objectives or their 
outcomes. The Commission does not, nor has it been requested to review the setting 
of the regulatory objectives themselves.  
This is not the first study to examine aspects of the processes that underpin major 
project DAA. Previous recent reviews include: 
• the report by Infrastructure Australia, Building Australia’s Future: A Review of 
Approval Processes for Major Infrastructure (2009) 
• the Commission’s Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business 
Regulation: Planning, Zoning and Development Assessments (2011) 
• industry specific reviews, such as the National Aviation Policy White Paper 
which resulted in changes to the Airports Act 1996 (Cwlth) (2009) 
• the COAG Reform Council’s review of capital city strategic planning systems 
(2011) 
• recent and current work on development assessment processes by individual 
jurisdictions, such as the New South Wales Planning System Review, the South 
Australian Expert Panel on Planning Reform and the Western Australian 
Department of Planning’s Planning Makes it Happen: Blueprint for Planning 
Reform 
• work in 2012 led by the Commonwealth Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet to pursue bilateral arrangements for accreditation of State and Territory 
Government environment assessments and approvals processes 
• the Independent Review of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (the Hawke Review) (2009). 
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There is also work underway to address duplication in assessment and approval 
processes between levels of government. The Australian Government has signed 
memorandums of understanding with the Queensland and New South Wales 
Governments that aim to achieve bilateral approval agreements with these States for 
environmental matters. The Australian Government is seeking similar agreements 
with other States and Territories. 
1.2 Scope of the study  
The Commission has been asked to benchmark Australia’s major project DAA 
processes against international and domestic best practice and to make 
recommendations on how to improve processes based on an examination and 
assessment of: 
• the objectives and key features of Australia’s DAA processes at all levels of 
government, including the interactions within and between levels of government 
• the regulatory objectives and key features of DAA processes in comparable 
international systems 
• the efficiency and effectiveness with which Australian DAA processes achieve 
the protection of social, economic, heritage, cultural and environmental assets 
compared with comparable international systems 
• the decision making approaches in Australian jurisdictions and whether they 
have a material impact on costs, timeliness, transparency, certainty and 
regulatory outcomes 
• the strategic planning context for major project DAA processes in Australia and 
in comparable international systems 
• jurisdictional and regulatory approaches, such as one-stop shops, lead agencies, 
statutory timeframes and risk- and outcome-based regulation.  
The Commission’s recommendations build on initiatives suggested by the earlier 
reviews and aim to enable Australia to accrue the full benefits of major projects and 
remain an attractive destination for investment, while protecting its environmental, 
heritage and cultural assets. 
The study focuses on the regulatory approvals related to managing the impacts of a 
major development and the enforcement of conditions placed on those approvals. 
The DAA processes that are in scope for the purposes of this study relate to: 
• land acquisition, use and access (including zoning) 
• planning and development approvals 
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• environment regulations (including regulations covering pollution, waste 
management, habitat and biodiversity, fauna, and flora and threatened species) 
• heritage (Indigenous, historical and natural) issues 
• access to water and other natural resources 
• native title 
• public health and safety.  
There are other business regulations that relate to the development and operational 
phases of projects, such as industrial relations, foreign investment, immigration (for 
example, 457 visas) and local procurement requirements. These may impact on the 
feasibility of a major project, but they are not directly linked to a DAA approval, 
and are not within the scope of this study.  
Key concepts and definitions  
The Commission has not sought to define the term ‘major project’ by the size of 
capital expenditure alone, but rather through characteristics that include physical 
size; complexity; long lead times; and potential for significant economic, 
environmental and social impacts on the local and broader community. Major 
projects can include both public and private projects. Some of the other key 
concepts and definitions that are used throughout the report are explained in 
box 1.1. 
1.3 The Commission’s approach to benchmarking 
Benchmarking involves collecting data to construct indicators that enable 
comparisons of economic performance and of approaches to policy across 
jurisdictions. Indicators can either be quantitative (statistical or empirical) or 
qualitative (descriptive).  
Benchmarking is a powerful analytical tool that helps to identify practices that work 
well and those that do not. It fosters accountability and can lead to improved 
efficiency and effectiveness of regulation by: exposing areas where improvement is 
needed; identifying good practice processes; setting targets for improvement; and 
encouraging innovation.  
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Box 1.1 Key concepts and definitions 
• Approval authority: the Minister or regulatory authority that is making a decision to 
approve a project or a particular action within the scope of the project (also referred 
to as the ‘decision maker’). 
• Assessment authority: the Minister or regulatory authority (for example, the 
government department, agency or statutory body) that is undertaking an 
examination of the merits and consequences of a project proposal or part thereof. 
• Conditions: requirements on major project proponents as a consequence of a 
project or action being approved. 
• Fast track: methods by which different rules of assessment and approval apply to a 
particular development, or if the rules are not changed, the decision maker is 
changed (for example, to a Minister or appointed body). 
• Major project proponent: the individual or entity seeking regulatory approval for a 
project.  
• Major project development assessment and approval (DAA) regulations and 
processes: the regulations and processes that proponents must adhere to in 
seeking the various permits, authorisations and approvals needed by law for their 
project. 
• Major project DAA pathways: designated regulatory pathways for projects deemed 
to be ‘major’ or ‘significant’. The pathways differ across jurisdictions and the types of 
permits, authorisations and approvals that apply. 
• Offsets: measures that counter or compensate in full, or in part, for the adverse 
impacts of a development on the environment or local amenity. 
• Primary approvals: decisions by Ministers or delegated decision makers about 
whether a project is able to be developed. 
• Secondary approvals: the various authorisations, licences and permits required 
concurrently with (or subsequently to) primary approvals for a project to proceed. 
• Stages of a DAA process: DAA processes (whether for environmental or other 
matters) generally consist of four stages: application; assessment; approval; and, 
for projects that are approved, monitoring of compliance and enforcement of 
approval conditions. 
• Strategic assessment: an analytical process that systematically assesses the 
potential impacts of plans, policies and programs across an entire region, catchment 
area, activity or industry.  
• Strategic planning: a continuous and systematic process during which people and 
organisations make decisions about intended future outcomes, how they are to be 
accomplished, and how outcomes are to be measured and evaluated.  
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Limitations and challenges of benchmarking 
There are practical challenges in benchmarking DAA regulations and processes for 
major projects within Australia and internationally. These challenges relate to very 
limited data availability, the difficulty of making comparisons and drawing 
inferences when regulatory objectives and preferences differ, and of controlling for 
particularities in major project characteristics.  
Benchmarking Australia’s DAA performance against international best practice is 
particularly demanding, since countries have different regulatory objectives, 
institutional frameworks and political systems. Countries at different stages of 
development, or with different preferences, place different weight on policy 
objectives or public involvement in decision making. Such differences mean that 
there is not a perfect international comparator and it is not feasible to label a 
jurisdiction’s DAA regulations as international or Australian ‘best practice’. 
A practical approach 
In light of these methodological issues the Commission has adopted a practical 
approach that:  
• involves as far as possible comparing ‘like with like’, using largely qualitative 
benchmarking techniques to compare DAA processes against a set of criteria (or 
principles) that relate to the good governance and conduct of regulators  
• identifies leading regulatory practices, and lessons learnt from case studies of 
specific major project DAA experiences and processes in Australia and overseas. 
On this basis, the Commission has selected four countries that have similar political 
systems, are at roughly equivalent stages of economic and legal development, and 
face broadly equivalent challenges in making tradeoffs between commercial, 
environmental and heritage concerns. These countries are Canada, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada and the United States, like 
Australia, are significant resource producers, and all four countries have large 
infrastructure projects. The study has not focused on lower income countries, in 
which the policy objectives differ greatly and the institutional arrangements are less 
comparable. 
The Commission has drawn on its own work on regulatory policy (2009a, 2011a, 
2011c) and on a range of other sources (for example, Australian Government 
(2010); COAG (2007); Development Assessment Forum (2005, 2009); Government 
of Victoria (2011); Infrastructure Australia (2009); OECD (2010); Regulation 
Taskforce (2006); and the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission 
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(2009)) to develop 13 regulatory principles that constitute a benchmark of good 
regulatory governance and conduct (box 1.2).  
 
Box 1.2 Commission criteria for benchmarking regulatory practices 
Regulator governance 
• clear, well-defined regulatory objectives  
• clarity in roles and responsibilities  
• accountable decision makers 
• appropriately independent regulators 
• suitably skilled and resourced institutions 
• opportunities for public participation and review of decisions 
• consistency with other regulations and higher level planning strategies 
• regular review and evaluation 
Regulator conduct 
• clear and predictable processes 
• regulatory outcomes consistent with objectives 
• open and transparent processes 
• proportionate and flexible regulatory requirements 
• no unnecessary costs.  
 
Where this approach has identified insights or a leading practice from an Australian 
or international jurisdiction that the Commission considers could improve DAA 
processes in Australia, it has explained why it considers this to be the case. Using 
this approach, the Commission has been able to pinpoint a number of leading 
practices that could be replicated in Australia. However, the DAA processes in none 
of the countries benchmarked for this study stood out as overall performing better 
than in Australia. 
FINDING 1.1 
None of the jurisdictions whose development assessment and approval (DAA) 
processes were benchmarked for this study stood out as performing better overall. 
However, leading practices were identified both domestically and internationally 
that could be replicated across Australia to improve outcomes from DAA processes.  
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1.4 Conduct of the study 
The Commission has conducted this study using transparent and public processes to 
identify reforms that are likely to increase the wellbeing of the Australian 
community as a whole. In keeping with section eight of the 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cwlth), the Commission has considered, among 
other issues, the need to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens on business, to 
encourage growth and competitiveness, and to ensure industry develops in an 
ecologically sustainable way. 
The Commission has drawn on a range of information and data sources to evaluate 
DAA processes. This includes: 
• evidence submitted by study participants in response to the Commission issues 
paper published in February 2013 (60 submissions) and to the Commission’s 
draft report published in August 2013 (46 submissions) 
• information gathered through stakeholder visits and roundtables including with 
government agencies, businesses, industry associations, non-government 
organisations such as community groups, and academics (the Commission has 
conducted meetings with governments, proponents (and their advisors and 
industry groups) and a wide range of environment groups)  
• meetings with stakeholders in those jurisdictions selected for benchmarking 
(Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom) 
• existing reviews, studies and literature. The Commission has been particularly 
mindful of previous reviews (described earlier) into aspects of major project 
DAA processes  
• case studies. 
1.5 Structure of the report 
The structure of this report is as follows: 
• chapters two and three provide, respectively, overviews of major project 
development in Australia and of how DAA processes are organised 
• chapters four to seven examine the setting of regulatory objectives and the 
application, assessment and approval phases of DAA processes to identify areas 
where efficiency improvements could be made without weakening regulatory 
outcomes 
• chapter eight reviews major project approval conditions and offsets 
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• chapter nine analyses review and appeal rights associated with DAA processes  
• chapter ten examines compliance and enforcement activities post approval of a 
project 
• chapter eleven considers how Strategic Planning and Assessments can deal with 
cumulative impacts and manage assessments more effectively than relying solely 
on project-level DAA processes 
• chapter twelve provides guidance on implementation issues associated with the 
Commission’s recommendations. 
• appendixes provide: 
– a list of participants involved in this study through submissions, visits and 
roundtable discussions (appendix A) 
– a description of the Commission’s criteria for benchmarking regulatory 
practices (appendix B) 
– summaries of DAA processes in each Australian jurisdiction (appendix C) 
– an overview of DAA processes in selected international jurisdictions 
(appendix D) 
– a review of reports that rank either aspects of Australia’s DAA processes or, 
more generally, the overall regulatory system (appendix E) 
– a summary of domestic and selected international jurisdictions’ use of 
strategic approaches (appendix F). 
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2 Major project development in 
Australia 
 
Key points 
• Major projects are characterised by their scale, complexity, long lead times and 
potential to have significant economic, social and environmental impacts.  
• Major projects are typically natural resource developments, infrastructure projects, 
big hotel and resort developments and large commercial or public purpose 
buildings, such as hospitals or stadiums. 
• Major projects are drivers of economic performance and the material wellbeing of 
Australians. They contribute directly to gross domestic product during the 
construction phase. Once completed, the new productive capacity boosts domestic 
and often export income, creates new employment opportunities and raises 
productivity. 
• Major developments also have impacts that are not reflected in measures of market 
output, such as loss of biodiversity, damage to waterways and pollution of the 
atmosphere. Local communities may also incur a loss of amenity value and 
experience noise, congestion and other impacts.  
• The total value of major project investment has surged over the past decade and 
this activity has been one of the reasons why Australia was able to weather the 
recent global recession and its aftermath better than other advanced economies.  
• Major project investments are concentrated in a few industries, with resource and 
economic infrastructure projects accounting for around 85 per cent of the total value 
of investment.  
• The average value of major projects has also increased and the size of the largest 
projects is unprecedented in Australia’s history. 
• Western Australia and Queensland account for the bulk of major project investment, 
which is often located in regional and remote areas.  
 
This chapter provides an overview of major project investment in Australia. It 
considers the defining characteristics of major projects, examines the importance of 
major project investment to Australia’s economy and describes trends in the 
composition, type and geographic location of major project investment. 
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2.1 What is a major project? 
There are various criteria as to what developments qualify as ‘major projects’ 
(box 2.1). One approach used by the Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 
(BREE) and Deloitte Access Economics (DAE) is to set an arbitrary capital 
expenditure threshold. This has the benefit of readily enabling the collection of 
statistics on major projects. In practice, however, information sources are not 
comparable, because the choice of expenditure threshold varies over time and 
depends on the sector. 
BREE considers a resource project to be a major project if it involves $50 million or 
more in capital expenditure (BREE 2013) and DAE’s Investment Monitor uses a 
capital expenditure threshold of $20 million or more (DAE 2013). However, the use 
of a capital expenditure threshold alone does not distinguish between large and 
complex projects that require dedicated assessment pathways and large, but 
relatively straightforward developments that do not. For this reason, the choice of 
capital expenditure threshold may also be supplemented by consideration of the 
type of project. For example, BREE defines major electricity projects on the basis 
of their expected capacity. 
Another approach is to define major projects through their attributes. This has the 
advantage of directly permitting the consideration of the potential magnitude and 
nature of the economic, social and environmental impacts of a major project. The 
common attributes of a major project are usually defined in terms of their: 
• scale: major projects are of a large physical scale and involve substantial capital 
expenditures 
• complexity: major projects tend to be complex, in relation to the engineering and 
construction of the project, financing arrangements and ongoing operations  
• long lead times: major projects, because of their complexity and scale, tend to 
face long lead times between inception, development approval and 
commissioning. They also tend to have a long decommissioning period 
• significant impacts: major projects usually bear on a large number of 
stakeholders and often have significant economic, social and environmental 
impacts that can be both positive and negative.  
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Box 2.1 Definitions of major projects 
There is no single definition of a major project. Governments and agencies adopt 
different terminology and may apply different criteria over time and across sectors. 
• BREE currently considers a resource project to be a major project if it involves $50 
million or more in capital expenditure.  
– Before October 2012, a resource project was deemed a major project if capital 
expenditure was $15 million or more in the case of gold projects or $40 million or 
more in the case of all other resource projects.  
– BREE defines mega projects as resource projects that cost more than $5 billion.  
• BREE considers an electricity project to be a major project if its expected capacity 
exceeds 30 megawatts.  
• DAE maintains the Investment Monitor database, which includes large investment 
projects in Australia. The threshold for inclusion in this database is a gross fixed 
capital expenditure of $20 million or more. 
• The Australian Government publishes the National Infrastructure Construction 
Schedule for government infrastructure projects. It includes all public infrastructure 
projects valued at $50 million or more. 
• Under the Airports Act 1996 (Cwlth), a ‘major development’ includes a new or 
lengthened runway, a significant new terminal or terminal extension or a building, 
taxiway, road or railway exceeding $20 million in cost or any other development 
having a significant environmental impact. 
Sources: BREE (2012a, 2012b, 2013); DAE (2013).  
 
Both approaches to defining a major project are likely to capture similar 
developments. For the purpose of this study and where feasible, the Commission 
favours the second approach and defines a major project as one that is large in scale, 
complex in nature and likely to have significant impacts.  
On this basis, major projects in practice are typically natural resource developments, 
infrastructure projects, big hotel and resort developments and large commercial or 
public purpose buildings, such as hospitals or stadiums. Box 2.2 gives some 
examples of major projects with significant economic, social and environmental 
impacts. 
The characteristics and impacts of a major project depend on its stage of 
development. The life cycle of a major project has five phases: prefeasibility, 
feasibility, construction, completion and decommissioning. Box 2.3 provides an 
overview of each of these phases.  
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Box 2.2 Examples of major projects 
Some recent examples of major projects include:  
• The Perth (Kwinana) Seawater Desalination Plant, completed in 2008, now supplies 
approximately 17 per cent of Perth’s water. As the first major reverse osmosis 
desalination plant in Australia, the project involved potential environmental risks. 
These risks were managed through extensive environmental approval procedures 
and ongoing monitoring of the plant’s operation. The Emu Downs Wind Farm was 
built as an energy offset to alleviate the pressure that the desalination plant would 
place on the electricity grid. 
• The Victorian Government is constructing the Regional Rail Link between West 
Werribee and the Melbourne city centre. The transport link will directly benefit the 
community and facilitate increased business activity in the western region of 
Melbourne. The project is also expected to have some favourable environmental 
impacts through reduced greenhouse gas emissions, as well as some adverse 
impacts as the project potentially disturbs protected species along the rail link 
corridor. Moreover, in the short term, construction of the project will have noise, 
vibration, air and water quality impacts on the surrounding areas.  
• The Tarkine is a large wilderness area in the north west of Tasmania, parts of which 
have been placed on the National Heritage register (and many more recommended 
for inclusion by the Australian Heritage Council) for their environmental and 
Indigenous heritage values. A number of endangered species, most notably the 
Tasmanian devil, are native to the region. Currently, two mines are operating in the 
Tarkine, with a further ten mines proposed over the next five years. Mining groups 
argue that these projects will provide economic and social benefits for local 
communities. However, this must be balanced against any negative environmental 
and cultural impacts that may arise from mining in the area.  
• The Brisbane Airport Corporation is building a $1.3 billion parallel runway to ease 
congestion and to meet the future growth of passenger numbers and air services 
travelling through Brisbane Airport. Construction has had to accommodate the 
Lewin’s Rail, a rare bird species that inhabits the project site. To mitigate and offset 
the ecological effects of the project, the Brisbane Airport Corporation has 
undertaken to convert an adjacent casuarina forest into suitable habitat for the 
Lewin’s Rail and to put in place a research and monitoring program. 
• The Western Australian Government is building the Fiona Stanley Hospital. At an 
estimated $2 billion, the hospital will be Western Australia’s flagship health facility, 
providing health care services as well as dedicated research and education 
resources. As part of the project, more than $7 million will be invested in 
conservation programs (especially in relation to Carnaby’s black cockatoo) and 
environmental initiatives to ensure that the project achieves ‘the best possible 
environmental outcomes’ (DoH (WA) 2013). 
Sources: Brisbane Airport Corporation (2006); DoH (WA) (2013); Regional Rail Link Authority (2013); 
Water Corporation (WA) (2012).  
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Box 2.3 Life cycle of a major project 
 
• At the prefeasibility stage, the proponent identifies the need for a project and 
various options for addressing that need. Of these, one project is selected and the 
proponent publicly announces that project. The proponent conducts prefeasibility 
studies, including an assessment of planned output and costs.  
• At the feasibility stage, the project undergoes internal feasibility studies and the 
scope of the project is finalised. The project also undergoes external assessment in 
the form of government approval processes. The proponent then makes a final 
decision as to whether to invest in and proceed with the project. 
• At the construction stage, the project is implemented with project management 
processes. 
• Once the project is completed, it may be subject to ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation.  
• The project may also eventually be decommissioned, which can involve the site 
being cleared and rehabilitated to something resembling its state prior to 
development. 
Sources: BREE (2013); DAE (2013); IC (1991).  
 
An understanding of where projects lie in the ‘pipeline’ is important because it 
provides an indication of future economic activity. Not all projects will proceed 
from one stage of their life cycle to the next. Factors potentially influencing the 
realisation of a major project include: availability of finance; changes in expected 
levels of demand for, and prices of, output; actions by competitors; increased 
community valuation placed on amenity and environmental assets; and the cost, 
timelines, transparency and conditions placed on approvals for prospective large 
developments.  
This report focuses on development assessment and approval (DAA) regulations 
and processes, and the role, if any, that these play in determining the success or 
viability of major projects, while protecting Australia’s environmental, heritage and 
cultural assets. 
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2.2 The economic importance of major projects 
Investment in major projects is critical to economic performance and the material 
wellbeing of Australians. Major project developments give rise to a number of 
direct economic benefits by adding to the capital base and contributing to gross 
domestic product (GDP), employment and often export demand. Indeed, Australia’s 
economic performance over the past decade has been strongly and positively 
influenced by the surge in large resource and infrastructure projects. The 
contribution of these projects to GDP through construction and export activity is 
one of the reasons why Australia was able to weather the recent global recession 
and its aftermath better than other advanced economies.  
Major projects may also contribute to economic performance indirectly. Once 
completed, some projects improve productivity by increasing the stock of 
productive assets. In particular, a higher capital stock raises labour productivity and 
lifts wages. Some projects may also remove bottlenecks, thereby improving the 
utilisation and efficiency of the existing capital stock. For example, major urban 
road and rail projects enhance the ability to move goods through supply chains and 
improve the quality of life in urban environments by reducing congestion, which 
has been forecast to cost Australia’s major cities $20.4 billion per annum by 2020 
(BTRE 2007). 
These benefits, however, will not all accrue at the same time. The long lead times 
and massive capital expenditure in resource and infrastructure projects, for instance, 
boost input growth well ahead of output growth. In the short run, major project 
development may supress aggregate productivity given the lag between the 
investment of capital and output emerging from the project (box 2.4). 
Major developments also have impacts that are not reflected in measures of market 
output, such as loss of biodiversity, damage to waterways and pollution of the 
atmosphere. Local communities may also incur a loss of amenity value and 
experience noise, congestion and other external impacts. Development assessment 
and approval regulations aim to consider these wider impacts on community 
wellbeing. The potential negative externalities of major projects are discussed 
further in chapter 3. 
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Box 2.4 Major project investment and productivity 
Multifactor productivity (MFP) is a measure of productive efficiency. The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) derives estimates of MFP using the ‘growth-accounting’ 
approach, whereby the annual rate of MFP growth is measured as the difference 
between the growth rate of output and the growth rate of inputs (labour and capital). 
The latest ABS estimates show that the slowdown in market sector MFP growth that 
began in Australia in 2004-05 continued into 2011-12. The Commission’s industry level 
analysis suggests that while some temporary factors are at play, structural forces in the 
economy are driving up input use without a commensurate increase in outputs. 
In terms of temporary factors, massive capital expenditure programs in mining (and 
industries such as utilities) have increased input growth well ahead of output growth. 
Because this is a temporary factor, MFP growth should improve as newly installed 
capacity is more fully utilised. 
However, structural forces have raised production costs (lowered MFP) on a more 
enduring basis. For example, in mining, newly developed deposits are generally 
deeper underground, further offshore, more distant from existing infrastructure or of 
lower quality or grade. They require more labour and physical capital per unit of output 
than previously established mines, but remain profitable as long as prices for their 
outputs are high. 
Sources: Topp & Kulys (2013); Topp et al. (2008).  
 
2.3 The landscape of major projects in Australia 
There are no comprehensive and consistent statistics on the number, value, 
composition and location of major projects in Australia. However, there are a 
number of rough proxies. These include Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data 
on new engineering construction spending, the DAE Investment Monitor data which 
track the stock of committed large-scale projects and the BREE Resources and 
Energy Major Projects list which contains information on current and forthcoming 
large projects in the resource sector. Box 2.5 gives an overview of these data 
sources on major project developments. 
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Box 2.5 Data sources on major project developments 
ABS Australian National Accounts  
The ABS publishes quarterly statistics on the total value of engineering construction 
activity in Australia. The measure of ‘new engineering construction’ includes 
expenditure on fixed assets and is calculated as expenditure on new and second-hand 
assets, less sales of existing assets. The data are presented as an aggregate measure 
of all civil engineering works, regardless of size. 
DAE Investment Monitor  
The DAE Investment Monitor database records information on large projects being 
developed in Australia in all industries. The threshold for inclusion in this database is 
an estimated gross fixed capital expenditure of $20 million or more. 
The database includes projects at all stages of development, and hence includes 
projects that are in the process of construction as well as projects that may be realised 
in the future. In their use of this database, the Business Council of Australia 
distinguishes between ‘prospective’ investments, where a final investment decision has 
not yet been made, and ‘definite projects’, where a decision to proceed has been 
announced and construction may have commenced. This terminology is adopted in this 
chapter.  
The information in the database is collected from a variety of media, government and 
private sources. DAE provides no guarantee as to the accuracy or completeness of the 
data and investment may be missing from the database if a project has not been 
publicly disclosed or if estimates of capital expenditure are not available.  
BREE Resources and Energy Major Projects  
The BREE Resources and Energy Major Projects list is a biannual publication that 
provides a snapshot of the ‘pipeline’ of current and forthcoming projects in the 
resources industry. The threshold for inclusion in this list has changed over time. Prior 
to October 2012, projects were included if capital expenditure was $15 million or more 
in the case of gold projects, or $40 million or more in the case of other resource 
projects. After October 2012, new projects with a capital expenditure of less than $50 
million ceased to be added to the database.  
The information in this database is obtained from project and government websites, 
company reports and media releases, as well as directly from companies. 
Sources: ABS (2013); BCA (2012), BREE (2012c, 2013), DAE (2013).  
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How big are major projects? 
The total value and individual scale of major project investments in Australia has 
risen sharply over the last decade and is unprecedented in Australia’s history. As at 
September 2013, there were over 950 definite and prospective investment projects, 
with a total value of $874 billion (DAE 2013).  
Woodside’s Pluto Stage 1 gas development is the most expensive project ever 
completed in Australia at an estimated cost of $14 billion. This compares with 
$8 billion for the Snowy Mountains scheme at today’s prices. There are currently 
seven projects under construction which exceed $14 billion. These include the 
National Broadband Network, large transport infrastructure and several liquefied 
natural gas plants, including the Gorgon development ($52 billion), which is 
Australia’s largest project under construction (box 2.6). Figure 2.1 compares the 
size of a selection of these projects.  
 
Box 2.6 The Gorgon liquefied natural gas plant: Australia’s largest 
major project 
The Gorgon project is the largest major project in Australia’s history and one of the 
world’s largest natural gas projects. The $52 billion project includes the construction of 
a liquefied natural gas plant on Barrow Island, a jetty for transport to international 
markets and a domestic gas plant and pipeline for domestic supply. The project is a 
joint venture of Chevron Australia, Exxon Mobil, Shell, Osaka Gas, Tokyo Gas and 
Chubu Electric Power.  
The project has a number of economic, social and environmental impacts. According to 
Chevron Australia, the project will directly and indirectly generate 10 000 jobs, boost 
Australia’s GDP by some $64 billion and support education and training in the Karratha 
and Dampier region.  
Barrow Island is a Class A nature reserve and is home to fauna not found on the 
Australian mainland. Among them is the flatback turtle, which is a vulnerable species. 
Environmental groups have raised concerns regarding the introduction of non-endemic 
species to the island and the risks associated with the geological sequestration of 
carbon dioxide. To manage these risks, and in response to the environmental 
assessment of the project, approval conditions were imposed by both the Australian 
and the State governments 
Source: Chevron Australia (2013).  
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Figure 2.1 The size of Australia’s largest major projectsa 
 
a Capital expenditure for projects is based on estimates as at September 2013. Light grey shading indicates 
that the project is committed or under construction. Dark shading indicates that the project has been 
completed.  
Source: DAE (2013). 
Most major projects are resource or infrastructure projects 
The landscape of major project investments in Australia is dominated by a few 
industries. Developments in the natural resource industry and economic 
infrastructure — including projects in the transport and storage, energy generation, 
gas, water and telecommunication industries — account for around 85 per cent of 
all prospective and definite major projects investment (table 2.1).  
Natural resource industry projects 
The value of natural resource capital expenditure has steadily increased over the last 
decade, growing at an average annual rate of around 23 per cent between 2001-02 
and 2011-12 (BREE 2012c). As at September 2013, the total value of resource 
projects was about $440 billion, accounting for half of all major project investment 
in Australia (DAE 2013). Around 80 per cent of this amount is in ‘mega projects’, 
which are projects where capital expenditure exceeds $5 billion (BREE 2013). The 
prevalence of major natural resource projects is to be expected given that Australia 
is a resource-rich country and many commodity prices are at or close to their 
historical peaks. 
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Table 2.1 Major project investment by industry  
Prospective and definite projects valued at $20 million or more 
Industrya Number of 
projects 
Value of projectsb 
 $ million 
Value as a per 
cent of total 
Mining 163 439 747 50.3 
Transport and Storage 224 232 098 26.6 
Communication 6 46 306 5.3 
Electricity, Gas and Water 119 39 508 4.5 
Community and Other services 210 38 968 4.5 
Manufacturing 33 22 868 2.6 
Mixed use 48 18 670 2.1 
Finance, Property and Business services 66 17 179 2.0 
Trade 54 11 360 1.3 
Accommodation 24 4 626 0.5 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2 1 220 0.1 
Government 7 1 148 0.1 
a Classifications used by DAE are based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial 
Classification. Includes projects that are possible, under consideration, committed and under construction. 
b The ‘value’ of a project refers to the estimated gross capital expenditure for the project. 
Source: DAE (2013). 
Economic infrastructure projects 
Infrastructure projects in the transport and storage; electricity, gas and water; and 
communication industries also represent a significant share of major project 
investment in Australia. In late 2013, they accounted for over one-third of the total 
value of capital spending on major projects (DAE 2013). The majority of these by 
number were in the transport and storage and the electricity, gas and water 
industries.  
Engineering projects dominate the landscape 
The bulk of major project investment is in the form of engineering construction, that 
is, construction of civil structures (such as dams, roads and runways) (table 2.2).The 
liquefied natural gas plants on Curtis Island in Queensland, the Hornsdale wind 
farm in South Australia and the Hunter Expressway in New South Wales are 
examples of current major engineering construction projects in Australia. 
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Table 2.2 Investment by sector  
Prospective and definite projects valued at $20 million or more 
Sectora Number of 
projects 
Value of projectsb 
 $ million 
Value as a 
percentage of total 
Engineering construction 527 828 690 89.2 
Non-residential projects 383 85 398 9.2 
Machinery and equipment 12 13 193 1.4 
Agricultural and forestry 5 1 640 0.2 
a Classification based on the investment classification used by the ABS for engineering construction and 
non-residential building projects. b The ‘value’ of a project refers to the estimated gross capital expenditure for 
the project. 
Source: DAE (2013). 
The ABS measure of new engineering construction expenditure includes all 
expenditure on civil engineering works regardless of size, and is therefore only a 
proxy for the value of major project construction. Figure 2.2 indicates that new 
engineering construction sharply increased over the last decade, peaking in late 
2013 at about 7 per cent of GDP, a seven-fold increase from the average level of the 
previous three decades of 1 per cent. 
Figure 2.2 New engineering construction has risen sharplya 
June 1977 to June 2013 (seasonally adjusted) 
 
a New engineering construction includes all expenditure on civil engineering works regardless of size. 
Source: ABS (Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, Cat. no. 5206.0). 
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The split between public and private projects 
The number of major projects is evenly split between public and private proponents 
(DAE 2013). However, the value of private sector led projects is more than four 
times the value of publicly owned projects. This disparity is largely driven by high 
value resource projects, which tend to be privately owned. Many projects, 
especially community services and economic infrastructure projects are public–
private partnerships. 
Where is major project investment taking place? 
Nearly two thirds of investment in major projects is located in Western Australia 
and Queensland, reflecting the concentration of resource projects, which tend to be 
high-value, in these two states (figure 2.3). Indeed, investment in resource projects 
is largely responsible for the dramatic increase in the value of projects in Western 
Australia and Queensland over the last five years (figure 2.4). In this figure, the 
surge in the value of projects in other states and territories in March 2012 is 
attributable to the decision to proceed with the $31 billion Ichthys gas field project 
in the Northern Territory (DAE 2012). 
Figure 2.3 Major project investment by jurisdiction 
Definite projects valued at $20 million or morea 
 
a Includes projects listed as ‘committed’ or ‘under construction’ in the database as at September 2013. 
b Includes projects not based in a single state or territory and projects for which the location is undecided. 
Source: DAE (2013). 
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Figure 2.4 Major projects by jurisdiction 
Definite projects valued at $20 million or morea 
 
a Includes projects listed as ‘committed’ or ‘under construction’ in the database. 
Source: DAE (2013). 
In contrast, investment in major infrastructure projects is concentrated in the more 
populous states, with New South Wales leading in the value of infrastructure 
investment. Investment in Victoria is concentrated in major transport projects, 
including $5.3 billion of investment in the Regional Rail Link between West 
Werribee and the Melbourne city centre. Economic infrastructure projects also 
account for the majority of nationwide investment, comprising the National 
Broadband Network project, upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and 
substantial road and rail repairs following the 2011 floods in Queensland and other 
states (DAE 2013). 
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3 Major project assessment and 
approval processes 
Key points 
• Governments regulate major projects to mitigate and manage impacts on 
environmental and heritage values, amenity and other aspects that bear on 
community wellbeing. 
• Application, assessment, approval and monitoring are the four main stages of the 
regulatory process. The Commission has developed ‘good practice’ regulatory 
principles against which these stages are assessed. 
• The building blocks of a sound development assessment and approval (DAA) system 
are already in place for Australia. However, there is substantial scope for 
improvement. The Commission has identified leading practices which, if 
implemented, would improve Australia’s major project DAA processes. 
• The powers for granting a major project approval are distributed between: 
– the Australian Government, which is responsible for assessing and approving 
actions that are likely to have a significant impact on matters of national 
environmental significance, projects on Commonwealth land and waters, and 
certain actions by Commonwealth agencies 
– State and Territory Governments, which have the primary role in DAA processes 
for major projects. (Local governments have a role in planning and secondary 
approvals.)  
• Major project DAA legislation and regulatory processes are vast and complex. A 
major project proponent may need to undertake impact assessments and obtain 
approvals relating to environmental protection, planning and zoning, land use, and 
heritage, social, cultural and Indigenous issues before the development can proceed.  
• Governments have established innovative mechanisms to process major project 
applications: 
– dedicated development assessment legislation or ministerial call-in powers that 
define a dedicated assessment pathway 
– specific administrative arrangements (for example, lead agency arrangements to 
coordinate and facilitate the approval process) 
– bilateral assessment and approval agreements between governments, and 
strategic assessments to create a more seamless DAA process.  
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Well-designed and administered legislation and regulatory processes governing the 
assessment and approval of major developments help promote the welfare of the 
community as a whole. In Australia’s federal system of government, powers for 
granting (and determining the conditions attached to) an approval for a major 
development are divided across the federal, state and territory, and local levels of 
government. The institutional arrangements, legislative instruments and regulatory 
agencies involved in this framework are both extensive and complex.  
This chapter provides an overview of current major project development assessment 
and approval (DAA) regulations and processes.  
3.1 Major projects and the regulatory framework 
Why do governments regulate development activity? 
For resources in a market economy to be allocated to the areas where they are most 
highly valued, a range of conditions must be met. These include effective 
competition, access to information and prices that reflect the value the community 
places on goods and services and on non-market values, such as heritage and 
environmental protection. Where these conditions are not fulfilled, markets can fail 
to allocate resources efficiently and in the best interests of the community. 
In the absence of policy interventions, the commercial assessment of major 
developments by the proponent would focus solely on market determined values for 
its outputs and inputs and the size of potential markets. For many small-scale or 
low-impact projects, this approach will work well to filter out unviable projects and 
identify projects that promise to deliver the best economic outcomes for the 
proponent and for the community as a whole.  
However, issues arise when markets are incomplete or do not function efficiently, 
meaning price discovery is absent or unreliable. Markets may not exist to value 
community assets, such as heritage and biodiversity, that can be adversely impacted 
by a major development. Negative externalities — such as noise, air and water 
pollution and loss of amenity — are often not efficiently priced (box 3.1). Similarly, 
a project may deliver benefits that cannot easily be captured by the proponent, even 
though they are valued by the community. For example, the construction of an 
urban transport infrastructure project could reduce congestion, improve access to 
employment and services, and improve the urban environment.  
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Box 3.1 Potential negative externalities of major projects 
Negative externalities refer to the costs experienced by people other than those 
directly engaged in a particular activity, such as where construction noise impacts 
neighbouring properties. In the absence of government intervention (or other means of 
action), the person responsible does not bear the full costs of the adverse effects and 
has no incentive to redress these effects.  
Aspects of major projects that may have adverse effects on others include: 
• emission of dust, lead or other noxious particles into the air 
• clearing native vegetation, causing a loss of fauna habitat 
• dredging a marine environment, causing loss of marine biodiversity 
• pollution of groundwater, affecting the irrigation of surrounding agricultural land. 
Participants in this inquiry cited a number of examples of negative externalities, 
including: 
• mining impacting pristine or near-pristine waterways in drinking water catchments or 
waterways which are elements of significant conservation areas (Lock the Gate 
Alliance, sub. DR97) 
• potential impacts of a mine on the community (Blue Mountains Conservation 
Society, sub. DR86; Nature Conservation Council of NSW, sub. DR94) 
• noise pollution from coal crushing machinery (Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97) 
• loss of irrigation water affecting agricultural land (East End Mine Action Group, 
sub. 38; Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97) 
• unauthorised discharges of contaminated water, polluting ponds and killing native 
wildlife, and discharges of benzene and toluene into groundwater (ANEDO, 
sub. DR92) 
• concerns that the Great Barrier Reef is threatened by ‘pollution, climate change, 
acidification, and intensive coastal development, particularly of ports … ’ (Jeremy 
Tager, sub 8, p. 3).  
 
Development regulations are intended to correct for such market failures and 
promote broader economic, social and environmental objectives. Governments have 
historically played a role mediating how and to what extent societies use the 
physical and natural environment, so as to balance economic, environmental, social, 
heritage, aesthetic and other impacts. Efficient and effective policies in this area 
will be those backed by a robust rationale for intervention, clear and consistent 
objectives, and sound implementation. 
Major project DAA processes also provide a mechanism for the public to participate 
in development decisions. Public participation may be sought to gather information, 
identify and possibly resolve differing opinions or competing objectives among 
stakeholders, and/or enhance public understanding, trust or support for decisions. 
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Some have argued that ‘the basic legitimacy of an [environmental impact 
assessment] process is questionable if the process does not provide for meaningful 
participation’ (Sinclair, Schneider and Mitchell 2012, p. 85). 
How are responsibilities for major projects divided between 
governments? 
While the precise division of responsibilities between levels of government varies 
between jurisdictions, broadly speaking: 
• the Australian Government regulates matters of national environmental 
significance, certain heritage matters, developments on Commonwealth land 
(such as some airports and defence facilities) and waters beyond the three 
nautical mile limit, and certain actions by Commonwealth agencies 
• State and Territory Governments have the ability to legislate on a broad range of 
matters, including the environment and cultural and natural heritage 
• local governments normally implement and enforce much of state planning and 
development legislation. Major projects are usually assessed and approved at the 
state level, bypassing local government. However, local governments often have 
a range of other responsibilities, such as granting permits (including ‘secondary 
approvals’) within their jurisdiction. 
This division of responsibilities broadly reflects the subsidiarity principle. This 
principle states that ‘policy development, program delivery and decision making 
should be the responsibility of the level of government best placed to deliver agreed 
outcomes’ (COAG 1997) (box 3.2). 
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Box 3.2 The subsidiarity principle and the governance of planning 
systems 
Subsidiarity is the principle that decisions should be made by the lowest level of 
governance capable of properly doing so. The idea is that local decision makers have 
specific knowledge and expertise relevant to decisions, such as development 
approvals, and can use that knowledge to assess the competing interests at stake at a 
lower cost. 
A decision becomes unsuited to local determination (and more suitable for, say, state 
determination) when the effects of the decision are felt outside the area governed by 
that particular body. In these cases, the local body tends to act in the interests of its 
constituents, even when negative consequences for other parties are ‘overproduced’ or 
positive outcomes are ‘underproduced’. For example, they may allow housing 
development to place additional stress on public transport, reducing the facilities 
available to communities further out, or resist an airport being built, to avoid higher 
noise levels for the local community, while not taking into account the broader benefits 
to the whole city. 
This suggests that, ideally, a decision-making body should be responsible for an area 
corresponding to the area affected by the decision. However, this is difficult to achieve 
since decisions of a given body are likely to impact on different and/or overlapping 
areas (and sometimes involve different levels of government). Furthermore, the costs 
associated with a decision may extend over a different area (or group of residents) 
than the benefits derived from a project (such as in the case of a waste disposal facility 
or public access to a beach). In practice, a workable option is to consider the spread of 
costs and benefits for the issue or project in question, and which level of government is 
most likely to fully weigh up these to make a sound decision. For example, a State 
Government might be better placed to assess and approve a major project affecting an 
entire state. 
After a decision has been made, there is also the question of which level of 
government should implement or enforce it. Commonly, State or Territory 
Governments are required to monitor and enforce decisions for major projects, other 
than in relation to Commonwealth matters. (This may vary according to the stage of the 
development, for instance, when it is under construction, and when it has been 
completed.) 
Source: PC (2011c).  
 
As the Australian Constitution does not contain specific powers for the Australian 
Government to legislate on environmental or planning matters, the Australian 
Government has had to use other constitutional heads of power to legislate on the 
environment, most notably the external affairs power and the corporations power, 
which have been broadly interpreted (box 3.3). 
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Box 3.3 The Australian Government’s power to make environmental 
laws 
The Australian Government has no direct power to make laws with respect to the 
environment (except on Commonwealth land, territories and waters). As such, it relies 
on other Constitutional powers — particularly the ‘trade and commerce’ power, the 
‘trading, financial and foreign corporations’ power, and the ‘external affairs’ power — to 
implement its environment policy. 
The scope of the Australian Government’s power to make laws has been determined 
over time by the High Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.  
• In the Tasmanian Dams Case (1983), the High Court held that the ‘external affairs’ 
power (s51(xxix)) may be used to enact domestic legislation if the subject matter of 
the legislation is of international concern, or if it implements an international treaty 
(in this case the World Heritage Convention). It also held that the ‘corporations 
power’ (s51(xx)) could be used to regulate the activities of the Tasmanian 
Hydroelectric Commission. 
• In the Workchoices Case (2006), the High Court extended the application of the 
corporations power when it held that it may be used to regulate the affairs of 
corporations, including the industrial relations matters within those corporations. In 
dissent, Justice Kirby argued that the majority’s reasoning could be extended to a 
broader range of matters affecting corporations, such as planning. 
Sources: Bates (2010); Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625 (Tasmanian Dams Case); New 
South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1 (Workchoices Case).  
 
The incremental clarification of the Australian Government’s role in regulating the 
environment has, in the past, created some uncertainty (Bates 2010). Two 
intergovernmental agreements in the 1990s were designed to clarify the role of the 
different levels of government in environmental regulation. 
• The 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment established the 
Australian Government’s responsibility for safeguarding and accommodating 
matters of national environmental significance, including matters contained in 
international treaties and conventions.  
• The 1997 COAG Heads of Agreement assigned specific matters of national 
environmental significance to the Australian Government, and matters related to 
state or territory regulation to the State and Territory Governments.  
The matters of national environmental significance are now triggers for the 
operation of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cwlth) (the EPBC Act). The EPBC Act also provides a framework for assessing 
and approving matters on Commonwealth land or waters (box 3.4). 
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Box 3.4 Matters protected by the EPBC Act 
The matters that are protected by Part 3 of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) are: 
• world heritage values 
• national heritage values 
• ecological character of wetlands of international significance  
• listed threatened species and ecological communities 
• listed migratory species  
• nuclear actions (including uranium mines) 
• Commonwealth marine areas 
• the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
• water resources impacted by a coal seam gas development or a large coal mining 
development 
• actions on Commonwealth land 
• actions by Commonwealth agencies. 
Source: Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth).  
 
Development assessment and approval legislation 
In addition to matters of national environmental significance, the Australian 
Government has jurisdiction over other specific matters on Commonwealth land or 
waters, including certain airports leased from the Commonwealth (Airports Act 
1996), offshore minerals (Offshore Minerals Act 1994), offshore petroleum 
(Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006), historic shipwrecks 
(Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976), fisheries (Fisheries Management Act 1991), and 
Indigenous heritage and native title regulation. 
The State and Territory Governments have the power to legislate on a broad range 
of matters that may require a project proponent to: obtain various permits, licences, 
and authorisations; and to comply with conditions before a project can commence. 
The legislation relates to: development assessment; mining and petroleum; planning 
and zoning; environmental protection; Indigenous and non-Indigenous heritage; 
land acquisition; native title; marine and coastal areas (within the three mile limit); 
habitat, biodiversity and native vegetation; natural resource management; pollution 
and waste management, among other things.  
Selected features and examples from each of these areas are summarised in 
table 3.1. Appendix C gives a more comprehensive listing of the legislation 
governing major developments in Australian jurisdictions. 
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Table 3.1 Types of legislation affecting major project DAA processesa  
Category of legislation Comments 
Planning, zoning and 
development assessment 
Most State and Territory Governments have multiple pathways for 
assessing and approving major projects. 
All development applications are assessed against state, regional and 
local strategic plans, but these can sometimes be overridden for major 
projects.  
Mineral resources Specific State and Territory legislation often applies to mineral 
resources. However, large mining projects are often, but not always, 
subject to development assessment under a dedicated major project 
pathway. 
Petroleum Specific State and Northern Territory legislation applies to petroleum 
developments. The Australian Government regulates areas more than 
three nautical miles from the coastline. 
Environment and natural 
resource management 
State and Territory environment legislation encompasses a range of 
matters, such as fisheries, forestry and native vegetation. This 
legislation might require an environmental impact assessment, an 
environmental management plan, and/or a works permit, among other 
things. 
Heritage State and Territory Governments regulate heritage matters. However, 
the Australian Government also has a role in heritage protection under 
the EPBC Act. 
Indigenous heritage State and Territory Governments regulate Indigenous heritage. 
However, the Australian Government has powers to intervene where 
state processes are deemed to have failed.  
Land access and 
acquisition 
The Australian, and the State and Territory Governments each have a 
role in land acquisition matters in their respective jurisdictions. In some 
cases, specific tenure requirements apply for development on Crown 
land. 
Native title Responsibility for native title matters is shared between the Australian 
Government and State and Territory Governments. The Federal Court 
has a key role in determining native title claims. 
Marine and coastal State and Territory Governments regulate marine, coastal and riverine 
areas. The Australian Government regulates development in areas 
more than three nautical miles from the coastline, and specific areas, 
such as the Great Barrier Reef and the Australian Antarctic Territory. 
Pollution and waste 
management 
State and Territory Governments regulate pollution and waste 
management. The Australian Government regulates areas more than 
three nautical miles from the coastline and on Commonwealth lands. 
Other legislation A range of other State and Territory legislation might also apply, 
covering matters such as roads, electricity permits, genetically 
modified organisms, and pests. 
a A list of legislation can be found in appendix C. 
Sources: Commission research; Commonwealth, State and Territory websites. 
Notable features of the legislation relating to major project DAA processes include: 
• every State and Territory Government has legislation that sets out DAA 
processes for major (or ‘significant’) projects. Most State and Territory 
Governments have multiple pathways, depending on the type of project 
• most jurisdictions have separate legislation regulating mining projects 
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• a major project proponent will ordinarily be required to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA). Other impact assessments (such as a 
social impact assessment) might also be required 
• regimes for the protection of Indigenous heritage vary significantly between 
jurisdictions. They differ in terms of what heritage is protected, how it is 
protected, whether consultation is conducted, and who decides whether an 
activity can go ahead when, for example, harm to an Indigenous heritage site 
cannot be avoided 
• when a major project proposal impacts on habitat, biodiversity or native 
vegetation, a range of legislation is in place to regulate these impacts. 
Proponents of major projects might be required to obtain a permit, enter into an 
environmental management plan and/or comply with other specific 
requirements.  
Mechanisms to facilitate a major development through the regulatory 
process 
Given the potentially significant impacts of a major development, the regulatory 
requirements that a proponent must meet are extensive. The complexity of the 
system is in part a legacy of incremental modifications to the planning laws that 
have accumulated over time, and is compounded by the need to obtain approvals 
from multiple regulators within a jurisdiction and between jurisdictions.  
Understanding how the system functions as a whole, and what specific requirements 
are needed, can be challenging. This can still be the case for major project 
proponents, which are usually well-resourced companies or government agencies 
with significant technical expertise in managing DAA processes. To deal with this 
complexity, all Australian jurisdictions have put in place mechanisms designed to 
guide and facilitate a major project proponent through the regulatory process. 
Specifically, governments have established dedicated DAA legislation that provides 
a streamlined assessment pathway for major project developments of particular 
significance (economic or other) for the State or Territory. Another approach has 
been to apply regular DAA processes, but to establish specific administrative 
arrangements and special units within government to coordinate the various 
licensing agencies involved in the approval process. These approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, and some jurisdictions use both. Bates (2010) calls these 
approaches ‘fast-track’ mechanisms. 
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3.2 How are major projects assessed and approved? 
The DAA processes for major projects vary significantly within and between 
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding this, there are four broad stages of a major project 
DAA process common to all jurisdictions: application, assessment, approval and 
monitoring (box 3.5).  
The Commission has developed ‘good practice’ regulatory principles against which 
the four stages of the DAA process are assessed (chapter 1).  
The Commission’s assessment — set out in subsequent chapters — indicates that 
the building blocks of a sound major project regulatory system are in place, there is 
substantial scope for improvement at each stage of the DAA process. The 
Commission has identified leading practices which, if implemented, would improve 
Australia’s major project regulatory framework. 
Application stage 
The application stage for a major project includes: the upfront provision of 
information and guidance on the regulatory framework and requirements; decisions 
on the regulatory pathway(s) that a project will be subject to; and consultation on 
the scope of any assessments (such as for environmental, heritage and social 
impacts). Determining the regulatory pathway that a major project will be assessed 
under depends on whether a development is declared a major project, or is subject 
to special legislation, state agreements, or specific arrangements for public projects. 
Declaration of a major project 
For a development to be declared a major project and assessed under a major 
project pathway, it must meet the criteria for a ‘major project’ as set out in the 
legislation. These criteria or triggers differ between jurisdictions (box 3.6).  
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Box 3.5 The four stages of the major project DAA process 
There are four stages of the development assessment and approval (DAA) regulatory 
process.  
• Application: a project needs to be declared a major project to be assessed under a 
‘fast-track’ pathway (otherwise the regular planning and approval processes apply). 
The choice of pathway determines what requirements the project must meet. 
• Assessment: the impacts of the project are assessed, public consultation is 
conducted, and the material provided to the regulator, which provides advice and 
recommendations to the decision maker on whether the project should proceed. 
• Approval: the decision maker decides whether or not to approve the project and, if 
so, with what conditions.  
• Monitoring of compliance: the regulator assesses the proponent’s compliance with 
the conditions on an ongoing basis. 
Not all of these activities necessarily apply in every Australian jurisdiction or to all 
assessment and approval processes.  
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Box 3.6 Triggers for declaring a major project 
• In some jurisdictions, special assessment pathways are triggered by the capital 
value of the project. For example, in New South Wales, a project will be declared a 
‘state significant development’ if it falls into one of 24 development classes and has 
a capital value greater than $30 million. Similarly, Western Australia has a separate 
pathway for major developments (based on their size, complexity, or impact) which 
triggers the Lead Agency framework.  
• Other jurisdictions adopt the subjective criteria of whether the project is sufficiently 
‘significant’, ‘important’ or ‘complex’. In South Australia, a project may be declared a 
‘major development’ if it is of major environmental, social or economic importance. 
In Queensland, a ‘coordinated project’ will be declared if it has complex approval 
requirements; strategic significance to a locality, region, or the State; significant 
environmental effects; or significant infrastructure requirements. 
• Some pathways are triggered by projects of a particular type. For example, in 
Victoria, a project might be declared a ‘major transport project’ if it comprises road, 
rail or other infrastructure that can be used for the movement of persons or goods, a 
port, or a facility at which goods can be transferred or temporarily stored. 
• Ministerial discretion can play a role in many of these triggers, both in determining 
whether certain criteria are met, and in deciding whether to declare a project (when 
it meets, or even if it does not meet, the criteria). For example, Victoria and the ACT 
rely on the Minister ‘calling in’ a project to assess and approve it. 
• The Australian Government does not have a dedicated major project assessment 
pathway. However, it has a Major Project Facilitation Program. To access this 
program, a project must either: significantly boost Australian industry innovation; 
have significant net economic benefit for regional Australia; or have an estimated 
investment in excess of $50 million and make a significant contribution to economic 
growth, employment and/or infrastructure. Further, under the Airports Act 1996 
(Cwlth), development carried out at an airport site is generally defined as ‘major 
airport development’ if the cost of construction exceeds $20 million, is likely to 
impact noise exposures or flight paths, or is likely to have a significant 
environmental impact. 
Source: Appendix C.  
 
Despite the establishment of a major projects pathway, the Minister may still have a 
reserve power to call-in a development application and decide the application in 
place of the nominated assessment manager, or declare that the project will be 
assessed under a particular pathway. For example: 
• in Queensland, the Minister has broad call-in powers, which allow him or her to 
assess and approve the project. When the power is exercised, the Minister is 
required to table a report in Parliament 
• in Victoria, the broad exercise of the ministerial call-in power is governed by 
guidelines set out in statute 
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• in South Australia, the Minister has discretion to declare that a project will be 
assessed under one of the major project pathways. 
Special legislation and state agreements 
Another way for governments to facilitate major projects is to enact special 
legislation. This may be used in many situations, for example, where a ‘government 
wishes to make contractual arrangements with a developer guaranteeing capital 
investment and employment in return for supply of resources and infrastructure’ 
(Bates 2010, p. 293). This legislation constitutes the major project DAA process and 
contains the conditions of approval. 
State agreements are a form of special legislation. For example, in Western 
Australia, state agreements: 
… are used to foster major developments, including mineral, petroleum and related 
downstream processing proposals, together with associated infrastructure investments. 
Such proposals require long-term certainty, extensive or complex land tenure and are 
often located in relatively remote areas of the State requiring significant infrastructure 
development. (DSD (WA) 2012) 
State agreements and special legislation are used for many different types of 
projects, including major projects. For example: 
• Western Australia has 62 state agreements for a wide range of industries, 
including alumina, oil, salt, mineral sands, gas, uranium, iron ore, diamonds, 
railways, silicon, and industrial lands 
• Victoria relied on special legislation for an urban road development: Eastlink 
Project Act 2004, and to facilitate creation of the Docklands precinct: Docklands 
Act 1991 
• Tasmania relied on special legislation for the Bell Bay pulp mill: Pulp Mill 
Assessment Act 2007 
• Queensland has at least 13 coal, aluminium and nickel mines under state 
agreements, as well as for other projects, such as the Gladstone Power Station 
Agreement Act 1993. 
Public projects 
Many jurisdictions have specific major project DAA pathways for major projects 
where a government agency is the proponent.  
• In New South Wales, specific provisions apply to state significant infrastructure, 
critical state significant infrastructure, and Crown development. Reforms have 
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been proposed that would allow deemed approvals for public priority 
infrastructure identified in strategic plans in high-growth areas (NSW 
Government 2013). 
• South Australia has different assessment tracks for Crown infrastructure (public) 
and major developments (primarily private). 
• In Queensland, the Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 governs certain kinds of 
public projects, such as ports. 
• In Victoria, Major Projects Victoria has a facilitative role for public projects, and 
the Major Transport Projects Facilitation Act 2009 covers some 
government-funded transport infrastructure projects.  
Application stage processes are discussed further in chapter 5. 
Assessment stage 
After the major project DAA pathway has been determined, the expected impacts of 
a proposed major project are assessed. This involves one or more assessment 
processes of varying focus and scope. 
For example, a project might require an EIA. An EIA is a systematic process for the 
examination and evaluation of the environmental effects of proposed activities that 
can be used to inform decision makers about the environmental impacts of the 
proposal and how they will be managed (Bates 2010) (box 3.7). If an EIA is 
required, the assessment manager will have to determine the scope of the EIA by 
developing terms of reference (which may involve public consultation). Other 
assessment processes that might apply include assessments related to heritage 
matters, Indigenous land rights and native title, and social impacts on local 
communities. 
It is common practice for major project assessment processes to focus on the 
impacts of a proposed development on a range of matters, and options for avoiding, 
managing and mitigating impacts. Often, input−output modelling is used to 
estimate, for example, the impact of a proposed project on local and broader levels 
of economic activity. This is distinct from a cost−benefit analysis approach, which 
focuses on assessing the net benefit to the community of a project proceeding. That 
said, there is evidence that New South Wales is moving in the direction of greater 
use of economic analysis — draft guidelines have been released which include an 
optional cost−benefit analysis for coal and coal seam gas projects on strategic 
agricultural land (Economists at Large, sub. 13; Economists at Large and The 
Australia Institute, sub. DR83). 
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The way the assessment stage is managed varies between jurisdictions. For 
example, the New South Wales Department of Planning is responsible for 
conducting an integrated assessment for state significant development and state 
significant infrastructure. Where relatively integrated assessment arrangements 
apply, other agencies might participate in the process through referral arrangements. 
For example, the assessment authority may be required to seek input from agencies 
that have responsibility for particular project impacts, such as heritage issues or the 
management of a forest reserve. Referral agencies might provide advice, suggest 
conditions, or in some cases, mandate conditions. 
 
Box 3.7 The environmental impact assessment process 
An environmental impact assessment (EIA) generally incorporates most, if not all, of 
the following procedural steps. 
• Referral: A referral of an activity of potential environmental significance to a decision 
maker for a decision as to the need for an EIA or some alternative form of 
documentation. This decision will be made on whether the proposed activity is likely 
to significantly affect the environment or whether the proposed activity is on a list of 
activities for which an EIA is required. 
• Terms of reference for the EIA: A scoping procedure by which the range of matters 
required to be addressed in an EIA is defined in some detail with reference to the 
circumstances surrounding the particular proposed activity. 
• Impact analysis: The impacts mentioned in the terms of reference are assessed. 
• Consultation with relevant government agencies and the public: This is often 
connected to an obligation to revise the draft EIA so as to respond to comments 
received. 
• Assessment and determination: A review of the final EIA by the assessing authority, 
which usually results in recommendations being made to the decision maker for the 
development or activities as to whether the proposal should be given consent and 
on what conditions. 
• Monitoring: Monitoring of the development, which involves conditions which operate 
after an activity has commenced so as to measure the accuracy of predictions made 
in an EIA and promote adaptive management. 
Source: Bates (2010).  
 
In other jurisdictions, assessment arrangements are more disparate and a number of 
stand-alone assessment processes apply, such as occurs in Victoria. Governments 
have established various administrative arrangements to help coordinate these 
assessment processes (chapter 6).  
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Approval stage 
Once the assessment process is complete, a decision as to whether to approve the 
project is made. Under some major project DAA pathways and for some types of 
projects, a project can be approved by the same agency that conducted the 
assessment. In other cases, the assessment authority makes recommendations to an 
approval body (most often a Minister or delegate), which approves the project and 
finalises any conditions attached to the project. The power of the approval authority 
to vary the conditions of the assessment authority or referral agency varies between 
jurisdictions. For example, in Queensland, the Coordinator-General conducts the 
EIA and imposes conditions which the approval authority must accept if the project 
is approved. 
These arrangements are discussed further in chapter 7. 
Secondary approvals 
In addition to the primary approval for the project to go ahead, there may also be a 
number of licences or secondary approvals of works or management plans required, 
which can also contain conditions. For example: 
• It is not uncommon for major projects to need 70 different primary and 
secondary approvals, licences, permits and authorisations (Business Council of 
Australia, sub. 43). 
• A Productivity Commission review (2009b) of the upstream petroleum sector 
found a single liquefied natural gas project could require up to 390 regulatory 
approvals. 
• Anglo-Gold Ashanti required 66 approvals (both primary and secondary) for its 
Tropicana Gold Mine (pers. comm., 4 June 2013). 
• Dredging Moreton Bay to build a new runway at Brisbane Airport required a 
number of secondary approvals (table 3.2) in addition to the consent to allow the 
project to proceed (under the Airports Act 1996 (Cwlth), EPBC Act, and the 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld)). 
• The Port Phillip channel deepening project was subject to 79 different pieces of 
legislation and relevant policies under which a number of primary and secondary 
approvals were required (DTF (Vic) 2008) — for example, some secondary 
approvals were required under ports and freight legislation and policy (box 3.8). 
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Table 3.2 Secondary approvals relevant to dredging Moreton Bay to build 
a runway at Brisbane Airport 
Approval Administering agencya Legislation 
Permission to enter and use 
marine park 
Environmental Protection 
Agency (Qld) 
Marine Parks Act 2004 
Marine Parks Regulation 1990 
Marine Parks (Moreton Bay) Zoning 
Plan 1997 
Approved dredge  
management plan 
Environmental Protection 
Agency (Qld) 
Coastal Protection and Management 
Act 1995 
Registration certificate for 
environmentally relevant activity 
Environmental Protection 
Agency (Qld) 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 
Permit to occupy Department of Natural 
Resources and Water 
(Qld) 
Land Act 1994 
Development permit for  
material change of use 
Brisbane City Council Integrated Planning Act 1997 
Integrated Planning Regulation 1998 
Development permit for 
operational works 
Brisbane City Council Integrated Planning Act 1997 
Integrated Planning Regulation 1998 
Development permit for 
operational works (tidal works 
or prescribed tidal works) 
Brisbane City Council 
Environmental Protection 
Agency (Qld) 
Maritime Safety (Qld) 
Queensland Harbour 
Master  
Port of Brisbane 
Corporation 
Coastal Protection and Management 
Act 1995 and Regulations 
Integrated Planning Act 1997 
Integrated Planning Regulation 1998 
Transport Operation (Marine Safety) 
Act 1994 
Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 
Development permit for 
operational works (the removal, 
destruction or damage of a 
marine plant) 
Department of Primary 
Industries and Fisheries 
(Qld) 
Fisheries Act 1994 
Integrated Planning Act 1997 
Integrated Planning Regulation 1998 
Transport Operation (Marine Safety) 
Act 1995 
Transport Infrastructure Act 1994  
Development permit for 
operational works involving 
interference with quarry 
material on state coastal land in 
a coastal management district 
Environmental Protection 
Agency (Qld) 
Fisheries Act 1994 
Integrated Planning Act 1997 
Placement of dredge pipeline 
and construction of an access 
track on the land and 
construction of a culvert under 
the proposed taxiway link 
Department of Transport 
and Regional Services 
(Cwlth) 
Airport Building Controller 
and Airport Environment 
Office (Cwlth) 
Airports Act 1996 
Airport (Building Control) Regulation 
1997 
Airport (Environmental Protection) 
Regulation 1997 
a Agencies current as at 2007. 
Source: Based on Brisbane Airport Corporation (2006). 
   
   
80 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
Box 3.8 Resource conservation and management legislation and 
policy relevant to the Port Phillip channel deepening project 
• Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) 
• National Parks Act 1975 (Vic) 
• National Parks (Marine National Parks and Marine Sanctuaries) Act 2002 (Vic) 
• Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978 (Vic) 
• Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 (Vic) 
• Wildlife Act 1975 (Vic) 
• Water Act 1989 (Vic) 
• Water Industry Act 1994 (Vic) 
• Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994 (Vic) 
• Land Act 1958 (Vic) 
• Victoria’s Biodiversity Strategy 1997 
• Victoria’s Native Vegetation Management: A Framework for Action 2002. 
Source: Department of Treasury and Finance (Vic) (2008).  
 
Conditions and offsets 
Approval conditions are a necessary and appropriate feature of the major projects 
regulatory framework. Conditions are used to avoid or mitigate adverse project 
impacts and ensure regulatory objectives are achieved. How effectively conditions 
achieve their regulatory goals depends on the processes used to determine how they 
are set, reviewed and complied with. 
Offsets are a particular type of environmental condition. Broadly interpreted, they 
are measures that are intended to counter or compensate for the adverse impacts of a 
development on the environment. For example, under the Queensland 
Government’s offsets policy, Offsets for net gain of koala habitat in South East 
Queensland, a proponent is required to deliver the equivalent of five new koala 
trees for every non-juvenile koala tree removed. 
Conditions and offsets are discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
Review and appeal 
Review and appeal processes can allow proponents, participants in the public 
consultation process, and/or members of the community, to appeal a major project 
DAA decision. The persons that can bring a review application differ between 
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jurisdictions, and review rights for major projects are typically more limited than 
review rights for ordinary developments.  
There are two types of review available. The first type is a merits review which 
allows the decision made by the original decision maker to be challenged. In this 
case, a review body looks at whether the decision was the ‘correct or preferable’ 
one. Merits review can be limited in different ways, such as by restricting the 
matters or materials the review body can consider (limited merits review).  
The second type of review is a judicial review. It seeks to determine if a decision 
was lawful, but not whether a preferable decision was available. This is more 
restrictive in scope than a merits review because it looks at the legality of the 
decision-making process, rather than the outcome of the decision itself. 
Review processes are discussed further in chapter 9. 
Monitoring of compliance and enforcement 
Monitoring of compliance and enforcement arrangements varies between projects, 
by jurisdiction, and depending on the type of conditions imposed on a project. 
Given that a project will usually be required to obtain a number of primary and 
secondary approvals, multiple compliance activities might be required. Regulatory 
agencies generally rely heavily on self-reporting by project proponents, backed up 
by audits required by regulators’ compliance policies or programs. In some 
jurisdictions, the regulatory functions are separate from the policy ones, while in 
others they are not. Many jurisdictions allow members of the public or other parties 
(such as local government bodies) to bring an action in the court to enforce 
conditions that have been breached by project proponents. 
Monitoring of compliance with approval conditions and enforcement is discussed 
further in chapter 10.  
Public participation 
The stakeholders involved in the major project DAA process are regulators, project 
proponents, other businesses (such as users of infrastructure) and communities. 
Different forms of public participation can occur between these stakeholders. The 
most widely acknowledged form of public participation is public consultation with 
communities. Public consultation increases transparency of decision making, builds 
public confidence in the decision-making process, increases the information 
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available to decision makers, and helps regulators to balance competing interests. 
Participation in the public consultation process can also give rise to appeal rights. 
Most commonly, public consultation occurs when a proponent has submitted the 
EIA to the regulator and communities have the opportunity to comment on it. Some 
jurisdictions also allow communities to participate in the development of the terms 
of reference for the EIA. In addition, it is possible for public consultation to occur 
outside the project-specific DAA process; for example, in the development of 
strategic plans or strategic assessments.  
The different types of consultation at particular stages of the major project DAA 
process and their interactions with other parts of the process are discussed in 
chapters 5, 9, and 11. 
Strategic assessment and planning 
The stages of major project DAA processes focus on assessing individual projects, 
but there are also broader approaches that take a higher-level view of the 
development. 
Strategic assessment is a tool that focuses on the potential impacts of plans, policies 
and programs, rather than individual projects. As such, it can reduce or even remove 
the need for subsequent project-level assessments. Under the EPBC Act, the 
Australian Government has the power to conduct strategic assessments with State 
and Territory Governments, or with other partners, such as mining companies. To 
date, five strategic assessments have been completed and a further ten are in 
progress, including one for the Great Barrier Reef (that is being jointly undertaken 
by the Queensland Government and the Australian Government Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park Authority) (consultation draft released November 2013).  
Strategic assessments conducted under the EPBC Act can also remove the need for 
further Commonwealth approval of some subsequent specified actions, meaning 
that, to a significant extent, the effect is the same as a limited approval bilateral 
(chapter 7). State and Territory Governments can also conduct strategic assessments 
of various types. 
Strategic planning is another tool that helps to: 
• improve the way major project DAA processes operate 
• indicate broad community preferences for the location of particular types of 
developments 
• consider environmental, heritage and other values. 
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Strategic planning is ‘a way of achieving a balance between conflicting objectives 
or priorities and resolving the conflicts between economic, social, environmental 
and cultural imperatives’ (DAF 2001, p. 8). 
Strategic planning documents set out what the ground rules are for the use, 
development, and/or conservation of land (DAF 2001). Where such plans are 
underpinned by community consultation and consideration of environmental, 
heritage and other values, they can help proponents of major projects design 
proposals that are likely to be less contentious and have fewer assessment issues. 
Approaches to strategic planning vary greatly between jurisdictions, but there are 
several common types of plans (PC 2011c): 
• high-level strategic plans, which indicate goals and set the direction for 
development in a particular region or state 
• metropolitan land use plans (often described as strategic spatial plans, because 
they define land uses for certain areas, as well as goals and policies) 
• infrastructure plans, which are necessary to facilitate desired land uses. 
Strategic assessment and strategic planning are discussed further in chapter 11. 
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4 Regulatory objectives 
Key points 
• The main aims of development assessment and approval (DAA) regulations and 
processes are to promote safe and orderly development while mitigating associated 
risks to environmental, cultural and Indigenous heritage assets.  
• Clear and consistent regulatory objectives that reflect the preferences of the 
community are a prerequisite for a well-functioning regulatory system.  
• The policy and regulatory objectives that impact major project DAA processes 
across jurisdictions are not always well defined and sometimes overlap. This can 
produce conflicting outcomes. Guidance on how decision makers are to weigh and 
balance objectives is also inadequate. 
• Better specified objectives would provide greater certainty to proponents and help 
simplify DAA processes for all stakeholders. 
• Better guidance about how to balance competing objectives and how to interpret 
ecologically sustainable development would assist decision makers and improve 
understanding of the DAA system among proponents and the community.  
 
This chapter examines and evaluates the clarity, consistency and guidance provided 
on the regulatory objectives of planning and policy frameworks relevant to major 
project development assessment and approval (DAA) processes.  
Regulations with clear and consistent objectives are likely to better target the policy 
issues at hand and be easier to understand. Clear objectives, by constraining 
discretion and providing a transparent base for evaluation, also improve the 
accountability of regulators and reduce the scope for regulatory creep. 
In order to analyse objectives at a jurisdiction level, the Commission has examined 
objects clauses in key legislation (that is, primary planning legislation pertaining to 
the most utilised major project assessment pathways, and primary environmental 
protection legislation). The mission statement or ‘vision’ of the primary assessment 
agency was also examined. 
The Commission has made a high-level assessment of selected jurisdictional 
regulatory objectives and has identified and evaluated two key issues: the level of 
clarity and consistency of core objectives; and the potential scope for better 
guidance on balancing competing objectives.  
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4.1 Overview of jurisdictions’ DAA objectives 
There is a plethora of legislation that potentially applies to major projects. As an 
illustration, the Victorian Government has reported that its Port Phillip channel 
deepening project had to comply with around 79 pieces of State or Federal 
legislation or policies (DTF (Vic) 2008). Much of this legislation targets multiple 
objectives. Against this backdrop, table 4.1 details a snapshot of selected legislative 
objects, to illustrate the wide range of legislative objects contained in key major 
project DAA legislation. The overarching objectives of planning legislation 
primarily revolve around ensuring safe and orderly development, while those of 
environmental protection legislation primarily revolve around promoting 
ecologically sustainable development (ESD).  
Why are clear and consistent objectives important?  
One of the key elements of leading practice policy making is a specific and clear 
statement of objectives (PC 1999). Clear objectives, roles and responsibilities signal 
to those who operate within the regulatory system what they need to do to achieve 
the government’s policy goals. Further, it is difficult to evaluate regulatory 
outcomes without a clear statement of what the regulation was meant to achieve 
(VCEC 2011) — thus, measurable objectives contribute to greater clarity of purpose 
and accountability (PC 2005). If objectives are ambiguous or difficult to measure 
they may only be partially met or not achieved at all. 
Most legislation contains an objects clause. Commonly, DAA regulators are 
required to ‘have regard to’ their Act’s objects in framing decisions. Some objects 
clauses also require decision makers to ‘further’ the objects. Interpretation Acts 
across jurisdictions commonly state that an interpretation that promotes the objects 
is to be favoured over one that does not.  
Properly drafted, objects clauses provide guidance to regulators on the interpretation 
of legislation, promote consistent decision making, and aid transparency, 
accountability and probity. Objects clauses can also support outcome-based 
regulation, and help promote clarity and certainty for proponents (by narrowing 
regulators’ discretion in interpretation and reducing the risk of regulatory creep — 
which is where the administration of law diverges from the intent of parliament over 
time). 
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Table 4.1 Selected legislative objects applying in key DAA legislation 
across jurisdictionsa 
Objective NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Cwlth 
Promoting proper, safe and/or orderly 
development 
         
Supplying utilities/infrastructure and 
linked services 
         
Housing choice or affordable housing           
Enhancing/protecting amenity or form of 
built environment 
         
Sustainable development, ESD or 
Sustainable resource use 
         
Protecting environment/endangered 
species and critical habitat 
         
Using precautionary principle          
Conserving heritage          
Waste management and/or minimisation          
Avoiding climate change, urban 
congestion 
         
Community participation          
Indigenous participation          
Protecting interests of future generations          
Promoting social and economic welfare 
of the community  
         
Providing community services and 
facilities and/or land for public purposes 
         
Sharing of responsibility across levels of 
government/integration of policies/ 
strategic planning at different levels  
         
Accountable, coordinated and efficient 
processes 
         
Establishing planning system elements/ 
achieving other planning objectives 
         
Ensuring compliance and enforcement          
Providing for compensation on just terms          
a () signifies at least one piece of DAA legislation has this objective within the jurisdiction, as assessed by 
the Commission. List based on key major project DAA legislation examined in table 4.2. Other objectives may 
or may not apply.  
The study has heard from stakeholders many examples of the fundamental role that 
clear legislative and regulatory objectives play in DAA processes, and the 
consequences when clarity is absent. For instance: 
Clarity and consistency of regulatory objectives is paramount to a well-functioning 
regulatory system. Lack of clarity and inconsistency leads to poor decision making, 
unnecessary regulatory burdens, lost time, increased cost and lack of confidence by the 
industry and community. (Master Builders Australia, sub. DR80, p. 2) 
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Similar concerns were expressed by the Queensland Resources Council (QRC): 
Failing to articulate clear regulatory objectives is a common shortfall … The added 
complexity for regulations without clear objectives is they create a tendency to 
over-condition to the highest possible risk. (sub. DR91, p. 2) 
The Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices (ANEDO) also said: 
A fundamental problem with Australia’s planning systems is the lack of clear and 
consistent regulatory objectives. This reduces the likelihood of balanced, ‘triple bottom 
line’ decision making. (sub. 14, p. 13)  
Further, a number of participants in this study argued that DAA regulations often 
tried to achieve too many objectives, and created overlapping requirements. For 
example, the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association noted: 
Australia’s environmental regulatory framework contains numerous overlapping, 
excessive and inconsistent requirements that are causing unnecessary project delays 
and costs. The legislation does not always clearly define or achieve its objectives, or 
add any additional benefit to the Australian economy. (sub. 17, p. 2)  
Xstrata Coal was also concerned about overlapping objectives: 
The regulatory objectives of major project DAA processes often overlap with the 
objectives and controls imposed by other State legislation relating to protection of the 
environment and the built environment … These overlapping objectives mean that 
various State Government agencies have the power to impose assessment requirements 
and compliance requirements in relation to the same issue but with different outcomes. 
(sub. 50, p. 42)  
Such inconsistencies can arise where policy objectives are not well integrated, 
leading to objectives that conflict with one another or overlap. Alternatively, 
objectives that appear distinct may in practice create overlapping compliance 
obligations. For example, multiple regulators might require similar surveys or 
management plans to meet similar objectives.  
When objectives are unclear, multiple, and conflicting they necessitate decisions on 
what objectives to prioritise and what tradeoffs need to be made to achieve these 
objectives (PC 2011b). This can be problematic because legislation is promulgated 
by parliament but interpreted and applied by regulators and by courts. When it is not 
clear what parliament intended to achieve, this separation of responsibility can lead 
to conflicting interpretations (Brown, Stern and Tenenbaum 2006), frustrate the 
purpose of parliament and generate uncertainty for proponents.  
This uncertainty is particularly undesirable because Ministers, as elected 
representatives accountable to the public, should be responsible for arbitrating the 
tradeoffs that are inherent in the objectives of legislation applying to approvals. 
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Unelected bodies (such as regulators or merits review tribunals) are not appropriate 
bodies to decide how to prioritise objectives or what tradeoffs to make to achieve 
these objectives, as there is no guarantee that these tradeoffs will reflect the will of 
parliament (PC 2011b; Peterson 2006).  
Current reforms to objectives  
Against the backdrop of the Warkworth case (box 4.1), the New South Wales 
Minister for Planning has recently progressed reforms to the objectives of the 
State’s planning system. The measures include: 
• amending the State Environmental Planning Policy (Mining, Petroleum 
Production and Extractive Industries) to reflect that economic benefits are the 
‘principal’ consideration when approving a mine (Clayton Utz 2013b) 
• proposing to amend ESD in the planning legislation by deleting mention of the 
precautionary principle and intergenerational equity and renaming the concept 
‘sustainable development’. Clayton Utz suggests this subtle change shifts the 
emphasis ‘towards economic development’ slightly (2013a).  
 
Box 4.1 Balancing objectives in DAA decisions — the Warkworth case  
Warkworth, an April 2013 decision of the New South Wales Land and Environment 
Court, illustrates how material the balance struck between objectives by decision 
makers can be for major project approvals.  
The case involved a merits review of an approval of an extension to an existing open 
cut coal mine. Chief Judge Preston overturned the approval and found that:  
• the project’s economic and social benefits were insufficient to outweigh its 
significant and unacceptable environmental, noise and social impacts  
• mitigation strategies and proposed conditions were inadequate  
• there were limitations in the benefit–cost analysis and choice modelling, including 
inadequate consideration of intergenerational equity — a component principle of 
ecologically sustainable development (a relevant legislative object). 
Both the proponent and the Minister for Planning have appealed the decision, but (at 
the time of writing) judgment has been reserved. 
Source: Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure and 
Warkworth Mining Limited (April 2013) NSWLEC 48.  
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4.2 Evaluating objectives 
The Commission has evaluated the objects clauses in key planning and environment 
laws across Australian jurisdictions and identified the principles and approaches 
listed in box 4.2.  
 
Box 4.2 Leading practice principles for objects clauses  
There are several principles and approaches that the Commission has identified as 
associated with leading practice objects clauses: 
• Clarity — objects are specified, including for major project pathways. The language 
used allows a reasonable person to understand the objective. Key terms are defined 
and consistently applied across key legislation (for example, within the main 
planning and environmental protection legislation). 
• Brevity — an overarching objective is specified (with a limited number of secondary 
objectives); alternatively specific objectives are concise (not unwieldy). Redundant 
or related and overlapping objectives are removed. 
• Consistency — objectives are broadly aligned (that is, not in obvious conflict) across 
significant legislation. 
• Accountability and transparency — key administrative output criteria for relevant 
agencies are aligned with objectives, with associated reporting requirements in 
place. 
• Measurability — where possible, objectives set out defined, measurable outcomes.  
 
In the Commission’s judgment, no one jurisdiction stands out as leading practice 
against these principles — all jurisdictions have scope to improve the clarity and 
consistency of objectives. Specifically, not all Acts include objects or purpose 
clauses. For those that do, many clauses could be briefer — some cover multiple 
pages — and in many cases key terms are insufficiently defined. This can 
complicate the task of decision makers, who may have to weight tens of 
insufficiently defined objects. Additionally, some clauses list objects that are 
arguably better dealt with in other laws or regulations, or are implied in other 
objects. For example, objects to promote orderly economic development and the 
protection of the environment are implied in ESD, another common object. 
Further analysis of jurisdictions against selected leading practices is detailed in 
table 4.2. While there is substantial scope for improvement, this analysis shows 
some jurisdictions approach leading practice in some aspects. For example, key 
legislation in Queensland has a primary objective, Tasmania specifies a consistent 
schedule of objects across its legislation, and in New South Wales, planning and 
environmental assessment processes are incorporated in one Act, promoting 
consistency of objects.  
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Table 4.2 Evaluation of key objects clauses from DAA legislation  
against four leading practicesa 
 Legislation Primary 
objective or 
clear order 
of objects 
Key objects 
or terms 
shared 
across key 
laws 
Agency 
mission 
broadly 
reflects key 
objects 
Agency 
reports 
against 
objects in 
annual report 
NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment 
Act 1979 
    
Vic Planning and Environment Act 1987      
 Major Transport Projects Facilitation 
Act 2009 
    
 Environment Effects Act 1978 - - - - 
Qld Sustainable Planning Act 2009     
 State Development and Public Works 
Organisation Act 1971 
- - - - 
 Environmental Protection Act 1994     
SA Development Act 1993     
 Environment Protection Act 1993     
WA Planning and Development Act 2005     
 Environmental Protection Act 1986     
Tas State Policies and Projects Act 1993     
 Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993      
 Major Infrastructure Development Approvals 
Act 1999 
    
 Environmental Management and Pollution 
Control Act 1994 
    
NT Planning Act     
 Environmental Assessment Act     
ACT Planning and Development Act 2007     
 Environment Protection Act 1997     
Cwlth Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999  
    
 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2006 
    
a () yes; () no; (-) Act has no primary objects or purpose clause to examine. As assessed by the 
Commission, based on relevant DAA legislation, agency annual reports and websites.   
Reflecting on international experiences, some stakeholders highlighted the New 
Zealand Resource Management Act 1991 as an example of an Act with a primary 
object and hierarchy of related objects; although others expressed concerns about 
how the Act operates in practice (box 4.3). 
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Box 4.3 New Zealand’s Resource Management Act 1991 objects 
The Act has a single primary object: ‘to promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources’. In executing the Act, decision makers must then 
‘recognise and provide for’ seven matters of national importance (including protecting 
Indigenous rights and historic heritage). ‘Particular regard’ must also be exercised in 
relation to 11 further matters (including the effects of climate change and the 
enhancement of amenity). 
The Act thus specifies a hierarchy of related objects around a primary object. 
New Zealand business has expressed reservations about uncertainties and costs the 
Act purportedly imposes. The New Zealand Productivity Commission has also criticised 
the Act for ambiguities around whether it: 
… allows for the ‘balancing’ of socio-economic aspirations with environmental outcomes, or 
whether these provisions represent an ‘environmental bottomline’ that must be secured 
regardless of the social or economic cost. (2012, p. 150) 
New Zealand courts have apparently adopted both interpretations, adding to the 
ambiguities. This emphasises the importance of clear and consistent objects, with 
guidance around how they may be applied.  
 
4.3 Moving towards leading practice 
Given the substantial scope for improvement, there are two steps jurisdictions can 
take to move towards leading practice objects clauses: 
• review and rationalisation of regulatory objectives, so that they are more clear, 
concise, consistent, coherent and measurable 
• providing guidance to regulators on how to balance competing objectives. 
Review and rationalisation of objectives 
A review and rationalisation of regulatory objectives as suggested in the 
Commission’s draft report was supported by a number of stakeholders (Australian 
Local Government Association, sub. DR71; Planning Institute of Australia, 
sub. DR73; Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, sub. DR85; 
General Electric, sub. DR89; QRC, sub. DR91; AGL Energy, sub. DR96; Origin 
Energy, sub. DR100; Tasmanian Department of Premier and Cabinet, sub. DR101).  
In addition, many stakeholders specifically endorsed ecologically sustainable 
development as a primary legislative objective (Chamber of Minerals and Energy of 
Western Australia, sub. DR85; QRC, sub. DR91; ANEDO, sub. DR92; Nature 
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Conservation Council of NSW, sub. DR94; Nature Conservation Society of South 
Australia, sub. DR95; and Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97).  
Jurisdictions should also consider reviewing whether their stated legislative 
objectives align with intended policy outcomes. Specific methods to improve clarity 
and consistency include the following. 
• Refining objects to include one succinct primary goal. Secondary objectives 
could flow from this primary goal. This would promote coherence, reduce 
ambiguity and increase the scope for regulators to be held more accountable for 
outcomes. It would also assist in reducing administrative overlap and 
compliance burdens. 
• Where practicable, specifying consistent objectives across legislation. This 
might also involve considering how to manage competing objectives in 
interactions between different levels of government, and how, for example, 
planning objectives integrate with the regulatory objectives for major projects 
(Local Government Association of Queensland, sub. DR78, p. 2). 
• Agency mission statements and key performance outcome measures could be 
better aligned with legislative objectives through, for example, reporting against 
objectives in the annual report. This requirement could also encourage further 
refining of objects over time, so they are more measurable.  
• Use of memorandums of understanding (MOUs), where overlapping objectives 
result in conflicting administrative requirements across agencies, can help 
rationalise administration of DAA processes (South Australian State 
Government Departments sub. 51, p. 18). In the United States, MOUs are also 
used to help deal with interjurisdictional overlaps in objectives (appendix D). 
For example, the State of California and the United States Department of the 
Interior have MOUs in place. 
RECOMMENDATION 4.1 
Governments should review legislative and regulatory objectives across major 
project development assessment and approval processes within their jurisdiction 
to ensure that they are clear, consistent and coherent.  
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Provision of guidance 
Guidance should be provided to decision makers (and made publicly available) on 
how objectives should be interpreted or how competing objectives should be 
balanced. Even where there is a publicly accountable ministerial decision maker, the 
provision of guidance helps ensure the will of parliament is achieved, increases 
consistency, transparency, probity and community understanding about regulation 
(ICAC (NSW) 2012; VCEC 2009). 
The provision of guidance has been supported by a number of previous inquiries. 
For example, the Regulation Taskforce recommended: 
Legislation should provide clear guidance to regulators about policy objectives, as well 
as the principles they should follow in pursuing them … Guidance should be specific 
about what balance is required, where tradeoffs in objectives exist, and the need for 
risk-based implementation strategies. (2006, p. 161) 
Similarly, the Commission’s inquiry into the Urban Water Sector supported 
guidance: 
Where conflicting objectives are considered unavoidable, regulators should be given 
clear guidance by government on how to prioritise objectives … 
… guidance on how to prioritise objectives should be given through a governance 
charter for utilities or through the inclusion of an overarching objects clause in 
regulatory acts. (2011b, pp. 268, 270)  
A number of stakeholders supported clear guidance. For example, Xstrata Coal said: 
… it is critical … that agencies have clear guidance in relation to consistent application 
of relevant legislation to avoid [inconsistencies, inefficiencies and conflict between 
agencies in assessment and enforcement of approvals]. (sub. 50, p. 42)  
The Brisbane City Council also noted uncertainty impacts:  
Major projects benefit from clear guidelines on how a lead agent should manage 
competing or contradictory priorities … Multiple assessment layers often leave the 
investor in the dark if economic, social and environmental priorities compete. (sub. 60, 
p. 2)  
Notwithstanding the benefits of clearer guidance from elected representatives, some 
stakeholders expressed concern that it could result in some objects being advanced 
at the expense of others they favoured. The Lock the Gate Alliance noted they were: 
 … deeply concerned that the creation of guidelines … will bias the major projects 
system even more decisively in favour of resource developments against other matters 
of public interest, like agricultural sustainability, biodiversity, public amenity, and 
health. (sub. DR97, p. 8) 
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Similar concerns were expressed by ANEDO, which was:  
… concerned that existing assessment and approval processes emphasise short-term 
economic considerations over longer term social and environmental considerations. 
(sub. DR92, p. 11) 
In the presence of multiple objectives, it is unsurprising stakeholders take differing 
views on the appropriate weight each should be given. Absent a clear hierarchy and 
guidance on weighting, this can present notable difficulties for decision makers, as 
is illustrated through an examination of the frequent DAA objective of furthering 
ESD. 
Ecologically sustainable development 
ESD is a widely specified objective applying to decision making on environmental 
impacts (box 4.4). Since the 1990s, much of Australia’s environment, planning and 
natural resources management legislation has been amended to make ESD a key 
legislative object (Bates 2010; Godden and Peel 2010). Decision makers are 
generally required to ‘encourage’, ‘promote’ or ‘have regard to’ ESD.  
However, the interpretation of ESD in the courts has been far from clear (Preston 
(NSW LEC) 2006). Given its multiple component principles and differing 
definitions in law, ESD appears insufficiently defined to allow a clear and common 
interpretation.  
One potential reason for this is a lack of detailed guidance on how to apply it to 
decision making, and in particular, how to make tradeoffs between environmental, 
social and economic impacts. Justice Paul Stein (1999) usefully summarised many 
of the issues:  
[The inclusion of ESD] principles in Australian legislation has been largely confined to 
objectives of statutes or agencies without any real guidance to decision makers as to 
whether and how to apply the core principles or what weight to give them. Moreover, 
some of the principles contain vague statements, some might call them aspirations, as 
well as ambiguities, inconsistencies and uncertainties. Difficulties of interpretation and 
application are manifest. There is even discussion on whether the principles are merely 
guiding or whether they are also operational. In these circumstances, who can blame 
the courts for proceeding, like the precautionary principle, with a degree of caution.  
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Box 4.4 Ecologically sustainable development and related principles  
Ecologically sustainable development (ESD) and the related principles of 
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle are important considerations in 
development assessment and approval decisions, given the role of ESD in relevant 
objects clauses. 
When COAG endorsed the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development 
in 1992 it noted: 
While there is no universally accepted definition of ESD, in 1990 the Commonwealth 
Government suggested the following definition for ESD in Australia: ‘using, conserving and 
enhancing the community’s resources so that ecological processes, on which life depends, 
are maintained, and the total quality of life, now and in the future, can be increased’. (1992b) 
While subsequent legislative definitions applied across the States and Territories have 
varied, they commonly call for decision-making processes to integrate long- and 
short-term economic, environmental, social and equity considerations.  
The four ESD implementation principles listed in the 1992 COAG Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Environment are also commonly referenced: 
• precautionary principle (where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation) 
• intergenerational equity  
• conservation of biological diversity and ecological processes  
• improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms.  
Other principles, including encouraging public participation, access to information and 
the polluter-pays principle may also feature in development assessment and approval 
legislation. 
Sources: Bates (2010); Australian Government (1992a, 1992b).  
 
Consequently, there are notably diverging views on what ESD entails and how it 
should be operationalised. For example, one interpretational difficulty revolves 
around whether ESD implies a strong or weak sustainability constraint.  
Strong sustainability holds that there is no (or notably constrained) substitutability 
between environmental and other types of capital, such as human, economic or 
social capital. This implies that future generations cannot enjoy increased wellbeing 
where there are declines in environmental capital (say through environmental 
degradation), even when other stocks increase. A number of stakeholders expressed 
views broadly consistent with this interpretation. The Blue Mountains Conservation 
Society, for example, argued substitution between domains is not possible: 
A coal mine which destroys a town (a common proposal) can potentially develop 
economic capital, however it causes permanent irreversible damage to social capital. 
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While social and environmental capital are the foundation of all economic capital, the 
opposite is not true. However hard we may try economic capital can never restore 
social or environmental assets once they are lost. To borrow the analogy, the town is 
gone. (sub. DR86, p. 5) 
That said, there are a range of views about strong sustainability:  
Interpreted strictly, strong sustainability implies that every component of the 
environment and every species must be preserved indefinitely, and that it is ethically 
indefensible for future generations to be compensated for losses of natural capital via 
consumption of services from other forms of capital. This implies that a very high, 
potentially infinite, value is placed on these resources. Other views suggest that 
non-renewable and renewable forms of natural capital can be substituted for each other 
as long as the total stock of natural capital is maintained. (Markulev and Long 2013, 
p. 7) 
Andrew Macintosh argues tradeoffs are necessary to make a strong sustainability 
approach operable: 
This requires rules to be devised to determine what ecological processes and 
biophysical systems are ‘essential’, and what ecosystems, species and populations 
should be prioritised for protection. (Forthcoming) 
In contrast, weak sustainability accepts that substitutability is possible between 
domains. For example, while environmental capital may be depleted, other forms of 
capital can be increased to restore the total capital stock left to future generations, 
and hence maintain or increase community wellbeing (Carmody 2012; Markulev 
and Long 2013). Stakeholder views broadly consistent with this perspective 
included the Business Council of Australia, which argued for ‘sustainable 
development’ objectives that ‘prioritise the investment and business activity needed 
to grow national wealth and achieve well-managed population growth’ (sub. 43, 
p. 13; pers. comm., 11 July 2013).  
In addition, the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission (VCEC) has 
found that ESD principles can be consistent with conventional economic analysis, 
including the use of cost–benefit analysis. This is because cost–benefit analysis can 
integrate: 
… economic, environmental and social (including equity) impacts, and account for the 
pattern of those impacts over time. Inter-generational issues can be explicitly 
considered and integrated where relevant through, for example, choice of discount rates 
and/or use of equity weights. (2009, p. 342) 
Economists at Large and The Australia Institute (sub. DR83) strongly supported 
more robust and comprehensive use of cost–benefit analysis in major project DAA 
processes. They argued that such analysis should include costs and benefits 
accruing to all stakeholders and also attempt to quantify relevant non-market 
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environmental and social values. All three perspectives are broadly consistent with 
a weak sustainability interpretation, which does not rule out the possibility that 
tradeoffs can be made.  
Andrew Macintosh, in examining the history and impact of ESD in Australia, 
concludes that some of ESD’s imprecision may have even been a deliberate attempt 
to chart a course through such divergent views: 
There have been improvements in environmental management since the advent of ESD 
but not because of it. ESD has been used as a rhetorical device with which governments 
and others have sought to nullify conflict and convey messages about their level of 
concern about environmental issues. When attempts have been made to institutionalise 
it, the principles have been kept at the highest level of abstraction. The experience with 
ESD in Australia is a standout example of how policy makers use ambiguity to limit 
conflict … (Forthcoming). 
Whatever views governments and societies take on these issues, it is likely that 
greater specificity and guidance around ESD would assist to clarify objectives and 
allow for greater accountability for outcomes. Specifically, guidance is needed on 
how to apply ESD to decision making, particularly in situations where tradeoffs 
between economic, environmental and social impacts are unavoidable. 
Ideally, parliaments should outline an analytical basis to guide decision makers 
about making ESD tradeoffs between economic, environmental and social impacts. 
Guidance should also detail practical examples, as the VCEC has recommended:  
… departments and agencies administering environmental regulation [should] prepare 
guidance for their staff on how to administer the regulation consistent with ESD 
principles. This guidance should include practical case studies relevant to the regulation 
and be released publicly … (2009, p. 347) 
Underlying the VCEC analysis was the contention that ESD canvasses high-level 
objectives that are hard to define for specific situations ahead of time. Thus ESD 
may be best incorporated into decision making by integrating it earlier into policy 
development or assessment processes. This is likely best achieved through practical 
guidance and tools to assist decision makers.  
Delivering guidance 
Despite the benefits of guidance on objectives, to date its use has been limited. 
Parliaments (or the executive) should therefore prioritise the development of 
guidance for regulators on how to achieve legislative objects. It is best practice for 
this guidance to be made public to promote transparency, certainty and 
accountability (PC 2005, 2011b). 
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It is important to note that some scope for administrative discretion should remain 
— the provision of guidance does not negate the need to exercise judgment 
(Business SA, sub. DR74, p. 2). Attempts to eliminate regulatory discretion would 
result in excessive prescription and remove the flexibility needed to take into 
account the circumstances of each case (Peterson 2006). The weight courts place on 
guidance varies between jurisdictions and, as a form of quasi-regulation, can also 
impose costs on businesses (PC 2012a). Consequently, efforts should ensure 
guidance is consistent with the law and periodically reviewed and updated to ensure 
it is accurate and complete.  
There are a range of approaches that could be used to provide better guidance on 
balancing regulatory objectives. For instance, State and Territory Governments 
could consider the following. 
• Implementing one succinct primary policy goal (or overarching legislative 
objective) for primary planning legislation applying to major projects. 
• Promulgating an instrument which describes the framework for how decision 
makers are to balance development impacts across the social, environmental and 
economic domains.  
– The 2010 Intergenerational Report provides a possible framework, which 
jurisdictions could consider as a template (Australian Government, Swan and 
Treasury 2010). 
– Any guidance material could be complemented by practical case studies, to 
illustrate how balancing may occur.  
• Additionally, other parts of the DAA process, such as improved strategic 
planning and strategic assessment (chapter 11), as well as meaningful public 
consultation (chapter 5), can also help provide guidance to decision makers on 
community preferences and how to manage tradeoffs effectively. 
RECOMMENDATION 4.2 
Where conflicting objectives are unavoidable, parliaments and governments 
should provide public guidance to their regulators with regard to the priority and 
weighting to be given to different objectives. A range of approaches may be 
appropriate, from the inclusion of an overarching policy goal in objects clauses, 
to the provision of guidelines on how tradeoffs are to be made between objectives.  
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5 The application stage 
 
Key points 
• The application stage for a major project involves the upfront provision of 
information and guidance on the development assessment and approval (DAA) 
framework and requirements, decisions on the regulatory pathway(s) a project will 
be subject to, and consultation on the scope of primary assessments (such as 
environment, heritage and social impact assessments). 
• The Commission has identified at least 31 key pathways used across Australia to 
assess and approve major projects (26 are dedicated major project pathways, the 
remainder include Ministerial call-ins and regular development approval processes). 
• Study participants have raised three issues regarding the application stage of the 
DAA process for major projects. These relate to: 
– a lack of upfront clarity and guidance on processes and requirements  
– excessive Ministerial discretion to declare a project into a regulatory pathway 
– limited early stakeholder participation in setting the scope of assessments. 
• Recommendations to improve regulatory certainty, transparency and accountability 
at the application stage for major projects include: 
– provision of clear, upfront information and guidance on major project pathways, 
including on the processes, information requirements, assessment criteria, 
standard and model conditions and statutory timelines 
– use of statutory criteria to determine which pathway(s) apply to a given project  
– limited Ministerial discretion to declare a project into a pathway, and when used 
the Minister should follow guidelines and publicly report the reasons  
– early input by key stakeholders (including local governments, the public and 
proponents) to the draft terms of reference (TOR) of primary assessments 
– public reporting of all stakeholder input to the draft TOR, and the regulator’s 
rationale for the final TOR of an assessment. 
• A number of Australian jurisdictions have implemented (or are in the process of 
implementing) some of these ‘leading practice’ approaches to major project 
application.  
 
The application stage of a development assessment and approval (DAA) process for 
a major project includes the upfront provision of information and guidance by 
governments and regulators on the policy and regulatory framework major 
developments face. Once a development has been proposed, the application stage 
typically involves decisions about which regulatory pathway(s) a project will be 
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assessed and approved under and the type of consultation between proponents, 
regulators and the public needed to inform the scope of ‘primary’ assessments 
(including environment, heritage and social impact assessments).  
These processes assist proponents and others to understand the constraints on 
development activity in a particular region, and how major projects can be designed 
to ensure that regulatory objectives (such as those relating to the environment, 
heritage, health and safety and local communities) are achieved. This chapter 
examines the application stage processes in detail and makes recommendations to 
improve the certainty, transparency and accountability of the current arrangements. 
5.1 Overview of the application stage 
Assessment pathways applied to major projects 
The Commission has identified at least 31 pathways used to assess major projects in 
Australia (table 5.1). These pathways typically encompass the main regulatory 
processes a major project is subject to (such as the primary development approval 
and environment assessment) but do not necessarily incorporate all assessments, 
approvals, authorisations, licenses and permits that may be needed (such as those 
relating to land access, water use and waste management). 
Most jurisdictions have at least one of four types of dedicated major project 
pathways. These include: 
• generic pathways applying to a range of project types — such as coordinated 
projects (Queensland) and major developments or projects (South Australia) 
• infrastructure pathways designed to apply to large (predominantly public) 
infrastructure developments — such as major infrastructure projects (Tasmania) 
and Crown developments and public infrastructure (South Australia) 
• sector-specific pathways used to assess major developments in particular sectors 
— such as mining and energy (South Australia) and major airport infrastructure 
(Commonwealth)  
• project-specific pathways based on agreements or legislation — such as the 
Natural Gas (Canning Basin Joint Venture) Agreement Act 2013 (Western 
Australia) and the Adelaide Oval Redevelopment and Management Act 2011 
(South Australia). 
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Table 5.1 Key regulatory pathways applied to major projectsa 
(Continued next page) 
Jurisdiction Pathway Types of projects typically subject to the pathway 
New South 
Wales 
State significant 
developmentsb 
Projects greater than $30 million (e.g. urban commercial 
and residential, resource and infrastructure projects) 
 State significant 
infrastructureb 
Large public infrastructure projects (e.g. road and rail) 
 Critical state significant 
infrastructureb  
State significant infrastructure declared as ‘critical’ 
Victoria Ministerial ‘call-in’b State significant projects requiring a planning permit or 
planning scheme amendment that are called-in by the 
Planning Minister (e.g. wind farms and urban projects 
such as roads, subdivisions and sports venues) 
 Ministerial permitsb Large commercial and residential developments in the 
City of Melbourne, its surrounds, and Alpine areas 
 Major transport 
projectsb  
Large public road, rail and port infrastructure 
 Special legislationb Large public infrastructure projects (e.g. East Link) 
 Planning permits/ 
planning scheme 
amendmentsc 
Major projects not called-in by the Minister or subject to a 
designated major project pathway (e.g. wind farms and 
urban developments) 
 Environment effects 
statementsd 
Any project that is likely to have a significant 
environmental impact 
Queensland Coordinated projectsb Projects with complex approval requirements; of strategic 
significance; with significant environmental effects; or 
significant infrastructure requirements (e.g. LNG and 
mining projects, industrial installations and resorts)  
 Prescribed 
developmentsb  
Resource projects of major economic significance; that 
require provision of infrastructure which would place an 
excessive financial burden on the state; or significantly 
affect provision of services and facilities by government 
 Prescribed projectsb  Ministerial call-in of coordinated projects; projects in a 
state development area; or projects of economic or social 
significance to the state or a region 
 State development 
areasb 
Projects within one of the declared state development 
areas (e.g. Gladstone) 
 Private infrastructure 
facilitiesb 
Projects with economic or social significance; economic 
or social benefits to a region; or that satisfy an identified 
need or demand for services 
 Urban developmentsb Projects in a declared ‘priority development area’ 
 Ministerial call-inb Any project with a ‘state interest’ 
Western 
Australia 
Development 
assessment panelsb 
Projects of $15 million or more in the City of Perth, or 
$7 million or more in the rest of the state 
 State agreements or 
special legislationb 
Large mining projects and related processing and 
infrastructure (e.g. Natural Gas (Canning Basin Joint 
Venture) Agreement Act 2013) 
 Public environmental 
reviewsd 
Any project considered likely to have a significant effect 
on the environment 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
a Key pathways include dedicated major project pathways (regulatory processes that are specifically designed 
to assess and approve major projects), regular development pathways and environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) processes where they may be conducted separately to a dedicated major project or regular development 
pathway. Not all possible major project pathways are listed. b Dedicated major project pathway. c Regular 
development pathway. d Highest level EIA process. Lesser environmental assessments may be undertaken 
where impacts are deemed to be less significant. 
Source: Based on appendix C.  
Jurisdiction Pathway Types of projects typically subject to the pathway 
South 
Australia 
Major developments or 
projectsb 
Projects of major economic, social or environmental 
importance, and where declaration is appropriate or 
necessary for proper assessment (e.g. port facilities, 
commercial and residential buildings and mines) 
 Crown developments and 
public infrastructureb 
Government infrastructure projects 
 Mining, petroleum, and 
geothermal projectsb 
Projects subject to the Mining Act 1971 (SA) or the 
Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 (SA)  
 Special legislationb Decided case-by-case (e.g. Adelaide Oval) 
 Environmental impact 
statementsd 
For the most complex projects where there is a wide 
range of issues to be investigated in depth 
Tasmania Projects of state 
significanceb 
Projects with significant impacts (including on economic 
development, investment, the economy and the 
environment), or that have complex technical 
processes, engineering designs, or infrastructure 
requirements (e.g. Basslink) 
 Projects of regional 
significanceb  
Projects of regional planning significance; requiring high 
level assessment; or having a significant environmental 
impact (no projects have used this pathway to date) 
 Major infrastructure 
projectsb 
Linear infrastructure such as road, railway, power and 
telecommunications lines  
 Special legislationb Decided case-by-case (e.g. Bell Bay Pulp Mill)  
Northern 
Territory 
Significant developmentb Projects significant to future land use and development 
(e.g. a significant impact on strategic planning, the 
natural environment or existing amenity of land) 
 Exceptional development 
permitsc 
Ministers can grant exceptional development permits for 
projects (major and non-major) otherwise in breach of 
planning schemes (e.g. Conoco Phillips gas plant, 
Ichthys accommodation facility) 
 Development consentc Projects (major and non-major) not subject to an 
exceptional development permit  
 Environmental impact 
statementsd 
Any project considered likely to have a significant effect 
on the environment  
ACT Development applicationsc Projects (major and non-major) 
 Environment impact 
statementsd 
Any project considered likely to have a significant effect 
on the environment 
Cwlth ‘Controlled’ actions under 
the EPBC Act (Cwlth)d 
Any project that includes an action likely to have a 
significant impact on a matter of national environmental 
significance, matters on Commonwealth land or waters, 
or actions taken by Commonwealth agencies 
 Major airport 
infrastructureb 
Major infrastructure at airports covered by the Airports 
Act 1996 (Cwlth) (typically more than $20 million)  
   
 THE APPLICATION 
STAGE 
105 
 
Some dedicated major project pathways include integrated primary impact 
assessments. For example, projects declared as state significant developments (New 
South Wales) typically undergo an environmental impact assessment (EIA). 
However, some dedicated pathways only include assessments if they are deemed to 
be required in a separate process. For example, projects subject to the development 
assessment panel pathway (Western Australia) require an EIA if the project is 
determined to have a ‘significant’ environmental impact by the state Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA). Similarly, major developments under the Airports Act 
1996 (Cwlth) only require an EIA if they trigger one under the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (the EPBC Act). 
Some jurisdictions assess and approve major projects using regular development 
approval pathways. This occurs most frequently in Victoria, Western Australia, the 
Northern Territory and the ACT (with the need for an EIA depending on the 
project’s likely environmental impact). Federally, assessment under the 
Commonwealth EPBC Act can be required for any project that includes a 
‘controlled’ action — an action likely to have a significant impact on a matter of 
national environmental significance, other specific matters on Commonwealth land 
or waters, or actions taken by Commonwealth agencies (chapter 3). 
Upfront guidance on regulatory requirements 
All Australian jurisdictions provide varying levels of upfront information to 
proponents on the processes and requirements of their major project DAA pathways 
(appendix C). This can provide a degree of certainty about what is expected by 
proponents, reduce compliance costs and avoid delays. Generally, upfront guidance 
material includes:  
• information on the general DAA framework (including state, regional and local 
development policies, strategic plans and assessments, general planning, 
development, environment and heritage legislation and regulations). (The use of 
strategic planning and assessments to provide upfront information and guidance 
on major project DAA processes is discussed in chapter 11.) 
• the legislation establishing the dedicated major project pathways, and the 
associated guidelines and explanatory documents that set out how the pathways 
work (including descriptions of processes; criteria for accessing a pathway, 
Ministerial interventions, and assessment and approval decisions; environmental 
and technical standards; statutory timelines and requirements for consultation, 
public notification and reporting). 
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Many jurisdictions provide further guidance through the use of standardised or 
indicative examples of key aspects of DAA processes (such as model EIAs, 
conditions and offsets). Some jurisdictions also offer proponents the opportunity to 
formally meet with regulators to discuss a project proposal before a formal 
application is lodged. 
Determining which pathway applies 
The processes used to determine which regulatory pathway is applied to a major 
project differ across jurisdictions (appendix C). Key differences relate to the: 
• degree of ministerial discretion: The most common approach among 
jurisdictions is to rely on ministerial discretion (guided by non-binding criteria 
or guidelines) to declare or ‘call-in’ a project to a dedicated pathway. Some 
pathways (such as state significant developments (SSDs) (New South Wales)) 
rely primarily on statutory criteria. 
• public reporting requirements of ministerial declarations: Some pathways (such 
as major developments or projects (South Australia)) do not require the Minister 
to publicly explain the reasons for a declaration. Other pathways (such as 
environment effects statements (EESs) (Victoria)) require the relevant Minister 
to publish their reasons against established criteria. 
The processes used to determine the type and level of assessment are discussed 
further in chapter 6. 
Stakeholder participation in setting the scope of primary assessments  
Major project DAA pathways include a variety of voluntary and mandated 
opportunities for stakeholder participation. These can occur at various stages in the 
DAA process (including pre-application, application, assessment, approval and 
post-approval); involve different groups (such as referral agencies, proponents, local 
government, land owners, Indigenous groups, and the general public); and have 
different aims (such as to build ‘social licence’, to identify likely environmental, 
heritage and social impacts, to clarify assessments requirements, and to allow 
appeals and reviews of regulatory decisions). Australian major project DAA 
processes include multiple opportunities for public participation (box 5.1). 
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Box 5.1 Public participation in major project processes in Australia 
Opportunities for public participation in major project development assessment and 
approval (DAA) processes occur at various stages: 
• Pre-application: Proponents often undertake voluntary public consultation at the 
project design phase to build social licence and gather information on community 
concerns and impacts. The Airports Act 1996 (Cwlth) mandates public consultation 
before a development can be considered.  
• Application: Some regulators consult local governments and the public when setting 
the scope of assessments (such as the terms of reference of environmental, social 
or heritage impact assessments). Some require proponents to consult the public as 
part of the preparation of the impact assessments. 
• Assessment: Jurisdictions typically exhibit impact assessment documents to allow 
interested parties to review their content and provide comment. Regulators can 
require amendments and further work in response to the public input. A regulator’s 
assessment report may also be exhibited for public comment (chapter 6). 
• Approval: In some cases, a draft determination may be exhibited for public comment 
before a final decision is made (chapter 7). 
• Reviews and appeals: The public has a range of appeal rights over decisions made 
as part of a major project DAA process (chapter 9). 
• Compliance and monitoring: Some jurisdictions use consultative forums to allow the 
public, local government and proponents to monitor a project’s ongoing operation 
and performance (chapter 10). 
Public participation is also an integral aspect of strategic planning and assessment with 
public input on issues such as land use incorporated into the processes. Effective 
public involvement at a strategic level may reduce the level of consultation required 
during a project-specific assessment (chapter 11). 
More generally, public participation at one stage of a project–level assessment may 
affect or be substituted for processes at other stages. For example, early public 
participation at the pre-application or application stage may impact on: 
• the level of consultation required later (such as when an environmental impact 
assessment is publicly exhibited)  
• the capacity of regulators to ‘stop the clock’ or request further information at later 
stages (chapter 7) 
• the frequency with which parties exercise appeal and review rights (chapter 9). 
Source: Based on appendix C.   
 
Major project pathways offer different opportunities for stakeholder participation in 
setting the scope of primary assessments (appendix C). For example, key 
differences in participation provisions for EIAs include:  
• stakeholder participation in setting the TOR: Most jurisdictions require the 
assessment authority responsible for setting the TOR to consult referral agencies 
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on the issues and requirements to include. Some pathways require wider 
consultation on draft TOR (for example, the Director General (NSW) also 
consults relevant local governments while the assessment authority for the EES 
pathway (Victoria) allows public input). In a few cases (such as with the 
Coordinator-General (Queensland) and state referral agencies (South Australia)), 
regulators also consult proponents on the TOR. 
• stakeholder participation during the preparation of the EIA: Some pathways 
require proponents to undertake extensive public consultation and report on the 
issues raised and the proponent’s responses as part of preparing the EIA. This 
consultation may be in addition to public input on draft TOR (for example, the 
Victorian EES pathway can require both). Or it may be done in place of it (for 
example, the NSW Director General does not allow public input on the TOR but 
requires proponents to undertake public consultation (and report on the 
outcomes) as part of the EIA). Many jurisdictions also allow ongoing contact 
between regulators and proponents during the preparation of the EIA to enable 
clarification on the scope and requirements of the TOR.  
• public reporting of the scope setting process: The degree to which stakeholder 
input on the TOR of an EIA is publicly reported varies widely. Some pathways 
(such as major developments or projects (South Australia)) require referral 
agency advice to be publicly released. Others require community input on draft 
TOR to be made public. The extent of public reporting of consultation between 
regulators and proponents on draft TOR or during the preparation of the EIA is 
unclear. Under some pathways (such as EESs (Victoria) and SSDs (NSW)), the 
responsible assessment authority publishes its rationale for aspects of the final 
TOR (for example by listing relevant assessment criteria, legislation and policies 
that should be addressed in an EIA).  
Appendix C provides a more detailed description of the legislation governing the 
application stage of DAA for major projects in Australian jurisdictions. 
What are the key issues? 
Study participants have raised through submissions and stakeholder consultation 
three issues regarding the application stage of the DAA process for major projects. 
These relate to:  
• a lack of upfront clarity and guidance for proponents on DAA processes and 
requirements  
• excessive ministerial discretion to declare a project into a pathway 
• limited early stakeholder participation in setting the scope of assessments.  
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Each of these issues is examined below. 
5.2  Guidance on regulatory processes and 
requirements 
Although there is extensive guidance and information available for project 
proponents (section 5.1), a number of participants expressed frustration with the 
relevance and quality of some of this material, claiming it is a source of potential 
problems (for example, unnecessary delays) later in the DAA process, and that 
these problems could be addressed by better upfront information and guidance.  
Uncertainty about regulatory requirements  
The Minerals Council of New South Wales noted: 
… a lack of clear and transparent assessment policy has been a concern for industry, 
and has led to unprecedented decisions by both the Planning and Assessment 
Commission and the Land and Environment Court. (sub. 23, p. 4) 
The Minerals Council went on to favour a clear statement of assessment policy to 
improve certainty for proponents about the criteria they need to meet:  
Major project proponents should be able to rely on compliance with clear policy on 
impacts, mitigation measures and other matters, to assess the viability of the project and 
determine whether to proceed, alter the project or abandon the project as unviable. 
(sub. 23, p. 4) 
Likewise, the Business Council of Australia supported greater upfront clarity from 
regulators assessing major projects: 
Major project assessment should require state authorities to issue upfront the standards, 
requirements, and the technical studies that need to be incorporated as preconditions for 
consent to be granted. (sub. 43, p. 4) 
Improving regulatory certainty 
There is an extensive literature on leading practice in this domain of regulatory 
policy. The Commission’s 2011 study of planning and zoning focused on improving 
development assessment processes through the establishment of clear objectives, 
rules and decision making criteria (PC 2011c). Predictable processes, well defined 
roles and responsibilities, accountable decision makers, and open and transparent 
processes are all among the Commission’s criteria for benchmarking regulatory 
practices in this study (appendix B).  
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The Development Assessment Forum principles are similar to the Commission’s 
criteria of leading regulatory practice. They state that development assessment 
requirements and criteria should be written as objective rules and tests that are 
linked to stated policy intentions. In relation to the development of environmental 
impact statement (EIS) processes, they favour: 
• clear, statutory criteria to determine which projects are subject to a pathway  
• clear guidelines for applicants 
• specification of timeframes for actions by regulators and public consultation 
processes (DAF 2009). 
Infrastructure Australia, in a review of approval processes for major infrastructure 
projects, also favoured better documentation of assessment requirements: 
Stronger scoping documents help to identify the requirements for the environmental 
statement more robustly at the front end of the assessment process, minimising the risk 
of approval authorities adding to timeframes by requiring further information and 
studies. (2009, p. 40) 
A diverse range of study participants have supported action by governments and 
regulators to provide better upfront information and guidance on the regulatory 
processes and requirements for major project assessment (sub. DR70; 73; 76; 85; 
92; 98; 100; 102; 105; 106). 
Some Australian jurisdictions have developed or are developing additional guidance 
through the wider use of standardised or indicative examples of key DAA 
processes. For instance: 
• The WA EPA (2013b) has developed Environmental Assessment Guidelines to 
better convey to proponents (and others) the EPA’s expectations on the content 
and form of the environmental scoping document (the TOR) for public 
environmental reviews (EIAs). The guidelines are intended to make the EIA 
process more transparent, to focus it on the matters of key importance and to 
reduce unnecessary content. 
• The Queensland Coordinator-General (2013) has developed generic TOR for 
coordinated project EISs that include standardisation of aspects of the scope and 
information requirements. The aim of the reform is to focus the EIS on the 
critical matters of a project’s assessment. 
• The WA Department of Environmental Regulation (2013) is implementing a 
reform program (Re-Engineering for Industry and Environment) that aims to 
create common template licences (including standardised conditions).  
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• The NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure (2013b) is preparing draft 
sets of standard and model conditions (by industry sector) to assist proponents, 
regulators and the community understand the types of conditions that are likely 
to be applied to state significant developments, should they be approved.  
• The Commonwealth EPBC Act environmental offsets calculator attempts to 
standardise acceptable offsets for a given project impact (DSEWPAC 
(Cwlth) 2012g).  
The Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ) supported the 
Queensland Coordinator-General’s development of generic TOR for coordinated 
project EISs, noting that this should provide greater clarity around the scope of 
impacts assessed. However, they also argued for guidance on the level of 
information required: 
The development of generic terms of reference for the Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) is useful in this regard. However, LGAQ believes the State Government needs to 
take leadership in developing a shared understanding amongst stakeholders about what 
is sufficient information. This would help manage community expectations about the 
management and mitigation [of] actions. (sub. DR78, p. 3) 
The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia noted: 
… the [Western Australian] State Government is [also] currently engaging with 
industry to improve guidance material for mine closure and environmental offsets. 
(sub. DR85, p. 7) 
The Commission supports the provision of clear, upfront information and guidance 
on the DAA pathways that apply to major projects. Clarity about the regulatory 
processes, and where possible, the use of standardised processes and indicative 
examples of requirements, gives all stakeholders greater certainty about the types of 
projects that can be undertaken, the regulatory processes and requirements and the 
likely costs and timeframes involved. It helps proponents decide where to propose 
developments, and how to design them in ways that reduce costs and improve the 
chance of approval. It also increases the accountability and transparency of 
regulators, and can build public confidence in the process and acceptance of the 
outcomes. However, care must be taken to avoid oversimplification which could 
compromise the ability of regulators to identify, analyse and appropriately consider 
the impacts of major developments.  
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RECOMMENDATION 5.1  
Governments should provide clear, upfront information and guidance on the 
development assessment and approval pathways that apply to major projects, 
including details about the processes, the generic information requirements, the 
assessment criteria, the standard and model conditions and the statutory timelines 
that apply under a given pathway. 
Pre-application meetings between proponents and regulators  
Some jurisdictions offer proponents the opportunity to formally meet with 
regulators to discuss a project proposal before a formal application is lodged 
(box 5.2). These opportunities can be mutually beneficial. Regulators can gain an 
earlier understanding of a proposal which may assist in staff resourcing and agency 
coordination. And proponents have an opportunity for early clarification of which 
regulatory processes are likely to apply and how, and explore issues that may be 
potentially sensitive with an agency.  
These benefits were considered significant by a number of participants in this study. 
For instance, the Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure and Transport1 
noted: 
Proponents have previously pointed to the advantages of having an open dialogue with 
Government agencies early in their planning processes to identify possible 
impediments that may then be addressed. (sub. 59, p. 15) 
Likewise, the Association of Mining and Energy Companies argued: 
… such an approach is extremely important in scoping the project and having a clear 
understanding of approval agency expectations and likely assessment timeframes. 
(sub. DR70, p. 16) 
Infrastructure Australia in its review of major infrastructure approval processes 
found that the South Australian approach to pre-application information provision 
incorporated ‘clear identification upfront of the required government approvals and 
ensuring that agreed timeframes are adhered to … ’ (2009, p. 25). 
There are also potential disadvantages with pre-application meetings. They could be 
resource intensive and pose risks to regulator transparency and independence, which 
could instil a perception of undue influence and compromise public confidence in 
the DAA system.  
                                              
1 Now the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. 
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While agreeing that pre-application meetings could be beneficial, the Chamber of 
Minerals and Energy of Western Australia noted that guidelines would be needed to 
ensure the meetings were productive and transparent: 
… the benefits of pre-application meetings between major project proponents and 
approval agencies is also supported. Guidelines are required to ensure the scope and 
intent of meetings is clear and transparent. (sub. DR85, p. 7) 
 
Box 5.2 Regulator-proponent pre-application consultation in Australia 
Some jurisdictions offer major project proponents the opportunity to meet with 
regulators to discuss a project proposal before a development application is lodged. 
Commonwealth 
For major infrastructure projects granted Major Project Facilitation status the 
Department for Infrastructure and Regional Development may: 
• advise proponents on approvals needed under Commonwealth legislation  
• facilitate relationships between the proponent, and State, Territory and Australian 
Government agencies  
• advise proponents on impediments or policy issues and forward these issues to the 
relevant policy areas within the Australian Government. 
Queensland 
Major project proponents seeking to be declared a coordinated project can request 
pre-lodgement meetings with the Coordinator-General (CG) where the proponent and 
the CG can discuss: 
• likely assessment processes, content of the application, timelines, and fees 
• the terms of reference for the environmental impact statement 
• approvals, including any alternative approval pathways 
• high risk, sensitive or contentious matters or impacts 
• possible referral of the project to the Australian Government. 
South Australia 
The South Australian Government provides informal pre-application guidance to major 
project proponents. For example, a proponent may contact the Planning Department to 
discuss options for declaring a development a major project. Typically, the Department 
seeks legal advice and briefs the Minister. A suggestion is then made to the proponent 
on the likely assessment pathway.  
Sources: DSDIP (Qld) (2013c); DIT (Cwlth) (2012); SA Government pers. comm. 22 March 2013.  
 
There are safeguards that could limit the risks of early proponent-regulator 
engagement, such as public documentation and reporting of meetings and clear 
guidelines for regulator conduct (ICAC (NSW) 2012). Such practices have been 
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institutionalised by the National Energy Board of Canada, which the Commission 
considers to be a good model for regulator-proponent consultation at the 
pre-application stage (box 5.3). 
 
Box 5.3 Pre-application meetings with the National Energy Board of 
Canada 
The development assessment and approval process of the Canadian National Energy 
Board (NEB) — the federal regulator for cross-provincial energy projects — includes a 
‘planning and pre-application’ phase.  
Pre-application meetings give stakeholders and the regulator the opportunity to share 
information about processes, establish contacts, discuss filing requirements and 
identify resources. The NEB states that the meetings can contribute to more complete 
applications, facilitate the assessment process and help to avoid unnecessary delays. 
Meetings are typically between NEB staff and a project proponent (although anyone 
may request a meeting).  
Proponents can make a presentation on their project enabling NEB staff to learn about 
aspects of the proposal, including what pre-application public consultation has been 
undertaken by the proponent and what contact has been made with other regulatory 
agencies.  
NEB staff can advise the proponent on regulatory processes and application 
requirements (including on which sections of the NEB Filing Manual, regulatory 
precedent and other guidance documents are relevant to the proposal). Staff can also 
refer a proponent to other government regulatory processes, advise on typical 
timelines and provide relevant government contacts.  
The NEB is an independent regulator and a number of safeguards are in place to 
ensure transparency and accountability in the process.  
• NEB staff are subject to a Code of Conduct and natural justice principles.  
• Pre-application meetings cannot be used to promote a project or, beyond a short 
project description, discuss the merits of the project. 
• Pre-application Meeting Guidance Notes set out the appropriate content for a 
meeting, and presentation materials are vetted in advance. 
• Meeting notes and materials are available to the public upon request. 
• Once an application has been filed, all communication with NEB staff must be 
directed through Legal Services or the Office of the Secretary. 
Source: NEB (2013a).  
 
The Commission believes that more systematic use of pre-application consultation 
meetings with major project proponents would improve certainty and the efficiency 
of DAA processes. However, appropriate safeguards must be in place to ensure 
transparency and accountability and that public trust is maintained. Moreover, 
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pre-application meetings should not become an alternative to existing regulatory 
processes (such as those for determining the DAA pathway or the TOR of the EIA) 
or a substitute for governments providing clear upfront information on how their 
regulations work. To avoid unnecessary costs, pre-application meetings should 
target very large, complex and state significant developments.  
5.3 Ministerial discretion to declare major projects 
The majority of DAA pathways used to assess major projects rely on ministerial 
discretion to declare or call-in a development. However, when such discretionary 
powers are exercised without reference to objective criteria and clear processes, 
which is mostly the case in Australian jurisdictions, it can impinge adversely on 
transparency, limit opportunities for public consultation and increase the proclivity 
to corrupt practices, undermining public confidence in the regulatory process (ICAC 
(NSW) 2010). 
Excessive ministerial discretion 
Several submissions focused on the potential downsides of wide ministerial 
discretion. For example, the Local Government Association of South Australia 
(LGASA) argued that ill-defined ministerial powers to call-in major projects reduce 
transparency and are open to misuse:  
Whilst the Minister must form an opinion that the development or project is of ‘major 
environmental, social or economic importance’, there are no specific criteria prescribed 
in either the Act or Regulations to guide the Minister in forming this opinion. … 
This lack of clearly defining criteria can lead to uncertainty for a development 
proponent, Local Government, and the community as to when Major Project status can 
or should be sought. It can also lead to accusations of lack of transparency or undue 
influence in the development process.  
Typically, but not always, no detailed explanation is given as to the basis for the 
decision to grant Major Project status to a particular proposal. This contributes to 
concerns about transparency and also leads to a lack of precedent for future projects as 
they are unable to assess the criteria by which other projects have been deemed a major 
project. (sub. 25, pp. 2-4) 
Local Government New South Wales reasoned that Part 3A of the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (now repealed) was an example of how 
ministerial discretionary powers could be misused when not subject to clear criteria:  
The result [of an increasing use of Part 3A] was that many residential, commercial and 
coastal projects were declared [by the Minister] as ‘state significant’ and ‘called in’ for 
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ministerial determination when in reality they were of only a regional or even local 
scale. The original intent may have been to speed up assessments and/or remove 
blockages to ‘major’ developments, but the practice became widespread and subject to 
ministerial discretion, and only served to alienate local communities and diminish trust. 
(sub. 36, p. 4) 
The Nature Conservation Council of NSW argued that discretionary decision 
making powers reduce transparency, accountability and public confidence in the 
planning system:  
In NSW, the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) is heavy 
with discretionary decision making processes that have historically led to 
environmental considerations losing out to development and economic interests. These 
discretionary processes have also contributed to inefficiencies in the system as a result 
of uncertainty and lack of transparency. (sub. 22, p. 4)  
The Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association noted that 
arbitrary use of call-in can increase risk: 
Situations where major projects can be ‘called in’ have generated significant ‘sovereign 
risk’ images for the Australian regulatory environment. This is particularly the case 
where the reasons for calling in a project are not transparent, or seem to be based on 
arbitrary information. (sub. DR105, p. 12) 
Improving certainty and transparency 
Recent reforms in New South Wales aim to redress these shortcomings. In line with 
some of the recommendations in an Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) report into the use of ministerial discretion (ICAC (NSW) 2012) and the 
Development Assessment Forum best practice principles (DAF 2009), New South 
Wales limited ministerial discretion to declare a project as state significant by 
developing clear and statutory criteria for determining which developments qualify. 
This is similar to the practice of the Victorian Department of Planning, which lists 
the types of large-scale projects subject to the ministerial permit pathway, as well as 
the areas where any development must be assessed under that pathway (DPCD 
(Vic) 2013).  
The Business Council of Australia supported these measures (sub. 43) and the 
LGASA favoured further transparency measures: 
Major Project status should only be granted following an assessment of the proposal 
against clear and specific criteria. … In the interests of greater transparency, a publicly 
available report should be prepared which identifies the reasons for granting Major 
Project status. (sub. 25, p. 6) 
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These approaches are consistent with leading practice. They provide clarity and 
certainty to all stakeholders about which regulatory pathway a project is subject to 
and transparency around how the decision is made. They also limit the opportunity 
for misuse of ministerial discretion. However, the exclusive use of binding criteria 
could limit regulatory flexibility and hamper effective assessment.  
The NSW system addresses this potential rigidity by allowing limited ministerial 
discretion to declare projects that do not otherwise meet the statutory criteria. In line 
with the ICAC recommendation for public reporting requirements around the use of 
‘ministerial orders’ (ICAC (NSW) 2010), the NSW reforms require that the 
ministerial power can only be used after an independent body (the Planning 
Assessment Commission) has assessed and publicly reported on the ‘state or 
regional significance of the development’. The Minister is also required to report on 
his or her reasons for using the call-in power (appendix C).  
There has been widespread support from study participants for the combined use of 
statutory criteria to determine which projects are subject to major project processes, 
with a requirement that ministerial powers be subject to clear guidelines and 
publicly reported on (sub. DR66; 71; 73; 85; 92; 94; 96; 98; 100; 102; 106). 
In particular, AGL emphasized the importance to business of the regulatory 
certainty that this approach would bring: 
It is vital that consistent processes exist that proponents know in advance and are able 
to plan projects on the basis of. Exceptions to standard processes should be minimised, 
and to the greatest extent possible, should be based upon objective and 
clearly-articulated guidelines or policies as distinct from discretion. (sub. DR96, p. 3) 
While the Australian Local Government Association highlighted the potential 
benefits of greater transparency around the exercise of Ministerial powers: 
To ensure consistency, trust in the process and reduce the potential for proponents to 
seek preferential treatment, it is critical for Ministerial guidelines to be developed and 
all interested parties to understand the reasons for decisions that are made. (sub. DR71, 
p. 13) 
The Commission considers that articulating criteria to determine which proposed 
developments have access to designated major project pathways is a leading 
practice. To provide flexibility, the appropriate Minister should be given defined 
and limited powers to declare projects into a pathway where there is a demonstrable 
benefit in doing so. However, in exercising this power, the Minister must be guided 
by clear guidelines and processes, and be required to report publicly at the time of 
making the declaration why the declaration was necessary.  
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RECOMMENDATION 5.2  
Governments should establish statutory criteria that identify which projects have 
access to designated major project pathways. Limited ministerial discretion 
should be available to ‘declare’ or ‘call-in’ a project that does not meet the 
criteria (thereby making it subject to a major project pathway). In exercising this 
power the Minister must: 
• follow guidelines on when and how the power can be used  
• publicly report the reasons for any declaration against the guidelines. 
5.4 Stakeholder participation in setting the scope of 
assessments 
Study participants have raised concerns about the level of certainty, transparency 
and accountability in the processes used to set the scope of major project primary 
assessments (such as environment, social and heritage impact assessments), 
particularly in relation to public and proponent participation and the degree of 
public reporting on stakeholder input.  
Late public participation 
Many participants in this study argued that public consultation practices and their 
timing for major project DAA processes fell short of leading practices. For instance, 
the LGASA stated:  
The relevant Council should have the opportunity to comment on its capacity to deal 
with a proposal prior to Major Project status being granted. This would also give the 
Council the opportunity to flag any potential issues that might have a negative impact 
on local communities or local service provision. (sub. 25, p. 6)  
Local Government New South Wales also expressed the view that the first 
opportunity for public consultation came too late in the DAA process: 
To date, concerns raised by a community [in New South Wales] have been only 
considered at the project approval stage. The inclusion of community concerns at this 
stage may be far too late; realistically, proponents may have an expectation that they 
will receive an approval as they have followed the agency requirements. … Community 
anxiety and resistance could be reduced to a certain degree if early and genuine 
consultation with communities was undertaken and appropriate consultation 
frameworks (such as consultative committees) were established. (sub. 36, p. 6) 
Similarly, Amelia Thorpe argued that consulting after the EIA is completed limits 
the chances of meaningful participation by stakeholders: 
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… since submissions are not generally sought until project proposals are 
well-developed, it is much harder to incorporate public suggestions and thus much 
harder to provide meaningful opportunities for participation. The easiest way for the 
public to engage in such process is to criticise project proposals, or to focus discussions 
on superficial issues such as managing impacts during construction. (sub. 16, p. 5) 
Xstrata Coal suggested that allowing earlier public participation in the DAA process 
could reduce some of the problems that occur later: 
[Public] input should occur at the start of the approval process (at the terms of 
reference, environmental impact statement or equivalent stage) rather [than] at the end 
of the process to avoid costly delays or de-railing the assessment process. (sub. 50, p. 2) 
Likewise, NTSCORP (sub. DR104) emphasised the importance of early and 
genuine engagement with Traditional Owners as a way of increasing a community’s 
acceptance of a project and avoiding delays later on. 
Early opportunities for public involvement 
Major projects can have multiple impacts on communities and on the environment. 
This generates expectations of public involvement in deciding if and how they are 
approved. Open and early community engagement is a leading regulatory practice 
that raises decision makers’ awareness of public interest concerns and increases 
community acceptance of decisions.  
The OECD emphasises the benefits of public participation in regulatory processes, 
stating that it can: 
• bring into the discussion the expertise, perspectives, and ideas for alternative 
actions of those directly affected 
• help regulators to balance opposing interests 
• identify unintended effects and practical problems. Pre-notification makes it easier 
to foresee the consequences of planned policies and is a productive way to identify 
administrative burdens 
• provide a quality check on the administration’s assessment of costs and benefits 
• identify interactions between regulations from various parts of government. 
(OECD 2013a, p. 2)  
There is no unique model on how to achieve effective public participation and 
methods depend on the nature of the project. However, research into the strategies 
used in development and planning in Australia has identified some leading practices 
that can make consultation more meaningful and effective (box 5.4). In particular, 
public participation was found to be more effective where it occurred early enough 
to allow input to be considered and incorporated into decision making, and where 
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participants received feedback, including explanations where their ideas were not 
taken up (ACTPLA 2005). 
NTSCORP agreed, noting that in the case of consultation with Indigenous groups, 
‘genuine’ participation involved: 
… seeking the input of Traditional Owners in matters that affect their rights and 
interests, including cultural heritage, at the outset of project assessment. Genuine 
engagement would also ensure that any feedback or input is addressed, to avoid the 
process becoming tokenistic. Ideally, issues raised by Traditional Owners, would be 
incorporated into project design to avoid, minimise, and mitigate impacts on native title 
rights and interests. … [and] ensuring that persons with appropriate knowledge and 
authority to speak for country are consulted. (sub. DR104, p. 6)  
 
Box 5.4 Some leading practices on public consultation 
Research undertaken for the ACT Planning and Land Authority — the Edwards Report 
(2004) and ArtCraft Research Report (2004) — identified leading practices in 
community consultation on development and planning policy. They relate to:  
• a need for clear, communicated reasons for each engagement exercise  
• engagement techniques tailored to suit different circumstances, such as the stage of 
policy development and the communities participating  
• all interested people having the opportunity to give their views, not just a vocal 
minority  
• clear statements and understanding of why consultation occurs  
• clarity as to the appropriate form of consultation in connection with different types of 
plans, such as master plans and neighbourhood plans  
• processes that require community suggestions and comments to be seriously 
considered and, where appropriate, incorporated into policy  
• giving clear reasons for policy decisions and feedback to persons involved 
including, where relevant, reasons for ideas not being taken up. 
Source: ACT Planning and Land Authority (2005).  
 
One of the early opportunities for public consultation in major project DAA 
processes is on the scope of issues to be investigated by a proponent in an impact 
assessment — typically referred to as the terms of reference (TOR). More extensive 
opportunities occur during the preparation of the assessment documentation, when 
proponents have more time to engage with stakeholders and respond to (and report 
on) the issues raised.  
The Commission’s analysis found limited opportunities for early public 
participation on the TOR of primary major project assessments. For EIAs, for 
example, few of the pathways require regulators to consult the public or relevant 
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local governments on the TOR. A number of pathways can require a proponent to 
undertake public consultation while preparing an EIA and to report on the issues 
raised and the proponent’s responses (section 5.1). However, in some cases, the first 
meaningful opportunity for public input into the assessment process occurs once the 
EIA has been completed and is publicly exhibited (chapter 6).  
Notable exceptions are Victoria and Western Australia. Ministerial guidelines for 
the environment effects statement in Victoria (box 5.5) and the EIA process 
undertaken by the EPA in Western Australia include opportunities for early 
community input on the TOR (called the draft scoping requirements in Victoria and 
the environmental scoping document in Western Australia), and require proponents 
to undertake their own public consultation as part of preparing the environmental 
assessment documents (DSE (Vic) (2006); EPA (WA) (2013b)). The Commission 
considers that the Victorian and WA processes are leading practices in early public 
participation and other jurisdictions should adopt these approaches, or similar 
practices. 
 
Box 5.5 Victoria’s environment effects statement and public 
participation 
Ministerial guidelines outline public participation in environment effects statement 
(EES) assessments undertaken under the Environment Effects Act 1978.  
The process to set the EES scoping requirements typically includes:  
• a proponent providing a list of issues to be investigated and a draft study program 
• the Minister considering the information together with advice from relevant agencies 
and authorities and preparing draft scoping requirements (DSRs) 
• the DSRs being released for public comment for a minimum of 15 business days 
• the Minister reviewing public submissions, finalising the DSRs (normally within 15 
business days of the close of the comment period) and making them public. 
A second opportunity for public participation can occur while the proponent is preparing 
the EES. Generally, a proponent must develop and implement a Consultation Plan to 
inform individuals and groups who could be affected by the project and provide 
opportunities for input. This engagement helps the proponent to identify issues of 
concern and potential effects, as well as get feedback from stakeholders on project 
options or potential mitigation measures. The proponent includes this feedback and 
their response to the issues and concerns raised in the EES.  
A third opportunity for public input occurs once the EES is completed and exhibited for 
public comment. The public have between 20 and 30 business days to make written 
submissions. The Minister may appoint an inquiry panel to evaluate the effects of the 
project, having regard to the EES studies and public submissions.  
Source: DSE (Vic) (2006) .  
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There has been widespread support from study participants for requiring regulators 
to publicly consult on draft TOR for EIAs (sub. DR71; 76; 85; 92; 95; 98; 100; 102; 
104; 105).  
Allowing public input on the TOR for primary impact assessments (such as EIAs) 
improves transparency and accountability around the process and can increase 
public buy-in. It also provides an early avenue through which important community 
issues potentially missed by regulators can be included upfront in major project 
assessments, reducing the chance of ‘new’ issues arising later in the assessment 
process that can contribute to delays and increased costs.  
Further, meaningful consultation on the TOR strengthens the case for limiting the 
use of ‘stop the clock’ provisions which many participants have indicated are a 
significant source of delay in DAA processes, and for introducing statutory time 
limits on approval decisions (chapter 7). However, the timeframes for public input 
on draft TOR are typically brief — around two weeks — which is insufficient time 
for full public engagement on a project’s impacts. Accordingly, it should not be 
seen as a substitute for the more extensive public consultation typically undertaken 
by a proponent as part of their investigation of project impacts and preparation of 
the assessment documentation.  
Effective early proponent-led consultation with affected parties (including the 
public, local governments and others) as part of impact assessment processes builds 
on the benefits of public input on the TOR. In particular it provides opportunities 
for: 
• the public to understand a development, provide information on its likely 
impacts and articulate their concerns 
• proponents to consider the public input, incorporate it into their investigations, 
provide feedback and possibly adjust the project design to mitigate impacts.  
Reporting on public engagement in the assessment documents also increases 
transparency, certainty and accountability by providing a public record of the issues 
raised and responses made by proponents. However, there are also potential costs 
from expanding early opportunities for public consultation on major projects. It 
could lead to delays as additional time is set aside for the process to be undertaken 
and it could add to the compliance and administrative costs borne by project 
proponents and regulators.  
The Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association supported early 
public participation, but noted that it must ‘be commensurate to the circumstances 
of each project’ and that ‘objectives of consultation have to be clear, and the 
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purpose must be stated’ (sub. DR105, p. 12). They also highlighted the risk of 
delays, arguing: 
… there have been cases in the past where public consultation processes [have been] 
deliberately overloaded for the purpose of slowing down the process. (sub. DR105, 
p. 12)  
Peabody Energy Australia noted that while early consultation can be beneficial, the 
potential for project designs to change over time should be taken into account: 
At such an early project stage, … the level of [project] detail is often subject to change. 
This needs to be recognised and accepted by regulators. (sub. DR81, p. 2)  
Two jurisdictions, citing the goal of shorter timelines for the DAA process, have 
recently moved away from public consultation on the TOR for major project EIAs. 
The SA Government removed it from the major project pathway (sub. 51) and the 
Queensland Government granted the Coordinator-General greater discretion to 
decide whether an EIS will be publicly notified (the Economic Development Act 
2012 (Qld)).  
It is not straightforward to give an assessment of the adequacy of existing early 
public consultation practices and recent reforms in this area. The rationale for, and 
impacts of, even small changes depend critically on other aspects of the DAA 
regulatory system, such as the right to appeal decisions (chapter 9), the use of 
statutory timelines and stop the clock provisions (chapter 7) and whether strategic 
plans or assessments are in place (chapter 11).  
On balance, the Commission believes that the gains from fostering earlier public 
participation at the application stage are greater than the downside risks, provided 
participation is effective, does not unduly delay projects or increase regulatory 
burdens, and that related reforms to later DAA processes (such as the introduction 
of statutory timeframes and limits on ‘stop the clock’) are also implemented. The 
form of public participation required at the project-level should also take into 
account consultation already undertaken as part of a strategic plan or assessment 
(chapter 11). 
Pre-application public participation 
Some overseas jurisdictions require major project proponents to undertake and 
report on public consultation as a pre-requisite for lodging a development 
application (box 5.6). Typically, the purpose of this approach is to require a 
proponent to engage with affected parties early enough to be able to take the input 
into account in a project’s design. Where a regulator is convinced that the 
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consultation is sufficient and the proponent has appropriately responded to the 
issues raised, later opportunities for public participation are limited. 
In Australia, the Airports Act 1996 (Cwlth) requires proponents of major airport 
developments to undertake and report on pre-application consultation with affected 
parties and agencies before lodging a development application. More typically in 
Australia, proponents voluntarily initiate pre-application consultation as a means to 
build social licence for a development and allay community concerns. For example, 
ElectraNet notes that the company: 
… has a policy of active community and stakeholder engagement prior to finalising 
development applications for assessment and consideration by the relevant planning 
authority. (sub. DR63, p. 3) 
 
Box 5.6 Overseas examples of pre-application public consultation  
Nationally significant infrastructure projects (the United Kingdom) 
The assessment and approval process for nationally significant infrastructure projects 
in the United Kingdom (typically large road, rail and water infrastructure) requires 
proponents to undertake extensive public consultation before lodging a development 
application. 
Pre-application, a proponent must prepare a Statement of Community Consultation 
which details the project, the type of environmental assessment required, and how the 
applicant will publicise and undertake consultations. Once the consultation is complete, 
the developer lodges a report (covering the issues raised and how they have been 
addressed) with the development application and an environmental impact assessment 
(where required). 
National Energy Board (Canada) 
The National Energy Board of Canada — the federal regulator for cross provincial 
energy projects — requires a proponent to develop and conduct a consultation 
program prior to lodging a project application.  
The objective of the process is to effectively communicate with all individuals, groups 
and agencies affected by the project to discover their concerns and to respond to the 
issues raised in the planning and design of the project. 
Sources: DCLG (2013b); NEB (2013c).  
 
The Commission considers proponent-initiated pre-application public consultation 
to be a good practice, especially for projects that are likely to have large or 
contentious community impacts. Project proponents are best placed to determine if 
and how such consultation should occur.  
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Proponent participation in setting the scope of assessments 
Some participants in the study supported early consultation between major project 
proponents and regulatory agencies. The Queensland Resources Council, for 
instance, argued:  
Currently proponents waste a lot of time and effort because different agency districts or 
regions have different expectations of what should be in a ToR and the EIS. 
(sub. 19, p. 5) 
The Australian Uranium Association went further, calling for binding 
pre-application consultation between proponents and regulators being built into the 
formal DAA process (sub. 34). 
Some major project pathways include opportunities for early consultation between 
regulators and proponents to begin the process of determining the scope of primary 
assessments (such as the TOR for EIAs) (box 5.7). Jurisdictions also allow meetings 
between regulators and proponents during the preparation of the assessment 
documents to allow for ongoing clarification and guidance on the interpretation and 
requirements of the TOR.  
 
Box 5.7 Proponent-regulator consultation on the scope of 
assessments  
Jurisdictions approach early consultation between regulators and proponents on the 
scope of assessments in different ways. 
The South Australian Government allows proponents to enter into formal discussions 
with a referral body (such as the Environmental Protection Authority) before lodging a 
development application. A pre-lodgement agreement may result, which can remove 
the need for the application to be referred to the referral body when eventually lodged. 
In Western Australia, the Environmental Protection Authority’s process for setting the 
scope of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) for projects subject to a Public 
Environmental Review includes pre-referral discussions with the proponent, relevant 
decision making authorities and other government agencies. 
In Queensland, the Coordinator-General can arrange meetings between proponents of 
coordinated projects and referral agencies during the consultation period on the draft 
terms of reference to: 
• explain the EIA process, including the agencies' roles 
• enable the proponent to outline the key elements of the project, its likely impacts 
and mitigation strategies 
• solicit feedback from agencies on issues that should be addressed in the EIA.  
Sources: DSDIP (Qld) (2013c); SA Government pers. comm. 22 March 2013; WA EPA (2013b).  
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Early consultation between a proponent and regulator on the TOR of a major project 
assessment can improve regulatory outcomes and avoid unnecessary regulatory 
burdens. It helps to clarify the scope and deliverables in an impact assessment, and 
to avoid situations where specific work is undertaken even though it is not required 
by any of the agencies. It can also reduce delays later in the DAA process caused by 
a regulator stopping the clock to request more information. However, as with 
pre-application meetings between proponents and regulators (section 5.2), there are 
risks associated with this approach. 
Where consultation between major project proponents and regulatory agencies 
occurs, safeguards (including public reporting of meetings and clear guidelines for 
regulator conduct) should be in place to limit the risks of regulatory capture and to 
ensure transparency and accountability in the process.  
Public reporting of processes to set the scope of assessments 
Transparency and accountability in a regulatory process also depends on the public 
and other stakeholders being able to see how decisions are made. ICAC, in a review 
of the NSW planning system, highlighted the importance of publicly available 
information: 
The provision of information is fundamental to ensuring transparency and generating 
public interest in proposals. A transparent planning system requires the provision of 
publicly available information so that members of the public understand what is being 
proposed, why decisions have been made, what has influenced those decisions, and the 
processes involved in making a decision. (2012, p. 12)  
In this regard, the scope and detail of public reporting on the processes used to set 
the scope and requirements of major project assessments in Australia varies 
depending on the DAA pathway. In the case of EIAs: 
• some pathways allow referral agencies to publicly report on the advice they give 
to the authority responsible for setting the TOR (for example, the NSW Director 
General Requirements for SSDs can be released with the referral agency advice 
attached) 
• some pathways with public input on draft TOR publish the submissions received 
while others do not (for example, submissions on the draft TOR for the Victorian 
EES are not normally publicly released) 
• in some pathways, such as for EESs (Victoria) and SSDs (NSW), the authority 
responsible for setting the final TOR lists the draft assessment criteria and 
legislation and policies that need to be addressed in the EIA. However, few 
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jurisdictions require the regulator to further explain the rationale for the TOR 
(section 5.1). 
There has been widespread support from study participants for better public 
reporting of the processes used for setting the scope of EIAs (sub. DR71; 76; 85; 
92; 95; 98; 100; 102).  
A public reporting requirement on regulatory agencies involved in setting the scope 
of a major project assessment has multiple benefits. It can help to: 
• ensure that regulators adhere to any requirements, and are held accountable 
when they do not 
• identify where incorrect or inappropriate information is used, and reduce 
opportunities for undue influence 
• build public trust in major project DAA processes and legitimacy in the 
outcomes  
• provide certainty for project proponents because they understand the reasons for 
regulator decisions and learn from the precedent set by earlier decisions.  
The Commission believes that public reporting of all advice used in setting the 
scope of primary major project assessments, and of the rationale used by the 
regulators involved, is leading practice.  
RECOMMENDATION 5.3  
To achieve greater transparency, accountability and certainty in the process for 
setting the scope of major project primary assessments, governments should 
ensure that key stakeholders (including local governments, the public and 
proponents) have input to the draft terms of reference for primary assessments 
and that such input, and how it has been addressed, should be made public.  
Accessible public participation  
Effective stakeholder participation in major project DAA processes depends on 
parties being able to access, comprehend and respond to the assessment documents 
prepared by proponents and assessment authorities. Some study participants have 
expressed concern that the increasing complexity and technical nature of EIAs 
(chapter 6), and the manner of publicly exhibiting the multiple documents involved, 
limits effective public participation.  
The Queensland Resources Council noted that the increasing size and complexity of 
EISs makes it difficult for the public to effectively engage: 
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… the comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS), has become so long, 
complex and detailed, that it is very difficult for a local community to engage in the 
assessment process. When EIS reports routinely run to 10,000-14,000 pages and the 
hard copies weigh upwards of 7-8 kilos, they are not documents that can be readily read 
and understood. As the EIS has become increasingly exhaustive in their coverage, the 
sheer volume of information has made them increasingly inaccessible to local 
stakeholders. (sub. 19, p. 2) 
Similarly, the Lock the Gate Alliance argued that larger, more technical EISs limit 
public engagement and contribute to delays: 
Community groups and individuals are, in our view, at considerable disadvantage in the 
public consultation processes as they have evolved in NSW and Queensland over the 
last ten years or so. 
… the jargonistic, technical and voluminous character of Environmental Impact 
Statements has become a major barrier to community participation. Indeed, this barrier 
could also be seen through the industry lens as a contribution to the “costs and delays” 
from the proponent’s perspective, since the impenetrable prose of EISs leads to 
community members not noticing major problems and gaps with the assessment until 
late in the process. (sub. DR97, p. 12) 
The Lock the Gate Alliance also pointed to the EIS for the Rocky Hill Coal Project 
— which consists of 55 separate PDF files some of which do not have file names 
describing their contents — as an example of how multiple and poorly presented 
documentation can act as a barrier to community participation: 
… community members confronted with a wall of large PDF documents and a table of 
contents 15 pages long must invest considerable time and patience in just finding the 
information that concerns them most, let alone reading and responding to it. 
(sub. DR97, p. 12) 
The Conservation Council SA noted that the practice (under the South Australian 
major developments or projects pathway) of removing assessment documents from 
the website at the end of a public comment period also limits community 
participation. They argued transparency would increase if: 
… documents released for public consultation are not removed from websites when 
consultation periods close, and are maintained on the public record. (sub. DR76, p. 4) 
To varying degrees, jurisdictions are improving public access to major project DAA 
documents. Many jurisdictions maintain online archives that hold key 
documentation (for example, the NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure 
Major Project Assessment web page stores existing and past major project 
documentation from the first application to the final determination). Proponents are 
also attempting to increase the digestibility of assessment information (for example, 
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through the use of executive summaries for EIAs which bring together information 
and findings from the multitude of assessment documents). 
Major project DAA documentation can be voluminous, fragmented, technical and 
difficult to understand. The Commission believes that maintaining an easily 
accessible public record of all major project assessment documentation and reports 
is a leading practice that facilitates effective public participation in DAA processes. 
In addition, where proponent assessment documentation (such as EIAs) or regulator 
assessment reports are released for public comment, the inclusion of a single, 
integrated executive summary that presents key information from a community 
perspective and includes links to the more detailed documents could be an effective 
and relatively low cost approach to improve community participation. 
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6 The assessment stage 
 
Key points  
• Major projects are subject to assessment processes across all levels of government 
depending on the nature, location and complexity of the project. Assessor 
institutions include government departments and statutory agencies. 
• State and Territory Governments have primary responsibility for assessing major 
project proposals. In some jurisdictions, a single institution is responsible for 
managing a relatively integrated assessment process. In other cases, a potentially 
large number of standalone assessment processes apply. 
• Australian Government assessment processes apply if proposed major projects are 
undertaken on Commonwealth land (or waters) or by the Commonwealth or its 
agencies, or if projects are likely to have a significant impact on matters of national 
environmental significance. 
• Local governments have a limited role in major project assessment. 
• Unnecessary regulatory burdens that add to timelines and compliance costs arise at 
the assessment stage due to: 
– duplication between assessment processes 
– uncoordinated administration of processes 
– concerns about the quality and independence of assessment analysis 
– assessment requirements that are disproportionate to project risks and impacts. 
• The Commission is recommending establishment of a ‘one project, one 
assessment’ framework for environmental matters through: 
– instituting more comprehensive bilateral assessment agreements under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) 
– greater cooperation between intra-jurisdictional regulators to conduct joint 
assessments, or to accredit each other’s processes. 
• Where such arrangements do not already exist, there is an ‘in-principle’ case for: 
establishing major projects coordination offices (or similar) at the state and territory 
level to better coordinate and track assessment and approval processes; and 
institutionally separating environmental policy from regulatory functions (including 
assessment and enforcement activities). Further work is required to assess the 
benefits and costs of these reforms. 
• Scaling measures (such as establishing assessment ‘tracks’ and using 
risk-assessment tools to set the scope of an assessment) encourage targeted and 
proportionate assessments of major project impacts. This can reduce compliance 
burdens and lead to more efficient resource allocation.  
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Rigorous assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts of major 
projects is fundamental to the achievement of broader regulatory objectives. To this 
end, proposed major project developments are subject to a range of regulatory 
assessment processes. Collectively, these processes can take several years to 
complete and impose a considerable burden on proponents, the community and 
governments. This chapter examines the efficiency and effectiveness of existing 
processes and proposes reforms for improving these arrangements while protecting 
Australia’s environmental, heritage and cultural assets. 
6.1 Overview of major project assessment processes 
In broad terms, major project assessment processes aim to identify and assess: 
• the nature and significance of the risks and impacts of a proposed major project 
on matters such as land use, the environment, Indigenous heritage, Aboriginal 
land rights and public health and safety 
• options for avoiding, mitigating or managing those impacts. 
Information revealed through the assessment process is used to inform decisions 
about the acceptability (or otherwise) of proposed projects, including any conditions 
that should apply. Major project approvals are the focus of chapter 7 and conditions 
are examined in chapter 8. 
The processes in place to facilitate major project assessment in Australia cover a 
diverse and complex set of issues, comprise various steps (including public 
consultation) and require substantial information and data. Box 6.1 provides a 
generic description of a sample of these processes. Appendix C provides a 
comprehensive account of assessment arrangements in Australian jurisdictions. 
In most cases, primary responsibility for assessing major projects rests with the 
States and Territories and regulatory approaches vary depending on the nature of 
the project and the assessment ‘pathway’ that is adopted (chapter 5). 
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Box 6.1 Key major project assessment processes 
• Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is the process of identifying, predicting, 
evaluating and mitigating the environmental impacts of development proposals prior 
to decisions being taken. Key steps include: 
– preparation (by the proponent) of assessment documentation 
– public exhibition of documentation and lodgement of submissions 
– assessment (by the relevant assessment authority) of the environmental impacts 
of the proposed project, and of measures to avoid, mitigate and/or ‘offset’ 
adverse impacts (referral agencies might also provide input into the assessment 
process)  
– provision of recommendations and advice to the relevant decision maker.  
• Some EIA processes (or similar processes, such as sustainability impact 
assessments and ecologically sustainable development assessments) also cover 
social and economic impacts. In other cases, a dedicated social impact assessment 
may apply. 
• Indigenous heritage processes typically involve: 
– identification (for example, through heritage surveys) of whether the area 
impacted by a proposed development has heritage significance 
– assessment of the likely impacts of the development on Indigenous heritage 
– consultation with relevant Indigenous parties 
– identification of possible management options, including duty of care processes 
and agreed cultural management plans or land use agreements (PC 2013a). 
• The assessment process for planning matters comprises: 
– lodgement of a planning application (as part of this, proponents are usually 
required to identify how the proposal is consistent with relevant planning policies) 
– registration of the planning application on the public register and provision of 
notice to members of the community affected by the proposal 
– consideration and assessment of the application by the planning authority. 
• Where native title is applicable, changes to existing land uses need to be consistent 
with native title. Other than seeking a Federal Court determination of native title 
rights and interests, developers can negotiate directly with Traditional Owners to 
ratify: 
– Indigenous Land Use Agreements: a legal agreement between a native title 
group and others about the use and management of land and waters. 
– Future Act Agreements: an agreement that sets out what future acts are 
permitted, the effect the act will have on native title and any compensation that is 
to be paid for interference with native title rights.  
 
In broad terms, assessment arrangements in New South Wales, South Australia and 
Tasmania can be characterised as relatively integrated (table 6.1). Under these 
arrangements, a comprehensive range of project impacts (ordinarily assessed by 
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separate agencies) are considered jointly. In Victoria, integrated assessment 
arrangements are in place for major transport projects only. 
Table 6.1 ‘Integrated’ approaches to major project assessment 
Jurisdiction Major project assessment 
pathway 
Key requirementsa 
New South 
Wales 
State significant development 
and state significant 
infrastructure 
• Environmental impact statement and 
development application 
• Public exhibition period of at least 30 days 
Victoria Major transport projects • Comprehensive impact statement or impact 
management plan 
• Public exhibition period of 20-30 days (for 
comprehensive impact statements) 
South 
Australia 
Section 46 (major development 
or project) process 
• Environmental impact statement or public 
environment report or development report 
• Public comment period of 3 to 6 weeks 
 Section 49 (Crown 
development and public 
infrastructure) process 
• Development application  
• Environmental impact statement (if required) 
• Public comment period of at least 3 weeks  
Tasmania Projects of state significance • Integrated impact statement 
• Public exhibition of draft impact statement 
 Projects of regional 
significance 
• Project impact statement 
• Environmental impact assessment (if required) 
• 28 day public exhibition period 
 Major infrastructure projects • Determined on a project-by-project basis 
a Includes preparation of impact assessment documentation and public exhibition of this material. 
Source: Based on appendix C. 
Although an integrated approach can reduce the total number of assessment 
processes that are administered, in most cases other (separate) requirements still 
apply (for example, processes covering native title issues, mining and 
petroleum-related approvals, and road access and works approvals). Moreover, the 
undertaking of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) does not necessarily 
substitute for compliance with other environmental obligations. 
Integrated major project assessment processes are not in place in Victoria (except 
for transport projects), Queensland, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and 
the ACT. Instead, a range of standalone development assessment and approval 
(DAA) processes apply (table 6.2). In some cases administrative arrangements are 
in place to coordinate these processes, as discussed in section 6.3. 
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Table 6.2 Key assessment processes in ‘non-integrated’ systems 
Jurisdiction Environment Heritage and native title Other  
Victoria Environment effects 
statement 
Cultural heritage 
management plan  
Planning permits 
 Works approval  Heritage permits Exploration, mining and 
production permits  
 Flora and fauna permits  Building permits  
 Water licences and 
permits 
 Road works permits  
 Works across waterways 
permits 
 Use of, or access to, 
Crown land reservations 
 Native vegetation clearing 
permits 
 Use or development of 
coastal Crown land 
Queensland Environmental impact 
statement 
Cultural heritage permits Social impact assessment 
 Environmental authorities Aboriginal cultural heritage 
management plan 
Planning approval 
 Water use and water 
extraction licences 
Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander land access 
permits 
Exploration, mining and 
production permits 
Western 
Australia 
Public environmental 
review or assessment on 
proponent information 
Aboriginal heritage 
assessment 
Planning approval 
 Native vegetation clearing 
permits 
Native title agreement Development consent 
 Flora and fauna permits  Exploration, mining and 
production permits 
 Works approval   
Northern 
Territory 
Environmental impact 
statement or public 
environmental review 
Aboriginal sacred site 
certificate (authority 
certificate) 
Land access assessment 
 Water licences and 
permits 
 Mining approval and 
exploration licences 
 Flora and fauna permits  Development consent 
 Native vegetation clearing 
permits 
  
 Works approval   
ACT Environmental impact 
statement 
Advice from Heritage 
Council 
Development application 
   Building consents and 
approvals 
   Water and sewerage 
approvals 
Source: Based on appendix C. 
Regulatory processes administered by the Australian Government might also apply 
to major projects. In particular, if a project is deemed to involve a ‘controlled 
action’ under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cwlth) (EPBC Act), the impacts of the project on matters of national 
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environmental significance must be assessed. Other potentially relevant Australian 
Government processes include: 
• health, safety and environmental assessments required under the Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cwlth). Specifically, 
proponents of offshore petroleum projects may be required to prepare an 
Environment Plan, Safety Case, Oil Spill Contingency Plan or Well Operations 
Management Plan  
• Indigenous heritage assessment processes under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cwlth) 
• processes for negotiating access to Aboriginal land or land held under native title 
as set out in the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cwlth) 
and the Native Title Act 1993 
• development assessment processes set out in the Airports Act 1996 (Cwlth), 
including preparation of a Major Development Plan consistent with a 
pre-existing Master Plan. 
What are the reform priorities? 
The remainder of this chapter examines the design and operation of major project 
assessment processes in Australia and makes recommendations for improving these 
arrangements. In particular, the Commission considers that regulatory burdens 
would be reduced, and relevant environment and social objectives better achieved, 
by: 
• removing overlap and duplication between assessment processes  
• better coordinating the administration of processes  
• enhancing the quality and independence of assessment work 
• encouraging more proportionate assessment requirements.  
6.2 Duplication between assessment processes 
Participants’ contrasting views on the extent of unnecessary 
duplication 
Concerns about duplication between environmental assessment processes 
administered by the Australian Government and the States and Territories have been 
a strong theme of study submissions: 
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Duplication in assessment and approval is an inefficient use of resources and adds 
unnecessary time delay to the approval process for no real benefit. … The State 
legislation is considered to be appropriate and robust, [and] able to ensure 
environmental protection in the decision making process. (Urban Taskforce Australia, 
sub. 15, p. 4) 
and 
The duplication and overlap of project approvals across governments is a major 
headache for project proponents … one recent investment triggered four assessment 
processes by four separate government agencies, at both federal and state levels, all 
with similar information requirements. (BCA, sub. 43, p. 10) 
The Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA) 
referred to a survey study conducted by Andrew Macintosh from the Australian 
National University that found: 
73 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement, ‘The EPBC Act process 
duplicated other regulatory processes without significantly improving environmental 
outcomes’. Further, 81 per cent of respondents whose actions were subject to 
conditions under the EPBC Act and state or territory planning and environment permits 
reported some or substantial overlap in the conditions. (Macintosh 2010, p. 408) 
Some respondents considered that overlaps between state and federal environmental 
regulations have worsened over time due to the ‘growing role’ of the Australian 
Government: 
The Commonwealth’s growing assertiveness at inserting a second and subsequent layer 
of review on environmental grounds seems more motivated by a focus on political 
rather than environmental outcomes. (Queensland Resources Council, sub. 19, p. 4) 
Notwithstanding these concerns, many respondents considered that state-level 
duplication is the most significant source of regulatory burden at the assessment 
stage. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia considered: 
Numerous duplications exist [in Western Australia] … for example, the Environment 
Protection Authority (EPA) and Department of Mines and Petroleum have 
environmental approval responsibilities, while the EPA and Department of Indigenous 
Affairs have Aboriginal heritage responsibilities. (sub. 44, p. 4) 
Xstrata Coal pointed to areas of regulatory duplication in New South Wales and 
Queensland: 
The objectives of the [New South Wales] Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 
1979 overlaps with the Heritage Act 1998 and the Water Management Act 2000. These 
overlapping objectives mean that various State Government agencies have the power to 
impose assessment requirements and compliance requirements in relation to the same 
issue but with different outcomes … In Queensland, reform is urged to consider the 
considerable overlap and duplication between the environmental impact statement 
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processes, and the subsequent Mineral Resources Act and Environment Protection Act 
processes. (sub. 50, pp. 42–44) 
Clayton Utz (pers. comm., 13 June 2013) also highlighted overlaps within the 
Queensland regulatory system, particularly with respect to regulation of vegetation 
clearing, surface water and groundwater management, noting that as many as six 
separate requirements could apply in each case. 
While most stakeholders gave in-principle support to measures aimed at reducing 
unnecessary duplication, the importance of the Australian Government’s role in 
assessing impacts on matters of national environmental significance was strongly 
emphasised by a number of participants. The Australian Network of Environmental 
Defender’s Offices (ANEDO) observed: 
States are not legally mandated to act in the national interest; States may have inherent 
conflicts of interest as proponents of major projects; The Commonwealth is responsible 
for implementing Australia’s international environmental obligations and … has an 
essential role in requiring consistent environmental standards and oversight of State 
processes. (sub. 14, pp. 9–10) 
The Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists noted that, in addition to concerns 
about environmental protection, state and territory processes may not ‘meet national 
standards for public participation, transparency, information, review and objective 
decision-making’ (sub. 1, p. 3). It was also proposed that, in particular cases, it is 
only through Australian Government intervention that ‘bad’ projects have been 
stopped: 
The Traveston Crossing Dam on the Mary River was … recommended for approval by 
the Queensland Coordinator-General. In 2009 the Commonwealth Environment 
Minister, Peter Garrett, acted under the EPBC Act to refuse the dam development on 
the ‘very clear’ scientific evidence that it would cause unacceptable impacts on 
nationally protected species: the Australian Lungfish, the Mary River Turtle and the 
Mary River Cod. (sub. 1, p. 1) 
The case for reform 
Major project assessment processes — and environmental assessment processes in 
particular — involve significant costs for proponents, regulators and the community 
(box 6.2). Despite this, study submissions have highlighted that it is not unusual for 
major projects to be subject to two (or more) assessment processes covering similar 
issues and impacts. 
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Box 6.2 Cost of environmental assessment processes 
Environmental assessment processes involve a range of costs (including 
administrative costs, compliance costs, delay costs and costs caused by uncertainty) 
and study respondents indicated that these costs can be significant. Xstrata Coal 
reported: 
The typical costs for a proponent in consultancy fees alone to prepare an environmental 
impact statement (EIS), supplementary EIS and negotiate a Coordinator-General’s report in 
Queensland for a new coal mine, rail or port can range from $3 million to $15 million per 
development type. (sub. 50, p. 39) 
A survey conducted by Andrew Macintosh of Australian National University found: 
The estimated average proponent cost associated with projects that have received final 
approval under the [EPBC Act] environmental impact assessment regime is between 
$660 000 and $2.2 million. (2009, p. 5) 
The Allen Consulting Group estimated the cost of preparing an average environment 
effects statement in Victoria at $1.2 million (excluding delay costs) (2009).  
The Office of the Environment Protection Authority in Western Australia estimated that 
in 2012-13, environment assessments involved (on average) about $50 000 in 
regulator expenses (2013b).  
 
The Commission notes that some participants regard streamlining of assessment 
processes as equivalent to a deterioration in regulatory scrutiny and, by 
consequence, environmental, heritage and social outcomes. 
However, there is no theoretical or evidential basis for arguing that two assessments 
are necessarily better than one. The administration of two similarly-focused 
processes could even compromise regulatory outcomes if, for example, 
inconsistencies arise between processes or there is a lack of accountability (or 
‘responsibility shifting’) on the part of assessment authorities. 
The Commission considers that judicious streamlining of major project assessment 
arrangements can materially reduce regulatory overlap (and the costs, delays and 
uncertainty that this gives rise to), whilst ensuring that regulatory objectives are 
maintained. Accordingly, the Commission is recommending reform in three areas, 
with the primary aim of ensuring that particular project impacts are only assessed 
once — that is, a ‘one project, one assessment’ framework. 
Stronger bilateral assessment agreements under the EPBC Act 
As set out in chapter 3, under Australia’s federal system of government the States 
and Territories are primarily responsible for environmental management and 
administer a range of regulatory processes in this context. The Australian 
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Government’s environmental responsibilities are more limited and include matters 
of national environmental significance, the environment on Commonwealth land (or 
waters) or impacts on the environment (anywhere) caused by the actions of a 
Commonwealth agency. For particular major projects, this circumstance can 
manifest in environmental assessment processes at each level of government that 
cover similar (if not the same) issues and impacts.  
Bilateral assessment agreements between the Commonwealth and the States and 
Territories are one way of reducing unnecessary duplication between processes. 
These agreements ‘accredit’ particular state and territory processes for the purposes 
of controlled action2 assessments under the EPBC Act. (Bilateral approval 
agreements are discussed in chapter 7.) 
Assessment by bilateral agreement is one of seven available assessment methods 
under the EPBC Act. The assessment approach decision is made by the 
Commonwealth Environment Minister in accordance with section 87 of the EPBC 
Act. Over the period that bilateral assessment agreements have been in place3, these 
arrangements have been used for less than 30 per cent of controlled action 
assessments (table 6.3). 
  
                                              
2 Not all controlled actions under the EBPC Act constitute ‘major projects’ — the controlled action 
decision is based on the expected impact of the action on protected matters. 
3 For each jurisdiction, data covers the period from when a bilateral assessment agreement was first 
entered into, to March 2013. 
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Table 6.3 Assessment approach for controlled actions under the EPBC 
Act — from date of bilateral agreement to March 2013a 
Jurisdiction Start date Bilateral Accredit RI PD PER EIS Total 
New South Wales Jan 2007 19 37 9 46 12 9 132 
Victoria Jun 2009 8 3  - 47 4 1 63 
Queensland Aug 2004 98 7 9 103 10 38 265 
South Australia Jul 2008 1 1  - 15 5 2 24 
Western Australia Aug 2002 59 6 13 127 8 7 220 
Tasmania May 2011 9 - - 5 1 1 16 
Northern Territory May 2002 29 - - 7 2 1 39 
ACT Jun 2009 5 - 2 14 1 - 22 
Total  228 54 33 364 43 59 781 
a A ‘controlled action’ is an action that is likely to have a significant impact on a matter of national 
environmental significance. Bilateral = assessment under a bilateral assessment agreement; 
Accredit = assessment under a state or territory assessment process accredited under the EPBC Act on a 
case-by-case basis; RI = assessment on referral information (the least rigorous level of assessment); 
PD = assessment on preliminary documentation; PER = assessment by public environment report; 
EIS = assessment by environmental impact statement. No controlled actions were assessed by inquiry over 
this period.  
Source: Unpublished data provided by DSEWPAC. 
One reason for this is the relatively narrow scope of bilateral assessment agreements 
(table 6.4). For example, in the case of South Australia, while the ‘section 46’ 
(major development or project) assessment process (under the Development Act 
1993) is accredited, the ‘section 49’ (Crown development and public infrastructure) 
process and key mining assessment processes (under the Mining Act 1971) are not. 
This — in part — explains why only one of 24 controlled actions has been assessed 
under the South Australian bilateral agreement since it commenced in 2008. 
In Western Australia, the EPA administers two forms of EIA — while the public 
environment review process is accredited, the assessment on proponent information 
process is not. The Government of Western Australia considered that this creates a 
perverse situation where complex developments are subject to a single assessment, 
but more straightforward proposals are required to partake in two processes: 
This [assessment on proponent information] is the most common level of assessment in 
Western Australia and applies to less complex matters where impacts are well 
understood. In these cases, proponents are often required to obtain separate approvals 
under the EPBC Act. (sub. DR103, p. 3) 
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Table 6.4 Accredited State and Territory assessment processes 
Jurisdiction  Accredited processes Legislation 
New South Walesa This agreement has expired -- 
Victoria Environment effects statement  Environment Effects Act 1978 
 Assessment by an Advisory 
Committee or a joint Advisory 
Committee/Panel  
Planning and Environment Act 1987 
 Assessment by permit application Planning and Environment Act 1987 
 Works approval application Environment Protection Act 1970 
 Bulk water entitlement assessment Water Act 1989 
Queensland Environmental impact statement for 
coordinated projects 
Sustainable Planning Act 2009 
State Development and Public 
Works Organisation Act 1971 
Environment Protection Act 1994 
Western Australia Assessment by public environmental 
review  
Environment Protection Act 1986 
South Australia Environmental impact statement, 
public environment report or 
development report for ‘major 
projects’ 
Development Act 1993  
Northern Territory Assessment by environmental 
impact statement or public 
environmental report 
Environmental Assessment Act 
 
 Assessment by inquiry Northern Territory Inquiries Act 
Tasmania Integrated assessment process for 
projects of state significance 
State Policies and Projects Act 1993 
 Assessment of development 
proposal and environmental 
management plan 
Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994 
 Assessment process for projects of 
regional significance 
Land Use Planning and Approvals 
Act 1993 
ACT Environmental impact statement Planning and Development Act 2007 
a The New South Wales agreement expired in 2012. The Australian and NSW Governments have indicated 
that this agreement will be renewed in 2014. 
The scope of bilateral assessment agreements should not be determined by the 
administrative efficiencies that would be achieved through more streamlined 
regulatory arrangements. Only those processes that accord with the objectives of the 
EPBC Act constitute legitimate candidates for inclusion in a bilateral agreement 
(chapter 7).  
Moreover, the Commission recognises that just because two processes ‘look the 
same’ does not necessarily mean they are perfect substitutes. For example, major 
developments in Victoria are typically subject to multiple environment-related 
assessment processes. Notwithstanding areas of overlap, these assessments also 
cover distinct environmental issues, that is, the Environment Protection Act 1970 
(Vic) focuses on pollution control, the Commonwealth EPBC Act seeks to protect 
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matters of national environmental significance while the Environment Effects Act 
1978 (Vic) sets out a process to enable Victorian decision makers to make an 
informed decision about whether a project with potentially significant 
environmental effects should proceed.  
Indeed, several respondents submitted that dual environmental assessments at the 
Commonwealth and state and territory level are warranted due to the substantive 
differences between these processes and their objectives. 
Notwithstanding these issues, the Commission considers that bilateral assessment 
agreements can and should play a larger role in major project assessment. The 
overlap between Commonwealth and state environmental assessment processes 
(and the cost this gives rise to) is not trivial and includes duplication in information 
and data inputs, public consultation requirements, assessment and analysis by 
regulators and condition-setting processes. Further, differences in the role and 
nature of Commonwealth and state environmental assessment responsibilities do not 
preclude the development of a single, mutually-acceptable assessment process. 
The incidence of case-by-case accreditation (table 6.3) of state and territory 
assessment processes suggests that there is more scope and flexibility to agree a 
single assessment process than bilateral agreements currently provide for. Indeed, a 
number of State and Territory Governments have indicated support for more 
comprehensive bilateral assessment agreements:  
South Australia has previously taken advantage of informal streamlining of 
assessments with the EPBC Act, and has indicated a willingness to consider entering 
into formal assessment bilateral agreements for the Mining Act 1971 and the Petroleum 
and Geothermal Energy Act 2000. (South Australian State Government Departments, 
sub. 51, p. 37) 
and 
The exclusion of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park from the assessment bilateral 
constrains Queensland’s ability to streamline a larger number of development 
approvals. (Queensland Government, sub. 47, p. 2) 
The Government of Western Australia has also called for more expansive bilateral 
assessment agreements: 
The Western Australian Government seeks assessment and approval bilateral 
agreements that accredit both of the State’s levels of assessment under the 
Environmental Impact Assessment process, and the State’s native vegetation clearing 
permitting process. (sub. DR103, p. 3) 
The Commission recognises that it might never be practical to remove all 
incidences of duplication between Australian Government and state and territory 
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environmental assessment processes. However, more comprehensive bilateral 
assessment agreements that accredit a broader range of state and territory processes 
— and in particular, those most commonly used for major project assessment — 
offer significant potential to reduce the incidence of regulatory duplication (and the 
costs, delays and uncertainty that this gives rise to). 
All bilateral agreements should be reviewed and renewed with the aim of instituting 
a ‘one project, one assessment’ framework for the significant majority of major 
projects requiring approval under the EPBC Act. Furthermore, where accreditation 
of a process to all applicable matters is not possible, consideration should be given 
to whether processes can be accredited for use in particular circumstances, locations 
or for particular types of projects (‘partial accreditation’) — this approach has been 
adopted in Canada (box 6.3). The outcome of this work should be public, including 
(where relevant) the reasons why processes are not deemed to meet Commonwealth 
standards. 
 
Box 6.3 Bilateral assessment arrangements in Canada 
Recent reforms in Canada provide for ‘substitution agreements’ that allow for provincial 
regulatory assessment processes to be used in place of federal assessment processes 
(in this respect, these arrangements mirror Australia’s bilateral assessment 
agreements).  
However, it is also possible in Canada for provincial assessment processes to be 
‘partially’ accredited, meaning a process can be applied in particular circumstances — 
for example, to assess specific classes of major projects. This approach can facilitate 
more streamlined regulatory processes even where ‘full’ or unconditional accreditation 
of processes is not possible. 
Source: British Colombia Environmental Assessment Office (2013).  
 
RECOMMENDATION 6.1 
The Australian and State and Territory Governments should continue to 
strengthen and expand the scope of existing bilateral assessment agreements 
under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cwlth). Areas for improvement include agreements on standards and procedures 
for assessment, and extending the number of regulatory processes accredited (in 
full or part) under current bilateral agreements. 
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Cooperative arrangements within jurisdictions 
The scope and significance of major project impacts typically means that a large 
number of DAA processes are relevant, irrespective of whether Commonwealth 
assessment processes apply.  
In practice, this can mean that similar impacts are assessed by two or more 
regulators within a single jurisdiction. For example, mining projects often require 
(at least) two environmental assessments at the state and territory level — one under 
general environmental law and another under mining-specific law. In this 
circumstance, the scope for overlap is significant.  
The Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission (VCEC) considered this 
issue as part of its review of environmental regulation in Victoria and found that 
numerous agencies are involved in habitat and biodiversity regulation (including 
local councils, Catchment Management Authorities, multiple State Government 
departments, Parks Victoria and Trust for Nature), and that this is ‘contributing to 
concerns about the lack of effectiveness, cost, uncertainty and delays associated 
with the regulations’ (VCEC 2009, p. 301). 
Study respondents supported greater use of practical measures to minimise 
duplication and overlap between assessment processes at the jurisdiction level. This 
includes formal cooperative arrangements (for example, memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) agreements4) between relevant agencies to undertake ‘joint 
assessments’, or alternatively, to accredit the process of one agency as meeting the 
requirements of another agency. Where feasible, these arrangements present 
significant potential for efficiency gains by removing the need for proponents to 
comply with two separate but similar and overlapping assessment processes.  
The Local Government Association of Queensland advocated strongly for MOU 
agreements and proposed that local government regulators also be included: 
In terms of reducing duplication within jurisdictions, LGAQ agrees that State agencies 
should be encouraged to work together to share assessments and streamline decision 
making. LGAQ considers there is also benefit in extending memorandums of 
understandings between State agencies and local governments so one process can be 
used to meet the decision making requirements for both levels of government. For 
example, in areas like transport and road infrastructure a one network approach (State 
controlled and local roads) to assessment and approvals makes sense. (sub. DR78, p. 3) 
                                              
4 A memorandum of understanding (MOU) is a document that records the common intent of two or 
more parties where the parties do not wish to assume legally binding obligations. They are 
commonly used to establish formal relationships between government agencies, and between 
government and not-for-profit organisations (VCEC 2013). 
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The Queensland Resources Council supported greater cooperation between 
regulators and proposed that this is also relevant for the monitoring and compliance 
stage: 
At present, CSG [coal seam gas] companies must report to three separate agencies on 
water and exploration drilling/fracking. The requirement for reporting is accepted, but 
not to three separate agencies in three formats. One agency should hold the database 
and share this information with the other agencies where expert advice might be 
needed. (sub. DR91, p. 3) 
A noteworthy example of how regulators within the same jurisdiction can cooperate 
on assessment and approval matters is the foreshadowed changes to environmental 
regulations applying to offshore petroleum projects at the federal level (box 6.4). 
Such streamlining is consistent with the Commission’s recommendation that 
regulators establish cooperative arrangements to minimise unnecessary regulatory 
duplication within a jurisdiction (recommendation 6.2).  
 
Box 6.4 Federal environment regulation of offshore petroleum projects 
A number of study participants raised concerns about overlap in federal environmental 
regulations administered by the Department of the Environment, and the National 
Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA): 
The Woodside case study demonstrates that operational conditions made by the 
Commonwealth Environment Minister in granting approval under the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 [EPBC Act], duplicate, in identical form, permit 
requirements under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 
[administered by NOPSEMA]. These ‘dual approvals’ with different timeframes and unclear 
objectives do not deliver any additional benefit to Australia or the environment. (APPEA, 
sub. 17, p. 4) 
On 27 May 2013, the then Minister for Resources and Energy announced the intention 
of the Australian Government to accredit NOPSEMA’s environmental management 
authorisation process under the EPBC Act (Gray 2013). The new Commonwealth 
Ministers for Industry and Environment and the CEO of NOPSEMA agreed to 
undertake a strategic assessment of NOPSEMA’s process in October 2013. The 
Minister for the Environment will determine whether NOPSEMA’s process should be 
endorsed under the EPBC Act in early 2014, following public consultation on a draft 
strategic assessment report and finalisation of the assessment (Macfarlane and 
Hunt 2013).  
 
Cooperative arrangements between regulators at the state and territory level are also 
becoming more common: 
The OEPA [Office of the Environmental Protection Authority in Western Australia] 
continued to work with the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) to collaborate and 
share information to better understand the respective agency roles in assessments of 
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Aboriginal sites and to be more effective in these roles. A working group has been 
established to progress a MOU with the DAA. (OEPA (WA) 2013b, p. 37) 
and 
A number of agreements exist between regulators, which are intended to avoid overlap 
when multiple regulators manage similar risks, interests and/or stakeholders. Of the 
regulators surveyed, 63 per cent reported having a formal agreement with another 
Victorian regulator/agency and 39 per cent reported an agreement with a 
Commonwealth regulator. (VCEC 2013, p. 11)  
The Victorian EPA recently committed to establishing formal, cooperative 
arrangements with other Victorian regulators to reduce overlap and inconsistencies 
between DAA processes: 
[The EPA will] seek to improve the coordination of approvals by working with other 
agencies. … [the] EPA will hold several meetings of a working group in the first half of 
2013 to formalise arrangements for improved coordination. … Improving the 
coordination of EPA’s approvals process with other agencies will help to reduce the 
cumulative impacts of regulation on Victorian industry. (EPA (Vic) 2013, p. 16)  
The Commission is recommending that regulatory agencies in all jurisdictions 
establish formal arrangements to minimise unnecessary duplication and 
inconsistencies through joint, substitutable or accredited major project assessment 
processes. 
RECOMMENDATION 6.2 
Regulatory agencies should establish cooperative arrangements — for example, 
memorandums of understanding — for joint or substitutable assessments to 
minimise unnecessary duplication between major project assessment processes 
within a jurisdiction. 
Establishing the case for regulatory intervention: the ‘water trigger’  
A key feature of ‘best practice’ regulatory process is to ensure that unnecessary 
regulations are not introduced in the first place. That is, ahead of undertaking 
significant legislative or regulatory reform, the expected benefits and costs must be 
assessed.  
The ‘water trigger’ amendment to the EPBC Act passed the Australian Senate in 
July 2013. This amendment means that coal seam gas and large coal mining 
developments must be assessed and approved by the Australian Government if they 
are expected to significantly impact on a water resource. This requirement is in 
addition to assessment and approval requirements at the state and territory level. 
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Several participants have queried the benefits of this amendment, claiming that state 
and territory water protection laws are adequate and the new trigger adds to the 
regulatory burden unnecessarily: 
The introduction of the water trigger will mean that water will be assessed by up to 
three different bodies on some mining projects in NSW: the independent gateway 
panel; the Planning Assessment Commission; and the Australian Government. This 
process is not efficient, will result in increased delays and costs for projects, and is 
unlikely to achieve commensurate gains for the environment. (NSW Minerals Council, 
sub. 23, p. 3) 
and 
The plan to introduce the [water] trigger … is a textbook example of how regulation 
can increase costs to industry while delivering no environmental benefit. (APPEA, 
sub. 17, p. 1) 
On the other hand, a number of respondents supported the water trigger amendment: 
The NCSSA strongly supports the EPBC Act ‘water trigger’ amendment as the 
appropriate measure for national oversight of significant environmental impacts in 
order to meet Australia’s international obligations under the Ramsar Convention and 
other treaties … State approval of projects will reduce the capacity for cross-border 
impacts to be effectively and objectively assessed. The Murray Darling dispute is a 
perfect testament to the risks in leaving decision-making regarding shared 
environmental assets to individual states. (Nature Conservation Society of South 
Australia, sub. DR95, p. 5) 
and 
Water resources are clearly a matter of national environmental significance that 
traverse state boundaries and Commonwealth oversight of water is established in law 
and policy. Application of the water trigger to specific activities occurred in recognition 
that coal mining and coal seam gas extraction are occurring at a landscape scale in 
NSW and Queensland and having a profound impact on this matter of national 
environmental significance. (Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97, p. 7) 
In Australia, the appropriate mechanism for weighing the expected benefits and 
costs of proposed regulatory reform is the regulatory impact statement (RIS) 
process. However, the Australian Government determined that the water trigger 
amendment should not be subject to RIS requirements, a decision that has been met 
with strong disapproval from stakeholders: 
Exemptions from regulatory impact statement (RISs) should only be granted in 
exceptional circumstances, including where truly urgent and unforseen events arise or 
there is a matter of budget or other sensitivity … it is critical that this [a RIS] is 
undertaken to allow properly informed debate about the justification for the Bill and its 
costs and benefits. (NSW Minerals Council 2013b, p. 2) 
   
 THE ASSESSMENT 
STAGE 
149 
 
and 
The process by which the Bill came to be considered by the Parliament is void of 
satisfactory industry consultation ordinarily and reasonably afforded to regulatory 
amendments of such a significant nature and runs counter to the Government’s recent 
commitment to effective, proportionate and beneficial regulations through the 
mandatory regulatory impact statement process. (QGC 2013, p. 2) 
Several features of the water trigger amendment have also attracted criticism. 
First, the water trigger amendment rules out the potential for relevant actions to be 
approved by State and Territory Governments under any future bilateral approval 
agreement (chapter 7). This is at odds with the objects of the EPBC Act (namely, to 
‘strengthen intergovernmental cooperation, and minimise duplication, through 
bilateral agreements’ and ‘provide for the intergovernmental accreditation of 
environmental assessment and approval processes’ (s. 3)), and recent commitments 
made by the Australian Government to reduce double-handling and streamline 
regulatory processes.  
Second, the new amendment has created an input-based (and activity-specific) 
EPBC Act trigger. That is, the controlled action decision is based on the nature of 
the development activity, not the significance of the impact. In this respect the water 
trigger contradicts the ‘output-based’ approach that underpins the EPBC Act. 
Moreover, the new arrangements imply that if a water resource is impacted by coal 
seam gas and coal mining activities, this is a matter of national environmental 
significance. However, if the water resource is impacted through some other means 
(say water extraction for irrigation purposes), this is not a matter of concern for the 
Australian Government even if the environmental consequences are the same or 
greater. 
The Commission does not support the Australian Government’s decision to exempt 
the water trigger amendment from a RIS process. Such exemptions should be 
limited to genuinely exceptional circumstances, such as emergency situations, 
where a clear public interest can be demonstrated (PC 2012b). 
The water trigger amendment (in combination with the prohibition on use of 
bilateral approval agreements) imposes an extra layer of regulation on affected 
proponents. Further, it is not obvious that existing laws are deficient or that the 
particular legislative amendment adopted by the Australian Government is the best 
approach to deal with any identified gap in the regulatory framework. There is a 
strong case for undertaking a public and independent review of the water trigger 
amendment to determine whether the benefits exceed the costs.  
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RECOMMENDATION 6.3 
The Australian Government should undertake and publish a regulatory impact 
assessment of the ‘water trigger’ amendment to the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth), including the exclusion of water 
trigger-related actions from bilateral approval arrangements. If the assessment 
shows that there are no net benefits to the community, the amendment should be 
repealed. 
6.3 Coordination of major project DAA processes 
Why is coordination important? 
Even if the Commission’s proposals for a more streamlined regulatory system are 
adopted, the number, scope and complexity of major project assessment and 
approval requirements will remain significant. Moreover, these requirements are 
spread across multiple legislative instruments and vary depending on the nature and 
location of the project. 
In this circumstance, effective coordination between regulators and regulatory 
processes is critical to guide proponents through the approvals system, reduce 
uncertainty, facilitate timely processing and minimise overlaps and inconsistencies.  
In practice, however, regulatory coordination is often lacking. Participants have 
described a fragmented, confusing and uncertain regulatory system that imposes 
material transaction costs on proponents. Xstrata Coal noted: 
State and Territory Government agency coordination [and] cooperation … must be 
improved through the adoption of a ‘whole of Government’ approach to major project 
assessment. (sub. 50, p. 45) 
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia pointed to a lack of 
‘parallel processing’ under the current arrangements, leading to sequencing 
problems and unnecessary delays (sub. 44). Inadequate communication and 
information sharing between regulators was also raised as an issue, with many 
proponents noting that they often have to provide the same information twice. 
A particularly frustrating issue for proponents is a lack of timely information on the 
progress of project approvals once assessment has commenced. The Association of 
Mining and Exploration Companies considered: 
Wide implementation of integrated electronic lodgment and tracking systems for 
applications is an essential component of a more efficient approvals system … parallel 
processing should be implemented at every opportunity during the assessment process 
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to ensure the most efficient use of time and resources, and avoid unnecessary delays. 
Such an approach involves multiple approval processes occurring simultaneously by 
differing agencies, where they are not reliant upon completion of the other. (sub. DR70, 
pp. 16–17) 
Moreover, respondents often found it difficult to identify the relevant person within 
government to contact about the progress of a project application. 
Options for enhancing regulatory coordination 
Coordination problems are most directly (and efficiently) mitigated by ensuring that 
all major project assessment and approval processes are consistent with best 
practice regulation making principles (chapter 1). However, in practice it is not 
feasible or necessarily desirable to redesign the entire regulatory system ‘from 
scratch’, meaning a second-best solution is required. In this context, governments 
have adopted various institutional structures to reduce costs and achieve a more 
seamless and timely DAA process. 
• Under a ‘one-stop shop’ model, a number of statutory assessment and approval 
functions (that would normally reside with other regulators) are undertaken by a 
single agency or Minister. Depending on the scope of the one-stop shop, this 
approach can reduce or even remove the need for coordination between separate 
processes and regulators. 
• A ‘lead agency’ approach means that a single agency is responsible for 
coordinating major project DAA processes across government and providing 
guidance to proponents. Lead agencies have some responsibility for assessment 
and approval, but cannot override the decision making capacity of other 
regulators. 
• A ‘coordination office’ performs similar functions to a lead agency (namely, 
coordination and facilitation of relevant regulatory processes) but is independent 
of the major projects regulatory system, meaning the office does not have any 
assessment or approval responsibilities and is not itself a major project 
proponent. 
Table 6.5 characterises these models in terms of the coordination and assessment 
and approval functions carried out. 
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Table 6.5 Major project coordination modelsa 
Model Coordination of major project 
DAA processes 
Assessment and approval of 
proposed major projects  
Coordination office   
Lead agency   
One-stop shopb n/a  
a Two ticks (), one tick () or a cross () means the entity has exclusive, partial or no responsibility 
respectively for relevant functions. b Assuming the one-stop shop covers all relevant major project approvals. 
In Australia, the regulatory arrangements governing major transport projects in 
Victoria provide an example of the one-stop shop model. Internationally, this model 
has been adopted for major projects in New Zealand (the ‘board of inquiry’ process) 
and, to a lesser extent, for major energy projects in Canada (box 6.5). 
 
Box 6.5 One-stop shop models for major project developments 
Major transport projects — Victoria 
The Major Transport Projects Facilitation Act 2009 establishes the Minister for Planning 
as the responsible authority for: 
• approving proposed major transport projects 
• granting various ‘applicable approvals’ that are required by the proponent, but 
ordinarily determined by other regulators. This includes permits and approvals 
related to heritage, environment protection, flora and fauna, road management and 
water. 
Board of inquiry process — New Zealand 
In New Zealand, nationally significant developments seeking approval under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 may be assessed and approved by a board of 
inquiry. Boards of inquiry are appointed by the Minister for the Environment, but are 
independent of the Environment Protection Agency and the Minister. Board of inquiry 
decisions can only be appealed to the High Court on points of law.  
National Energy Board — Canada 
A variation of the one-stop shop model is used for regulation of major international and 
interprovincial oil, gas and electricity projects in Canada. Specifically, the National 
Energy Board has the authority to grant approvals for relevant pipeline and power line 
projects to proceed, as well as some approvals required under other legislation, 
including environmental approvals required under national environmental law. 
Sources: DPCD (Vic) (2010); EPA (NZ) (2013); NEB (Canada) (2013d).  
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Western Australia and South Australia have lead agency-type arrangements in 
place. The WA lead agency framework applies to major resource, infrastructure and 
transport projects, as well as large-scale land and housing proposals. One of four 
government departments acts as the lead agency depending on the nature of the 
project seeking approval (DPC (WA) 2011). For example, the Department of Mines 
and Petroleum is the lead agency for mining, petroleum, geothermal and carbon 
capture and storage proposals. For these projects, the Department would: 
• assess and determine exploration and pipeline licence applications (if such 
approvals are required) 
• coordinate and facilitate DAA processes across government. 
Similarly, the South Australian Government offers a case management service to 
major project proponents: 
The immediate benefit … is the Case Manager, a single government contact point 
acting as a go between and providing leadership for the project, who has the skills to:  
• Understand the approval process, regulatory considerations, and the issues a project 
will trigger to assist in streamlining the development approval and any licensing 
process; 
• Navigate through and identify who within government will need to be involved in 
the development approval process; and 
• Engage all agencies with a possible interest in the project early to identify all the 
issues so the project proponent has a clear understanding of the issues to be 
addressed, what will be required and is then able to make an early assessment as to 
the commercial risks in progressing the project. (South Australian State 
Government Departments, sub. 51, p. 26) 
The South Australian case management service is managed by the Department for 
Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, Resources and Energy. This agency is also 
responsible for various mining and petroleum-related major project approvals.  
The Coordinator-General arrangements in Queensland are not analogous to the 
coordination models described here. The Coordinator-General’s role is confined to 
the EIA process, and therefore does not include coordinating and facilitating major 
project DAA processes in the broad. 
An example of the coordination office model is provided by the Major Projects 
Management Office (MPMO) in Canada. Less sophisticated versions can also be 
found in Australia, including the Australian Government’s Major Project 
Facilitation Program, and the State Assessment and Referral Agency in Queensland 
(for ordinary development) (box 6.6). 
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Box 6.6 Examples of the coordination office model 
Major Projects Management Office — Canada 
The Major Projects Management Office (MPMO) was established in 2007 to provide 
over-arching project coordination, management and accountability for major resource 
projects (defined as ‘large resource projects which are subject to either a 
comprehensive study or panel review under the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act’). Functions of the MPMO include: 
• providing information regarding relevant regulatory requirements 
• developing ‘Project Agreements’ that outline the roles and responsibilities of federal 
agencies and target timelines for each component of the process 
• tracking and publicly reporting on the progress of federal regulatory processes 
against agreed timeframes (via the publicly accessible web-based ‘MPMO tracker’) 
• monitoring compliance with, and reporting on performance against, the Canadian 
Government’s Aboriginal Consultation requirements 
• leading research on initiatives to improve the performance of the regulatory system. 
The 2007 budget provided $30 million over five years for the MPMO. The lead minister 
for the MPMO is the Minister of Natural Resources. He or she must report annually to 
Cabinet and parliament on progress made by the MPMO towards achievement of its 
objectives. 
Major Project Facilitation Program — Australia 
The Australian Government’s Major Project Facilitation Program (administered by the 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development) provides eligible proponents 
with advice on relevant Australian Government approvals and facilitates relationships 
with key State and Territory Government agencies. Very limited resources are 
dedicated to this program. 
State Assessment and Referral Agency — Queensland 
In July 2013, the Queensland Government launched the State Assessment Referral 
Agency (SARA). SARA makes the Department of State Development, Infrastructure 
and Planning the single lodgement and assessment point for all development 
applications where the state has a jurisdiction under the Sustainable Planning Act 
2009. SARA is supported by MyDAS, an online system that allows an applicant to 
lodge and track development applications. 
Sources: Canadian Government (2012); DIRD (2013); DSDIP (2013d). 
Evaluating the options 
Is there a case for ‘one-stop shop’ arrangements? 
A one-stop shop approach offers significant potential to reduce coordination costs 
and provide greater certainty and clarity about the regulatory framework. Several 
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participants favoured the establishment of a one-stop shop that covers all required 
major project approvals: 
Governments should work together to remove all overlap and duplication in approving 
major projects and introduce wherever possible a single point of contact for business 
(or ‘one-stop shop’) that covers all project approvals requirements for major project 
proponents. (BCA, sub. 43, p. 3) 
and 
Project proponents would have a single authority with which to deal and could expect a 
single set of requirements. There would be no finger pointing between agencies or the 
various levels of Government in the case of cost blow outs or delays. (J. Spiers, 
sub. DR67, p. 4) 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits, the costs and risks inherent in this model are 
significant, namely:  
• the real or perceived risk of ‘regulatory capture’, and associated community 
concerns about the independence and rigour of the process 
• the feasibility of one agency having the combined expertise to assess and grant 
approvals across a range of areas 
• the risk that environmental (and other) law is applied inconsistently (a 
consequence of two regulators having responsibility for administering the same 
piece of law — one for major projects and one for other developments) 
• the risk of the one-stop shop making decisions that have precedentiary and other 
impacts on the activities and decisions of the agencies that administer the laws in 
question on a routine basis 
• the costs associated with implementing legislative changes and establishing 
efficient and effective referral arrangements, to the extent that input and advice 
from other departments is sought. 
A number of study respondents expressed serious reservations about one-stop shop 
models: 
ANEDO supports improved agency coordination but does not support centralisation of 
major project assessment and approval processes in a single agency … risks of 
centralisation of major project assessment and approval processes in a single agency 
include less rigorous assessment, conflicts of duties, reduced community confidence 
and corruption risks. (ANEDO, sub. DR92, p. 20) 
and 
The proposal for a … one stop shop … further strips away the public consultation 
rights under the Sustainable Planning Act and the Planning and Environment Court … 
While economic outcomes are important, all costs including externalities need to be 
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considered, and a fast tracking one stop shop without accounting for changes to or 
impacts on ecosystem services is a flawed process. (K. Faldt, sub. DR82, pp. 1-2) 
On balance, the Commission considers it impractical to establish one-stop shop 
arrangements for the broad class of major projects in Australia. Major projects are 
not limited to a single sector or activity and a vast amount of legislation would need 
modification to give authority to the one-stop shop. Moreover, establishing a single 
agency with the requisite skills and expertise to assess and approve a diverse range 
of project types and impacts would be very challenging, create overlap with 
agencies that regulate regular sized developments and risk ‘regulatory capture’. 
The Commission’s preferred approach 
The Commission anticipates that many of the same benefits associated with the 
one-stop shop model could be achieved by adopting alternative (and less costly and 
risky) institutional arrangements in the form of a major projects coordination office 
(or similar). 
This approach has the potential to deliver a more certain, timely and transparent 
approval process — with corresponding benefits for proponents and the community 
— by: 
• acting as a single point of entry into the regulatory system (at the jurisdiction 
level) 
• advising proponents on relevant statutory requirements, including through 
pre-application consultation meetings with proponents (chapter 5)  
• developing ‘project agreements’ with proponents and regulators that document 
agreed working arrangements and timeframes for the completion of primary and 
secondary approval processes 
• electronically tracking the progress of individual assessment and approval 
processes against timeframes, identifying bottlenecks and publicly reporting on 
performance against timeframes 
• facilitating interaction with responsible regulators at the Commonwealth and 
local government level  
• identifying opportunities for regulators to cooperate to reduce overlap and 
duplication between assessment and approval processes (section 6.2).  
A number of study respondents supported the coordination office model: 
There are numerous overlapping and often conflicting levels of Government in the 
regulatory approvals of major projects. This is particularly the case in Environmental 
approvals. APPEA has found that much of this issue stems from a lack of 
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understanding / communication between departments and agencies. A single 
coordinated office … could have significant benefits to industry by making the major 
project application process simpler, and minimising the different points of contact 
within the Government. (APPEA, sub. DR105, p. 10) 
and 
The Association supports [the Commission’s proposal] … for jurisdictions to establish 
a major projects coordination office. In particular, LGAQ strongly supports the State, 
through a major projects coordination office, facilitating interactions between 
regulatory agencies and local government as well as between proponents and local 
government. (LGAQ, sub. DR78, p. 4) 
NTSCORP considered that the coordination office model would facilitate better 
integration between native title and major project assessment and approval: 
An office has the potential to address current system fragmentation and improve project 
turnaround. … the lack of integration between native title and State project approval 
processes can lead to disputes, delays and added cost. … the major projects 
coordination office could assist in advising proponents about their obligations under the 
Native Title Act. (DR104, pp. 9-10) 
Evidence from operation of the MPMO in Canada suggests that the magnitude of 
these efficiency gains could be significant: 
The Major Projects Management Office initiative has helped to transform the approvals 
process for major natural resource projects by shortening the average review times 
from 4 years to just 22 months, and improving accountability by monitoring the 
performance of federal regulatory departments. (Government of Canada 2013, p. 1) 
Natural Resources Canada undertook an evaluation of the MPMO in 2012 and 
concluded that there is a strong case for retaining the current arrangements: 
• The evidence clearly demonstrates a continued need for the MPMO initiative 
(MPMOI) … There is a strongly articulated need for system-wide coordination and 
governance — with senior management involvement — that supports policy 
leadership, as well as performance monitoring and management. 
• The integration and federal coordination of environmental assessments and 
regulatory reviews were found to have increased under the MPMOI. … federal 
timelines were viewed by internal and external stakeholders consulted to be 
improving due to increased capacity and improved integration and coordination (as 
a result of MPMOI procedures, coordination, and legislative improvements). 
• Transparency and accountability of the federal regulatory process within the federal 
government increased significantly through the MPMOI … The MPMOI also led to 
benefits that extended beyond the Initiative, such as a ‘catalyzing’ effect for further 
process improvements within federal departments/agencies, as well as developing 
an exceptional level of horizontal dialogue at senior management levels. 
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• The evaluation found that operation and delivery of MPMOI activities, outputs and 
outcomes would be difficult to achieve at a lower cost under the current regulatory 
system. 
• The international comparative analysis revealed that the MPMOI performed quite 
well compared to similar initiatives. The MPMOI implemented several best 
practices and offered some unique features not identified elsewhere. (2012, pp. 1–3) 
The Commission is recommending that State and Territory Governments establish a 
major projects coordination office, where the benefits exceed the costs. Where a 
similar coordination mechanism already exists, the case for refining those 
arrangements (in terms of functions and resources) should be considered. 
While the structure and functions for a coordination office would vary across 
jurisdictions, the net benefits of this model are likely to be maximised where: 
• coordination offices report directly to senior economic Ministers in each state 
and territory, for example, the Premier, Treasurer or Minister for State 
Development. In most cases, this would ensure that the Minister responsible for 
primary development approval decisions (usually the Minister for Planning — 
chapter 7) is not also responsible for the coordination office. 
• access is limited to projects that are large scale (in terms of the scale of the 
activities involved and the physical or geographic footprint of the project), 
technically complex and ‘state significant’ (that is, make a significant 
contribution to the broader economic development or infrastructure requirements 
of the State or Territory). In practice, a coordination office is likely to manage a 
handful of projects at a time, while in some periods it may have none. 
• the resources of coordination offices can be readily scaled up or down over time 
in line with the level and nature of major project investment activity. 
• the Australian Government commits its regulators to actively participating in and 
supporting the coordination activities of these offices. 
A similar body is unlikely to be justified at the federal level given the limited 
number of Australian Government DAA processes. That said, the case for 
expanding the resources and operational relevance of the Major Project Facilitation 
Program (box 6.6) should be considered. 
Finally, the Commission notes that the new Australian Government has committed 
to establishing jurisdiction-based one-stop shops for particular environment 
approvals: 
The Coalition will offer State and Territory governments the opportunity to act as a 
one-stop-shop for environmental approvals. Should they accept, the States and 
Territories would administer a single approvals process including approvals under 
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Commonwealth legislation such as the Commonwealth Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act. (Liberal Party of Australia 2013) 
Under this approach, State and Territory Governments would have responsibility for 
granting approvals under the EPBC Act (approvals that would normally be granted 
by the Commonwealth Environment Minister), but other statutory approval 
responsibilities would remain unchanged. This is consistent with the Commission’s 
recommendation for bilateral agreements to be established between the 
Commonwealth and State and Territory Governments for environmental approvals 
under the EPBC Act (chapter 7). 
RECOMMENDATION 6.4 
Where they do not exist, State and Territory Governments should establish a 
major projects coordination office (or similar) to: 
• advise proponents of complex, large-scale projects of state or territory 
significance on regulatory requirements 
• develop project agreements that document agreed working arrangements 
among regulators and timeframes for the completion of processes 
• electronically track and publicly report on progress against statutory and 
regulator-determined timeframes 
• facilitate interactions with relevant Australian Government regulators and 
local governments. 
A public assessment of the expected benefits and costs of this reform should be 
undertaken to determine the functions and resources of these offices. 
6.4 Independent assessment agencies 
Reports of substandard assessment work 
Accurate and objective examination of major project impacts — and proposed 
avoidance and mitigation measures — is fundamental to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the regulatory framework. However, study respondents have 
expressed scepticism about the rigour and impartiality of current assessment 
processes: 
From East End Mine Action Group’s experience … environmental impact statement 
processes are often fast tracked, deficient, untrustworthy and can be marked by grossly 
inaccurate science. (EEMAG, sub. DR68, p. 9) 
and 
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… agencies and decision makers rely heavily on the information in environmental 
impact assessment reports which are provided by the proponent, and prepared by 
consultants paid by proponents. This raises potential risks of conflicts of duty, and 
perceived or actual risks of corruption. (ANEDO, sub. DR92, pp. 22-23) 
Xstrata Coal emphasised the importance of regulators closely scrutinising 
assessment information: 
It is the responsibility of the assessing officers to critically evaluate the assessments 
contained in the environmental impact statement and to then provide full, frank and 
independent advice to the consent authority. (Xstrata Coal, sub. 50, p. 52) 
However, Economists at Large and the Australia Institute considered that this does 
not always occur: 
Given the highly technical nature of many EIS reports and the potential lack of suitably 
qualified and resourced reviewers in planning departments, there is great incentive for 
consultants to make technical assumptions which produce results favourable to their 
employers. Consultants know such assumptions will be difficult for most reviewers to 
identify or question. (sub. DR83, p. 7) 
Measures to encourage high-quality major project assessment 
Governments have implemented various administrative and institutional measures 
to encourage expert and robust assessments of major project impacts. For example, 
external expert groups have been established in a number of jurisdictions to advise 
regulators on technical matters — the statutory advisory committees and panels 
provided for under the EPBC Act are one example. 
In other cases, peer review arrangements or ‘accreditation’ systems are used to 
manage quality concerns. For example, to access the Brisbane City Council 
RiskSMART scheme, proponents must partner with an accredited consultant. A 
number of participants supported accreditation schemes for major project 
assessments: 
Accreditation could be done through an industry, government or co-regulatory body, 
including by building on existing voluntary accreditation mechanisms. … Formal 
accreditation for major project EIA would have a range of potential co-benefits, 
including increased reliability and re-use of EIA information, less delays in seeking 
further information, continuous improvement of professional standards, and greater 
trust in decision making. (ANEDO, sub. DR92, pp. 22-23)  
and 
Best practice environmental impact assessment should remove the nexus between 
developers and environmental consultants by introducing a framework for the 
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independent appointment of environmental consultants. (Nature Conservation Council 
of NSW, sub. 22, p. 3) 
A further way of encouraging objective and rigorous regulatory assessment is by 
assigning major project assessment responsibilities to ‘independent’ regulatory 
bodies (box 6.7) that are: 
• separate from the policy making functions of government (and more specifically, 
the direction of Ministers) 
• not themselves a proponent of major project developments. 
 
Box 6.7 Defining independence  
‘Independence’ is not a binary condition: regulators can be more or less independent in 
a range of ways: 
• Regulation independence: The degree to which a regulator has discretion to set and 
adjust regulations as it thinks fit in order to achieve the objectives of regulation, how 
quickly and flexibly it can do this, and what sort of political process is required. 
• Operational independence: The degree to which a regulator has operational 
independence, or a broad discretion to exercise a range of powers, to protect 
against interference from politicians or industry. 
• Budgetary independence: The degree to which a regulator is protected from political 
or sector pressure through its funding arrangements. 
• Institutional independence: The degree of distance in the regulator’s relationship 
with the executive and legislative branches of government; the rules governing the 
appointment and dismissal of governors or senior staff.  
Source: New Zealand Productivity Commission (2013).  
 
Assessing the options 
Accreditation is unlikely to offer net benefits 
The Commission does not favour accreditation schemes that dictate which 
consultants can provide input into major project assessment processes. These 
arrangements present several costs and risks, including: 
• a lessening of competition amongst consultants (or ‘closed shop’), particularly if 
barriers to accreditation are high (for example, if accreditation requirements are 
unnecessarily time-consuming or costly). Any reduction in competition is likely 
to increase the cost of consultancy services and stifle innovation. 
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• restricted access to subject-matter experts. Major project impacts are complex, 
diverse and often highly uncertain. A range of technical expertise is typically 
required to prepare the necessary assessment documentation. It would not be 
straightforward (or low-cost) to design and implement an accreditation scheme 
that covers multiple subject-areas, industry sectors and countries. By contrast, 
most professional accreditation schemes are sector, occupation and jurisdiction 
specific. 
• a risk ‘low-quality’ consultants are accredited. It is not clear that governments 
are better placed (or better informed) relative to project proponents to assess the 
quality of services provided by consultants. 
Moreover, while participants have expressed anecdotal concerns about the quality 
and objectivity of information supplied to regulators, specific evidence to support 
these claims has been limited.  
In any case, while accreditation schemes may be effective in ensuring that only 
suitably qualified consultants prepare assessment information, so long as 
proponents are funding this work, the (real or perceived) risk of ‘proponent bias’ 
remains. More effective and efficient ways to safeguard against low-quality 
assessment work include: 
• provision of clear, upfront guidance on the type, level and quality of information 
and data required of proponents (chapter 5) 
• ensuring regulators have the authority to reject assessment material that is 
deemed to be incomplete, inadequate or invalid and to request further 
information (‘stop the clock’ — chapter 7). This depends critically on regulatory 
agencies being adequately resourced to evaluate and interrogate assessment 
documentation (chapter 12) 
• sanctions for providing false or misleading information 
• transparent and participative assessment processes, including appropriate 
opportunities for consultation on assessment documentation (chapters 5 and 6). 
Independent regulatory assessment agencies are desirable  
In order to be seen as fair and impartial, it is often desirable for regulators to be 
independent, both from government and from those whom it regulates. A mix of 
government departments and independent agencies are currently responsible for 
assessing proposed major project developments in Australia (table 6.6). 
Independent major project assessment arrangements are perhaps most developed in 
Tasmania, where the Tasmanian Planning Commission (an independent statutory 
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body under the Tasmanian Planning Commission Act 1997) is responsible for 
conducting an integrated assessment of projects of state significance. The 
Commission then makes recommendations to the Minister, however it is the 
government that finally determines whether the project proceeds, and if so, on what 
terms and conditions. 
In other jurisdictions, only certain aspects of major project assessment are 
undertaken by independent agencies. This is particularly true for environmental 
matters. For example, in both Western Australia and the Northern Territory an 
independent environment protection authority (EPA) is responsible for 
environmental assessment processes (box 6.8). 
In some States and Territories, independent environment regulators have a more 
limited role in major project assessment. For example, the Victorian EPA is 
responsible for assessing applications for works approvals and other licences (in 
addition to being the general environmental law enforcement agency and 
undertaking some monitoring and enforcement activities in relation to major project 
approvals — chapter 10). Responsibility for the ‘primary’ environmental 
assessment process in Victoria (the environment effects statement) rests with the 
Minister for Planning. 
A number of study participants supported more independent major project 
assessment arrangements: 
ANEDO agrees that arms-length, independent assessment and enforcement functions 
would improve the effectiveness and rigour of major project regulation, and support 
public confidence in DAA processes. For example, relying on state Planning 
Departments to develop policy, set environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
requirements, assess EIAs, approve projects, set conditions, and enforce compliance 
with those conditions, is an inappropriate concentration of functions in a single office 
or department. (sub. DR92, p. 22) 
The BCA considered: 
In our view while there are benefits (e.g. independence) and risks (potentially less 
accountability on policy makers) from splitting functions, on balance we agree with the 
proposal. (sub. DR102, p. 5) 
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Table 6.6 Regulatory assessment agencies 
Jurisdiction Assessment pathway or process Regulator  
New South Wales State significant development 
and state significant 
infrastructure 
Department of Planning  
Victoria Environment effects statement  Minister for Planning 
 Works approval Environment Protection Authority 
Victoria 
 Major transport projects Minister for Planning 
Queensland Environmental impact statement 
for coordinated projects 
Coordinator-General 
South Australia Section 46 (major development 
or project) process 
Minister for Planning 
 Section 49 (Crown development 
and public infrastructure) process 
Development Assessment Commission 
 Works approval Environment Protection Authority South 
Australia 
Western Australia Public environmental review or 
assessment on proponent 
information 
Environmental Protection Authority 
Western Australia 
 Development Assessment Panel 
application 
Local government or the Western 
Australian Planning Commission  
Tasmania Projects of state significance Tasmanian Planning Commission 
 Projects of regional significance Panel appointed by the Tasmanian 
Planning Commission 
 Development approval for major 
infrastructure project 
Combined Planning Authority 
established by Minister 
 Environmental impact 
assessment 
Environment Protection Authority 
Tasmania 
Northern Territory Environmental impact statement 
or public environmental review 
Northern Territory Environment 
Protection Authority 
 Authority certificate Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority 
ACT Environment impact statement Environment and Sustainable 
Development Directorate; Inquiry panel 
may also be established by the Minister 
 Development application Environment and Sustainable 
Development Directorate 
Commonwealth Controlled action assessment 
under the EPBC Act 
Department of the Environment 
 Heritage listing assessments 
under the EPBC Act 
Australian Heritage Council 
 Offshore petroleum 
environmental and safety 
assessments 
National Offshore Petroleum Safety and 
Environmental Management Authority 
Source: Based on appendix C. 
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Box 6.8 Independent environment regulators — Australia 
Western Australia 
The Western Australian Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) — established in 
1971 — comprises five members appointed by the Governor on the recommendation 
of the Minister for Environment. Functions of the EPA include:  
• conducting environmental impact assessments  
• preparing statutory policies for environmental protection  
• preparing and publishing guidelines for managing environmental impacts 
• providing strategic advice to the Minister for Environment. 
The Office of the EPA (OEPA) was established in 2009 to service the EPA in 
undertaking its statutory functions, and to directly assist the Minister in the performance 
of his functions under the Act (including compliance and enforcement). In 2012-13, 
approximately 100 fulltime equivalent staff were employed by the OEPA and the 
annual cost of services totalled about $17 million. 
Northern Territory 
The Northern Territory EPA — established in 2008 — consists of a Chairperson and 
four members appointed by the Administrator of the Northern Territory and the Chair of 
the NT Planning Commission. It is funded by an annual budget allocation of about $1.5 
million. Functions include: 
• conducting environmental impact assessments  
• issuing licences under the Waste Management and Pollution Control Act and the 
Water Act  
• compliance and enforcement activities 
• administration of the container deposit scheme. 
Sources: OEPA (2013b); NT EPA (2012).  
 
The ‘in principle’ benefits of institutionally separating regulatory functions from 
policy making functions are well established. The OECD Regulatory Policy 
Committee found: 
Establishing the regulator with a degree of independence (both from those it regulates 
and from government) can provide greater confidence and trust that regulatory 
decisions are made with integrity. A high level of integrity improves outcomes of the 
regulatory decisions … Independent regulatory decision-making, at arm’s length from 
the political process, is likely to be appropriate where: 
• there is a need for the regulator to be seen as independent, to maintain public 
confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of decisions; 
• both government and non-government entities are regulated under the same 
framework and competitive neutrality is therefore required; or 
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• the decisions of the regulator can have a significant impact on particular interests 
and there is a need to protect its impartiality. (OECD 2013b, p. 8) 
Similarly, the New Zealand Productivity Commission considered that more 
regulatory independence is desirable where: the issues (and costs) involved are 
long-term and likely to be undervalued due to a focus on electoral cycles, the 
regulatory functions require a substantial degree of technical expertise or expert 
judgment of complex analysis, and a consistent regulatory approach is required over 
time to create a stable environment (2013). 
The VCEC has advocated for independent regulators in a range of contexts — 
including environmental regulation — to guard against the risks and costs of 
combining policy and regulatory functions, namely:  
• That regulation will become more complex, where regulators have an interest in 
creating complex regulatory arrangements in which it becomes difficult to 
determine whether regulatory outcomes are attributable to the regulators’ 
performance or the inability of regulated entities to understand and comply with 
regulation. 
• Regulatory creep, where it is in the regulator’s institutional interest to maintain and 
expand its role by adding new regulation and a bias towards regulatory over 
non-regulatory options (for example, expenditure programs). 
• Reduced accountability by lessening incentives for regulators to set out clear 
objectives against which their performance can be assessed. 
• The risk that regulators may be ‘captured’ by particular interest groups. 
• That regulators will be drawn into political debates about policy issues, thereby 
compromising their actual or perceived independence. (2009, p. 293) 
In the Commission’s view, there is a strong ‘in principle’ rationale for embedding 
more independence in major project assessment arrangements by assigning this 
responsibility to an independent regulator. This is particularly the case for 
comprehensive environmental assessment processes, such as EIAs, which represent 
the primary assessment requirement for proposed major developments.  
Similarly, there is merit in (related) monitoring and enforcement activities 
(chapter 10) residing with an independent regulator. Concentrating these 
responsibilities in a single regulator can ensure that insights about the practicality 
and enforceability of approval conditions are taken into account during the 
assessment process (and thus feed into the development of recommended 
conditions). 
For environmental matters protected under the EPBC Act, adoption of this approach 
would mean transferring responsibility for assessment and enforcement functions 
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from the Australian Government Department of the Environment to a new 
independent federal agency (the ‘Australian Environment Protection Agency’) 
(AEPA). Specifically, this body would: 
• determine whether assessment under the EPBC Act is required, and if so, the 
appropriate assessment method (including whether the assessment can be 
undertaken under a bilateral agreement), and the terms of reference for the 
assessment. 
– If necessary, the EPBC Act should be redrafted to allow the Commonwealth 
Environment Minister to delegate the controlled action and assessment 
approach decisions to the AEPA. 
• conduct the assessment process (if a bilateral is not used) and provide advice and 
recommendations to the Australian Government Environment Minister (who 
would remain the approval authority — chapter 7) as to whether the action 
should be approved, and any conditions or offset requirements to be attached to 
that approval. 
– For actions that are assessed under a bilateral agreement (but that are not 
covered by a bilateral approval agreement), the AEPA would provide advice 
to the Minister regarding the approval decision and any relevant conditions.  
– Strategic assessments under the EPBC Act (chapter 11) would also be 
undertaken by the AEPA. 
• undertake monitoring, audit, compliance and enforcement activities under the 
EPBC Act. 
The Department of the Environment would continue to have exclusive 
responsibility for policy functions under the EPBC Act, including the development 
of legislation and subordinate legislation, the identification and management of 
World, National and Commonwealth heritage places, properties and values, and 
listing threatened species and ecological communities and managing conservation 
programs associated with these matters. The Department would also remain 
responsible for negotiating and managing (on behalf of the Minister) bilateral 
assessment and approval agreements with the States and Territories. 
Institutional separation of regulatory assessment and enforcement functions from 
environmental policy at the national level is common to many federal systems 
(box 6.9). 
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Box 6.9 Independent federal environment agencies 
• The Canadian Environment Assessment Agency (CEAA) is an independent federal 
body accountable to the Minister of the Environment. The CEAA is responsible for 
determining whether an environmental assessment is required, issuing the terms of 
reference, reviewing the documentation and preparing an assessment report for the 
Minister. 
• The New Zealand Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) was established in 
2009 to centralise and streamline the decision making process of nationally 
significant proposals. The EPA is responsible for assessing whether a proposal 
should be identified as a project of national significance, and if so, it will recommend 
to the Minister that he or she refer the matter to a board of inquiry (chaired by a 
current, former or retired Environment Judge or a retired High Court Judge) or the 
Environment Court for decision. 
• The Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment (NCEA) was 
established in 1987 as an independent expert body to advise governments 
(national, provincial and local) on the scope and quality of environmental 
assessment reports (including environmental impact assessments and strategic 
assessments). Advisory reports prepared by NCEA are intended to provide an 
impartial judgment on controversial projects, increase the value of environmental 
assessment reports as a basis for decision making and reduce the likelihood of 
legal challenges to decisions. 
Sources: CEAA (2012); EPA (NZ) (2013); NCEA (2011).  
 
This proposal is also consistent with (but not identical to) the recommendation 
made by Dr Allan Hawke as part of the Independent Review of the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (this recommendation was not 
supported by the former Australian Government). The Senate Standing Committee 
on Environment and Communications recently noted: 
The committee is persuaded by the evidence it received to indicate that Australia’s 
interests would be well served by establishing an independent National Environment 
Commission and appointing a National Environment Commissioner. … The committee 
is of the view that the Commonwealth should reconsider its position on this [Hawke] 
recommendation as the evidence in support of the recommendation is strong. (2013, 
p. 29) 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of this reform, establishing an independent 
environment regulator at the national level — and at the state and territory level 
where such arrangements do not already exist — would involve costs. 
The Commission expects that some of these costs could be met through a transfer of 
staff from relevant environment departments, reducing the need for ‘new’ 
expenditure. Nevertheless, the Commission is recommending that the Australian 
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Government and relevant State and Territory Governments undertake a detailed 
assessment of the benefits and costs of institutionally separating environmental 
policy functions from regulatory assessment and enforcement functions. This work 
should: 
• take into account whether independent environment authorities already exist, and 
the scope for expanding or refining the roles of these agencies to include a 
broader range of regulatory assessment functions 
• identify ‘least cost’ transition pathways for implementing institutional reform, 
drawing lessons from similar experiences in Australia, for example, the 
establishment of NOPSEMA, and from overseas (such as the recently created 
Environment Protection Agency in New Zealand) 
• be public, and undertaken in the context of the full set of recommendations made 
in this report. 
RECOMMENDATION 6.5 
Where not already the case, the Australian and State and Territory Governments 
should institutionally separate regulatory assessment and enforcement functions 
from environmental policy functions, provided that the expected benefits exceed 
the costs. 
6.5 ‘Scaling’ assessment requirements 
The importance of proportionate and targeted assessments 
Economic efficiency suggests that major project assessment processes should only 
be as rigorous (and as expansive) as necessary to ensure that regulatory objectives 
are met. The UK Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment notes: 
Environmental impact assessment should … impose the minimum cost burdens in 
terms of time and finance on proponents and participants consistent with meeting 
accepted requirements and objectives of EIA … be adjusted to the realities, issues and 
circumstances of the proposals under review without compromising the integrity of the 
process … be applied so that the scope of review is consistent with the size of the 
proposal and commensurate with the likely issues and impacts. (2002, p. 128) 
In practice, it is very difficult to design and administer perfectly efficient 
assessment processes. The complex and variable characteristics of major projects 
mean that the ‘optimal’ level, scope and type of assessment (including public 
consultation processes) can vary across projects, locations and time.  
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This presents a difficult balancing act for regulators at the assessment stage. If the 
assessment is not sufficiently rigorous, information and analysis about project 
impacts will be incomplete or substandard, with potentially significant 
repercussions for environmental and social outcomes. The risk of assessment 
processes being delayed, repeated or the subject of an appeal would also increase, 
generating costs and causing frustration for proponents. 
For example, in Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc v Minister for Planning 
and Infrastructure and Warkworth Mining Limited (2013) NSWLEC 48, Justice 
Preston found that the economic analyses relied upon by Warkworth and the 
Minister had not addressed relevant environmental and social factors adequately: 
At best, the two forms of economic analysis provided, the Benefit Cost Analysis and 
the Input-Output Analysis, provide some information about some of the relevant 
matters that are to be considered in the ultimate task of weighting and balancing in 
determining whether or not the Project should be approved … the results of those 
analyses are of limited value in deciding whether I can reach a state of satisfaction as to 
the nature and extent of impacts in considering each and all of the relevant matters, the 
weight I should assign to each matter, and the balancing of the matters, to determine 
whether the Project should be approved or disapproved. (para. 453 and 496) 
On the other hand, major project assessment is a time-consuming and expensive 
exercise. Excessive assessment requirements (that is, over and above what is 
required to ensure that regulatory objectives are achieved) impose unnecessary costs 
on proponents and the community. A number of study participants considered that 
poorly targeted and disproportionate assessment requirements are driving up 
regulatory costs, with no offsetting benefits: 
Government agencies prefer an applicant to ‘cover the field’ of issues in the 
development assessment process, regardless of the substantive merits of each particular 
issue and its relevance to the specific project. … A one size fits all approach … results 
in devoting time, effort and expense in areas that have little or no relevance to the 
project. (Xstrata Coal, sub. 50, pp. 34 and 39) 
and 
One of the reasons terms of references (ToRs) and environmental impact statements 
(EISs) are so large is that some of the points needing to be responded to are beyond the 
scope of the legislation … The ToR needs to request information that is within the 
management responsibility of the agency requesting the information, and be relevant to 
support an application. (QRC, sub. 19, p. 5) 
Xstrata Coal referred to a case study example where a proponent was required to 
assess the impact of a coal mine in Western Queensland on marine species despite a 
river length of over 400 kilometres from the project site to the marine environment: 
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A marine study … can cost a proponent tens of thousands in reporting and Government 
negotiation. Add this type of terms of reference (ToR) scope across multiple EIA topics 
(noise, air, water, ecology, visual amenity), and the cost of addressing ToR scope that 
has little or no relevance to the project and provides no positive environmental or social 
outcome, can easily exceed hundreds of thousands of dollars within months of a project 
EIA commencing. (sub. 50, p. 39) 
A number of respondents referred to the significant costs associated with preparing 
assessment documentation and, in this context, emphasised the importance of 
ensuring that information requirements are relevant and justified. The costs 
associated with conducting heritage surveys and managing native title claims in 
Western Australia was of particular concern:  
The average cost of a heritage survey has increased from $11 000 per day in 2010 to 
the current approximate cost of $15 000 per day … [these] costs are in addition to those 
paid to anthropologists, archaeologists, consultants, lawyers and a lesser percentage to 
native title representative bodies and Traditional Owners themselves. (AMEC, sub. 42, 
pp. 9-10) 
As well as imposing unnecessary costs, the BCA considered that poorly targeted 
assessments divert resources away from high-risk major projects: 
Jurisdictions should adopt a risk-based approach to regulation to ensure that regulatory 
effort is directed to the areas of development approvals where it will have most impact 
and that the costs of regulation are commensurate with the risks to be managed. (BCA, 
sub. 43, p. 2) 
Moreover, processes that encourage overly complex and technical assessment 
documentation can adversely impact on the effectiveness of public consultation 
processes:  
While we fully support the comprehensive and rigorous assessment of potential impacts 
of coal mine and gas projects on a range of environmental and social matters, it is clear 
that the jargonistic, technical and voluminous character of Environmental Impact 
Statements has become a major barrier to community participation. Indeed, this barrier 
could also be seen through the industry lens as a contribution to the ‘costs and delays’ 
from the proponent’s perspective, since the impenetrable prose of EISs leads to 
community members not noticing major problems and gaps with the assessment until 
late in the process. (Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97, p. 12) 
On this point, several respondents considered that assessment requirements have 
increased unnecessarily over time, citing the length of EIA documentation as 
evidence. Information provided to the Commission by the EPA of Western 
Australia illustrates how EIA assessment documentation in that state has increased 
in length (figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1 EIA assessment documentation is increasing in length 
Based on a sample of EIAs completed in Western Australia, 1975–2010 
 
Data source: Based on data provided by EPA (WA). 
The package of reforms set out in this report is expected to encourage a more 
proportionate and focused approach to major project assessment. Notwithstanding 
this, some participants have suggested that explicit ‘scaling’ mechanisms are 
required to ensure assessment is commensurate (in terms of size, scope and 
complexity) to the particular risks and impacts associated with individual major 
projects. In this way, scaling measures are analogous to a ‘risk-based’ regulatory 
approach (box 6.10). 
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Box 6.10 What is risk-based regulation? 
Risk can be defined as the probability of an unfavourable event multiplied by the 
severity of harm if the event occurs. When a regulator employs a risk-based approach, 
they are recognising that different major project characteristics present different levels 
of risk to meeting intended regulatory objectives. Likewise, regulators can also 
accommodate the different nature of risk — some regulations seek to prevent 
catastrophic outcomes, such as the loss of lives, while others aim to reduce less 
significant adverse events such as damage to a local road. 
Armed with knowledge about such differences in risk, a regulator can then tailor the 
delivery of regulation so that compliance costs are proportionate to the benefits of 
addressing those risks. Accordingly, risk-based approaches can ensure that regulatory 
resources are allocated efficiently and that objectives are achieved at ‘least cost’ to the 
community. Notwithstanding this, use of a risk-based approach requires regulators to 
develop the information and capacity to systematically target their effort to regulatory 
areas presenting the greatest risks.  
Source: PC (2013b).  
 
How can ‘scaling’ be achieved in practice? 
The variable size, nature, location and complexity of major project developments 
(and their impacts) demands a reasonably sophisticated assessment framework — a 
‘one size fits all’ approach is neither feasible nor desirable. Major project 
assessment arrangements must be capable of accommodating a broad range of 
project proposals, but have sufficient flexibility to allow for targeted and 
proportionate assessments of project impacts. 
In this context, regulators have adopted various measures to ‘scale’ major project 
assessment requirements. For primary assessment and approval processes, this 
includes: 
• allocating proposed major projects to assessment ‘tracks’, where the 
requirements associated with each track vary  
• tailoring (to varying degrees) the scope (or terms of reference) of an assessment 
based on the likelihood and significance of major project impacts (table 6.7). 
A further way to scale assessment requirements is by exempting certain ‘low risk’ 
activities from assessment requirements altogether (that is, granting ‘automatic’ or 
‘standard’ approvals) (box. 6.11). In the context of major projects, this is unlikely to 
be appropriate for primary approvals but could apply to certain secondary approval 
processes. 
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Table 6.7 Examples of major project scaling measures 
Major project assessment ‘tracks’ Measures to scale the assessment scope 
For the environmental impact assessment in 
Western Australia, two levels of assessment are 
available: 
• Assessment on proponent information  
• Public environmental review. 
For public environmental reviews in Western 
Australia, the EPA applies a ‘significance 
framework’ to identify the key environmental 
factors that should be covered by the 
assessment process. This forms part of the 
environmental scoping document. 
Under the ‘section 46’ impact assessment 
process in South Australia, three levels of 
assessment apply: 
• Development report  
• Public environmental report  
• Environmental impact statement. 
For coordinated projects in Queensland, generic 
terms of reference apply for all environmental 
impact statements. These include a generic 
requirement to assess any ‘critical matters’, 
defined as aspects of the proposal that may 
have ‘a high or medium probability of causing 
serious or material environmental harm’. 
For controlled action assessments under the 
EPBC Act, five tracks are available (if a bilateral 
assessment is not used): 
• Assessment on referral information  
• Assessment on preliminary documentation 
• Environmental impact statement  
• Public environmental review  
• Assessment by public inquiry. 
 
Source: Based on appendix C. 
Scaling measures can deliver net benefits, but implementation is key 
Measures that scale and focus assessment requirements based on expected project 
impacts were broadly supported by participants. King and Wood Mallesons 
considered that assessment tracks ‘recognise different types and scales of project’ 
and encourage ‘the application of an appropriate assessment approach … so as to 
reduce the prevalence of unnecessary assessment requirements’ (sub. DR99, p. 1).  
APPEA also favoured a hierarchy of assessment methods: 
Project approvals can be subject to ‘regulatory creep’ where assessment creeps outside 
of the original intent / scope of the legislation. This drives up cost and compliance 
burden, not just for industry but also for Government … APPEA supports risk-based 
regulation, where compliance is commensurate with the nature and scale of the activity, 
and the level of risk it demonstrates. Impact assessment should impose the minimum 
cost burdens consistent with meeting the requirements and objectives of the 
assessment. (sub. DR105, p. 16) 
Assessment track arrangements are consistent with the Commission’s Planning, 
Zoning and Development Assessments report that found ‘leading practice’ 
development assessment processes include: 
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Streaming development and rezoning applications into assessment ‘tracks’ that 
correspond with the level of assessment required to make an appropriately informed 
decision. This both speeds up most development assessments and rezonings, and 
releases assessment resources to focus on those proposals which are particularly 
technically complex or have significant impacts on others. (2011c, p. XLVIII) 
 
Box 6.11 Assessment ‘exemptions’ for low-risk activities 
Risk-based reforms to native vegetation regulations have been undertaken in Victoria 
and Queensland. 
• The Vegetation Management Framework Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) establishes 
self-assessable clearing codes that enable landowners to undertake vegetation 
clearing without the need to obtain a development permit in certain circumstances. 
(Queensland Government 2013b) 
• Risk-based pathways for native vegetation permit applications have been 
established in Victoria to better match the obligations and costs faced by 
landholders with the biodiversity impact of clearing proposals. For example, low-risk 
permit applications do not need to include a ‘habitat hectares’ assessment of the 
native vegetation to be removed. (DEPI (Vic) 2013b)  
The Queensland Government is also implementing reforms that lower regulatory 
assessment requirements for low-risk mining developments and exploration activities: 
Low environmental risk resource activities that meet eligibility criteria can now automatically 
receive a standard approval containing standard environmental conditions. … The principles 
of risk based assessment are being applied in developing new thresholds for assessment of 
resource project expansions and in determining thresholds for application of environment 
authorities. It is expected that this will simplify the application process for certain activities 
and significantly reduce the compliance burden. (sub. 47, pp. 5 and 37) 
and 
Queensland has instigated a substantial reform process over the last two years, which aims 
to provide a level of codified environmental regulation for a suite of standard low-risk 
exploration activities. The changes have been most marked in the area of gemfield and 
alluvial mining, where exploration within a bounded area can occur by certifying compliance 
with a standard set of environmental conditions. (QRC, sub. DR91, p. 10) 
The Victorian EPA is implementing a risk-based system for assessing and approving 
works approvals and other EPA licences, including exemptions and fast-track 
approvals for low-risk proposals (EPA (Vic) 2013).  
 
Notwithstanding broad support for scaling, participants highlighted the challenges 
with applying risk-based approaches, and the importance of good regulatory design: 
A single bad development outcome can discredit the entire risk-based approach if the 
risk framework hadn’t anticipated that situation or was not flexible enough to deal with 
it. This is especially the case if public, media or political attention is focused on the bad 
decision — there tends to be an over-reaction and movement back to a very risk averse 
approach. (Queensland Government, sub. 47, p. 40) 
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and 
Using risk-based approaches to regulation may have drawbacks, particularly if there are 
significant unknowns either with the technology proposed to be used in the project, or a 
lack of knowledge on the existing environmental conditions of a site. (Xstrata Coal, 
sub. 50, p. 57) 
The Commission considers that, if properly designed and implemented, multi-track 
assessment arrangements and risk-based scoping methods have merit. Such 
measures can encourage a level of regulatory scrutiny commensurate with project 
impacts, thus reducing the incidence and materiality of unnecessary compliance 
burdens and ensuring that scarce regulatory resources are allocated efficiently. 
In practice, regulators are best-placed to determine how major project assessment 
processes can be scaled to minimise unnecessary regulatory burdens. However, a 
number of guiding principles are critical: 
• clear and public criteria should be identified to guide regulator decisions about 
the appropriate level or scope of an assessment 
• regulator decisions and reasons should be public 
• regulators must rely on robust, transparent and consistent methodologies and 
decision-making frameworks for assessing project risks and impacts  
• to the extent assessment requirements are lowered for particular activities, 
risk-based assessment arrangements must be accompanied by a strong 
monitoring and enforcement regime (including material penalties for breaking 
environmental law and a real and credible threat of detection) (chapter 10). 
Further, government has a crucial role in facilitating risk-based assessment 
approaches by: 
• clarifying the policy objectives being sought (chapter 4), and the government’s 
expectations on the treatment of risk (or ‘risk appetite’) 
• providing regulators with the requisite resources to administer risk-based 
assessment approaches (chapter 12). 
Strategic Assessment tools can also support a proportionate approach to major 
project regulation by reducing the need for project-specific assessment 
requirements. The role and impact of Strategic Approaches is considered in 
chapter 11. 
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RECOMMENDATION 6.6 
Where it is not already the case, regulators should establish measures that ‘scale’ 
aspects of the major project assessment requirements based on the risk and 
significance of expected impacts. Criteria for determining the level and scope of 
assessment should be identified and publicly available. 
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7 The approval stage 
Key points 
• During the approval stage of development assessment and approval processes, 
decisions are made about whether, and under what conditions, proposed major 
project developments are allowed to proceed. 
• The Commission has identified four areas of policy concern: 
– unnecessary duplication of processes between levels of government 
– the length of time it takes to make decisions 
– inappropriate allocation of responsibilities for making primary approval decisions 
– the quality of the process that decision makers are required to follow. 
• Reducing duplication requires renewed effort to establish a ‘one project, one 
assessment, one approval’ framework for environmental matters, through bilateral 
approval agreements between the Australian and State and Territory Governments, 
underpinned by rigorous environmental standards.  
• To improve the timeliness of primary approval processes, jurisdictions should set a 
maximum time that may elapse between a proponent’s assessment documentation 
being lodged and when the assessment agency provides its report to the decision 
maker, and a maximum time for the approval decision to be made. 
• There should be: 
– one opportunity for the approval authority to ‘stop the clock’ 
– clarity about when the clock starts, combined with clear triggers for when and for 
how long it can be stopped  
– public disclosure of when and why stop the clock provisions are activated. 
• If the approval decision is not made within the set time period, the recommendation 
made by the assessment agency (along with the reasons and any conditions) 
should be deemed to be the approval decision. Increased tracking of performance 
against statutory timelines would also encourage timely decisions. 
• Governments should also seek to improve the timeliness of secondary approval 
processes by, for example, imposing statutory timelines on them. 
• Ministers should make the primary approval decisions for major projects. Guidelines 
should indicate the types of decisions that Ministers can delegate. 
• To strengthen the decision-making process, jurisdictions should publish the steps to 
be followed when making approval decisions. Decision makers should publish 
statements of reasons for their approval decisions and conditions.  
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During the approval stage of development assessment and approval (DAA) 
processes, decisions are made about whether, and under what conditions, proposed 
major developments are allowed to proceed, based on assessments that have 
previously been undertaken. This chapter proposes ways to improve the process that 
leads to the approval decision. Conditions and offsets attached to an approval 
decision are discussed in chapter 8. 
7.1 Overview of major project approval processes 
There is typically a primary approval decision about whether a proposed project 
may proceed. In addition, proponents of major projects usually require various other 
authorisations, licences and permits (‘secondary approvals’). 
While there is not a standard approval process across Australian jurisdictions, key 
features include: 
• an identified decision maker  
• specification of the decision maker’s discretion to depart from the assessment 
recommendations 
• the process to be followed in reaching decisions, including the matters to which 
the decision maker must and must not have regard  
• time periods within which decisions must be made (and the consequences when 
these time periods are breached).  
These features are not necessarily specified in legislation. For example, the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), the Planning and 
Environment Act 1987 (Vic), the Planning Act (NT), and the Planning and 
Development Act 2007 (ACT) do not set out the process to be followed when 
making decisions. In contrast, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (EPBC Act) sets out clearly the four features of the 
approval stage (box 7.1). 
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Box 7.1 The approval process in the EPBC Act 
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth): 
• establishes the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment (or delegate) as the 
decision maker under the Act, who decides whether to approve, approve with 
conditions, or not approve a proposed action  
• specifies how much discretion the Minister has when responding to the 
recommendations of the assessment report provided by the relevant 
Commonwealth Department or State Government agency (when there is a bilateral 
assessment agreement). The Minister does not have to accept these 
recommendations. However, the Minister’s decisions must be cost effective ‘as far 
as practicable’. The Minister may impose broad conditions relating to the protection 
of, or repair or mitigation of damage to, any matter of national environmental 
significance affected by the action. Conditions that are not reasonably related to the 
action can only be applied with the consent of the applicant 
• sets out the process that the Minister must follow when making an approval decision 
(box 7.2) 
• stipulates time limits for decisions made under the Act that vary between 20 and 40 
business days after the Minister receives the relevant report, depending on the 
assessment pathway. The Minister must make the decision within these time 
periods or within ‘such longer time period as the Minister specifies in writing’. If the 
Minister specifies a longer period, the specification of the variation must be 
published  
• does not specify any consequences if the time period is breached. 
Source: EPBC Act, s. 130, s 134.  
 
The identity of the approval authority 
Table 7.1 shows approval authorities for selected major project pathways. In some 
cases, a Minister is the approval authority (for example, for the Commonwealth and 
Victorian pathways shown). In others, the approval authority is an agency (for 
example, Development Assessment Panels in Western Australia). Sometimes the 
entity that assesses the project is also the approval authority.  
Legislation sometimes permits the Minister to delegate approval authority. For 
instance, Victoria’s Planning and Environment Act (s. 186) enables the Minister to 
delegate any of his or her powers to the Secretary or employees of the Department 
or to the Growth Areas Authority. Under the EPBC Act (s. 515), the Minister may 
delegate his or her powers or functions to an officer or employee in the Department 
of Environment or to the Director of National Parks, although the delegate is subject 
to the directions of the Minister and decisions of the delegate may be reviewed by 
the Minister. 
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Table 7.1 Approval authoritiesa (selected pathways, by jurisdiction) 
Major project assessment 
pathways 
Approval authority Assessor is the 
approval authority 
New South Wales   
State significant developments Minister may delegate to the Planning 
Assessment Commission or Department 
Sometimes 
State significant infrastructure Ministerb or the Planning Assessment 
Commission or Department 
Sometimes 
Victoria   
Ministerial call-in Minister for Planning Yes 
Major transport projects Minister for Planning Sometimesc 
Queensland   
Coordinated projects Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection 
Nod 
Urban development Minister for Economic Development Yes 
Western Australia   
Development assessment 
panel projects 
Development Assessment Panel No 
 
South Australia    
Major developments or 
projects 
Governor (effectively the Executive). 
Delegation to the Minister or Development 
Assessment Commission is possible 
Sometimes 
Crown development and 
public infrastructure 
Minister No 
Tasmania   
Projects of state significance Minister and both Houses of Parliament No 
Projects of regional 
significance 
Development Assessment Panel Yes 
Major infrastructure projects Combined Planning Authority Yes 
Northern Territory   
Development permits Development Consent Authority Yes 
Exceptional development 
permits 
Minister for Planning Yes 
Ministerial call-in Minister for Planning Yes 
ACT   
Ordinary development Environment and Sustainable Development 
Directorate 
Yes 
Ministerial call-in Minister for Planning  Yes 
Commonwealth   
Matters of national 
environmental significance  
Minister for Environment No 
Airports under a major 
development plan 
Minister for Infrastructure Yese 
a More details can be found in table C.3 in appendix C. b Minister cannot delegate decision making for critical 
state significant infrastructure. c Assessment manager is either the Minister for Planning, or an assessment 
committee established by the Minister. d Even though the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
is the assessment manager under the Sustainable Planning Act, the Coordinator-General conducts the 
environment impact assessment process. e In certain circumstances, advice may be required from the 
Minister for the Environment and off-airport impacts may require separate assessment.  
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The approval authority’s decision-making discretion  
The extent to which approval authorities have discretion to depart from the 
recommendations in assessment reports differs between jurisdictions, although in 
most cases the differences are small.  
• In Tasmania, the Minister is not bound by the recommendations of the 
Tasmanian Planning Commission.  
• In Western Australia, Development Assessment Panels must have regard to, but 
are not bound to give effect to, the recommendations included in the assessment 
report. 
• In New South Wales, the Minister must consider the findings of the Planning 
Assessment Commission, but can approve the project with modifications or 
conditions that the Minister may determine.  
• By contrast, in Queensland, if the approval authority (ordinarily the Department 
of Environment and Heritage Protection) approves a project, it must impose the 
conditions recommended by the Coordinator-General, and any other conditions 
that it imposes must be consistent with the conditions proposed by the 
Coordinator-General.  
The decision-making process 
The process that decision makers are required to follow when considering 
assessment reports — such as the principles that should guide them, the evidence 
they should examine, the matters to which the decision maker must and must not 
have regard, and whom they should consult — affects the quality of their approval 
decisions. The EPBC Act specifies the process that the Commonwealth 
Environment Minister should follow, including the matters that the Minister must or 
may take into account (box 7.2). State and Territory legislation sometimes sets out 
matters that the decision maker is required to consider. For example:  
• in South Australia, the Development Act 1993 (s. 48) requires that before the 
Governor approves a major development, he or she must have regard to the 
objects of the general environmental duty, and any relevant environmental 
protection policies under the Environmental Protection Act 1993, among other 
things  
• in Tasmania, a set of objectives is included in a schedule to each of the Acts 
within the Resource Management and Planning System, to ensure that all 
decisions about the use of land and natural resources within the State are made in 
pursuit of common objectives (Land Use and Planning Approvals Act 1993, 
schedule 1). 
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The Commission found few instances where decision makers are bound by good 
regulatory practice when reaching decisions. One example of legislation that goes in 
this direction is South Australia’s Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000. The 
Act’s objectives include an effective, efficient and flexible regulatory system, and 
appropriate consultation. 
 
Box 7.2 Decision making under the EPBC Act 
Factors that the Commonwealth Environment Minister must take into account include: 
• the principles of ecologically sustainable development 
• the assessment report relating to the action 
• the relevant recommendation report from the Secretary of the Australian 
Government Department of the Environment 
• community and stakeholder comments 
• any other relevant information available on the impacts of the proposed action 
• relevant comments from other Australian Government and State and Territory 
Government Ministers (such as information on social and economic factors). 
The Environment Minister may also take into account the environmental history of the 
individual or company proposing to take the action.  
Before reaching an approval decision, the Environment Minister: 
• must inform relevant Ministers and the proponent about the proposed decision and 
seek comments 
• must take into account any relevant comments made by the proponent 
• must seek advice from the Independent Expert Scientific Committee on Coal Seam 
Gas and Large Coal Mining Development, when the action involves coal seam gas 
or coal mining 
• may invite public comment by publishing the proposed decision on the internet 
• may in some cases request the appropriate State or Territory Minister to provide a 
notice stating the method that has been used to assess the impacts of the action on 
other matters.  
If the Minister refuses to approve the action, the proponent may request reasons for 
the refusal and the Minister must give them. Conditions requiring specified activities to 
be undertaken cannot be attached to the approval of an action if these activities are not 
reasonably related to the action, unless the holder of the approval has consented to 
the attachment of the condition. 
Source: EPBC Act.  
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Time limits 
Time limits on approval decisions vary within and between jurisdictions. Some 
have none, while others have statutory time limits with no scope for extension. Most 
jurisdictions are positioned between these extremes, with specified timelines that 
can be extended (box 7.3). 
 
Box 7.3 Approaches to legislated timelines for approval decisions 
The approaches to legislated timelines for approval decisions differ between 
jurisdictions and sometimes between pathways within jurisdictions. 
• Some pathways (for example, major infrastructure projects in Tasmania) do not 
have legislated approval timelines.  
• Some pathways have legislated approval timelines with stop the clock provisions, 
although there are differences between jurisdictions as to how the clock can be 
stopped. 
– For coordinated projects in Queensland, the approval authority must make a 
decision within 20 business days of receiving the Coordinator-General’s report. 
However, this time can be extended with the written agreement of the proponent, 
and the proponent can choose to stop the clock in particular circumstances. 
– Other pathways stop the clock when requests for further information are made, 
such as for developments of regional significance in Tasmania (which require a 
decision to be made within one month of receiving the report on the 
environmental impact assessment). 
• Some jurisdictions have approval timelines with no stop the clock provisions. For 
example, in Western Australia, Development Assessment Panels must make a 
decision within 60 or 90 days of receiving a development application. Information 
requests do not stop the clock. 
• Whether or not there are consequences for breaches of timelines varies between 
jurisdictions and between pathways. 
– Some pathways, such as state significant developments in New South Wales, 
provide for deemed refusals (which can be appealed) when a timeline is 
breached. 
– In Queensland, the Coordinator-General can call-in a prescribed project if he or 
she is satisfied that the original decision maker has not complied with a notice to 
grant an approval within a specified time.  
– Other pathways, such as Crown developments in South Australia, do not have 
deemed refusals or call-in powers if timelines are breached. 
Source: Appendix C.  
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What are the key issues? 
The Commission has identified four areas of significant policy concern with the 
approval stage: 
• unnecessary duplication of approval processes between levels of government 
• the length of time it takes to make decisions  
• the allocation of responsibilities for making approval decisions  
• whether the process that decision makers are required to follow encourages 
evidence-based and balanced approval decisions. 
7.2 Duplication of approval processes between levels 
of government 
When two levels of government approve projects, there is a risk of unnecessary 
duplication — for example, two sets of requests for information and overlapping 
analysis — and of inconsistent regulatory requirements. This can increase the costs 
of DAA processes and delay decisions.  
Accreditation of one government’s approval process by another level of government 
would reduce these risks. In practice, efforts have concentrated on whether the 
Australian Government should accredit State and Territory Government processes. 
(This is the main focus of this section.) However, it is also possible for a State or 
Territory Government to accredit an Australian Government process. 
Bilateral approval agreements are allowed under the EPBC Act 
Chapter 6 recommended that governments strengthen and expand the scope of 
bilateral assessment agreements under the EPBC Act, including through accrediting 
key State and Territory major project assessment processes. The EPBC Act also 
enables the Commonwealth Environment Minister to enter into bilateral approval 
agreements, which would allow State or Territory authorities to approve projects 
that may have significant impacts on matters of national environmental significance 
(MNES) (s. 29 and s. 46). The EPBC Act requires a number of steps before a 
bilateral approval agreement can be finalised (box 7.4). 
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Box 7.4 Establishing a bilateral approval agreement 
The steps to establish a bilateral approval agreement under the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) include the following. 
• The relevant State or Territory Government is responsible for developing a 
management arrangement or authorisation process. The arrangement or process 
can only be bilaterally accredited if they are in effect under a law of that State or 
Territory (ss. 46(2) and (2A)). 
• The Australian Environment Minister (the Minister) tables in Parliament for 15 sitting 
days the State or Territory arrangement or process that the Minister is considering 
accrediting.  
• If the arrangement or process is not disallowed by Parliament, the Minister may 
accredit it in writing and publish the accrediting instrument. The Minister must first 
be satisfied that preconditions under s. 46(3) are met.  
• Before entering into an agreement, the Minister must be satisfied that it accords with 
the objects of the EPBC Act (s. 50). Further, ss. 51 through 55 set out things that 
the Minister must be satisfied of before he or she can enter an agreement against 
each matter of national environmental significance. These requirements can be 
summarised as requiring that agreements, or their provisions: 
– are not inconsistent with Australia’s obligations under each relevant international 
agreement 
– promote management of protected areas such as World Heritage properties, 
National Heritage places and Ramsar wetlands in accordance with management 
principles adopted under the EPBC Act 
– promote the survival and/or enhance the conservation status of any relevant 
threatened or migratory species and are not inconsistent with recovery plans or 
threat abatement plans. 
• The Minister must publish the draft bilateral agreement, invite public comment on it 
for a minimum of 28 days and take all public comments into account in deciding 
whether to enter the agreement (s. 49A). 
• The Minister, and the responsible State Minister, would execute a bilateral 
agreement after the public consultation and tabling periods.  
• The Minister may declare that actions in a class specified by the agreement 
approved in accordance with the accredited authorisation process do not require 
approval under Part 9 of the EPBC Act (approval of actions under the EPBC Act) for 
the purposes of a specified provision of Part 3 of the EPBC Act (that sets out which 
actions are controlled actions requiring approval). 
• As soon as practicable after entering the agreement, the Minister must publish the 
final agreement, a statement of reasons for entering into the agreement, and a 
report on any comments received on the draft. 
Source: DSEWPAC (2013e).  
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Progress in negotiating agreements has been slow 
The Sydney Opera House approval agreement, signed in 2005, is the only one that 
has been negotiated, and it has since expired (box 7.5). It illustrates how an 
approval agreement could be implemented, while satisfying the Australian 
Government Minister’s accountabilities under the EPBC Act.  
 
Box 7.5 The Sydney Opera House bilateral approval agreement 
The Australian and New South Wales Governments entered into a bilateral approval 
agreement in December 2005. Its aims were to: 
• protect the World Heritage and National Heritage values of the Sydney Opera 
House from unacceptable and unsustainable impacts 
• ensure an efficient, timely, and effective process for environmental assessment and 
approval of actions 
• minimise duplication of environmental assessment and approval processes relating 
to the protection of the World Heritage and National Heritage values of the Opera 
House. 
Under the agreement, certain specified actions no longer required approval under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 if they had been 
approved by an agency of New South Wales acting in accordance with the 
management plan for the Opera House that the Australian Government Environment 
Minister had accredited. The New South Wales Minister was required to notify the 
Australian Government of all proposed actions that will have or are likely to have a 
significant impact on the World or National Heritage values of the Opera House. 
The Commonwealth Auditor-General was able to audit the operation of the Australian 
Government in relation to the agreement.  
After the agreement expired in 2010, it was replaced by a conservation agreement for 
the Opera House as a World Heritage site, because that was less administratively 
burdensome and achieved the same outcome. 
Sources: Australian Government and New South Wales Government (2005); Senate Environment and 
Communications Legislation Committee (2013).  
 
COAG agreed in 2012 to expedite the accreditation of State and Territory 
environmental approval processes for MNES under the EPBC Act. To provide a 
framework within which approval agreements could be negotiated, the then 
Australian Government developed a Statement of Environmental Assurance 
Outcomes (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012h) and Framework of Standards for 
Accreditation (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012f). The outcomes that were proposed to be 
achieved included: 
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• productivity outcomes, such as more efficient regulation and more process 
certainty 
• environmental outcomes, including that Australia complies fully with its 
international environmental obligations and that MNES are protected as required 
under the EPBC Act 
• system outcomes, so that the community has confidence that systems will deliver 
certainty, efficiency, transparency, appropriate opportunities for public 
engagement and legally robust decisions. 
Negotiations to increase the number of bilateral approval agreements made little 
progress, and were halted in late 2012. However, the incoming Australian 
Government has recommenced negotiations, indicating that it will: 
• sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with each of the willing States 
that sets out key principles and confirms their cooperation on achieving a single 
process 
• update existing bilateral assessment agreements with States 
• within 12 months, sign bilateral approval agreements with willing States. 
In October and November 2013, the Australian Government signed MOUs with the 
Queensland and New South Wales Governments. The MOUs commit both levels of 
government to pursuing comprehensive bilateral approval agreements to accredit 
Queensland and New South Wales to undertake approvals under the EPBC Act. The 
MOUs, which specify that the agreements are to be concluded by 18 September 
2014, are similar, but not identical (box 7.6).  
The arguments for and against bilateral approval agreements 
Negotiations to secure bilateral approval agreements are taking place against the 
background of divergent views in the community about their advantages and 
disadvantages. Those supporting bilateral approval agreements expect reduced 
compliance and delay costs, while others have expressed concerns that they will 
reduce environmental standards. A Senate Committee inquiry reported these 
competing arguments, which were also evident in submissions to this study (Senate 
Environment and Communications Legislation Committee 2013).  
In a cost–benefit analysis of proposed reforms to environmental assessments under 
the EPBC Act, commissioned by the Department of Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities, Deloitte Access Economics estimated that 
bilateral assessment and approval agreements could create a net benefit approaching 
$400 million, largely from reduced delays (DAE 2011, pp. 33–36). The study did 
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not allocate these savings between assessment and approval agreements, but noted 
that delays have been experienced in both stages. Most of the benefits would accrue 
to project proponents. The Australian Government would have fewer approvals to 
process, while processing costs would rise a little for State and Territory 
Governments.  
 
Box 7.6 Key features of the Memoranda of Understanding between the 
Australian and the Queensland and New South Wales 
Governments 
• The purpose of the memoranda of understanding (MOU) is to set out agreed 
arrangements that will be pursued by the Australian and Queensland/New South 
Wales Governments to deliver a one stop shop for environmental approvals under 
the EPBC Act, removing duplication in assessment and approval processes, while 
maintaining environmental outcomes. They are not legally binding. 
• Queensland/New South Wales will become responsible for assessing projects for 
the purpose of the EPBC Act and, within 12 months, for approving projects, when 
an approval bilateral agreement has been signed. 
• Maintaining clearly articulated EPBC Act standards will be the basis for developing 
agreements. Any accredited process will ensure that any decisions proposed by 
Queensland/New South Wales will result in at least equivalent protection for matters 
of national environmental significance. 
• The Parties will refresh the existing assessment bilateral agreement by 
31 December 2013 (Queensland), and conclude a comprehensive assessment 
bilateral agreement within six months (New South Wales). The Parties agree the 
goal is to lift the use of single accredited assessment processes to 100 per cent. 
• The proposed bilateral approval agreements will include a process of regular 
review, with the first occurring after 12 months of the operation of the agreement. 
• The Queensland MOU specifies that the Parties will work to develop a common 
generic streamlined terms of reference for environmental impact statement 
processes and to utilise standard outcome-focused conditions for similar projects, 
based on level of risk. The New South Wales MOU specifies that the Parties will 
work towards publishing standard information requirements and outcome-focused 
conditions for high priority sectors. 
• The Australian Government agrees to use the conditions proposed by 
Queensland/New South Wales and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid 
imposing additional conditions when making approval decisions under the EPBC 
Act. For projects where further conditions are imposed by the Australian 
Government, the Parties agree to provide a single document that contains all the 
conditions of approval for that project imposed by both jurisdictions. 
Sources: Commonwealth of Australia and Queensland Government (2013); Commonwealth of Australia 
and New South Wales Government (2013).  
. 
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Submissions from business groups supported bilateral approval agreements, as a 
way to reduce the costs of approval processes and the time involved when two 
levels of government are involved in granting similar approvals. AGL Energy 
(sub. DR96), Peabody Energy Australia (sub. DR81) and the Australian Petroleum 
Production and Exploration Association (sub. DR105) argued that the agreements 
would reduce duplication. As an example of how delays can occur, Business SA 
(sub. DR74, p. 1) pointed out that:  
… situations have arisen where Federal and State Governments become trapped in a 
first mover scenario and neither tier will grant approval without the other’s 
commitment. This can be very frustrating for the project proponent and the 
Commission should be mindful of how it frames its recommendations to the 
Government so as to avoid such occurrences. 
Opponents of bilateral approval agreements argued that: 
• the Australian Government should retain decision-making responsibility for 
international conventions and other decisions that have a national impact 
(Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices (ANEDO), 
sub. DR92; Jeremy Tager, sub. DR72; Nature Conservation Council of NSW, 
sub. DR94; Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97). ANEDO (sub. DR92) argued 
that state and federal environment regulation is not duplicative but is part of a 
shared responsibility, with each level of government responsible for different 
aspects of environmental protection 
• State and Territory Governments may have a conflict of interest, given the 
revenue and other benefits that they secure from new projects, and their laws 
may not provide adequate environmental assessment and decision-making 
processes (ANEDO, sub. DR92; North Queensland Conservation Council, 
sub. DR64; Nature Conservation Council of NSW, sub. DR94; Lock the Gate 
Alliance, sub. DR97) 
• there is no empirical evidence of unnecessary regulatory burden caused by 
concurrent Commonwealth and State/Territory approval processes or that 
approval agreements would reduce costs. Moreover, the recent negotiations 
indicate that bilateral approval agreements may increase regulatory complexity 
as States overlay their own approval processes onto the federal system (ANEDO, 
sub. DR92; Nature Conservation Society of South Australia, sub. DR95). 
Weighing up the arguments 
Other than the analysis in DAE (2011), the Commission has not seen estimates of 
the savings from bilateral approval agreements. This is not surprising, given that the 
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size of these savings will depend on the quality of future agreements. Nevertheless, 
savings seem possible, from: 
• smaller unnecessary delay costs  
• reduced compliance costs from fewer inconsistencies or overlaps between 
approvals (and their associated conditions) issued under the EPBC Act and State 
and Territory legislation. (About 80 per cent of respondents to a survey reported 
that there is overlap between EPBC Act conditions and conditions imposed 
under State/Territory permits (Macintosh 2009, p. 42)). Such overlaps could 
require proponents to provide similar information twice or to comply with 
similar but not-identical conditions in different ways. 
The Commission considers that there are ways to address the concerns that have 
been raised about the impact of bilateral approval agreements on environmental 
standards. 
• Countering the argument that the Australian Government should retain 
responsibility for international conventions and decisions with national impact, 
are the EPBC’s Act’s safeguards — such as the process outlined in box 7.4 — 
which help to ensure that the Commonwealth Environment Minister’s 
obligations under international agreements are not diluted by entering an 
approval agreement. Concerns about whether States and Territories will act 
consistently with Australia’s international obligations could be further reduced 
by: 
–  requiring that the Minister does not accredit processes unless rights of appeal 
are no less than those in the EPBC Act. This would enable those with the 
right to seek a judicial review under the EPBC Act to seek a review of a 
decision made by a State or Territory Minister as if that decision had been 
made under the EPBC Act 
– requiring the Minister to publish explanations of outcomes that a proposed 
bilateral approval agreement is expected to achieve and of how it will do so, 
as well as of how it satisfies the conditions set out in the EPBC Act 
– retaining the Minister’s right to withdraw accreditation if national standards 
are not being met under an approval agreement. 
• The argument that State and Territory Governments would make less balanced 
decisions than the Commonwealth Environment Minister, because of their 
perceived conflict of interest, implies that such conflicts would be reduced or 
avoided if the Commonwealth Minister retained authority for primary approval 
decisions. Yet the Australian Government also receives additional revenue when 
projects are approved and so is exposed to a similar conflict. To the extent that 
such conflicts do exist, ensuring that assessment and approval processes are 
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transparent at all levels of government, with justifications for decisions 
published, can help to address them. Moreover, any agreement needs to be 
underpinned by robust environmental standards, as was pointed out by the 
Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia (sub. DR85) and the 
Queensland Resources Council (sub. DR91), and is foreshadowed in the MOUs 
between the Australian and Queensland and New South Wales Governments 
(box 7.6).  
• While the cost savings from bilateral approval agreements could be eroded if the 
State and Territory Governments overlay their own processes on top of the 
federal system, the risk that this will happen can be reduced by having an 
effective strategy for establishing and implementing agreements. The next 
section sets out such a strategy. 
A strategy for establishing bilateral approval agreements 
A strategy with five components, focused on achieving productivity, environmental 
and system outcomes without unduly prescribing how to achieve them, could build 
on the strategy that the Australian Government has announced. It could decrease 
duplication while addressing concerns that bilateral agreements may reduce 
environmental standards. 
First, working to increase the number of State and Territory assessment processes 
with Commonwealth accreditation, as recommended in chapter 6, would provide a 
firmer foundation on which to build accreditation of approval processes.  
Second, strengthening State and Territory approval and enforcement processes, 
through other reforms proposed in this report, would facilitate Commonwealth 
accreditation.  
Third, a targeted and staged approach, initially concluding agreements in areas that 
are less environmentally sensitive and where there is better information about 
impacts, such as urban environments, is likely to be more effective than trying to 
secure a comprehensive nationwide agreement. The Australian Government would 
continue to control matters where it considers that the community would not accept 
it exiting the field. 
Fourth, the process for negotiating bilateral approval agreements needs to be 
carefully designed. COAG should publish a timetable of agreed reforms and have 
the COAG Reform Council report annually on key milestones, barriers to reform 
and how to address them. The time allowed for completing the negotiations needs to 
match the complexity of the task.  
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Finally, close monitoring of the outcomes, as bilateral approval agreements are 
progressively negotiated, would: 
• provide early warning of any problems 
• confirm that agreements are reducing duplication without risking environmental 
harm 
• identify lessons for new agreements.  
The MOUs between the Australian and Queensland and New South Wales 
Governments provide for comprehensive reviews after 12 months of the operation 
of the agreements and periodic review after that. These reviews could examine how 
well the agreements are working, and make suggestions for improving them. As 
more agreements are negotiated and reviews undertaken, lessons will probably 
emerge that have implications across jurisdictions. To facilitate the opportunities for 
learning, governments should prepare annual reports on the operation of the 
bilateral approval agreements. 
Implementation of bilateral approval agreements 
The failed attempt to negotiate bilateral approval agreements in 2012 indicates that 
negotiating new agreements will be challenging. This section describes approaches 
to increase the likelihood of successful implementation. 
Avoid excessive prescription 
The Government of Western Australia considers that the previous approach to 
negotiating the agreements involved the Australian Government setting out 
standards in prescriptive detail, requiring State and Territory Governments to 
deliver these standards at their own expense, and requiring demonstration of the 
achievement of Commonwealth outcomes through exacting accreditation 
requirements. It suggested that instead the objective should be a co-regulatory 
arrangement whereby: 
• COAG agrees to high-level strategic outcomes for matters of National 
Environmental Significance and principles for balancing these with other 
objectives; 
• The Commonwealth accepts a formal agreement from the State to seek to meet the 
agreed National Environmental Significance outcomes through State approval 
processes and does not seek to prescribe or monitor requirements in detail; and 
• There is an agreed process for ‘call in’ and negotiated dispute settlement where the 
Commonwealth believes that there is failure to address a significant national threat. 
(sub. DR103, p. 3) 
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Success in future negotiations is more likely if both levels of government aim for 
agreements that achieve well-defined outcomes, but without prescribing how to 
achieve them. The MOUs between the Australian and Queensland and New South 
Wales Governments commit the Parties to ensuring that wherever conditions of 
approval are imposed, they are outcome focused and strictly necessary to maintain 
environmental standards.  
Agree on environmental standards and outcomes 
While undue prescription needs to be avoided, negotiations need to be conducted 
within a framework that sets out desired outcomes and accreditation standards. An 
early task is, therefore, to confirm or revise the existing framework, set out in the 
Framework of Standards for Accreditation and the Statement of Environmental 
Assurance Outcomes.  
Effective targeting 
Participants made constructive suggestions about how to target negotiating effort. 
• The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia suggested that 
‘individual states are likely to have different priority activities/areas to negotiate 
… and this flexibility should be accommodated’ (sub. DR85, p. 3).  
• The Queensland Resources Council suggested negotiations should focus initially 
on those MNES connected with existing State processes and capacity, such as 
Ramsar wetlands, threatened species, migratory species, and national heritage 
(sub. DR91). 
• King & Wood Mallesons suggested that projects suitable for approval 
agreements include those involving well known and proven technologies 
(sub. DR99).  
A targeted approach might initially involve the Commonwealth Environment 
Minister delegating to particular States and Territories the responsibility for 
assessing and granting most environmental approvals under the EPBC Act in urban 
areas, where relatively mature assessment and decision-making processes are in 
place and strategic planning tools have already been used successfully. The 
Commonwealth could subsequently transfer responsibility to State and Territory 
Governments for approving controlled activities in non-metropolitan areas. 
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Where there are different reform options, choose ones that facilitate approval 
agreements 
This report proposes reforms to State and Territory Government DAA processes. In 
some cases, governments may consider that there are different ways to give effect to 
these reforms. Choosing options that are consistent with agreed accreditation 
standards would facilitate progress towards bilateral approval agreements. 
Pick up synergies with strategic assessments 
Strategic assessments can be worthwhile in their own right (chapter 11). They might 
also help pave the way for bilateral approval agreements in two ways.  
• Issues that are settled through strategic assessments are removed as potential 
sticking points for bilateral approval agreements. 
• In the course of undertaking strategic assessments, States and Territories may 
learn more about Australian Government requirements in relation to MNES, and 
the Australian Government may learn more about the adequacy (or otherwise) of 
State and Territory policies, plans and programs for addressing MNES. This 
improved understanding may facilitate negotiation of bilateral approval 
agreements. 
Recognise that agreements may involve a State or Territory accrediting an 
Australian Government approval process 
As noted above, a targeted approach is likely to lead to the Australian Government 
continuing to control matters where it considers that the community would not 
accept it exiting the field. In such cases, the States and Territories should accredit 
Commonwealth processes where the processes address the same matter. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.1 
Governments should aim to establish a ‘one project, one assessment, one 
decision’ framework by restarting negotiations on bilateral approval agreements 
between the Australian Government and the States and Territories. Such 
agreements must ensure that environmental standards are not compromised and 
rights of appeal are no less than those in the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth), and provide for periodic reviews of 
the agreements’ effectiveness. 
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RECOMMENDATION 7.2 
To facilitate the successful negotiation of bilateral approval agreements, 
governments should adopt a strategy that involves: 
• increasing the number of State and Territory assessment processes with 
Commonwealth accreditation 
• strengthening the approval processes of States and Territories through the 
implementation of other reforms proposed in this report 
• targeting ‘easy wins’ — for example, by giving priority to approval 
responsibilities for activities in urban areas (other than on Commonwealth 
land) 
• scoping the task of negotiating the agreements between the Commonwealth 
and other jurisdictions, including a published timetable of key milestones  
• tasking the COAG Reform Council to monitor progress of development of 
agreements. 
7.3 Unnecessary delay in approval decisions 
The timeliness of DAA processes as a whole 
The timeliness of DAA processes has been a central issue in this study. Business 
participants contended that the process is too slow and has been lengthening, 
without any improvement in regulatory outcomes: 
Processes take too long or are highly uncertain: a Business Council of Australia 
member told us it took 10 years to get some basic service centres approved in Western 
Australia. Another said it took over five years to have a relatively straightforward mine 
deepening application approved … not knowing how long the approval process will 
take is a deterrent to business investment. (Business Council of Australia, sub. 43, 
pp. 9–11) 
Xstrata Coal (sub. 50) suggested that it took about 7 months on average to secure 
approval for major projects in 2002 and between 18 and 36 months in 2012. The 
Minerals Council of Australia (sub. 33) stated that the average period for 
approval-related activities for a thermal coal project was just over three years, 
compared with 1.8 years for the rest of the world.5 The Association of Mining and 
Exploration Companies referred to a Gantt chart prepared by the Department of 
                                              
5 This comparison is based on a sample of the 50 or so major global coal mines that are part of 
research firm Wood Mackenzie’s international database covering regions primarily within 
Canada, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Russia, Southern Africa, the United States and Venezuela 
(Minerals Council of Australia, pers. comm., 30 July 2013). 
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Mines and Petroleum in Western Australia that shows the minimum time to get an 
approval to explore for uranium is 358 days, and the total time that it takes to get 
approval (from exploration to production) is 1135 days (sub. 42). 
Queensland Conservation, on the other hand, suggested that Australian approval 
processes are not slow by international standards: 
… international mining reports such as the Behrens Dolbear Index routinely assess 
Australian approval process as the most efficient and timely in the world (based upon 
an assessment of the top 35 resource nations). (sub. DR77, p. 2) 
Much of the time required for DAA processes is taken up by the early stages, when 
the proponent is preparing assessment documentation and collecting public 
comments (DSEWPAC, sub. 55). The South Australian State Government 
Departments (sub. 51) and the North Queensland Conservation Council 
(sub. DR64) suggested that delays in these stages are largely caused by proponents. 
Assessments of major projects are complex tasks and can be expected to take a 
considerable time to complete. The length of time required will depend on the 
project itself, the degree of rigour used and the technical capability of the 
proponent. It is difficult to disentangle these factors from how much time is taken as 
a result of the conduct of regulators and inefficiencies in the structure of DAA 
processes. Nevertheless, recommendations in earlier chapters — including 
providing more guidance about DAA pathways, improving the process for setting 
terms of reference, and establishing major project coordination offices — should 
help to reduce unnecessary delays. Additional measures could streamline the 
assessment and approval stages. The next sections consider the evidence on the time 
taken in these two stages and propose further measures to avoid unnecessary delays. 
The time taken to prepare assessment reports and determine approval 
decisions 
In order to build on the largely anecdotal evidence about delays, the Commission 
reviewed publicly-available data about the time taken by regulators to prepare 
assessment reports and by decision makers to determine approvals. It also 
approached regulators in several jurisdictions for information. However, there is 
limited information about the time taken in these two parts of the DAA process. 
Agencies generally do not publicly report on (and are not statutorily required to 
report on) assessment and approval timeframes in a meaningful and comprehensive 
way.  
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Assessment  
There are little data on the total number of days between the proponent’s assessment 
documentation being ‘accepted’ by regulatory authorities, and their 
recommendation report being finalised, including stop the clock periods that may 
expand the total elapsed time before an approval decision is made. To the best of 
the Commission’s knowledge, this information is not publicly documented in any 
jurisdiction. Some agencies indicated that this information could not be collated 
without investing considerable resources to sift through hard copy files. The 
Business Council of Australia noted that ‘a better approach would be to ask 
agencies to record data and report on timeliness performance as they go’ 
(sub. DR102, p. 6). 
Aggregate measures of regulator performance against target timeframes are 
available in some jurisdictions (box 7.7), while in other jurisdictions regulators do 
not have statutory time limits to report against.  
 
Box 7.7 Timeframes on assessment processes 
Controlled action assessments under the EPBC Act 
For controlled action assessments on preliminary documentation, by public 
environment report or by environmental impact statement, the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth Department of the Environment (the Secretary) is to provide the 
relevant recommendation report to the Minister within 40 business days of receiving 
the finalised documents from the proponent. The Secretary must provide a copy of a 
recommendation report to a person who requests it (s. 135A). 
In 2011-12, 13 per cent of preliminary documentation recommendation reports did not 
meet this timeframe. A single environmental impact statement recommendation report 
was completed over this period and did not meet the 40 day timeframe. The Secretary 
is required to publish on the internet every week a notice of all finalised 
recommendation reports given to the Minister under Division 3A of Part 8 and each 
recommendation report given to the Minister under sections 95C, 100 or 105. In 
2011-12, 91 per cent of preliminary documentation and environmental impact 
statement recommendation reports were not published within this timeframe. 
Major project assessments in New South Wales  
State significant development and infrastructure projects are assessed by the 
Department of Infrastructure and Planning in New South Wales. Under this process, 
the Director-General is required to complete the assessment report within 90 days of 
the end of the public exhibition period. For projects assessed in 2009-10, 71 per cent 
of recommendation reports were finalised within 90 days, and 90 per cent within 
five months. 
Sources: DSEWPAC (2012b); Department of Planning (NSW) (2011).  
 
   
200 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
Approval 
Published information about compliance with statutory timelines during the 
approval stage, where it exists, is patchy.  
• In 2011-12, 42 out of 73 decisions under the EPBC Act were held up by 
administrative delays and requirements for further consultation. However, the 
amount of time that this added to the approval process is not reported 
(DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012b, p. 290).  
• In New South Wales and South Australia, determinations are often signed within 
a few days of assessment reports being signed (or even on the same day). This 
suggests either that the decision-making stage is extremely short or that the data 
do not fully separate the assessment and decision-making stages in these 
jurisdictions.  
• The Department of Mines and Petroleum in Western Australia publishes more 
information than most regulators, through a quarterly approvals performance 
report, and is moving to extend the range of approval processes on which it 
reports. However, it does not separate the assessment and approval stages 
(box 7.8).  
 
Box 7.8 Approvals performance in Western Australia 
The Department of Mines and Petroleum (DMP) in Western Australia has established 
an online Environmental Assessment and Regulatory System to track the progress of 
mining-related approvals, including exploration licences, mining leases, native 
vegetation clearing permits, pipeline licences, environment plans and radiation 
management plans.  
Target timelines (excluding stop the clock periods) apply to each approval process 
(ranging from 20 to 120 business days) and performance against timeframes is 
published quarterly. These timeframes are not specific to approvals (as assessment 
and approval processes are integrated). For the first quarter of 2013, the proportion of 
environmental applications and approvals for the minerals and petroleum and 
geothermal sectors that were finalised within timeline targets ranged from 51 to 
98 per cent. 
As part of Western Australia’s lead agency framework, DMP coordinates resource 
project approvals with other approval agencies. It is automating notification of certain 
applications with other agencies in order to improve interagency communication and to 
more effectively track interagency timelines for project approvals. 
Source: DMP (WA) (2013a).  
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In summary, the availability and value of published information about the 
timeliness of DAA processes is limited. It generally does not reveal: 
• the time taken to prepare assessment reports and reach approval decisions for 
individual projects 
• average or median timeframes for all assessments and approvals 
• the materiality of delays when target timeframes are not met 
• detailed explanation of the reasons for delays. 
Data limitations make it difficult to interpret: the key drivers of the time taken to 
complete the assessment and approval stages; the incidence, materiality and reasons 
for ‘unnecessary’ delays; and how assessment and approval timeframes have 
changed over time. 
The cost of an unnecessary delay to a major project  
While the evidence does not indicate how much time could be shaved off DAA 
processes without reducing the quality of approval decisions, the size of the costs 
caused by delays to major projects points to potentially substantial gains if efficient 
ways to save time can be found.  
For example, the Commission estimates that the indicative cost of a one-year delay 
to a major offshore liquefied natural gas project is in the order of $500 million to 
$2 billion, depending on assumptions made (box 7.9). The central estimate of 
$1.1 billion represents a reduction in the net present value of the investment by 
about 9 per cent. The equivalent cost of delay for a major project of more average 
size (with capital expenditure of $473 million) might be around $26 million to 
$59 million. 
By representing the cost in terms of a one-year delay, the Commission is not 
suggesting that this is the typical length of unnecessary delay caused by the DAA 
process as a whole or by any of its component stages. These examples do, however, 
indicate that the benefits of measures to reduce unnecessary delays may be 
substantial. 
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Box 7.9 Calculation of indicative costs of delay 
The Commission has calculated indicative costs of a one-year delay to: 
• an offshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) project of an investment size commensurate 
with the large projects currently being developed in the sector  
• a generic major project of an investment size roughly equivalent to the average of 
all other current major projects in Australia. 
The cost of delaying major projects is hard to estimate. Many simplifying assumptions 
have been made in calculating the following estimates and so they are indicative only. 
The estimates relate to the cost of an unnecessary delay and so it is assumed that the 
environmental and social outcomes (and related costs and benefits) are unchanged by 
the delay. 
Offshore LNG project 
Adapting previous Commission discounted cash flow methodology (PC 2009b) and 
utilising new data from the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration 
Association (APPEA) and other sources, it is estimated that a one-year delay to a 
major offshore LNG project could reduce its net present value (NPV) by between 
$0.5 and 2.0 billion, with a central estimate of $1.1 billion (or around 9 per cent). These 
estimates relate to costs borne by the project proponent (from delayed profits) and the 
wider community (through delayed royalty and tax revenue). Delay may also result in 
higher financing costs and commercial risks. 
These estimates were developed from an illustrative project with construction costs of 
$11.3 billion (within the $4.4 billion to $52 billion range for the eight oil and gas projects 
under construction in the September quarter of 2013 (DAE 2013)). Cash flows for the 
project were constructed using: output volume, and construction, operating and 
decommissioning cost data supplied by APPEA; and prices based on those producers 
are currently receiving (adjusted over time by an energy price growth assumption). 
These baseline cash flows were discounted to the present day using an assumed cost 
of capital of 8–12 per cent per year. Delay was modelled by assuming construction 
commences one year later, thus all cash flows are delayed one year. The delay 
scenario cash flows were also discounted to the present. The cost of delay was 
calculated as the difference between these two NPVs. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 7.9 (continued) 
The cost estimates are sensitive to the assumed profile of the project’s income stream 
and the discount rate. To test the sensitivity of the estimates, both the discount rate 
and price assumptions were varied. Table 7.2 presents the range of estimated costs 
that result from this analysis. 
Table 7.2  Sensitivity analysis — simulated offshore LNG projecta 
 Change in NPV ($ million) for a one-year delay  
Energy price growthb Discount ratec IRRd Baseline NPVe 
% 12.0 10.0 8.0 % $m 
0.0 -500 -600 -800 18 7 000 
2.0 -900 -1 100 -1 300 22 12 500 
4.0 -1 500 -1 800 -2 000 26 19 800 
Impact on NPV (%) -10.7 -9.1 -7.4   
a Capital investment of around $11.3 billion occurs over five years, with a subsequent 24 year effective 
production life. b Assumed annual nominal growth rate. c Per cent discount rate. d Internal rate of return. 
e Baseline NPV without delay, based on a 10 per cent discount rate. 
Sources: Commission calculations based on simulated project production and cost data provided by 
APPEA. 
These estimates are different from those in the draft report because they rely on more 
up to date and disaggregated cash-flow data. The new estimates also include some 
costs that accrue to the wider community as well as to the project proponent. 
There are a range of other factors not considered in the analysis that could influence 
the actual cost of a delay brought about by DAA processes. For example, an increased 
difficulty in financing the project or reduced flexibility to respond to market conditions 
could push costs higher and/or threaten the viability of the project. In contrast, any 
ability to accommodate the delay within the planned project schedule or use the delay 
to improve project design could lower costs.  
Generic major project 
To illustrate potential delay costs for a major project of more average size, a stylised 
cash-flow profile for a project with an average investment cost and similar features to 
the above project was constructed.  
This suggests a one-year delay could result in societal costs in the order of $26 million 
to $59 million for a project with a construction cost of $473 million (this being the 
average size of the non-oil and gas projects that were under construction in the 
September Quarter 2013 (DAE 2013)). This estimate assumes the same range of 
internal rates of return as for the LNG project, a discount rate of 10 per cent and a 
similar cash flow profile as for the LNG project (though scaled down to reflect the 
smaller investment and a shorter (20 year) operating life).   
Sources: DAE (2013); PC (2009b).  
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Improving timeliness 
Reforms that could improve the timeliness of the assessment and approval stages of 
DAA processes include: 
• increased use of statutory timelines 
• tighter specification of stop the clock provisions 
• using deemed decisions in combination with statutory timelines. 
Statutory timelines  
The use of timelines has been an issue in Australia and internationally. 
In New Zealand, when the Minister refers assessment of a matter to a board of 
inquiry, the board must make its final decision within nine months of the public 
notification of the Minister’s decision to call-in the matter. However, the Minister 
can extend this timeframe to 18 months if special circumstances exist (appendix D). 
In Australia, several submissions supported increased use of statutory timelines. 
Statutory timelines create discipline within regulatory agencies, deliver certainty and 
promote openness and transparency of the decision-making process. They also provide 
a mechanism for government and industry to monitor the regulatory agencies’ 
performance. (Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, sub. 42, p. 17) 
The Commission expects that more use of statutory limits on the time allowed for 
the assessment and approval phases of DAA processes would sharpen incentives for 
regulators to respond promptly and give proponents certainty about when decisions 
will be made. Increased certainty would support project planning and may assist 
with securing project finance.  
Specifically, jurisdictions should specify the maximum time, after a proponent’s 
assessment documentation is lodged, for: 
• the assessment agency to provide its report and decision recommendation to the 
relevant Minister 
• the Minister to make the decision.  
Imposing statutory timelines on secondary approval processes would also help to 
prevent delays. The Major Projects Coordination Office (chapter 6) could also assist 
through, for example, developing ‘project agreements’ with proponents and 
regulators, and electronically tracking the progress of individual processes against 
timeframes, identifying bottlenecks and publicly reporting on performance against 
timeframes. 
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Stop the clock provisions 
When there are statutory timelines, regulators are frequently allowed to suspend the 
process (‘stop the clock’) if further information is needed.  
Requests for further information during the assessment process may be viewed by 
proponents as a cause of unnecessary delay, yet to the authority assessing the project, 
and often the community, the information may be viewed as critical to ensuring an 
adequate assessment can be made. (Northern Territory Government, sub. 46, p. 4) 
There is less need for such procedures when there is effective early consultation 
between the public, proponents and regulators about the scope of an assessment 
(such as through stakeholder input on the terms of reference for an environmental 
impact assessment or during preparation of the related documentation), as this will 
help to ensure that the assessment focuses on the significant issues (chapter 5).  
Excessive use of stop the clock procedures can cause significant delays: 
As just one example, the statutory timeframe for the approval of one mine in WA in 
2013 was extended on three occasions by the Minister with no specific actions required 
of the project proponent, amounting to an additional 90 days over the original statutory 
timeframes. (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia, sub. 44, p. 5)  
These delays may be worsened if stop the clock arrangements apply to secondary as 
well as primary approvals. To avoid this problem, the Association of Mining and 
Exploration Companies suggested that there should not be any opportunity to stop 
the clock when applications are referred to other agencies, and that timelines should 
be specified on a ‘whole of government’ basis (sub. DR70). 
The Commission’s view is that to allow some flexibility while avoiding 
unnecessary delay and cost, regulators should only be permitted to stop the clock 
during assessment and approval when significant matters emerge that were not 
covered by the terms of reference or could not have been reasonably anticipated, 
and not simply because the decision maker or assessment agency wants more time. 
Regulators should be required to disclose when and why they are stopping the 
clock, when the clock is re-started and when the assessment has been completed. 
This information should be published in formats that allow meaningful comparisons 
across jurisdictions. 
Regulators should be permitted to stop the clock more than once while they are 
preparing assessment recommendations, provided that they can demonstrate 
publicly that they are complying with the conditions identified in the previous 
paragraph. However, one further opportunity to stop the clock is sufficient during 
the approval stage, given that there will have been an extended assessment process 
before the matter reaches the decision maker. 
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Using deemed decisions in combination with statutory timelines 
Business SA pointed out that statutory timelines need to be enforced (sub. DR74). 
In the Commission’s view, if the relevant Minister makes no decision within the 
specified time period, the recommendations made by the assessment body (along 
with its reasons and any conditions) should be deemed to be the decision of the 
Minister. This would encourage compliance with timelines and may, as Richard 
Clowes (sub. DR65) suggests, encourage approval authorities to focus on 
higher-impact proposals.  
The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia does not support 
deemed decisions, on the basis that only the Minister can take into account the full 
range of sustainable development principles when approving, conditioning or not 
approving a project. The Chamber considers that statutory timeframes are likely to 
have the largest impact if systems and reporting arrangements are in place to 
monitor agencies’ performance and hold them accountable to these timeframes 
(sub. DR85). 
The Commission agrees that better reporting arrangements would be helpful, but 
considers that they are unlikely to provide a sufficient incentive for compliance with 
timelines, without the added pressure of deemed decisions. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.3 
Governments should develop statutory timelines that specify the maximum time 
that may elapse between a proponent’s assessment documentation being lodged 
and when the assessment agency provides its report and decision recommendation 
to the relevant decision maker. 
Legislation should also set the maximum time for the decision maker to make the 
decision. If no decision is made within the time period specified, the 
recommendation (along with the reasons, advice regarding the decision and any 
conditions and offsets) made by the assessment agency should be deemed to be the 
decision by the decision maker and in the public domain. 
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RECOMMENDATION 7.4 
Governments should provide guidance, preferably in statutory form, for the use of 
any ‘stop the clock’ mechanisms. Such arrangements should only be available to 
assessment agencies when significant matters emerge that were not contained in 
the terms of reference or could not have been reasonably anticipated. Decision 
makers should only be able to stop the clock once. Proponents should be allowed 
to stop assessment and decision processes at any time. Any party that stops the 
clock should be required to disclose when these triggers are activated and the 
reason(s) for activation. 
7.4 Responsibility for making approval decisions 
As table 7.1 illustrated, there are examples in Australia of Parliaments, Ministers, 
departments and independent agencies having approval authority for major projects. 
This raises the question of which allocation of approval authority will lead to the 
most balanced approval decisions. 
When approval decisions can be made by applying objective, measurable rules, 
experts in those rules are well placed to make decisions. (Code assessable 
development decisions are an example.) Similarly, it is sometimes suggested that 
technical experts, such as the Threatened Species Scientific Committee and the 
Australian Heritage Council, should have decision-making authority. However, 
primary approval decisions about whether and how major projects should proceed 
often involve tradeoffs between competing environmental, social and economic 
values that a technical body is not equipped to assess. On this issue, the Hawke 
Review concluded that:  
It is appropriate that these decisions continue to be made by an elected representative of 
the people. In the vast majority of cases, it is expected that the Minister will follow 
expert advice. Retaining the Minister as the primary decision maker under the Act also 
means that the Minister can be held publicly accountable for those decisions and it 
creates a context that motivates experts to ensure their reasoning is careful, well 
supported and convincing. (Hawke 2009, p. 231) 
The Commission agrees with this conclusion, and considers that the case for 
Ministers being responsible for major project primary approval decisions applies 
equally in the States and Territories, given that a requirement to make comparable 
balancing judgments is involved and there are similar implications for public 
accountability. 
Because Ministers’ time needs to be used efficiently, approval legislation may 
permit them to delegate some or all of their powers. However, some legislation is 
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imprecise about the circumstances under which authority can be delegated and how 
that delegated authority should be exercised. In other cases, for example, in New 
South Wales, the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (s. 23) requires 
the publication of instruments of delegation in the Government Gazette that report 
the planning Minister’s delegation of approval decisions.  
While Ministers’ time is scarce, the Commission considers that they should not 
delegate decisions on primary approvals for major projects. If it was considered 
necessary to make this a legislative prohibition, as opposed to relying on Ministers 
choosing not to delegate, this would be relatively easy to implement in the case of 
legislation that is restricted to major projects. When the approval legislation within 
a jurisdiction applies to smaller, as well as major projects, implementing this 
approach would require defining in the legislation those major projects for which 
delegation of authority would not be permitted.  
Should governments decide to retain the capacity for Ministers to delegate decisions 
with respect to some major projects, the Commission considers that the types of 
decisions Ministers can delegate should be specified in legislation. For example, 
this could be limited to decisions that do not require balancing of different values or 
where the Minister has a potential conflict of interest. Further, as is the practice in 
New South Wales, delegations should be published.  
RECOMMENDATION 7.5 
Ministers should be the decision makers for major project primary approvals. 
Governments should consider whether this is better achieved through 
administrative or legislative means. Legislation should establish the types of 
decisions that Ministers can delegate. 
7.5 Improving the process that decision makers are 
required to follow 
The quality of approval decisions, and the conditions attached to them, will be 
influenced by the process that decision makers are required to follow, such as 
whether they are required to take expert advice and consult with affected parties. 
This process could be strengthened by: 
• clarifying and publishing the process, where this is not done already 
• publishing the justification for approval decisions. 
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Clarifying and publishing the process 
The EPBC Act specifies factors that the Minister must consider when making 
decisions, and the extent of consultation required (box 7.2). While this approach 
may not suit all approval frameworks, it indicates the types of factors that are likely 
to populate well-designed decision making processes.  
Adding a requirement that approval decisions are consistent with principles of good 
practice regulation, such as the ones outlined in chapter 1, could improve the quality 
of decisions. For example, requiring approval decisions to aim at achieving 
regulatory outcomes that are consistent with objectives would require the Minister 
to consider how this can be given effect. This would focus attention on whether the 
conditions attached to the approval are likely to achieve the regulatory objectives. 
This in turn would depend on whether the conditions are capable of being enforced 
(chapter 10). 
There is unlikely to be a single leading practice process for reaching approval 
decisions that all jurisdictions should implement, and it is important that specifying 
the process more clearly does not lead jurisdictions to increase regulatory burden or 
time requirements. However, each jurisdiction should publish its process. This 
would increase confidence that decisions are being made within a consistent 
framework, and with regard to relevant factors made on the basis of expert advice 
and suitable consultation. A properly constructed and transparent process can also 
increase public accountability and encourage evidence-based decisions.  
Making publication a legal requirement, as suggested by ANEDO (sub DR92) 
would help to ensure that this practice is observed over the long term. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.6 
Legislative guidance should be provided for decision makers to follow when 
making approval decisions. The guidance should include:  
• the factors that decision makers need to take into account when reaching 
decisions 
• the best ways to consult with other decision makers, agencies and interested 
parties, and to take account of community concerns. 
Publishing the justification for approval decisions 
It is common for jurisdictions to require that the reports and recommendations of 
assessment bodies are published. The Commission considers that this is a good 
practice that all jurisdictions should implement. 
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It is also common for approval authorities to publish decisions, including 
information that has guided those decisions. For example, the EPBC Act 
(s. 131AA(2)) requires that if the Minister proposes not to approve an action, he or 
she must give the proponent: 
• a copy of the assessment and recommendation reports  
• any information relating to economic and social matters that the Minister has 
considered 
• any information about the history of the proponent in relation to environmental 
matters that the Minister has considered.  
This requirement is subject to exemptions, including that the Minister believes it is 
not in the national interest to provide the information. Information prepared for the 
Minister by the Secretary of the Department is excluded from this requirement.  
The EPBC Act does not, however, require the Minister to explain why conditions 
are being imposed. Similarly, some State and Territory legislation also does not 
require decision makers to provide such explanations. The Hawke Review favoured 
the publication of statements of reasons for all decisions made by the Minister, or a 
delegate under the Act, at the time the decision is made (Hawke 2009, pp. 240–
241). The Australian Government agreed in principle with this recommendation, but 
noted that:  
Statements of reasons can be complex legal documents and are resource intensive to 
prepare. Requiring a statement of reasons for every decision under the amended Act, 
including those that are not controversial or are of an administrative nature, would 
unduly divert resources for little public benefit. 
The government supports providing the public with clear and accessible explanations 
for all significant decisions taken under the amended Act in a resource-efficient 
manner. (2011, p. 82)  
The Australian Government indicated that it would give effect to its decision by 
publishing reports from expert committees and from the Department of the 
Environment that contributed to the approval decision. It noted that this advice 
would not constitute a statement of reasons for the purposes of litigation, but that: 
People considering a legal challenge to a decision under the amended Act will still be 
able to make an application for a more comprehensive statement of reasons for any 
decision taken under the amended Act in accordance with the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cwlth). Similarly, those who are entitled to seek merits 
review of a decision may apply for a statement of reasons under the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cwlth). (2011, p. 82) 
ANEDO supports a more comprehensive approach, arguing that all of the 
information that informed the decision maker should be published (sub. DR92). 
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The Hawke Review covered a much wider range of decisions under the EPBC Act 
than are the subject of this study. As such, the costs of publishing reasons for all 
significant major project decisions would be less than the costs that were of concern 
to the Australian Government. In the Commission’s judgment, these costs would 
also be less than the benefits that would accrue to the community from increased 
transparency about major project decisions.  
Similarly, the Commission considers that States and Territories, as well as the 
Commonwealth, should publish statements of reasons for their major project 
primary approval decisions.   
RECOMMENDATION 7.7 
Decision makers should be required to publish assessment reports and statements 
of reasons (including identification of the risks being mitigated) for their 
approval decisions and conditions for all major projects.  
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8 Conditions and offsets 
 
Key points 
• Conditions and offsets are a key feature of the various approvals, permits and 
licences required by major project proponents. They are intended to ensure that 
major project proposals are implemented in a manner consistent with regulatory 
objectives. 
– Conditions refer to avoidance and mitigation measures that proponents are 
required to undertake to protect environmental, heritage and social outcomes. 
– Offsets are environmentally beneficial activities that seek to counterbalance or 
compensate for the residual adverse environmental impacts of a development. 
• Unnecessary regulatory burdens arise when conditions are: 
– not targeted at project impacts 
– impractical to comply with or unenforceable 
– excessively prescriptive 
– duplicative, overlapping and inconsistent. 
• Environmental offset policies may be imposing unnecessary costs on the 
community, and failing to deliver on their objectives, due to: 
– confusion and uncertainty about the outcomes being sought 
– a lack of transparency and scientific rigour in decision-making processes  
– inconsistencies between offset policy objectives and higher-order legislative 
requirements. 
• The Commission is recommending that major project regulators adopt a ‘leading 
practice’ framework for setting conditions. Key principles include: limiting conditions 
to the impacts of the development being consented, outcome-based requirements 
where possible and greater alignment between project-specific conditions and 
broader policy frameworks. 
• A dedicated and independent review of offset arrangements is warranted to 
examine: offset policy objectives, the quantitative methodologies used to identify 
suitable offsets, the merits of offset markets and the case for establishing a single, 
national offsets framework. The Commission is recommending that COAG 
commission a national and public review of offsets, to report by the end of 2014.  
 
Approval conditions are a necessary and appropriate feature of the major projects 
regulatory framework. Conditions are developed through the assessment and 
approval process and are intended to avoid or mitigate the adverse impacts of a 
proposed development on environmental, heritage and social outcomes. In this way, 
   
214 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
approval conditions can ensure that project proposals are implemented in a manner 
consistent with regulatory objectives. 
Environmental offset measures constitute one form of approval condition. In broad 
terms, offsets refer to environmentally beneficial activities that counterbalance or 
compensate for the adverse impacts of a development on the environment. 
This chapter describes how major project condition-setting processes could be 
improved through greater uptake of ‘leading practice’ approaches (section 8.1). The 
use of environmental offsets in the conditioning process presents some specific 
conceptual and practical challenges. Further work is required to resolve these issues, 
and to improve environmental offset practices (section 8.2). 
8.1 Approval conditions 
Role and nature of major project approval conditions 
Conditions are a prominent feature of the various environmental and 
non-environmental approvals, consents, permits and licences typically required of 
major project proponents. Compliance with conditions can involve a broad range of 
activities of varying significance, duration and origin: 
• Conditions might be proposed by the proponent as part of the approval 
application, or developed and imposed by the regulator as a condition of 
approval. 
• Conditions can include specific, ‘one-off’ requirements (for example, to install a 
water filter) as well as longer-term, ongoing activities (such as water quality 
monitoring). 
• Conditions are often classified as prescriptive or outcome-based in nature. 
Prescriptive conditions are akin to a ‘command and control’ regulatory approach 
and identify a specific action that needs to be performed by proponents. 
Outcome-based conditions specify the required outcome or objective, but leave 
the proponent to determine how best to achieve it.  
• Sometimes approval conditions involve ‘embedded’ requirements. For example, 
if a proponent is required to prepare and implement an approved environment 
management plan. 
• In some cases, contingent conditions might also feature in approval decisions. 
For example, the regulator might specify that particular activities be undertaken 
if pre-determined triggers are met. 
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Current approaches to setting conditions 
Regulatory framework for major project approval conditions 
In most States and Territories, major project assessment and approval 
responsibilities are relatively fragmented and decentralised (chapters 6 and 7). 
Under these systems, proponents obtain a number of ‘matter-specific’ approvals, 
each of which is likely to include approval conditions. For example, in Western 
Australia conditions can be imposed as part of the environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) process (the ‘primary’ environmental approval), as well as for approvals to 
clear native vegetation, take water from a river system and transport waste. 
In other cases, condition-setting responsibilities are more concentrated, owing to the 
relatively integrated nature of the development assessment and approval (DAA) 
process. For example, for state significant developments in New South Wales, the 
majority of applicable conditions are contained in a single approval. That said, if 
Australian or local government approvals are required, separate sets of conditions 
may be relevant. Moreover, centralised systems often require regulators to seek 
input or advice on conditions from various referral agencies.  
Generally speaking, conditions are expressly provided for in the legislative and 
regulatory instruments governing major project development. However, these 
provisions impose few restrictions on — or guidance about — the scope of 
allowable conditions. 
Table 8.1 describes the current legislative provisions for major project approval 
conditions in terms of whether: 
• the decision maker has broad power to impose any conditions as it ‘may 
determine’, ‘thinks fit’ or ‘wishes’ 
• conditions are required to be connected to or relevant to the development 
• conditions are required to be reasonable 
• certain conditions must be imposed on the approval 
• conditions must be consistent with or not inconsistent with other legislation. 
In most instances, regulators are afforded considerable discretion as to the nature 
and severity of approval conditions. Further, the requirement to ‘have regard to’ or 
‘further’ the objects of an Act is unlikely to materially constrain decision makers in 
practice if objects clauses are ambiguous or inconsistent (chapter 4). 
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Table 8.1 Legislative restrictions on condition-setting 
For key major project processes 
  Broad 
powera 
Relevantb Reasonablec Mandatory 
conditionsd 
Consistente 
NSW State significant development      
 State significant infrastructure      
 Heritage permit      
Vic Ministerial call-in (planning 
applications)      
 Major transport projects      
 Mining and resource projects      
 Environment effects 
statement assessment      
 Heritage permit      
Qld Coordinated projects       
 Prescribed projects      
SA Major developments      
 Crown developments      
 Heritage permit      
WA Environmental assessment      
 Heritage permit      
Tas Projects of state significance      
 Projects of regional 
significance      
 Major infrastructure 
developments      
 Works approval (heritage)      
NT Exceptional development      
 Work approval (heritage)      
ACT All development tracks      
 Ministerial call-in      
Cwlth Environmental assessment 
(EPBC Act)f      
 Major airport infrastructure      
a Decision maker has broad power to impose any conditions as it ‘may determine’, ‘thinks fit’ or ‘wishes’. 
b Conditions are required to be connected to or relevant to the development. c Conditions are required to be 
reasonable. d Certain conditions must be imposed on the approval. e Conditions must be consistent with or 
not inconsistent with other legislation, plans and so on. f Conditions must only be relevant to a matter 
protected under the EPBC Act, not to the impacts of the action being consented (s. 134).  
Key stages in condition-setting processes 
Condition-setting practices vary across regulatory processes and jurisdictions. 
However — for primary approval processes at least — some generic stages can be 
identified. 
First, as part of the application for approval and preparation of relevant assessment 
documentation, proponents typically commit to a series of avoidance and mitigation 
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activities. For example, a wind farm operator might commit to turning off turbines 
at certain times to reduce the impacts on birds and bats. (Offset measures may also 
be proposed by the proponent, as discussed in section 8.2.)  
These commitments demonstrate to regulators how a proponent intends to manage 
the anticipated adverse impacts of a development. Often, these actions are 
ultimately drafted into project approvals (that is, proponents are obliged to follow 
through on these commitments as a condition of approval). These upfront 
assurances can also influence the assessment pathway of a proposed major project 
development. For example, if net impacts can be demonstrated to be minor, a lower 
level of assessment may be appropriate (chapter 6). 
In some cases, regulators publish guidance to assist proponents in proposing 
conditions for particular types of project impacts. For example, the NSW 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure has prepared (draft) sets of ‘model 
conditions’ for state significant development projects across seven industry sectors 
(including mining, urban development, linear infrastructure and wind farms). These 
conditions cover a range of project impacts including noise emissions, biodiversity 
offset strategies and transport management. 
Upon receipt of relevant assessment documentation from the proponent, the 
assessment agency will consider whether the proposed development (inclusive of 
proposed avoidance and mitigation measures) is consistent with regulatory 
objectives. That is, whether the commitments made by the proponent are sufficient 
to make the development environmentally and socially acceptable. 
If not, the assessment agency will devise a series of additional conditions that it 
considers are necessary to ensure that objectives are met. These conditions form 
part of the recommendation put forward to decision makers. Proponents may be 
consulted throughout the development of these conditions; however, in some cases 
conditions are not disclosed until the time an approval is granted. Proponents can 
usually apply to have conditions ‘varied’ if required. (Processes for varying 
conditions are discussed in chapter 10.) 
The decision maker (frequently a Minister — chapter 7) is ultimately responsible 
for determining the final set of approval conditions. In most cases these conditions 
emanate from advice provided by the assessment agency, but they need not (that is, 
the decision maker usually has discretion to add, subtract or alter conditions). The 
Coordinator-General arrangements in Queensland are noteworthy, in that — if the 
decision maker decides to grant the approval — the conditions recommended by the 
Coordinator-General must be applied, and any additional conditions must not be 
inconsistent with these conditions. 
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Broad support among participants for improving condition-setting 
arrangements 
Major project approval conditions have been a prominent theme of study 
submissions. While participants’ views varied, there was support for reform that 
encourages more efficient and effective major project conditions.  
Proponents suggested that the number, complexity and severity of conditions has 
increased over time without any commensurate benefit, imposing significant costs 
on developers and the community: 
… the three LNG projects currently under construction in QLD have approximately 
1000 state conditions and more than 300 federal conditions each … the compliance cost 
of excessive conditions can be a lot higher than the initial costs associated with gaining 
project approval. The unnecessary costs of duplication, inefficiencies, uncertainties and 
onerous conditions are ultimately born by governments through reduced revenue, and 
by shareholders and the communities in which these projects occur. (APPEA, 
sub. DR105, p. 18) 
The Business Council of Australia (BCA) (sub. DR102, p. 7) considered that 
approval conditions ‘is the area of greatest cost and interference in project 
productivity’ and favoured introducing an impact assessment test to properly assess 
the costs and benefits of proposed conditions.  
More generally, participants expressed concerns about the practicality, 
enforceability and effectiveness of approval conditions in meeting their objectives. 
The Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices (ANEDO) noted: 
… conditions must be measurable and enforceable (with appropriate resources and 
agency culture); and must emphasise proactively preventing environmental damage, 
rather than risking that damage and reacting when it happens. (sub. DR92, p. 28)  
It is not feasible to assess the efficacy of individual major project approval 
conditions as part of this study. However, evidence provided through submissions 
coupled with the Commission’s own analysis suggests that there are systemic 
problems with current condition-setting processes. Moreover, given the important 
role of conditions in ensuring that regulatory objectives are met, and the substantial 
costs incurred by proponents in complying with conditions, the potential benefits 
from improving these arrangements are significant.  
In this context, the Commission favours developing a clear and practical 
principles-based framework for the setting of major project approval conditions. 
Key components of this framework are considered below. 
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Improving condition-setting practices 
The Commission considers that there is scope to improve condition-setting 
arrangements for major project-related approvals in a number of areas. 
Better aligning conditions with broader policy frameworks 
Proposed major projects are often expected to impact on matters or outcomes 
covered by broader environmental and resource management policies (such as those 
dealing with air pollution, water use and the clearing of native vegetation).  
There are good reasons for dealing with environmental problems and resource 
management considerations through high-level policy and legal frameworks. This 
approach ensures that the cumulative impacts of all activities impacting on the 
environment are taken into account, and provides for a more integrated and strategic 
response to environmental problems (chapter 11). By contrast, project-based 
assessment and approval processes primarily focus only on the adverse impacts of a 
particular development. 
There are limits to the extent that broader policy frameworks can be relied upon to 
condition major projects — some amount of project-specific conditioning will 
generally be required. However, there are clear advantages from better aligning 
major project DAA processes with prevailing environmental and resource 
management policies. Accordingly, the Commission is recommending that major 
project regulators ensure that approval conditions draw upon — and are consistent 
with — these policies. This is expected to: 
• deliver more effective and efficient avoidance and mitigation measures 
• reduce the regulatory burden on regulators and proponents (by avoiding the need 
to examine and assess particular issues and impacts as part of project approvals) 
• improve regulatory certainty and predictability  
• ensure all impacts (and stakeholders) are treated consistently. 
On the latter point, conditions have been imposed on major projects that are more 
stringent than general environmental standards encountered by, say, a farmer, even 
though both parties are causing equivalent environmental damage (for example, 
through clearing native vegetation). This is not appropriate. Better aligning major 
project conditioning processes with general environmental law will help guard 
against this. 
Similarly, it is not efficient for regulators to impose conditions on project approvals 
that amount to ‘do not break the law’. These practices increase administrative costs 
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and create confusion without a substantial benefit. The Environment Assessment 
Guidelines published by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) in Western 
Australia explicitly safeguard against this practice: 
Conditions should not be imposed where legislation exists to ensure an outcome, such 
as requiring approval for the removal of any flora or fauna protected under the Wildlife 
Conservation Act 1955. (2009, p. 4) 
Similar provisions should be adopted by all regulators with responsibility for setting 
major project approval conditions. 
Targeting conditions at project impacts 
Current legislative provisions governing key major project approvals give decision 
makers very broad authority to impose conditions on developments (table 8.1).  
A number of study respondents expressed concern about the linkages (or lack 
thereof) between project impacts and the outcomes being sought from approval 
conditions. For example, the Queensland Resources Council suggested that 
conditions are sometimes used as a means of funding public infrastructure: 
When major projects are routinely having twelve hundred or more specific conditions 
imposed on them — which collectively require hundreds of subsidiary assessment 
processes, such as the preparation of a social impact management plan — the case 
could be made that regulations are being made by stealth. In many cases, these 
quasi-regulations are blurring the boundaries of the Government’s responsibility to 
provide basic services for growing communities by seeking to shift these costs onto 
major projects. (sub. 19, p. 4) 
Only rarely is there a legislative requirement for a connection between a project’s 
impacts and the conditions imposed. Exceptionally, the Sustainable Planning Act 
2009 (Qld) s. 345 stipulates that a condition must be ‘relevant to, but not an 
unreasonable imposition on, the development … ’ or ‘reasonably required in 
relation to the development … ’. 
At the Commonwealth level, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) permits the Minister to impose conditions that 
are necessary or convenient for protecting, or repairing or mitigating damage to, a 
protected matter for which the approval has effect (s. 134). However, there is no 
requirement that those actions be targeted at the impacts of the proposed 
development itself. The Federal Court recently held that, where a proposed action 
posed risks to wild populations of the Tasmanian devil, the EPBC Act permitted 
approval conditions aimed at bolstering the ex-situ (or off-site) conservation of the 
species (box 8.1). 
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In the Commission’s view, conditions that impose requirements on proponents that 
are unrelated to the impacts of the development do not constitute good public 
policy. 
On the one hand, the Commission recognises that, even if a particular condition is 
unrelated to the impacts of the development being consented, it may effectively 
contribute to the furtherance of certain environmental, social or economic 
objectives. Moreover, in many cases proponents may be willing and able to bear the 
cost of complying with these conditions, particularly if it provides for a more 
expedient approvals process, or helps to build a ‘social licence’ to operate.  
However, if governments seek to extract ‘rents’ from major project developers 
through the imposition of approval conditions, they risk imposing significant 
efficiency costs on proponents and the community. There are several reasons for 
this: 
• Rent extraction is directed solely at transferring benefits from proponents to the 
government (or wider community), rather than the creation of wealth. 
• There are more direct, transparent and efficient ways to extract rents from 
proponents (for example, via a tax or royalty payment). 
• It is not clear that major project regulators have the information, skills or 
incentive to evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative investments to the 
community as a whole, or identify the least-cost or most efficient way of 
delivering certain benefits. 
• If the costs imposed on proponents exceed pure economic rents, this practice can 
deter investment in major projects, meaning benefits to the proponent and to the 
public (from the provision of goods and services) are forfeited. 
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Box 8.1 Conditions and project impacts — Shree Minerals case 
In December 2012, Shree Minerals obtained an approval from the Commonwealth 
Minister administering the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (EPBC Act) for the development and operation of an iron ore mine in North West 
Tasmania (EPBC 2011/5846). Attached to the approval were a number of conditions, 
including: 
• Condition 14, requiring Shree Minerals to donate $350 000 to the Save the 
Tasmanian Devil Program Appeal, for the purpose of ‘maintenance of the 
Tasmanian devil Insurance Population’. 
• Condition 20(c), which required additional contributions of $48 000 for each 
Tasmanian devil killed on roads within a defined area in excess of two devils within 
any 12 month period. 
In Tarkine National Coalition Incorporated v Minister for Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities & Anor [2013] FCA 694, the Tarkine National 
Coalition (TNC) challenged the validity of this approval.  
One of the grounds for the challenge was the validity of Conditions 14 and 20(c). 
Section 34 of the EPBC Act authorises conditions necessary or convenient for 
protecting, repairing or mitigating damage to, a ‘matter protected’. TNC argued that the 
‘matter protected’ in this instance was the wild population of the Tasmanian devil and 
hence conditions such as Conditions 14 and 20(c), which related to ex-situ 
conservation, were not permitted under the EPBC Act.  
Marshall J rejected this submission, on the basis the ‘matter protected’ referred to the 
listed threatened species (that is, the Tasmanian devil) generally, and that measures to 
improve the robustness of an insurance population also mitigated the risk of extinction 
of the species. 
Source: DSEWPAC (2012c). 
 
To safeguard against the practice of setting unrelated or poorly targeted conditions, 
the Commission recommends that — where necessary — relevant legislative 
provisions be redrafted to require that there is a connection between approval 
conditions and the expected impacts of the major project being consented. Further, 
to bolster public confidence in the condition-setting process, decision makers should 
explain how individual conditions relate to project impacts, and to the achievement 
of regulatory objectives. 
Outcome-based conditions where possible 
Outcome-based approval conditions require the proponent to achieve particular 
performance standards or measurable outcomes, but do not prescribe how to do so. 
Where feasible, this allows proponents to use innovative approaches and 
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improvements in technology to meet relevant objectives at ‘least cost’. It can also 
reduce the role of the regulator in the condition-setting process. 
There was broad support for outcome-based conditions amongst study respondents: 
LGAQ [Local Government Association of Queensland] supports outcome-based 
conditions that are based on established standards, proportionate to the level of risk, 
measurable and legally enforceable. … Outcome-based conditioning should also cover 
the project lifecycle (including decommissioning and site rehabilitation), not just the 
construction and early stages of operation. (Local Government Association of 
Queensland, sub. DR78, p. 5) 
Further, the COAG principles of best practice regulation note: 
Regulation should have clearly identifiable outcomes and unless prescriptive 
requirements are unavoidable in order to ensure public safety in high-risk situations, 
performance-based requirements that specify outcomes rather than inputs or other 
prescriptive requirements should be used. (2007, p. 5) 
Participants acknowledged that certain regulators have made notable progress in 
terms of adopting outcome-based conditions: 
In Queensland, it was not until recently that the objectives were clarified for 
environmental conditioning of mining projects with the development of a set of 
‘outcomes focused’ model mining conditions. … Critically, Queensland’s model 
mining conditions do not prescribe how objectives are to be met, which enables 
industry creativity and drives innovation in environmental management. (Queensland 
Resources Council, sub. DR91, p. 2) 
Outcome-based conditions are particularly appealing where the adverse impact — 
and the outcome or objective being sought — is readily quantifiable and 
measurable, such as emission levels or water quality. Regulators might also prefer 
outcome-based conditions when the desired outcome is known but the means to 
achieve it is not. 
In contrast, prescriptive conditions focus on ‘how’ to achieve the objective, and less 
on the objective itself. Prescriptive conditions — which might dictate use of a 
particular form of technology, or piece of equipment — do not permit proponents 
the flexibility to determine how the desired outcome will be achieved, and can have 
the effect of discouraging a proponent to go beyond compliance (Keating 2002). 
This can be particularly significant when conditions are in place over many years, 
and technological improvements might be significant. 
Notwithstanding the Commission’s broad preference for outcome-based conditions, 
caution is required. This is particularly the case where the desired environmental 
outcome is not well defined or easily measured (for example, visual amenity or 
biodiversity), or where there is significant uncertainty about the nature and severity 
   
224 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
of project impacts. In these circumstances more prescriptive conditions may be 
warranted, but should be regularly reviewed and updated if necessary. 
There is also merit in regulators making greater use of contingent conditions. For 
example, if monitoring shows that certain project impacts have reached (or 
exceeded) some pre-determined trigger level, the proponent would be required to 
undertake corresponding contingency actions. This adaptive approach to major 
project conditioning can avoid imposing burdensome requirements unnecessarily 
(or prematurely), whilst still ensuring that regulatory objectives are achieved. 
Ensuring conditions are practical and enforceable 
Respondents have suggested that approval conditions are often unrealistic or 
impractical to comply with, and difficult for regulators to measure, monitor and 
enforce (chapter 10). This increases costs for proponents and regulators — with no 
associated benefits — and erodes public confidence in the approval and 
conditioning process. 
Xstrata Coal considered: 
[There has been a] dramatic increase in ad hoc regulatory interventions on top of the 
existing regulatory or assessment processes (e.g. strategic cropping or land use 
legislation, aquifer interference policies or agricultural land impacts) which increases 
the regulatory burden, often for no material environmental gain. Many of these new 
regulatory requirements lack clarity in terms of practical implementation with 
ambiguities and are often left to the project proponent to resolve. (sub. 50, p. 4) 
Macintosh (2010) observed that enforceability can be problematic for 
outcome-based conditions if there are disagreements between proponents, regulators 
and third parties about what the obligations of the proponent are, and whether the 
steps taken by the proponent are sufficient. 
Governments and regulators have instituted various measures to guard against 
impractical and unenforceable conditions. For example, the EPA in Western 
Australia consults with proponents and key decision-making authorities as it 
develops proposal-specific implementation conditions: 
Consultation will ensure that the conditions the EPA recommends to the Minister for 
Environment do not contain technical errors or unnecessary difficulties with 
implementation. Consultation will be limited to matters of fact, technical issues and 
implementation. It will not involve negotiation over the application or content of 
recommended conditions. (EPA (WA) 2010, p. 1) 
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In addition, the EPA (WA) monitors and draws lessons from the success (or 
otherwise) of previously recommended approval conditions. This includes taking 
into account how conditions fare in the appeals process: 
… [in 2012-13] of the 24 assessments whose appeal period closed during the year, 
25 per cent (or 6 assessments) were the subject of an appeal. Of these, two required 
‘significant’ changes to the conditions and three had not yet received an appeal 
determination (OEPA (WA) 2013b, p. 19). 
Practical and measureable conditions can also be encouraged through greater use of 
‘model’ conditions, and by establishing a formal ‘feedback loop’ from compliance 
monitoring activities (chapter 10) to condition-setting processes. These experiences 
provide important insights about the achievability and measurability of conditions, 
thereby facilitating a process of continuous improvement. The Commission’s 
proposal for environmental assessment and enforcement functions to be 
consolidated in a single independent environment regulator (chapter 6) would 
facilitate this information sharing. 
Governments should ensure that all major project regulators only set conditions that 
are realistic, possible to comply with and readily measureable and enforceable. For 
outcome-based conditions, this includes consideration of whether the desired 
outcome is within the proponent’s control, and how other factors potentially 
contribute to the outcome. 
Mine rehabilitation conditions 
The enforceability of mine site rehabilitation-related conditions was identified by 
respondents as a particular area of concern: 
The law re: open cut mining requires rehab and containment of polluted water; and 
clean up at taxpayer expense in the future is neither intended by the law, and not good 
for productivity. … There is an estimated $10 billion owing by mine owners for rehab 
not yet completed. Why has there not been rehab? (Jim Leggate, sub. DR61, p. 3) 
The East End Mine Action Group noted: 
… there has been no independent audit of adverse environmental impacts of mines in 
Australia … what areas are rehabilitated? what areas are not rehabilitated? what is the 
incidence of abandoned legacy mines? will these be funded to be rehabilitated? 
(sub. DR68, p. 2) 
Governments have generally used security (or bond) payments to ensure that 
proponents comply with relevant rehabilitation conditions, and to protect the 
government (and community) from having to fund rehabilitation in the case of 
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non-compliance or insolvency. However, a number of disadvantages with these 
arrangements have been identified: 
• Security payment systems tie up significant amounts of capital unnecessarily, 
imposing efficiency costs on proponents and the community (as funds are 
quarantined for the duration of the project rather than producing income). 
• Security money can only be used to rehabilitate the particular mine for which the 
security is held. This leaves the problem of abandoned legacy mines6 
unaddressed.  
• There are no discounts or incentives offered for (past or future) good 
performance or compliance. 
To address some of these issues, the Western Australian Government has replaced 
the security payment system with a Mining Rehabilitation Fund (MRF) scheme. 
From 1 July 2014, mining operators will be required to pay a levy into a pooled 
government-administered fund. These funds will be used to meet rehabilitation 
costs in the event a miner does not comply with rehabilitation obligations. The size 
of the MRF levy for any particular mine is calculated by reference to several 
factors, including the number of hectares disturbed and the type of disturbance. 
Governments must ensure that efficient and effective measures are in place to guard 
against the risk that a mine operator might default on their obligations, and to 
protect the community from the cost of rehabilitating mine sites (including 
abandoned legacy mines). Experience with operation of the new MRF system in 
Western Australia is expected to offer valuable insights for other jurisdictions. 
Better coordination of condition-setting processes 
It is commonplace for multiple regulators to have responsibility for imposing 
conditions on major project implementation. In this circumstance, the risk (and cost) 
of duplicative, overlapping or inconsistent approval conditions is material.  
The Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA) 
referred to a 2009 survey conducted by the Australian National University that 
found: 
… 81 per cent of respondents whose actions were subject to conditions under the EPBC 
Act, as well as state and territory planning and environment permits, reported some or 
substantial overlap in the conditions. (sub. 17, p. 8) 
                                              
6 Mines that impose some environmental or safety burden (legacy) on the community as a 
consequence of abandonment and/or inadequate rehabilitation by the proponent. 
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If adopted, the reforms proposed in this report are expected to substantially reduce 
the incidence of redundant and contradictory conditions. In particular, the 
Commission is recommending: 
• streamlining of environmental assessment and approval processes (between and 
within levels of government) to reduce the number of agencies with 
responsibility for condition setting (chapters 6 and 7) 
• explicit provisions be included in bilateral assessment agreements, and 
intrajurisdiction memorandum of understanding agreements, regarding 
cooperation and collaboration between regulators on conditions (chapter 6) 
• establishment of a major projects coordination office (or similar) — where the 
benefits outweigh the costs — to coordinate regulatory processes and facilitate 
better communication and information sharing between regulators on proposed 
conditions (chapter 6). 
Notwithstanding this, ‘leading practice’ condition-setting processes should — as a 
matter of course — include collaboration with relevant regulatory agencies to 
identify potential overlaps and inconsistencies ahead of approvals being granted.  
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 
Governments should ensure that regulatory agencies only set conditions that: 
• are directed at the impacts of the development to be consented 
• are consistent with relevant regulatory objectives and broader environmental 
and natural resources management policies 
• are outcome-based wherever possible 
• deliver outcomes that are not assured by other legislation  
• are cognisant of, and do not duplicate, the conditions imposed by other 
regulatory agencies  
• are public, and identify the type of impact that the condition is seeking to 
address  
• are enforceable, precise and reasonable in all other respects. 
8.2 Environmental offsets 
The economics of environmental offsets 
The offsets concept is well established in Australia and has proved to be an 
increasingly utilised policy instrument. The primary appeal of offsets is their 
potential to meet environmental and economic development objectives in tandem. 
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Specifically, offset tools can provide alternative beneficial environmental outcomes 
in situations where social and economic growth is sought at some detriment to the 
environment (EPA (WA) 2006). Permissible offsets might include setting aside an 
area of land for conservation, restoring degraded habitat or protecting areas where 
there is imminent or projected loss of biodiversity. 
For example, suppose a proponent proposes to build a coal mine that could cause 
environmental damage, but it is also expected to deliver significant economic and 
social benefits. If prevailing regulations prohibit such a reduction in environmental 
quality, the mine would not be allowed to go ahead and the foregone economic and 
social benefits would represent the ‘opportunity cost’ of maintaining environmental 
quality. 
In contrast, if the proponent were able to undertake (or purchase from another) a 
separate action (‘offset’) that increases the quality of the environment by a 
sufficiently large amount (so as to ensure that relevant regulatory objectives are 
met), the development would be able to proceed. In this way, environmental offsets 
can allow economic and social benefits to be realised without compromising the 
achievement of relevant environmental objectives. 
Historically, the offsets instrument has been applied in an ad hoc and relatively 
unsophisticated way. For example, a proponent seeking to clear conservation estate 
land for development may have been required to add another comparable area of 
land into the conservation estate. 
Over time, offsets have been used more extensively and applied to a broader range 
of environmental (including air pollution, habitat and biodiversity, wetlands 
management, native vegetation and marine environments) and other (for example, 
heritage) policy domains. In turn, offsets have played a larger role in major project 
assessment and approval processes. 
Moreover, to support these new applications — and to address some of the inherent 
challenges associated with offset design and implementation (box 8.2) — more 
formalised and complex offset frameworks and methodologies have emerged.  
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Box 8.2 Common challenges with offsets 
The design and implementation of environmental offsets poses a number of 
challenges. 
• Identifying net loss: identifying the net environmental impacts of a proposed 
development may not be straightforward. Regulators must make judgments about 
how environmental quality should be measured and undertake assessments of the 
expected environmental losses associated with a proposed development, as well as 
any environmental gains.  
• Fungibility: the use of offsets presumes that the lost environmental values are 
exchangeable, in whole or in part, with other environmental or non-environmental 
assets. Because environmental values are heterogeneous, an offset cannot 
perfectly replicate the ecosystem adversely affected by the development. Policy 
makers and regulators must decide how much dissimilarity between the primary and 
the offsetting environment will be tolerated.  
• Additionality: in order to be meaningful, an offset must improve, restore or secure 
environmental assets over and above the status quo (that is, in the absence of the 
offset). An offset would not meet this requirement if, for example, the activity is 
required by law or regulation, or if the activity would have been undertaken by the 
proponent or another party anyway. Uncertainty about future activities can make it 
difficult to determine whether an offset is ‘additional’ to the status quo. 
• Accounting for risk: due to information constraints, the environmental outcomes of 
developments and offsetting activities are accompanied by a residual level of risk. 
This includes the risk of impermanence, whereby offsets are reversed as a result of 
future activity or natural disasters. Offsets and policies may need to be designed to 
reduce and account for these risks, which may make offsets more costly for 
proponents. 
Sources: McKenney (2005); Middle and Middle (2010).  
 
How do offset policies bear on major projects? 
Offset requirements — in the context of major projects — generally come about in 
one of two ways.  
First, offsets may be required if applicable laws and regulations stipulate that 
adverse environmental impacts must be ‘offset’ or ‘counterbalanced’ in some way. 
For example, to obtain consent to clear native vegetation under the New South 
Wales Native Vegetation Act 2003 (and associated regulations), an applicant may be 
required to undertake ‘natural resource management action or work’ (an offset) to 
ensure that the proposed clearing activity ‘improves or maintains environmental 
outcomes’. 
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Second, offset measures may be included in the set of conditions attached to other 
approvals (‘offset conditions’) — that is, the legal basis for imposing offsets is the 
same as for conditions more generally. In this instance, decisions on offset 
conditions are typically informed by associated policy guidance.  
Offset policies vary significantly across and within jurisdictions, although there are 
some common features (table 8.2). Most notably, offset policies are usually 
characterised by an objective that there is ‘no net loss to the environment’ (or some 
aspect of the environment), once offset measures are taken into account. To achieve 
this, liable parties are required to deliver environmental gains (offset measures) 
‘equivalent to’ the residual environmental losses associated with a proposed 
development, thereby leaving the environment unchanged or better off. 
In practice, the scope of the no net loss objective directly impacts on the operation 
of offset regimes, and some objectives are defined more narrowly than others. For 
example, the Australian Government’s Offsets Policy aims to ‘deliver an overall 
conservation outcome that improves or maintains the viability of the aspect of the 
environment that is protected by national environment law and affected by the 
proposed action’(DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012g, p. 6). 
By contrast, native vegetation clearing regulations in Victoria are governed by an 
objective that there is ‘no net loss in the contribution made by native vegetation to 
Victoria’s biodiversity’. Generally speaking, as the offset policy objective narrows, 
the scope of actions that qualify as valid offset measures also reduces. 
A related issue is the flexibility of offset policies — that is, whether offset liabilities 
are to be met entirely through ‘like’ offset measures, or whether some amount of 
‘unlike’ measures are permitted. While most policies allow for unlike offset 
measures (often on the proviso that some ‘like for like or better’ test is met), the 
amount and circumstances vary, as do approaches to determining ‘likeness’. 
Regulators have adopted non-uniform nomenclature for describing different types 
of offsets, including direct and indirect offsets, in-kind and out-of-kind offsets and 
other compensatory actions. 
The mitigation hierarchy is a further feature of many offset policies — this means 
that offsets must be a ‘last resort’, and only applied after appropriate efforts have 
been made to avoid adverse impacts, and then to minimise and mitigate the 
unavoidable impacts. 
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Table 8.2 Environmental offset policies 
Offset policy or scheme Scope Objective  
New South Wales   
Principles for the Use of 
Biodiversity Offsets 
General Net improvement in biodiversity over time 
Offset Principles for Major 
Projects 
State significant 
development and state 
significant infrastructure 
Improvement or maintenance of biodiversity 
values is preferred, but flexibility is 
permitted for projects providing significant 
social or economic benefits 
Biodiversity Banking and 
Offsets Scheme 
General Improve or maintain biodiversity values 
Victoria   
Biodiversity assessment 
guidelines 
General No net loss in the contribution made by 
native vegetation to Victoria’s biodiversity 
Queensland   
Queensland Government 
Environmental Offsets 
Policy 
General Equivalent or better environmental outcome 
Biodiversity Offset Policy General To increase the long-term viability of the 
State’s biodiversity 
Policy for Vegetation 
Management Offsets 
General Conserve certain vegetation, ensure 
clearing does not cause land degradation 
and prevent loss of biodiversity 
Marine Fish Habitat 
Offset Policy 
Developments that 
impact on fisheries 
resources or fish habitats 
No net loss of marine fish habitat 
Koala Offset Policy Developments within the 
South East Queensland 
Koala Protection Area  
Net gain in bushland koala habitat in South 
East Queensland by 2020 
Western Australia   
WA Government’s 
Environmental Offsets 
Policy 
General Protect and conserve environmental and 
biodiversity values for present and future 
generations 
Tasmania   
General Offset Principles General Maintain or improve conservation outcomes 
Biodiversity Offset Policy Development and tree 
removal in Kingsborough 
Council 
No long-term net loss of biodiversity and 
environmental values 
Commonwealth   
EPBC Act Environmental 
Offsets Policy 
Actions that impact on 
one or more matters of 
national environmental 
significance 
Deliver an overall conservation outcome 
that improves or maintains the viability of 
the aspect of the environment that is 
protected by national environment law and 
affected by the proposed action 
Sources: DEH (NSW) (2013); DECC (NSW) (2008); DEHP (Qld) (2008); DPIPWE (Tas) (n.d.); DSEWPAC 
(2012g); EPA (WA) (2011); DSE (Vic) (2012). 
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Are current offset arrangements leading practice? 
The efficiency and effectiveness of offset arrangements has been a key theme of 
study submissions. The Commission has heard that offset processes are 
inconsistent, non-transparent and failing to deliver on their objectives. To address 
these shortcomings, participants have advocated for comprehensive reform of 
current offset practices.  
In the Commission’s view, there is significant potential to improve the design and 
application of offset policies in Australia. (That said, based on meetings between 
the Commission and regulatory officials in Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, Australia’s offset policies are regarded favourably by the 
international community.) However, the scope and complexity of offset-related 
issues are such that it is not feasible or appropriate to undertake this work within the 
context of this study; environmental offset policies have implications far beyond the 
major projects context.  
Accordingly, the Commission is recommending that COAG commission a 
dedicated and independent review of offset policies and practices at the national 
level, to report by the end of 2014. Such a review should: 
• assess and compare current offset regimes, including offset policy objectives and 
methodologies for identifying suitable offsets 
• identify priority areas for reform, and a framework for implementing reform 
• examine the case for greater national consistency and, where appropriate, 
linkages between jurisdictional offset schemes. 
Most parties agreed that a public review of offset policy objectives would be 
helpful. The remainder of this section identifies issues arising in this study that 
would benefit from a fuller examination and as part of a national offsets review. 
Is ‘no net loss’ being achieved? 
Participants’ views on the meaning, merit and practicality of the ‘no net loss’ 
objective were mixed.  
Several parties considered that ‘no net loss’ is not being achieved because 
prescribed offset measures are often ineffective, or never properly implemented and 
enforced: 
The use of ‘offsets‘ to allow irreversible damage to be inflicted on threatened species 
and other biodiversity values is a growing scandal that has not received adequate 
attention. Our Alliance can provide detailed evidence of offset rorting, including 
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examples where coal mine proponents have gone back on offset arrangements to mine 
areas previously set aside as offsets (in Ravensworth, for example), where proponents 
have falsely mapped offset areas (in Maules Creek … ) and where proponents have 
applied for further stage approvals without delivering previously agreed offsets in the 
specified timetable, as has occurred with the Stage 3 expansion of New Hope Coal’s 
Acland mine and the Stage 2 expansion of Newcastle Coal Infrastructure Group’s coal 
export terminal. (Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97, p. 5) 
Similarly, ANEDO considered that the environmental benefits of offsetting actions 
are sometimes undermined by ‘legislative loopholes’: 
The intent of ‘in perpetuity’ protection for offsets is not matched by legal protections. 
The normal policy intent is that offsets should endure as long as the impact that it is 
designed to offset (for example, an open cut mine). In practice, this may require 
protection of the offset site ‘in perpetuity’, as the original site is either very unlikely to 
be fully rehabilitated to accommodate the original ecosystems, or may be used for a 
different purpose (such as conversion to a landfill site). However, there are several 
ways in which biodiversity offsetting agreements can be overridden (for example, by 
mining tenement rights), or revoked (for example, by the minister who made the 
agreement). (sub. DR92, p. 31) 
The effectiveness of offset measures in delivering on their objectives is a legitimate 
concern and ought to be explicitly considered as part of a national offsets review. 
That said, the Commission expects that many of the reforms proposed in this report 
regarding approval conditions (section 8.1) and monitoring and enforcement 
activities (chapter 10), would help ensure that outcomes sought via the conditioning 
process (including offsets) are actually achieved.  
Is a ‘no net loss’ objective realistic? 
Questions have also been raised about the feasibility of ever achieving a ‘no net 
loss’ objective. Some respondents considered that no quantity of offsite remedial 
activity can legitimately offset particular environmental impacts: 
The UNESCO World Heritage Committee rejected the view that offsets were possible 
in relation to areas assessed as having world heritage values that were affected by a 
project development. Certainly, it is true that an objective of ‘no net environmental 
impact’ would be difficult to realistically achieve in the context of World Heritage 
areas such as the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. (Queensland Resources Council, 
sub. DR79, p. 3) 
The North Queensland Conservation Council argued: 
… destroying area A while protecting area B results in a net loss of habitat. There is no 
getting away from the fact that the concept of offsets is flawed. (sub. DR64, p. 5) 
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While some environmental assets are unique, the Commission does not agree that 
‘no net loss’ is an unattainable policy goal. That said, this outcome will not be 
achieved if offsets do not deliver legitimate and equivalent environmental gains 
(relative to what is being lost). It is in this context that the use of ‘indirect offset 
measures’ has attracted considerable criticism from stakeholders. (Box 8.3 provides 
some examples of indirect offsets under the EPBC Act.) 
 
Box 8.3 Offset conditions under the EPBC Act 
South of Embley Bauxite Mine and Port Development — Queensland 
The South of Embley mine project was approved in May 2013. As a condition of 
approval (EPBC 2010/5642), the proponent must implement a Feral Pig Management 
Offset Strategy and the strategy must ‘provide information detailing Traditional Owner 
employment opportunities and mechanisms for reporting the number of local 
Indigenous person/s actually employed in the implementation of this strategy’. Similar 
employment requirements apply to the Inshore Dolphin Offset Strategy (DSEWPAC 
(Cwlth) 2013a). 
Australian Pacific LNG Project — Queensland 
Construction of a multi-train LNG plant at Curtis Island was granted approval in 2011 
(EPBC 2009/4977). Indirect offset measures include that the proponent provide 
funding of $200 000 per annum for the life of the project and $100 000 per annum, for 
each operating LNG train, to support implementation of a strategy for field 
management and visitor awareness of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area 
(DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2011). 
Southern Sydney Freight Line — New South Wales 
A proposal by the Australian Rail Track Corporation to construct a 30 kilometre rail 
track in Sydney was granted approval under the EPBC Act in 2008 (EPBC 2005/2393). 
Offset conditions include provision of street furniture, public art, landscaping and tree 
planting, lighting and other measures to the value of $2 million or more (DSEWPAC 
(Cwlth) 2008a). 
Fiona Stanley Hospital — Western Australia 
Approval to construct the Fiona Stanley Hospital in Murdoch was obtained in 2008 
(EPBC 2008/3970). Conditions include: 
• provide a minimum of $275 000 toward the Research Project on Carnaby’s Black 
Cockatoo, and $575 000 towards funding community and stakeholder 
environmental initiatives in the provision of care and rehabilitation for Carnaby’s 
Black Cockatoo 
• establish areas of open space within the Fiona Stanley Hospital including urban 
plaza, internal gardens and roof gardens planted with at least 70 per cent native 
species (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2008b).  
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Participants have argued that most indirect measures do not exhibit the ‘basic 
characteristics’ required of an environmental offset, and that it is misleading — and 
damaging to the offsets brand — to describe these obligations as offsets, or to claim 
that no net loss is being achieved as a result of their delivery.  
The North Queensland Conservation Council referred to a case where it considers 
that the indirect offset did not adequately compensate for the environmental damage 
incurred: 
[The] Queensland Government’s Coordinator-General considered the provision of the 
Port of Townsville Limited offer of lands for boat ramp facilities … in South 
Townsville an acceptable offset for loss of fisheries habitat as part of the approval 
process for development of the Townsville Marine Precinct Project. (sub. DR64, p. 5)  
Jim Leggate also questioned whether indirect measures genuinely offset 
environmental losses: 
Offsets to substitute for mine rehabilitation is a fudge. Toxic and hazardous wastes on 
disused mine sites, no matter what offsets are agreed, are required to be contained via 
proper rehab and decommissioning, and even then, if there is no sequential land use, 
mining has to be seen as permanent land use. This is why the ‘offset’ never completely 
offsets the rehab requirement. A lot of this is just trickery. (sub. DR61, p. 4) 
Queensland Gas Company suggested that governments may be using indirect offset 
requirements as a way to secure goods and services that would otherwise be 
publicly funded: 
Offsets should be directly relevant to the activity which is creating the environmental 
impact and should not be allowed to become a ‘de facto’ process of achieving broader 
community outcomes. (sub. DR79, p. 3) 
Similarly, the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (AMEC) queried 
the motivation of regulators in prescribing indirect offset requirements:  
Whether by design or accident, regulatory agencies appear to be using offsets to bolster 
or supplement their revenue for core business activities in the face of declining 
government appropriations. AMEC is aware of offsets that have been conditioned 
where agencies present wish lists of conservation/environmental management or 
research programs from which proponents choose one loosely based on their 
environmental impact. (sub. DR70, p. 15) 
The use of indirect offset measures is attractive as it provides for a more flexible 
approach to meeting offset liabilities. However, there is an inherent tension between 
broadening the scope of allowable measures and achieving a policy objective of ‘no 
net loss’ — particularly where this objective is relatively narrow. This issue should 
be explicitly considered as part of a national offsets review. 
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Are regulatory objectives internally consistent? 
A further area of concern relates to the consistency (or lack thereof) between an 
objective of ‘no net loss’ and higher-order regulatory objectives governing 
development decisions and environment protection. 
As discussed in chapter 4, the legislation underpinning major project DAA 
processes often identifies sustainable development or ecologically sustainable 
development (ESD) as a key objective. A common definition for ESD is ‘using, 
conserving and enhancing the community’s resources so that ecological processes, 
on which life depends, are maintained, and the total quality of life, now and in the 
future, can be increased’ (Australian Government 1992b). In turn, decision-making 
processes under an ESD framework should ‘effectively integrate both short- and 
long-term economic, environmental, social and equity considerations’ (Australian 
Government 1992b). 
However, pursuing an objective of ‘no net loss’ through the conditioning process 
(assuming an offset policy applies) implies that no amount of environmental loss is 
acceptable for any individual major project. That is, the approval decision is subject 
to a binding constraint that the development has a ‘net zero’ (or positive) 
environmental impact. This has important implications.  
First, pursuing this net zero outcome may come at a significant cost, including the 
cost of foregone consumption of other goods and services. 
Second, embedding this requirement in the major project approval decision-making 
process prioritises (or gives more weight to) the impacts of the project on 
environmental matters over all other impacts (including economic and social 
impacts that might be highly valued by society (box 8.4)). In some cases, an even 
narrower set of outcomes may be prioritised; for example, if the ‘no net loss’ 
objective is defined with reference to particular aspects of the environment.  
In the Commission’s view, it is not clear that this is consistent with the principles of 
ESD, and by consequence, the objectives of much of the legislation governing 
major project approval decisions. It also appears to be an impractical way to 
regulate development activity. 
This is not to say that ESD-based approval frameworks preclude (or even 
discourage) decisions that involve leaving the environment (or some element of the 
environment) unchanged or better off. Such decisions may be entirely appropriate, 
particularly where the economic and social costs of legitimate offsetting activities 
are low, and the benefits significant. In other cases, however, the economic and 
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social costs of environmental offsetting measures may lead decision makers to 
approve a major project despite some anticipated ‘net loss’ in environmental values. 
The New South Wales Government’s offsets policy appears to be more consistent 
with an ESD-based decision-making process than other strict ‘no net loss’ schemes:  
Offsets can be discounted where significant social and economic benefits accrue to 
NSW as a consequence of the proposal. While an outcome in which biodiversity values 
are improved or maintained is preferred, it is acknowledged that in some circumstances 
flexibility may be required, especially in the context of a project providing significant 
social or economic benefits to NSW. (OEH (NSW) 2013, p. 1) 
 
Box 8.4 The implications of complying with no net loss 
The figure below maps the amount of environmental assets (E) against the amount of 
non-environmental assets (N). The point (E*, N*) represents the existing level of 
environmental and non-environmental assets, and the curve A traces out combinations 
of E and N that are equally as valuable to society as the current stock of assets, 
(E*, N*) — that is, social welfare is constant at all points on A. Curve A is 
downward-sloping by assumption to capture the fact that both environmental and 
non-environmental assets are valuable to society. 
The combinations of E and N above curve A (denoted by the grey-shaded area), yield 
higher social welfare than (E*, N*), while all points below curve A are strictly inferior. 
 
Under a ‘no net loss’ framework, the only permissible outcomes are those that lie to the 
right of E* (as indicated by the hatched area in the diagram). This means: 
• certain welfare-enhancing outcomes are prohibited (the grey, unhatched area) 
• outcomes that reduce social welfare might be acceptable so long as the stock of 
environmental assets increases (the hatched area below curve A).  
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Christensen, Burge and Lloyd examined the role of biodiversity offsets in the 
resource consent process in New Zealand and found that sustainable development 
does not necessarily imply ‘no net loss’: 
It is important to recognise that biodiversity offsets and environmental compensation 
are not ends in themselves. ‘No net loss of biodiversity’ or ‘net biodiversity gain’ may 
be one outcome of a resource consent process, but it is not the only outcome possible. 
That is because the overall objective must still remain the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources as defined by s 5 of the Act — whether or not that 
involves the use of biodiversity offsets or environmental compensation. (2010, p. 27) 
The inconsistency between ‘no net loss’ and sustainable development has been 
explicitly acknowledged in recent New Zealand approval decisions, including the 
Transmission Gully road project approval: 
… while we recognise the desirability of achieving a situation of no net loss of 
biodiversity from a project, we do not believe that it is a requirement of RMA [the 
Resources Management Act 1991] that no net loss be achieved in any given case. The 
principle of sustainable management requires a broad consideration of a range of 
sometimes competing factors. A consent authority is entitled to conclude that consent 
ought be granted to the proposal notwithstanding that all adverse effects of the proposal 
have not been avoided, remedied or mitigated. In other words there may be a net loss of 
some values or aspects of the environment. The significance of that loss and its 
weighting against the benefits of any given proposal is a matter to be determined by a 
consent authority applying s5(2) RMA. (Board of Inquiry into the Transmission Gully 
Proposal 2012, p. 113) 
Participant views on this issue have been mixed — some stakeholders agreed that a 
no net loss requirement for every project may not align with ESD, while others 
considered that the two objectives are consistent: 
ANEDO strongly disagrees … that giving fundamental consideration to environmental 
protection and improvement – including in the context of offsets – is inconsistent with 
‘ecologically sustainable development’ (ESD) or its principles … rejecting an ‘improve 
or maintain’ or ‘net environmental benefit’ standard, implies that our policymakers 
should prescribe (and society and communities should accept) a gradual but definite 
deterioration of environmental qualities over time. (ANEDO, sub. DR92, pp. 27–8) 
The Nature Conservation Society of South Australia noted: 
The underlying principles of ‘no net loss’ and ‘maintain or improve’ are critical to 
ensure that the environment is given due consideration in relation to the impact of 
major project developments. (sub. DR95, p. 6) 
Economists at Large and The Australian Institute considered that, despite having 
‘reservations about many aspects of offset systems’, a no net loss approach can be 
economically efficient: 
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The use of offsets to internalise environmental damage does not give greater weight to 
environmental impacts. If the project is economically efficient, it should be able to pay 
for all costs and damages, either through compensation or internalisation. (sub. DR83, 
p. 9) 
The Commission does not disagree with the premise that economic efficiency is 
enhanced where proponents face the total social cost of development decisions (that 
is, private and external costs). One way to achieve this is to impose a tax (often 
referred to as a ‘pigouvian tax’) on activities that generate negative externalities, 
such as environmental pollution. Appropriately set, a pigouvian tax on the polluting 
activity ensures producers face the total social cost of their production decisions, 
and the socially optimal amount of development activity (and environmental 
pollution) is achieved.  
In some applications, environmental offset policies impose a liability on proponents 
that is broadly equivalent to a pigouvian tax. Macintosh and Burnett considered: 
A practice has developed amongst federal and state regulators of relying on cash and 
other indirect offsets. By definition, these are not offsets. Offsets involve the provision 
of an environmental benefit that offsets, or replaces, what has been lost. There must be 
equivalence between the harm and benefit, hence the notion of ‘fungibility’. Cash and 
indirect offsets are a form of hypothecated Pigouvian tax, involving the imposition of a 
price on an environmentally harmful activity and the dedication of the revenue to 
specific expenditures, typically associated with the relevant harm. (2013, p. 2) 
If offset regulations impose a monetary penalty on proponents that is equal to the 
external (damage) cost of development activity, this would be: 
• equivalent to a pigouvian tax 
• economically efficient (or ‘welfare maximising’). 
However, under a ‘no net loss’ approach, the offset liability facing proponents is 
usually determined by the nature, amount and location of expected environmental 
damage (at least for direct offsets). For example, if a project is expected to damage 
threatened species habitat, the proponent may be required to provide comparable 
areas of habitat in some contiguous region. The compliance cost associated with the 
offset policy is therefore determined by the cost of delivering ‘equivalent 
environmental gains’, not by the external cost of the development activity on the 
community. It is unlikely, therefore, that current offset policies and practices 
efficiently internalise the external costs associated with development activity.  
The Commission is recommending that consistency between offset policy 
objectives and relevant, higher-order legislative objectives be explicitly considered 
as part of a national offsets review. Where these objectives are not aligned, 
alternative offset policy objectives should be identified. 
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Further examination of the various ‘quasi-objectives’ common to offset policies is 
also warranted, including the requirement that offset measures only be considered 
after avoidance and mitigation measures (the ‘mitigation hierarchy’). At first 
glance, this practice risks imposing high efficiency costs if it prevents ‘least cost’ 
compliance with environmental regulations, and means forgoing higher-value 
environmental outcomes (from a landscape or ecosystem level). The Victorian 
Competition and Efficiency Commission (VCEC) reached a similar conclusion: 
… [the mitigation hierarchy] implies that on site avoidance, and reduce and reuse 
options must be considered before offsets can be applied. This approach, however, 
appears inconsistent with the objective of minimising the cost of achieving 
environmental targets, as lower cost options may be available off-site. (2008, p. 327) 
The New Zealand Environment Court found that, for projects seeking consent under 
the Resources Management Act 1991 (the key objective of which is sustainable 
management), there is no requirement for the mitigation hierarchy to be followed: 
In Winstone Aggregates Ltd v Auckland Regional Council EC Auckland A49/2002, 
26 February 2002 … the Court stated that it was a matter of judgment as to whether in 
a particular case the adverse effects are such that the cost of avoidance should be totally 
internalised. The Court stated that there were many cases where mitigation measures to 
reduce adverse effects were all that was required, particularly in the case of noise and 
dust mitigation. The Court went on to say that … whether emphasis is given to 
avoidance, remedying or mitigation will depend on the facts of a particular case and the 
application of section 5 to those facts. A judgment is required to be made which ‘allows 
for a comparison of conflicting considerations and the scale or degree of them, and 
their relative significance or proportion in the final outcome’. (Christensen, Burge and 
Lloyd 2010, p. 29) 
Are offset-setting processes robust and transparent? 
The predictability, rigour and transparency of offset-setting processes has been 
discussed at length by participants. AMEC noted: 
The cash offset framework and monetary multipliers have had no industry consultation, 
have not been substantiated by the Environmental Protection Authority, nor has there 
been any methodology released on how ‘good to excellent’ is determined. (sub. 42, 
p. 13) 
Xstrata Coal expressed similar concerns: 
Biodiversity offsetting requirements are unnecessarily excessive. In our experience 
agencies often rigidly apply a set ratio rather than assessing the need for offsets on a 
case by case basis … [and] there is a lack of scientific rigour in determining ratio 
offsets and this results in uncertainty and unpredictability. (sub. 50, pp. 39–40) 
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For offset mechanisms to work effectively — and to engender public support — the 
robustness and transparency of underlying processes is critical (irrespective of the 
particular objective being sought). 
First, regulators must adopt scientifically rigorous, consistent and predictable 
methodologies to quantitatively measure and value the expected environmental 
losses caused by development (and equally, to measure and value the expected 
environmental gains from available offset measures). 
In particular, the measurement and valuation process must recognise and address 
the ‘additionality’ problem (box 8.2) — that is, do gains from proposed offset 
measures present a true addition to what would have occurred otherwise? This 
requires establishing a baseline or counterfactual scenario to estimate what would 
have happened without the offset. For example, conserving and maintaining an area 
of biodiversity should only be regarded as an offset if that area would otherwise 
have been damaged or cleared. 
Second, decision makers must follow a transparent and evidence-based process for 
determining whether offsets are appropriate (given prevailing regulatory 
objectives), and the type and quantity of offset measures required (the offset 
‘liability’). 
The process of valuing environmental gains and losses is an essential element of 
offset policy frameworks, but it is also inherently contentious and subjective. 
Commendable progress has been made by a number of jurisdictions (box 8.5). 
However, it is imperative that work in this area continues. The Commission expects 
that a national offsets review would encourage and facilitate this, as would better 
environmental data, and greater adoption of strategic approaches (chapter 11).  
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Box 8.5 Measuring and valuing environmental losses and gains 
Victorian Government — NaturePrint 
In Victoria, if the removal of native vegetation is permitted, an offset is required as a 
condition of permit approval. The NaturePrint framework is used to make decisions 
about biodiversity offset requirements. This tool provides quantitative information about 
the strategic value of biodiversity assets across Victoria, by ranking each pixel (75 X 75 
metre cell) between 100 and 0. Strategic Natural Values maps have also been 
developed to highlight areas that contribute most to biodiversity conservation. 
Australian Government — Offsets calculator 
The Australian Government’s ‘Offsets Assessment Guide’ (or calculator) encourages 
greater consistency and predictability by using a balance sheet approach to the 
quantification of impacts and offsets (where the impacted matter is a threatened 
species or ecological community). While broadly supportive of the intent and direction 
of these reforms, several stakeholders have queried the methodology underpinning the 
offsets calculator and suggested that greater transparency is required to verify the 
robustness of this tool. 
Sources: DSE (Vic) (2012); DSEWPAC (2012g).  
 
The case for greater uniformity between offset frameworks within and between 
jurisdictions should also be examined. A number of stakeholders considered that 
prevailing inconsistencies may be generating unnecessary compliance costs: 
Within a project a single environmental impact can require two separate, sometimes 
conflicting, actions as an offset. For example, Federal procedures could require a direct 
offset of offsite habitat protection, while the state might mandate scientific research in 
response to the same impact, effectively double counting the impact and its costs to the 
business. (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia, sub. 44, p. 4) 
Xstrata Coal noted: 
The Commonwealth approval required the Ulan coal mining project to create 
biodiversity offset areas that are different to the biodiversity offset areas required by the 
NSW approval, which has made ongoing management of those biodiversity offset areas 
more difficult. (sub. 50, p. 9) 
The recently published Great Barrier Reef Strategic Assessment draft report 
included an evaluation of offset practices in Queensland. These arrangements were 
found to be only ‘partially effective’, in part because five separate offset policies 
apply at the state level: 
… [the] Queensland Government’s existing specific issue offset policies have been 
developed separately over a number of years and are not well integrated … and may 
not deliver strategic outcomes in all instances. (DSDIP (Qld) 2013b, p. 264) 
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Finally, the reforms proposed in this report are expected to ensure that offset 
decisions (for major projects) are transparent and evidence-based. In particular, 
consistent with recommendation 8.1, decision makers should be required to: 
• identify the adverse environmental impact (loss) being targeted 
• explain how the offset is expected to counterbalance that impact, and how this 
contributes to the achievement of regulatory objectives. 
What is the appropriate role for offset markets? 
Historically, offsets have either been delivered by the proponent directly, or 
procured from third parties on an ‘as needs’ basis. As the demand for offsets has 
increased, however, more formalised markets have developed (box 8.6).  
Offset markets can lower transaction costs by facilitating efficient exchanges 
between purchasers of offsets (developers) and offset providers (for example, land 
holders able to restore or protect environmental assets). In the absence of markets, 
these exchanges are often impeded by information problems and high transaction 
and coordination costs. 
Offset markets present genuine opportunities for efficiency gains and there is a 
strong ‘in-principle’ argument for using these approaches to deliver cost-effective 
offset opportunities. A previous Commission study found: 
Markets promote achievement of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation at 
least cost and promote innovative solutions over time as individuals have an incentive 
to identify cost-effective solutions. In this way, markets also deal with site-specific 
environmental problems and with variations in the benefits and costs of supplying 
conservation services across the country. In addition, as new information about supply 
and demand is continually revealed through prices, individuals can respond quickly to 
changing circumstances and to new understanding of native vegetation benefits or of 
the costs of supplying it. (2004, p. 196)  
That said, designing and administering efficient offset markets can be challenging. 
The Victorian Government noted: 
Issues identified with the offset market include high and volatile prices, and the 
inability to meet demand for certain offsets. … offset prices are considerably higher 
than the cost of similar permanent environmental outcomes purchased through tender 
programs. Volatility in offset prices has also been observed in the market. For example, 
since 2006, BushBroker offset average prices for bioregions ranged from $34 000 to 
$370 000 per Habitat Hectare. (2012, p. 19) 
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Box 8.6 Market-based offset approaches 
Victoria — BushBroker 
The BushBroker Scheme provides a mechanism for sourcing, generating and 
allocating ‘Native Vegetation Credits’ (NVCs). A NVC is a gain in the quality and/or 
quantity of native vegetation that is subject to a secure and ongoing agreement. If a 
developer seeking to clear native vegetation is required to obtain an offset, NVCs 
purchased via the BushBroker program can be used to meet this requirement. The 
Victorian Government trialled an online Native Vegetation Exchange (NVX) in 2012 to 
facilitate the trading of NVCs by automating the offset matching process. The NVX is 
under evaluation to determine whether it should be used on an ongoing basis. 
A national biobanking scheme? 
Dr Allan Hawke examined the role of market-based mechanisms in delivering 
biodiversity outcomes as part of the Independent Review of the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Hawke found that biodiversity banking 
schemes have merit and that a systematic approach to biobanking could bring 
considerable benefits to biodiversity conservation in Australia. Hawke recommended: 
• COAG develop a national biodiversity banking system and standards 
• the Australian Government, in the interim, accredit State and Territory biobanking 
schemes, subject to their meeting acceptable standards 
• the EPBC Act be amended to facilitate and promote the use of biobanking as part of 
project approvals and facilitate the operation of a national biobanking scheme. 
Sources: Victorian Government (2012); Hawke (2009).  
 
Similar problems have been experienced with the New South Wales BioBanking 
Scheme: 
Some developers and assessors are concerned about the availability of biodiversity 
credits at a reasonable price … A main cause is the reluctance of landowners to pay for 
the assessment and establishment of a biobank site without the certainty of a buyer for 
their credits. Landowners are tending to lodge expressions of interest only, which does 
not create a ready or guaranteed supply of credits in the market … The other key issue 
is the range of ecosystem credit types … . Ecosystem credit types are determined by 
five criteria – vegetation type, vegetation formation, catchment region, surrounding 
vegetation cover and patch size. This complexity fragments the credit market and limits 
trading opportunities. (OEH (NSW) 2012, p. 4) 
The VCEC found that offset market transactions can be complex and costly because 
nature is complex (meaning sophisticated trading rules and site assessments are 
required), markets are thin, there are package/synergy problems on both sides of the 
market and assets are lumpy (2009). 
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Offset ‘funds’ or fee in-lieu arrangements present a further way to support the 
cost-effective delivery of offset measures. Under this approach, developers are able 
to meet their offset obligations by making a payment into a dedicated fund that 
finances offsetting activities. The fund administrator (typically either a government 
agency or not-for-profit body) takes on the financial and legal responsibility for the 
delivery of offsets under this model. 
The New South Wales Government has committed to replacing the biobanking 
scheme with a biodiversity offset fund, while the Australian Government recently 
announced the establishment of a Great Barrier Reef offsets trust (box 8.7). 
 
Box 8.7 Offset funds 
New South Wales biodiversity offset fund 
In July 2013, the New South Wales Environment Minister announced that a new 
biodiversity offsets fund would be established to enable major project proponents to 
contribute money to the fund, instead of locating and purchasing offsets themselves. 
The new fund will direct money to large-scale environmental improvement programs or 
to ecological stewardship payments made to farmers who elect to manage parts of 
their land to higher environmental standards. The objective of the fund is to create 
greater connectivity across the landscape, protect strategically important areas and 
reduce the amount of time lost in seeking suitable offset sites for large development 
and infrastructure projects, including mining.  
Great Barrier Reef Trust 
The Australian Government has established a Reef Trust to improve coastal habitat 
and water quality along the Great Barrier Reef. The fund will be jointly co-ordinated by 
the Queensland Government and the Australian Government, with advice provided by 
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority and other agencies. The trust will be 
funded through offset payments made by project proponents seeking approval under 
Commonwealth environment law. The Australian Government has made an initial 
funding commitment of $40 million. 
Sources: Parker (2013); Hunt (2013).  
 
Relative to other approaches, offset funds can reduce transactions costs for 
proponents, deliver larger-scale offset measures, achieve more strategic and 
high-value offsets (for example, if the fund manager is more specialised and 
informed about environmental management than project developers) and reduce the 
risk of non-delivery (by requiring payment prior to development commencing). 
Macintosh and Burnett observed: 
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Offset programs often involve considerable transaction costs due to the complexity of 
devising and implementing offset methods, and in establishing and maintaining offset 
projects. Further, as offsets are ‘project driven’, they are unlikely to lead to an 
allocation of resources that maximises environmental returns. … [an environmental 
impact charge] would allow for the pooling of conservation resources and facilitate 
their strategic application, thereby increasing the cost-effectiveness of conservation and 
recovery actions. (2013, pp. 1–2) 
Notwithstanding this, good governance and institutional arrangements are 
important. For example, governments (as offset fund administrators and responsible 
approval authorities) might have a (real or perceived) incentive to allow 
unacceptable developments to proceed because of the cash flow implications 
(‘financial capture’). A third-party offsets fund manager might be desirable to guard 
against this risk (and the consequent undermining of scheme credibility). The 
Commission’s proposal for the establishment of separate environment assessment 
and enforcement agencies (chapter 6) would also bolster these arrangements and 
provide an entity to independently monitor the environmental compliance of the 
fund. Good regulatory design is also important to address the monopsony power 
risks inherent in a single offsets fund approach. 
A number of study participants favoured offset funds over direct provision or offset 
markets: 
One approach currently used allows proponents to contribute funding into a 
Government trust for offset projects rather than individually purchasing land (and 
potentially competing for the same parcel) and carrying out offset projects themselves. 
This model would simplify the process greatly and reduce compliance costs for 
proponents whilst still meeting regulatory objectives. (Xstrata Coal, sub. 50 p. 40) 
That said, some respondents highlighted that offset funds might make it more 
difficult for developers to obtain ‘social licence’ — for example, if offsets are not 
connected to the damage caused by development, or are not visible to the local 
community. 
Offset markets and offset funds are complex and contentious, and the efficiency 
benefits of such arrangements are contingent on a number of design and 
implementation issues. A comprehensive national offsets review is the appropriate 
forum to consider these tools in more detail.  
Finally, notwithstanding concerns about current offset policy objectives and 
practices, it is important to emphasise that the merits of environmental offsets as a 
policy instrument are undisputed. It is the Commission’s strong preference that 
efficiently designed and administered offset policies continue to play a role in the 
major projects regulatory framework. 
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RECOMMENDATION 8.2 
COAG should commission an independent and public national review of 
environmental offset policies and practices to report by the end of 2014. The 
review should: 
• survey the consistency of offset policy objectives against the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development  
• critically assess the methodologies used for measuring and valuing offsets 
• examine the role of market-based offset approaches, including offset funds 
• consider the case for greater national consistency and linkages between offset 
regimes, including the potential for a single national scheme. 
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9 Regulatory decisions: review and 
appeal rights 
 
Key points 
• Review mechanisms help ensure that development assessment and approval (DAA) 
decisions are made in a robust, transparent and accountable manner in accordance 
with regulatory objectives.  
• An effective review process needs to be designed in the context of the entire DAA 
system and take into consideration the costs and benefits of review. 
• Reviews can seek to determine whether a decision was lawful (judicial review), or to 
determine whether it was the best decision (merits review).  
• Reviews are a potential source of uncertainty and additional costs for proponents. 
Other stakeholders, such as non-government organisations, regard the degree to 
which they can participate in, and have rights of review, as a measure of whether 
DAA processes are serving the public interest. 
• Whether and what kind of review of DAA decisions are allowed needs to balance 
these competing views. The balance should depend on the context, particularly on 
who the decision maker is: 
– If the decision maker is a Minister, judicial review is appropriate.  
– In most other cases, limited merits review will be appropriate.  
• Standing (who can seek judicial or merits review) should be granted to proponents, 
those who are directly affected or could potentially be directly affected by the 
decision, and those who have taken a substantive interest in the assessment 
process. In exceptional circumstances, where natural justice would otherwise be 
denied, leave should be able to be granted to persons who are not included in the 
above categories.  
 
This chapter considers the provisions that exist for review of decisions throughout 
the major project development assessment and approval (DAA) process. 
Review mechanisms can help to ensure that DAA decisions are correct and are 
made in a transparent and accountable manner and in accordance with regulatory 
objectives. In practice, the degree to which review mechanisms contribute to 
transparency and accountability of decision making without incurring unnecessary 
costs depends on:  
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• what review rights apply to decisions made by a Minister, such as major project 
primary approval decisions 
• what review rights apply to decisions that are not made by a Minister, such as 
decisions made by government departments or independent bodies 
• procedural matters, including who has ‘standing’ for the purposes of bringing a 
judicial or merits review application; how vexatious review applications should 
be treated; and how costs associated with reviews are allocated 
• what other mechanisms exist for ensuring transparency and accountability, such 
as public participation during the assessment phase (chapter 5) and the 
publication of the justification for decisions (chapter 7). 
9.1 Overview of review processes 
Types of review 
A number of parties could be affected by a DAA decision and may seek to 
challenge it. When a DAA decision is made, it is important to identify whether it is 
reviewable and if so: 
• what is the scope of the review? 
• who can seek review? 
Jurisdictions’ practices vary as to what type of review, if any, is allowed for 
decisions about major projects, and whether ministerial decisions are reviewable.  
What is the scope of the review? 
There are two types of review: merits review and judicial review.  
Merits review allows a re-examination of the decision (box 9.1). The merits review 
body generally exercises all the power and discretion of the original decision maker 
(‘stands in their shoes’) to determine what is the correct or preferable decision 
(Bates 2010). 
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Box 9.1 Challenging decisions through merits review 
In two recent cases in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court, the decision 
maker’s judgments about the precautionary principle and ecologically sustainable 
development were overturned on merits review. 
In the first case, Warkworth, the approval for an extension of a mine was overturned 
because the judge found the social and environmental costs outweighed the economic 
and social benefits of the project. The judge criticised the modelling submitted to the 
development assessment and approval process, finding that: 
• the offsets were not scientifically proven to be effective 
• some of the social impacts on the community had been overlooked 
• the input−output analysis overstated the employment gains of the project 
• the non-market valuation study was flawed in its design 
• the benefit−cost analysis failed to take into account issues of equity, distributive 
justice, and intergenerational equity (a component of ecologically sustainable 
development, which is an objective of the relevant planning legislation).  
In the second case, Boral, the judge overturned the approval for the extension of a 
mine, because of the lack of data on the impacts on a nearby river, which: 
• meant the impacts could not be appropriately dealt with by an environmental 
management plan 
• meant the adaptive management regime did not meet the required standard of 
imposing precise limits on the cumulative operations of the mine 
• meant the precautionary principle had not been satisfied, because the proponent 
had not demonstrated the risk of environmental harm would be adequately 
mitigated. 
In both cases, appeals have been heard but, at the time of writing, judgment has been 
reserved. 
Sources: Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure and 
Warkworth Mining Limited [2013] NSWLEC 48 (15 April 2013); SCHCAG Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning 
and Infrastructure and Boral Cement Limited [2013] NSWLEC 1032 (27 February 2013).  
 
The right to merits review does not exist at common law and must be specifically 
conferred by statute. This means the statute determines whether or not merits review 
exists at all and if so, whether it is limited in some way — for example, the merits 
review body might only be able to consider certain things, or might be required to 
remit the decision back to the original decision maker (box 9.2). 
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Box 9.2 Limited merits review of decision making in the electricity and 
gas regulatory frameworks 
The COAG Standing Council on Energy and Resources recommended that a form of 
limited merits review be introduced for Australia’s electricity and gas regulatory 
frameworks, where the review body must: 
• only consider information that was available to the original decision maker 
• acquire expert advice as needed and consult with relevant stakeholders 
• remit more complex decisions back to the original decision maker. 
To obtain review, an applicant must demonstrate that the decision maker made an 
error of fact, an incorrect exercise of discretion or was unreasonable in its original 
decision, and also make a prima facie case that addressing this would lead to a 
materially preferable outcome in the long-term interests of consumers. 
Source: COAG Standing Council on Energy and Resources (2013).  
 
By contrast, judicial review generally does not allow the conclusions of the original 
decision maker to be challenged — it only looks at the legality of the decision 
making process (Cane 2010). In other words: 
… judicial review is limited in that it may only assess the lawfulness of a decision, not 
its merits. It is not for judges to question whether the decision was ‘good, bad or 
indifferent’, which is often what is sought in challenges to environmental decision 
making, nor can a judge substitute his or her opinion for that of an administrative 
decision maker. If the decision was within the power of the decision maker, then 
judicial review will not provide a remedy. (Cabarrus 2009, p. 114) 
The right to seek judicial review exists at common law, but some jurisdictions have 
passed judicial review statutes. In general, statutory judicial review has codified the 
grounds for judicial review (box 9.3), simplified the procedures required to seek 
judicial review, created a uniform test for standing and allowed flexible application 
of judicial review remedies (DJAG (NSW) 2011).  
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Box 9.3 Grounds for statutory judicial review 
The grounds for statutory judicial review listed in s. 5 of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cwlth) are: 
• a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the 
decision 
• procedures that were required by law to be observed in connection with the making 
of the decision were not observed. For example, a failure to properly consult might 
breach procedural fairness 
• the person who purported to make the decision did not have jurisdiction to make the 
decision 
• the decision was not authorised by the enactment in pursuance of which it was 
purported to be made 
• the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the 
enactment (which includes Wednesbury unreasonableness — see box 9.4, later) 
• the decision involved an error of law 
• the decision was induced or affected by fraud 
• there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision 
• the decision was otherwise contrary to law. 
Sources: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cwlth), s. 5; Preston (2008).  
 
Further, judicial review by the High Court is guaranteed by the Commonwealth 
Constitution for Commonwealth matters and cannot be removed by statute, but the 
States and Territories can remove judicial review in relation to decisions made 
under legislation, at least in part (for non-jurisdictional error).7 
Who can challenge the DAA decision? 
Not everyone is allowed to bring a merits or judicial review application before the 
tribunal or court. The people who can are specified by law (this is referred to as 
having ‘standing’). Standing can be expanded or narrowed by legislation, and hence 
it varies depending on the jurisdiction and the type of review application being 
brought.  
In general, to have standing, a person is required to have a ‘special interest’ in the 
impugned decision greater than the concern of the general public (greater than a 
mere intellectual or emotional concern), but this can be modified by legislation. The 
                                              
7 Jurisdictional error refers to the decision maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the 
relevant statute — that is, the decision maker did not have the authority to make the decision that 
was made (Robinson 2012). 
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different legislation across jurisdictions affects which ‘third parties’ (that is, a 
person other than a proponent) are able to bring a review application. A third party 
could be: 
• an ‘aggrieved person’ or someone who has a ‘special interest’ 
• an environmental group with conservation objectives, or 
• an objector (that is, a person who made a properly-made submission to an 
assessment process). 
What decisions can be reviewed? 
There are a number of different stages throughout the DAA process — for example, 
State and Territory Government major project DAA processes generally involve 
decisions: 
• to declare the project a major project or to ‘call-in’ the project 
• to decide whether or not an environmental impact assessment (EIA) should be 
conducted and if so, what level of assessment is required 
• to set the scope of the terms of reference of the EIA 
• to make a recommendation to the decision maker after the EIA is completed 
• to refuse the application or approve it (with or without conditions). 
Australian jurisdictions vary on which decisions preceding the approval decision 
(‘preliminary decisions’) are reviewable. In general, only decisions that are final 
and substantive will be subject to review (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond 
(1990) 170 CLR 321; ARC (1999). 
• A recommendation made by an assessment agency to a decision maker will 
generally not be reviewable as it is not a final decision. (One notable exception 
is the ability to seek merits review of the recommendations of the Western 
Australian Environmental Protection Authority.)  
• A decision that is procedural and does not have any substantive effect will 
generally not be reviewable. For example, the Australian Government (2011) 
rejected the Hawke Review’s (2009) recommendation that the assessment 
approach and controlled action decisions under the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (EPBC Act) be merits reviewable 
on the basis that these decisions are preliminary ‘filtering’ decisions, and 
allowing merits review would slow down the process unnecessarily. (Internal 
reconsideration of the controlled action decision can still be sought.)  
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• Not all preliminary decisions will fall into the above categories, particularly 
where the judicial review legislation allows for review of both ‘decisions’ and 
‘conduct’. To remove doubt, legislation might explicitly exclude review of 
decisions other than the approval decision (for example, the Victorian Major 
Transport Projects Facilitation Act 2009). 
The approval decision is the most important in the DAA process. Such decisions are 
usually reviewable, although review rights vary between jurisdictions (table 9.1).  
Costs and benefits of review 
An effective review process needs to be designed in the context of the entire DAA 
system and consider the costs and benefits of review. In practice this is difficult and, 
not surprisingly, there are divergent views on how well existing review processes in 
Australian jurisdictions promote transparency and accountability of major project 
decision making.  
Potential for costs and delay 
Submissions to this study and past reviews of DAA processes have noted that 
review processes can delay and add to the implementation cost of projects and that 
very few challenges result in projects being refused (for example, King & Wood 
Mallesons, sub. 39; NSW Minerals Council, sub. 23; Queensland Resources 
Council, sub. 19).  
The NSW Minerals Council (2013a, p. 8) has argued that ‘appeals cause very long 
delays, frequently of more than 12 months’. Examples from study participants of 
where court challenges have extended the time for an approval being granted 
mainly focus on coal mine cases in New South Wales and Queensland (NSW 
Minerals Council sub. DR93, 2013a; Xstrata Coal sub. 50) (figure 9.1). Little or no 
evidence from other jurisdictions was provided. 
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Table 9.1 Review rights for key major project primary approval decisions  
Jurisdiction Decision maker Proponent review 
rights 
Third party 
review rights 
Standing for third 
parties 
New South 
Wales 
    
State significant 
development 
Planning 
Assessment 
Commission or 
Department 
Merits and judicial 
review (common 
law)b 
Merits and 
judicial review 
(common law) 
Objectors (merits)c  
Any person (judicial) 
State significant 
infrastructure 
Minister, 
Planning 
Assessment 
Commission or 
Department 
Judicial review 
(common law) 
Judicial review 
(common law) 
Any person (judicial) 
Critical state 
significant 
infrastructure 
Minister for 
Planning 
Judicial review 
(common law) 
Judicial review 
(common law) 
Common law judicial 
reviewd 
Victoria     
Planning permits Responsible 
authority 
Merits and judicial 
review 
Merits and 
judicial review 
 Objectors, but 
affected persons 
may seek leave 
(merits) 
Person affected 
(judicial) 
Ministerial call-in Minister for 
Planning 
Judicial review  Judicial review  Person affected 
(judicial) 
Major transport 
projects  
Minister for 
Planning 
Judicial reviewe Judicial reviewe Person affected 
(judicial)  
Queensland     
Coordinated 
projects 
Department for 
Environment and 
Heritage 
Protectionf 
Merits and judicial 
review (but 
excluded for some 
parts of the 
decision)f 
Merits and 
judicial review 
(but excluded for 
some parts of the 
decision)f  
Objectors (merits) 
Person aggrieved 
(judicial, but 
excluded for some 
parts of the 
decision)f 
Priority 
Development 
Minister for 
Economic 
Development 
Merits review 
(conditions only), 
judicial review 
Judicial review Person aggrieved 
South Australia     
Major 
developments or 
projects 
Governor, or 
delegate 
Excluded by 
statuteg 
Excluded by 
statuteg 
..o 
Crown 
Development 
Minister Judicial review 
(common law)i 
Judicial review 
(common law)h 
Common law 
standingb 
 (Continued next page) 
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Table 9.1 (continued) 
Jurisdiction Decision maker Proponent review 
rights 
Third party 
review rights 
Standing for 
third parties 
Western Australia     
Development 
assessment panel 
decisions 
Development 
Assessment 
Panel 
Meritsiand judicial 
review (common 
law) 
Judicial review 
(common law)j 
Common law 
standingb 
Tasmania     
Projects of state 
significance 
Minister and both 
Houses of 
Parliament 
Excluded by 
statutek 
Excluded by 
statutek 
..o 
Projects of regional 
significance 
Development 
assessment 
panels 
Judicial review Judicial review Person 
aggrieved 
Major infrastructure 
projects 
Combined 
planning authority 
Merits and judicial 
review 
Merits and 
judicial review 
Objectors 
(merits) 
Person 
aggrieved 
(judicial) 
Northern Territory     
Ordinary development  Development 
Consent 
Authority 
Merits and judicial 
review (common 
law) 
Judicial review 
(common law)l 
Common law 
standingb 
Significant 
developments 
Minister for 
Planning  
Judicial review 
(common law) 
Judicial review 
(common law) 
Common law 
standingb 
ACT     
Ministerial call-in  Minister for 
Planning 
Judicial review Judicial review Person 
aggrieved 
Ordinary development Environment and 
Sustainable 
Development 
Directorate  
Meritsm and 
judicial review 
Meritsm and 
judicial review 
Objector plus 
material 
detrimentn 
Commonwealth     
EPBC Act Minister for the 
Environment 
Judicial review Judicial review Person 
aggrieved 
(engaged in 
conservation 
activities)a 
a Persons who could be directly affected or persons or organisations who have been engaged in conservation 
activities in the preceding two years. b Standing for common law judicial review varies between remedies 
sought. c Only for state significant development that would have been designated development had it not 
been declared. d Only mandatory requirement is to make EIS public. e Only approval decisions reviewable, 
restrictions on orders that can be sought. f Decisions and conduct of the Coordinator-General are excluded 
from review. g Section 48E likely to exclude common law judicial review. h Section 49(17) may not exclude 
common law judicial review: Hockey v Yelland (1984). i Minister can call-in the review. j If third party has a 
sufficient interest, may submit to an existing review process, or seek leave to intervene in the public interest. 
k Judicial review excluded. l Third party appeals only permitted for development near residential zones. 
m Internal reconsideration also allowed for certain approvals. n Person who made a representation and may 
suffer material detriment. o .. not applicable. 
Source: Based on appendix C. 
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Figure 9.1 Time between approval being granted and court challenge 
being determineda 
Selected projects, New South Wales and Queenslandb 
 
a Timeframes are calculated as the time elapsed between the approval decision being granted and the most 
recent appeal being determined (where that has occurred). For proceedings which are ongoing or the 
judgment has not been handed down (Warkworth, Berrima, Ashton, Wandoan and Alpha), the end date is 
taken to be 13 November 2013. Time indicated on graph does not necessarily reflect continuous court action 
— it may reflect multiple actions. b Indicative data set. Wandoan Coal project includes objections on mining 
lease (December 2011 to March 2012), compensation claim (July 2012 to June 2013), and judicial review 
application (commenced November 2012 and is ongoing). 
Sources: Commission analysis of data provided by Xstrata Coal, sub. 50; EDO NSW (2013). 
There are, as well, concerns that appeals may be used to undermine the DAA 
process and reduce confidence in the system. The NSW Minerals Council noted that 
third party merit appeals add delay, cost and risk to the development assessment 
process, and have rarely been successful against mining projects in New South 
Wales: 
Merit appeal causes crippling delay and uncertainty for major projects. A proponent of 
a major mining project may have expended hundreds of millions of dollars on the 
acquisition of an exploration licence, its exploration program, a mine design, and 
environmental assessment, and then face the risk of being exposed to the cost, delay 
and uncertainty of third party merit appeal. (sub. DR93, p. 7) 
However, other participants have emphasised that care is needed to avoid attributing 
‘unnecessary delays’ to court challenges:  
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 … the proponent of [Alpha Coal] has added years to the timeline for its development 
due to its failure to meet the basic standards very clearly laid out for its assessment … 
to blame the Alpha mine ‘delay’ on the assessment process, or the community members 
that advocate against the clearing of 7000 hectares of habitat for a threatened bird 
species is, frankly, perverse. For the proponent to push the system … to the point where 
an approval is issued without adequate threatened species surveys being undertaken, 
and a condition imposed to do them once the habitat in question in already condemned 
is … symptomatic of the problems with the major projects assessment process. (Lock 
the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97, pp. 11–12) 
Similarly: 
The … wording [of the Commission’s draft report] suggest that delays only impose 
costs on projects which are desirable. In fact they impose significant costs on 
communities and other stakeholders when the projects turn out to be undesirable. Of 
the seven projects in figure 9.1, three of them have at some stage in the DAA process, 
been found to be unwarranted, Warkworth and Berrima (hardly a ‘major’ project) by 
the Land and Environment Court, and Ashton SEOC by a Planning and Assessment 
Commission. Considerable costs have been incurred by these communities to ensure 
the rejection of potentially undesirable projects. (Economists at Large and The 
Australia Institute, sub. DR83, p. 6) 
Further, the Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices (ANEDO) 
suggests that, from what limited data are available, the majority of development 
appeals are brought by proponents (sub. DR92). Further, the number of cases 
brought, at least under the EPBC Act, appears to be low: 
 … there is little litigation initiated under the [EPBC] Act — either by third parties, 
proponents of actions, or permit applications. In approximately eight years since the 
Act commenced, there have been just eight applications to courts for injunctions, 21 
applications for judicial review of decisions, and 12 applications for merits review of 
decisions. When it is considered that this is Australia’s main national environmental 
legislation … this appears to be an extremely low level of litigation. (Senate Standing 
Committee on Environment, Communications and the Arts 2009, p. 82) 
Accountability and participatory democracy 
The benefits of major project DAA review processes have also been emphasised — 
for example, improved decision making, accountability, and exposure of poor 
decisions: 
Citizens and businesses that are subject to the decisions of public authorities should 
have ready access to systems for challenging the exercise of that authority … reviews 
can act as an accountability mechanism and can improve the quality of the regulator’s 
decision making and internal review processes. (OECD 2013b, p. 52)  
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Similarly: 
It is important that development assessment and approval processes incorporate robust 
checks and balances to ensure that decisions are lawful, impartial and based on best 
practice planning principles; and that laws are properly enforced. There are 
well-documented benefits of having court-based review rights in planning systems. 
(Nature Conservation Council of NSW, sub. 22, p. 5) 
Further: 
Third party appeal rights have the potential to deter corrupt approaches by minimising 
the chance that any favouritism sought will succeed. The absence of third party appeals 
creates an opportunity for corrupt conduct to occur, as an important disincentive for 
corrupt decision making is absent from the planning system. (ICAC (NSW) 2012, 
p. 22) 
ANEDO argued that review rights ‘are a fundamental access to justice issue’, and: 
… third party appeals often raise significant public interest matters, clarify what the 
law means in practice, and provides essential access to justice for communities, 
provides an important check on executive power, and in doing so, reduces the risk of 
corruption. … these benefits accrue despite the fact that third party appeals rarely 
overturn major project approvals. … merit appeals by local communities often result in 
better and clearer conditions, rather than a refusal. (sub. 14, p. 49) 
Overall, while certain views contend that third party appeal rights create ‘uncertainty’, 
ANEDO is strongly of the view that such rights promote access to justice, expose poor 
procedures that may otherwise go undetected, and encourage better and more 
accountable decision making. (sub. DR92, p. 38) 
Third party appeal rights can also foster participatory democracy, by allowing 
members of the public to influence the outcomes of issues that affect them. For 
example, Millner comments:  
… an essential part of attaining social justice is enabling the members of the 
community who will be adversely affected by these [environmental] impacts to 
participate in, influence, and have rights of review in relation to the making of 
environmental laws, decisions about land use, and development and enforcement of 
environmental laws. (2011, p. 190) 
The Department of Communities and Local Government in the United Kingdom 
argues that allowing proponent appeals results in better decision making: 
The main impact of the reinstatement of appeal rights where local authorities fail to 
validate planning applications is considered to be behavioural. The threat of challenge, 
via a potential appeal against non-determination, is considered likely to result in a 
positive influence on the behaviour of local authorities. (2013c, p. 27) 
In summary, while abuse of review processes, by both proponents and opponents of 
major developments arises on occasion, overall there is broadly no evidence that the 
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system is performing badly. Nonetheless, the Commission believes that there is 
scope to improve review procedures and access to review. Changes to review 
processes need to be considered in the context of the entire DAA system and take 
into account their costs and benefits.  
9.2 What review rights should proponents and third 
parties have? 
Designing effective review processes requires a balance to be struck between 
competing interests. Review can increase the accountability and integrity of the 
decision-making process and contribute to participatory democracy, but can also 
increase costs, delays, and uncertainty about the project. The review rights in each 
jurisdiction determine how easy it is to bring a review application, and hence how 
frequently they are brought (PC 2011c). 
Major project primary approval decisions require the decision maker to balance 
environmental, heritage, social and economic values. Chapter 7 recommends that 
Ministers — who are accountable to constituents in a way that unelected officials 
are not — are the most appropriate officials to make these values-based decisions. 
Given this, the question becomes whether it is appropriate for merits review 
tribunals — who are not accountable to constituents — to reconsider the decisions 
of a Minister, or whether this risks creating a duplicate approvals process. 
The Administrative Review Council (ARC) (1994, 1999) considered that, as a 
general rule, policy decisions of a high political content made by a Minister, 
including environmental decisions that involve major political controversies, should 
not be merits reviewable. Similarly, a range of literature has noted that courts and 
tribunals are better suited to adjudicating between competing individual rights 
rather than decisions dealing with many different public rights and interests (such as 
major project primary approval decisions). For example, Edgar argued: 
The cases suggest that environmental decisions have ‘political’ characteristics which 
indicate that a restrained approach to judicial review is appropriate. … Moreover, the 
final decision is generally made by the Minister for the Environment, a politician, and 
this is likely to be recognised as meaning that the public interest assessments are 
primarily a matter of political responsibility. (2011, pp. 460–1) 
It is for this reason that approval decisions under the EPBC Act are subject to 
judicial, not merits review.  
A small number of the [EPBC Act] … decisions require careful balancing of competing 
interests and judgments. The Government considers that where these decisions are 
sufficiently important to be taken by the Minister as an elected representative, those 
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judgment calls should not be able to be overturned by an unelected tribunal (DEH 
(Cwlth) 2006) 
The UK Government’s reforms (under the Localism Act 2011) reached a similar 
conclusion (appendix D). 
Divergent views on appropriate review rights 
A number of participants favoured restricted review rights, although suggested 
models varied. The Queensland Resources Council preferred judicial review, 
irrespective of the decision maker, in order to discourage actions ‘which seem more 
motivated by the opportunity to delay and frustrate major fossil fuel projects than … 
with debating the merits of a project’ (sub. 19, p. 6). Similarly, the Australian 
Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA) (sub. DR105) 
supported judicial, but not merits review, for major project decisions. By contrast, 
the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (sub. DR70) opposed review 
altogether because even judicial review can allow ministerial decisions to be 
challenged.  
The NSW Minerals Council adopted a different approach:  
Merit appeals by third parties should only be necessary and provided for by the 
legislation where the Minister makes a decision in conflict with the recommendations 
of an independent panel, or where an independent panel has not reviewed the project … 
Merit appeal … should only be available where there is a high risk that the decision 
does not have merit and the decision should be considered afresh. (sub. DR93, p. 8) 
Other stakeholders supported broader review rights and in particular, a greater role 
for merits review. ANEDO: 
… strongly supports equitable third party merits review and judicial review rights for 
major projects – including where the Minister is the decision maker. … ANEDO 
submits that judicial review and enforcement rights [for major infrastructure projects] 
are a fundamentally important accountability measure. (sub. DR92, p. 7) 
Advocates of merits review considered that it is critical to provide a mechanism to 
remedy flawed decisions. ANEDO (sub. DR92) noted one of the key benefits of 
community rights to court-based merits review (as shown by many public interest 
cases) is that it allows poorly defined or inadequate conditions to be rectified. For 
example: 
Ministers and agencies are equally capable of erring in the merit of their decisions, and 
the complexity of impacts associated with many major coal and unconventional gas 
projects requires merits review avenues, including through third party appeal, to ensure 
that the system is robust and capable of retaining the confidence of the community at 
large. (Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97, p. 7) 
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Similarly, the East End Mine Action Group noted that the absence of merits review 
means third parties are unable to challenge conditions in the courts and the scientific 
evidence they are based on (sub. 38). 
The Commission’s view 
Ministerial decisions 
Chapter 7 sets out the Commission’s recommendation that primary major project 
approval decisions should be made by Ministers. Ministers are accountable to 
Parliament and the public in a way that an independent body is not. Allowing merits 
review of ministerial primary approval decisions would allow the decisions of an 
elected official to be challenged by an unelected body, potentially undermining 
parliamentary accountability. (The same argument applies to decisions that have 
been ratified by Parliament.) However, ensuring the legality of, and public 
confidence in, the decision-making process is important and hence judicial review 
should be allowed. This is consistent with most existing review rights for primary 
approval decisions in major project DAA pathways where a Minister is the decision 
maker (table 9.1). 
Further, the Commission does not consider that proponents and third parties should 
have different review rights. The same considerations apply regardless of who is 
bringing the review application — that is, unelected merits review tribunals should 
not be allowed to challenge major project primary approval decisions of the 
Minister, even where a proponent is bringing the review application.  
Correction of perverse ministerial decisions 
One disadvantage of only allowing judicial review is that it prevents proponents and 
third parties from challenging perverse ministerial decisions (Willey 2005). This 
concern was raised by ANEDO (sub. DR93) and Lock the Gate Alliance 
(sub. DR97), who argued Ministers are as likely to make poor decisions as 
independent decision makers, making limited merits review more appropriate. 
Limited merits review is argued to be preferable as it can allow the reconsideration 
of perverse decisions while preserving the integrity of the Minister’s 
decision-making role (for example, by requiring the merits review body to remit the 
matter back to the original decision maker) (Brown, Stern and Tenenbaum 2006).  
Another limitation of judicial review is its inability to remedy an inadequate 
assessment — Prineas v Forestry Commission of NSW (1984) 49 LGRA 402 
established that, as long as the environmental impact assessment is not superficial, 
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subjective or noninformative, it will not be invalid merely by failure to cover certain 
issues. There is also generally no obligation on the decision maker to make inquiries 
or request further information, unless it is obvious that material is readily available 
which is centrally relevant to the decision (Prasad v Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs (1985) 159 CLR 550).  
Although Wednesbury unreasonableness (a ground for judicial review that ‘no 
reasonable decision maker could ever have made the decision’), can help correct the 
most egregious decisions, courts have been reluctant to let Wednesbury arguments 
succeed to avoid potentially trespassing into the realms of merits review 
(Weeks 2007, 2008). Thus, despite a recent High Court case which suggested a 
modification of the Wednesbury test, findings of Wednesbury are likely to remain 
rare (box 9.4).  
 
Box 9.4 Judicial deference and Wednesbury unreasonableness 
In considering Wednesbury, judges tend to defer to the original decision maker.  
In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, the High Court found that it was 
Wednesbury unreasonable for the Migration Review Tribunal to deny Li’s visa 
application because Li could not demonstrate a skills assessment. The Tribunal knew 
the skills assessment was being reviewed and the review’s outcome was likely to be 
favourable.  
• Importantly, the High Court in Li suggested a modified test for Wednesbury that 
incorporates illogicality. This test has been used in subsequent cases. 
However, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li has not been used to broaden 
Wednesbury — Justice Gaegler in Li emphasised it should be rarely used. This has 
been applied in subsequent cases. 
• For example, in Tarkine National Coalition v Minister for SEWPAC (Shree Minerals), 
the Federal Court emphasised Justice Gaegler’s view that it was inappropriate for 
the Court to use Wednesbury to look at the merits of the Minister’s broad power to 
impose certain conditions (a condition that money be paid into a fund when a 
Tasmanian Devil was killed, despite the Act’s objective of protecting the Tasmanian 
Devil). 
Sources: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; Sibley (2013); Tarkine National 
Coalition v Minister for SEWPAC (Shree Minerals) [2013] FCA 694.  
 
On the one hand, it is not desirable for perverse ministerial decisions to remain in 
force. On the other hand, it is generally desirable to preserve the integrity of 
decisions made by elected representatives. The tension between these competing 
considerations is ‘one of the most contentious and problematic areas of 
administrative law’ (Blackwell 2003, p. 182).  
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Considerations of preserving the integrity of ministerial decisions would seem to 
indicate that a limited form of review, such as judicial review, is the most 
appropriate for primary major project approval decisions. The Commission notes 
that most jurisdictions already have judicial review of major project approval 
decisions made by Ministers. Further, Wednesbury provides an important safeguard 
on the exercise of ministerial decision-making power. 
However, the Commission considers the scope of the Wednesbury test to be an 
important issue. The ARC (2012) recently released a report on federal judicial 
review which concluded that the grounds for judicial review in the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cwlth) should not be expanded. However, 
this ARC report was before the High Court decision in Minister for Immigration 
and Citizenship v Li. Given recent case law developments, there is scope for the 
ARC to do further work in this area. In the meantime, States and Territories could, 
at a minimum, include a judicial review ground equivalent to improper exercise of 
power (as per the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act) in the relevant 
legislation. (This would encompass Wednesbury.) 
In addition, ensuring the assessment is adequate can safeguard against perverse 
ministerial decisions. This can be achieved by explicitly requiring the decision 
maker to be satisfied that the information contained in the assessment report was 
sufficient to make an informed decision.  
Non-ministerial decisions 
In practice, there are many primary and non-primary decisions in the major project 
DAA process that are not made by Ministers: 
• Delegates: Although the Commission considers it is preferable that Ministers do 
not delegate major project primary approval decisions, delegation might occur 
because there is a tension between elected representatives making delicate 
balancing decisions themselves, and the efficient use of Ministerial time.  
– However, where a person makes a decision (either by statute or under a 
delegation) and a Minister can review and replace that decision (for example, 
the ability to seek ministerial reconsideration of a delegate’s decision), then 
judicial review of the decision is appropriate as the aggrieved person has the 
option, in effect, to have the decision made by the Minister. 
• Independent bodies: Parliament might decide that some major project primary 
approval decisions should be made by independent bodies — for example, New 
South Wales has moved towards this model by requiring the Minister for 
Planning to delegate approval authority for particular state significant 
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development and state significant infrastructure projects to the Planning 
Assessment Commission. 
• Deemed decisions of the assessment manager where a Minister fails to make a 
decision: Chapter 7 recommends that if the relevant Minister does not make a 
decision within a designated statutory time period, then the recommendations of 
the assessment body should be deemed to be decisions of the Minister. 
The argument for limiting review rights to judicial review does not apply when the 
decision is made by a delegate (and the decision is not able to be reconsidered), or 
made by an independent body or an assessment manager, since these bodies are not 
elected officials and are not accountable to Parliament in a way that a Minister is. 
Thus, there is no in-principle reason why another independent body (such as a 
tribunal or court) should not be able to review these decisions through limited 
merits review (box 9.5). Limited merits review (along with judicial review) is a 
desirable way of holding decision makers to account. Allowing limited merits 
review for deemed decisions would also strengthen the incentive for Ministers to 
make decisions within the required time. 
However, not all decisions made by delegates, independent bodies or assessment 
managers should be subject to limited merits review. As discussed earlier, some 
preliminary decisions are procedural in nature and do not have any substantive 
effect, and thus should not be subject to review (ARC 1999). There is also the risk 
that making multiple preliminary decisions reviewable leads to overlapping review 
rights — for example, review of both the controlled action and the assessment 
approach decisions could lead to the same issue being reviewed twice 
(Hawke 2009).  
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Box 9.5 The Commission’s preferred limited merits review model 
The Commission considers it is preferable that merits review be limited for major 
project primary approval decisions not made by Ministers. Limited merits review 
emphasises the primacy of the assessment and approval process. It allows the review 
body to provide an accountability mechanism (where parliamentary accountability does 
not operate), and, by limiting the role of the merits review body, ensures that the 
decision maker’s role is not supplanted. 
While there is no single form of limited merits review, the Commission considers, as a 
general rule, the review should be limited to the material that was available to the 
original decision maker. The only additional material that should be allowed to be 
introduced (and only by leave of the review body) should be material that could not 
have been reasonably available to the original decision maker and if it had been, there 
would be a significant prospect of a different decision. This would encourage 
participation in the public consultation process and give the decision maker an 
opportunity to consider issues of importance before they are raised on review.  
The East End Mine Action Group (sub. DR68) expressed concern that prohibiting 
evidence that was not raised at the public consultation stage from being raised on 
review would unduly disadvantage inexperienced participants and prevent issues from 
being raised on review that only emerged after the project was operational. The 
formulation of ‘could not have been reasonably available’ takes this into account, 
allowing matters that arose subsequent to the consultation process to be brought 
before the merits review body. 
Jurisdictions should also consider whether or not it is appropriate for more complex 
decisions to be remitted back to the original decision maker.  
 
In summary, the Commission favours judicial review of decisions personally made 
by a Minister (or ratified by Parliament), as it strikes an appropriate balance 
between accountability and timeliness. Limited merits review is appropriate for 
major project primary approval decisions not personally made by Ministers. 
However, where jurisdictions do not have judicial review statutes (New South 
Wales, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory), or where 
statutory judicial review is excluded, applicants have to rely on common law 
judicial review. Common law judicial review has complex procedural requirements 
and varying standing provisions, which can be difficult for applicants to navigate 
(although some jurisdictions have made procedural reforms to address this).  
Jurisdictions that do not have judicial review legislation (and have not made 
procedural reforms) should harmonise standing requirements and simplify 
procedural requirements to facilitate access to judicial review for major project 
DAA primary approval decisions. This will facilitate the operation of judicial 
review as a ‘safety valve’ in the system and ensure equal access to justice across 
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jurisdictions. The Commission also considers there are benefits to including the 
grounds for judicial review of major project DAA decisions in legislation. 
Finally, consideration should be given to using less formal review bodies such as 
tribunals, as this can help reduce costs and delays for parties to review applications. 
While the Commonwealth Constitution requires judicial review to be conducted by 
courts, similar prohibitions do not apply at the state level. Thus, State and Territory 
Governments should consider less formal review mechanisms in place of judicial 
review by courts. However, jurisdictions should ensure review bodies (particularly 
generalist tribunals) have the capacity, resources and expertise to review 
environmental decisions effectively and efficiently. 
RECOMMENDATION 9.1 
Judicial review is appropriate for major project primary approval decisions where 
a Minister is the decision maker. For decisions not made by a Minister, including 
those that are deemed because a Minister has not made a decision, limited merits 
review is appropriate (along with judicial review). Jurisdictions that do not have 
statutory judicial review for these decisions should provide for it in legislation. 
Other factors that might influence review rights 
Strategic approaches 
Some respondents considered that, where strategic processes have been conducted 
(chapter 11), the review rights available under subsequent project-specific DAA 
processes should be truncated. For example, the Business Council of Australia 
argued:  
If the system is working well then we do not see the case for extending third party 
appeals. Where there is good practice strategic planning, compliance with planning 
codes and high quality project assessment processes then we do not see where there are 
grounds for contesting the permissibility of a project. (sub. DR102, p. 5). 
Other participants, however, opposed any limitation of appeal rights. For example, 
ANEDO said: 
Reducing or limiting third party appeal rights reduces the incentive for proponents to 
address communities’ legitimate concerns, because the proponent is confident that their 
project approval is beyond challenge. … The absence of such rights would significantly 
reduce oversight and quality assurance … (sub. DR92, pp. 38−9) 
Review rights have been curtailed for certain developments in South Australia 
where strategic processes have been undertaken (box 9.6), and proposed reforms in 
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New South Wales include similar arrangements for public priority infrastructure 
(appendix C). 
 
Box 9.6 Wind farms in South Australia 
South Australia adopted the Statewide Wind Farm Development Plan Amendment 
which explicitly envisages wind farms in certain sparsely populated rural zones in the 
State. In these zones, third parties will not have notification, comment and appeal 
rights for wind farm developments. However, there will be third party notification, 
comment and appeal rights where there is a proposal to install a turbine within two 
kilometres of dwellings, tourist accommodation, or zones that could be adversely 
affected such as airfield, residential, settlement and township zones. 
The Development Plan Amendment also requires wind farms to comply with a number 
of conditions, including avoiding or minimising: excessive noise; interference with 
television and radio signals; striking of birds or bats; and shadowing, flickering, 
reflection or glint. 
Source: RenewablesSA (2012).  
 
The Commission does not consider that the undertaking of strategic processes 
should affect the availability of merits and judicial review at the project-specific 
stage. As noted earlier, access to merits review should depend on whether or not the 
development approval decision was made by a Minister. Whether or not this 
decision is made in the context of a completed strategic assessment does not change 
this principle. That said, where merits review is available at the project-specific 
stage, it is important that these processes are not used to reopen earlier decisions 
taken at the strategic level, and only deal with project-level issues.  
Moreover, judicial review focuses on the legality of the decision-making process. It 
is appropriate that judicial review is available for strategic and project-specific 
decisions. The undertaking of a strategic process should not diminish or otherwise 
affect judicial review rights for project-specific DAA decisions.  
Project-specific public consultation 
A further question raised by study participants is whether ‘early’ public consultation 
on proposed major projects (chapter 5) in the project-specific process should curtail 
review rights. 
Early consultation as part of the project approval process can help alleviate 
stakeholder concerns about adverse project impacts. However, there are limitations 
to the effectiveness of public consultation processes: 
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• Reliance on submissions might not give a representative picture of the 
community’s view on a particular project, as certain interest groups might be 
over or under-represented in the process.  
• The period for consultation on the environmental impact assessment may not 
give participants sufficient time to respond to a very lengthy document. (There 
are explicit measures in the United Kingdom to guard against this risk — 
box 9.7.) 
• There can be significant delays between granting the approval and the 
operationalisation of the project, which means issues can arise subsequent to the 
consultation process that were not able to be raised at that stage. 
While the Commission has proposed various measures to improve the effectiveness 
of public consultation (chapter 5), these reforms will not be sufficient to overcome 
the inherent limitations of consultation processes. In this context, and taking into 
account the important role of merits review in holding unelected decision makers to 
account, the Commission does not consider that review rights for project approval 
decisions should be reduced or otherwise impacted by the undertaking of early 
consultation. 
 
Box 9.7 Consultation and review rights for major projects in the United 
Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, substantial consultation is conducted at the strategic planning 
and pre-application stages for nationally significant infrastructure projects. There are a 
number of requirements for this consultation. 
• The European Union Directive on Strategic Environmental Assessment requires that 
the public are to be consulted during the strategic assessment process and that 
adequate time for consultation is allowed. 
• The European Union Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment requires public 
participation to be ‘fostered’, particularly participation of non-governmental 
organisations promoting environmental protection. 
• A proponent is required to prove the adequacy of pre-application consultation before 
an application can be submitted (appendix D). 
After the consultation is conducted, only those directly impacted by the project can 
object. All others can only object at the stage when the Statutory Policy Plan is being 
developed and open for consultation. 
Judicial review of the process and the approval decision is available in the High Court. 
(In the United Kingdom, Wednesbury is more expansive than in Australia). 
Sources: ARC (2012); Barclay (2011); Department for Communities and Local Government (2013c); 
European Union (2001, 2012).   
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9.3 Standing: who should be able to bring a review 
application? 
Those persons allowed to bring a judicial or merits review application are said to 
have ‘standing’. Standing varies between jurisdictions, and depends on the relevant 
legislation and (particularly for common law judicial review) what remedy is being 
sought. Generally, a person cannot bring a judicial review application unless they 
have a ‘special interest’ in the matter (box 9.8). 
 
Box 9.8 Who will have standing? 
Generally, a person is required to have a ‘special interest’ to be granted standing — 
this needs to be more than a ‘merely intellectual or emotional concern’ (ACF v 
Commonwealth 1980). For example: 
• an organisation will not demonstrate a special interest in the environment by simply 
formulating objects that demonstrate a commitment to preserving the environment. 
However, ‘peak’ regional conservation groups that are government funded and 
invited by the government to participate in advisory committees have standing 
(North Coast Environment Council Inc v Minister for Resources 1994) 
• the mere fact that a plaintiff is a local property holder is insufficient. What is required 
is an impact on the property. For example, in ACF v Minister for Resources (No. 2), 
the applicant owned a property near a State Forest that was proposed to be logged. 
The Court held that having an objection to logging and its aftermath was not 
sufficient to grant the applicant standing. The objections needed to be concerned 
with the effect of logging on the applicant’s property. In the absence of this, the 
applicant’s interest was no more than an ordinary member of the community. 
Canada has extended the ‘directly affected’ test to persons who could potentially be 
affected by the project, for example, people who live in an area (6 kilometres downwind 
of an oil and gas well) where outdoor pollutant concentrations may result in 
life-threatening or serious and possibly irreversible health effects (depending on which 
way the wind was blowing). The applicants were granted standing even though no gas 
had actually escaped (Kelly v Alberta 2009). 
The United Kingdom has taken a broader approach to standing for judicial review (for 
the writs of prohibition and certiorari). Provided the person is not a ‘mere busybody’, 
any member of the public whose interests are affected have standing in the case of a 
flagrant and serious breach of the law by a government authority which is continuing 
unchecked (R v Greater London Council; Ex parte Blackburn). 
Sources: Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; Australian 
Conservation Foundation v Minister for Resources (1989) 76 LGRA 200; Day v Pinglen (1981) 148 CLR 
289; Kelly v Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board) (2009) ABCA 349; North Coast Environment 
Council Inc v Minister for Resources (1994) 55 FCR 492; Preston (2006); R v Greater London Council; Ex 
parte Blackburn [1976] 3 All ER 184.  
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The standing rules can create uncertainty, particularly for environmental groups: 
Environmental groups have difficulty with the private rights and interests model [of 
standing] since their concerns are largely outside of its parameters. The interests that 
they seek to advance are commonly referred to as public interests. Their objectives in 
bringing litigation — such as to prevent environmental impacts, raise issues for 
legislative attention and improve decision-making processes — reflect public rather 
than private concerns, such as protecting property and financial interests. (Edgar 2011, 
p. 448) 
Determining appropriate standing rights requires a balance to be struck between 
allowing those who have a legitimate interest in the decision to bring an application, 
while discouraging undesirable and vexatious reviews and appeals. As noted earlier, 
proponents are usually given standing, but standing for third parties (particularly 
representative organisations) can be more limited (table 9.1). 
Participants’ contrasting views on standing rights 
A number of arguments supporting broad standing were put forward by participants:  
• Regardless of who the decision maker is, there is a general public interest in 
ensuring decision makers lawfully comply with procedures. Open standing for 
judicial review provides public confidence that the laws will be adhered to 
(ANEDO, sub. DR92; Nature Conservation Council of NSW, sub. DR94). 
• Broad third party standing for merits review is supported, irrespective of whether 
or not the decision is made by the Minister. There are important benefits from 
third party appeal rights (Nature Conservation Council of NSW, sub. DR94). 
• Standing limitations mean that scarce community resources must be first spent to 
demonstrate standing before proceeding to the issue of whether the law has been 
breached. Open standing ensures that limited resources are directed to arguing 
substantive issues (ANEDO, sub. DR92; Nature Conservation Council of NSW, 
sub. DR94). 
• There could be circumstances where groups and individuals not meeting the 
standing criteria should still be allowed to seek review. Standing should be 
granted to any community group whose objects and missions accord with the 
matter of public interest at stake in the project (Lock the Gate Alliance, 
sub. DR97). 
• Standing is about deciding whose benefits and costs count. Whether the net 
benefits of a project are positive or negative often depends on how narrow or 
broad this scope is. Proponents of projects tend to overstate the benefits and 
understate the social costs (Economists at Large, sub. 14). 
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Although other participants (such as AGL, sub. DR96 and APPEA, sub. DR105) 
supported standing for proponents and those directly affected by the decision, they 
pointed to the potential costs of broadening standing to allow third parties to bring a 
review application. Other points raised by these participants included: 
• Extending standing to third parties could be ‘extremely dangerous’ (Queensland 
Gas Company, sub. DR79, p. 2), ‘costly and counterproductive’ 
(BCA, sub. DR102, p. 2), and risks substantially raising costs and project 
approval timeframes for proponents, with consequent flow on effects on project 
development and investor confidence (AGL Energy, sub. DR96). 
• In particular, many participants opposed extending standing to those who had a 
substantive interest in the assessment process (BCA, sub. DR102; 
Origin Energy, sub. DR100), arguing this could potentially enable vexatious 
appeals by those who are not directly impacted by the approval decision (AGL 
Energy, sub. DR96), and this test would not effectively constrain the standing of 
people to initiate review (Queensland Gas Company, sub. DR79; Origin Energy, 
sub. DR100). APPEA (sub. DR105) noted that what constitutes a ‘substantive 
interest’ should be carefully considered to ensure that review processes cannot 
be hijacked by vexatious claims.  
• AGL Energy supported allowing the court to grant leave to persons other than 
those directly affected by the decision if not doing so would amount to a denial 
of natural justice. ‘This protection would avoid a miscarriage of justice in 
situations where a person whose interests are not directly impacted by an 
approval decision has legitimate grounds for review or appeal’ (sub. DR96, p. 3). 
However, the Queensland Gas Company (sub. DR79) criticised this test for 
being vague and open to interpretation by courts. 
Striking a balance on standing rights 
Standing is a fundamental access to justice issue, because it allows parties with an 
interest in proceedings to access the court while preventing court resources being 
occupied by parties with no interest in the outcome of a dispute (ARC 2012).  
In general, standing provisions for major project review applications are limited for 
third parties, although a number of reviews have recommended nearly open 
standing in order to allow third party judicial review applications which are brought 
in the public interest (box 9.9). 
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Box 9.9 Recommendations on standing from previous reviews 
• The Australian Law Reform Commission (1985, 1996) supported open standing to 
commence litigation to sue for public remedies, subject to the suitability of the 
litigant to represent the interests of a section of the public, and considerations as to 
whether the proceedings would unreasonably interfere with the ability of a person 
having a private interest in the matter to deal with it differently or not at all. 
• The Queensland Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (1990) also 
supported liberalised standing rules for judicial review, but proposed a number of 
criteria be used to determine whether or not a party who claims to be representative 
is suitable to represent those interests. 
• The Administrative Review Council (2012) recommended that the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal standing rules (giving standing to organisations where the decision 
relates to a matter included in the objects of the organisation, unless the 
organisation was formed after the decision was made) be used for Commonwealth 
judicial review.  
• The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia (2002) supported judicial review 
standing for those who were directly affected by the decision, but providing for leave 
to be granted if the proceedings were in the public interest.  
 
The Commission considers there is a public interest in allowing third parties to 
bring judicial review applications, as it allows the legality of the process to be 
enforced, providing an important ‘safety valve’ in the system. This suggests the 
need for broad standing provisions, but completely open standing is not appropriate 
— having some restrictions on standing provides a means for managing 
unmeritorious review applications (ARC 2012). (Courts also have the inherent 
ability to strike out vexatious claims — this is discussed later.) 
Proponents have an interest in major project DAA decisions and should be given 
standing, but persons other than proponents should also be able to seek review. In 
accordance with the findings of the New South Wales Independent Review Panel 
(2012), it is important to give standing to those who are, or could potentially be, 
directly affected by the project, such as neighbouring landowners. This is consistent 
with the existing standing provisions in most jurisdictions.  
However, the effects of major projects can be felt beyond neighbouring landowners 
(chapter 3), which implies that broader standing is warranted. For example, limiting 
standing to those who have a ‘special interest’ might exclude a decision that affects 
the entire community, but does not affect any one person to a greater extent than 
any other (Law Reform Commission of Western Australia 2002). 
A number of organisations have supported participation in the assessment process 
as grounds for standing (‘objector standing’), including the World Bank (2006). The 
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Commission considers there are benefits in granting standing to those who made a 
submission to the consultation process. It encourages individuals and interest groups 
to raise their issues in a submission to the decision maker, which helps prevent 
issues being brought before a review body that the original decision maker did not 
have a chance to consider (Brown, Stern and Tenenbaum 2006). Further, it also 
recognises that there are representative organisations that might have a legitimate 
interest in the major project DAA process that may not be granted standing at 
common law (for example, species protection groups).  
However, there might be situations where a nominal submission is made to the 
DAA process for the sole purpose of securing standing. To counter this, the 
Commission considers standing should only be granted to people or organisations 
that have shown a ‘substantial interest’8 in the assessment process, by lodging a 
substantive submission.  
As the ARC (2012, p. 146) noted, ‘standing is not the only barrier to access to 
review. Costs and other issues also play a role’. The existence of appropriate costs 
provisions (discussed later) and the courts’ inherent power to strike out vexatious 
litigation are important additional safeguards that would prevent the ‘substantial 
interest’ provision being misused.  
Further, it is never possible to foresee all circumstances where review ought to be 
allowed. Thus, the Commission considers that, in exceptional circumstances, the 
review body should be able to grant leave to persons seeking review if a denial of 
natural justice would occur if they were not granted standing. (‘Leave’ refers to the 
ability to apply to a court to seek an exception to a general rule, in this case, 
standing.) Given the additional cost of initiating an application for leave, the 
Commission anticipates this provision would be rarely used. 
Finally, the standing rules for judicial and merits review should be aligned as it will 
provide greater clarity and consistency in the system. This accords with the 
recommendation made by the ARC (2012). Given that most jurisdictions have 
different standing rights for judicial and merits review, implementation of this 
recommendation would require many jurisdictions to amend their standing 
requirements.  
  
                                              
8 Substantial is commonly defined as being ‘real or of substance, as distinct from ephemeral or 
nominal’: Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1979) 
27 ALR 367. 
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RECOMMENDATION 9.2 
Standing to initiate judicial or merits reviews of approval decisions should be 
limited to: 
• proponents 
• those whose interests have been, are, or could potentially be directly affected 
by the project or proposed project 
• those who have taken a substantial interest in the assessment process. 
In exceptional circumstances, the review body should be able to grant leave to 
persons other than those mentioned above to bring a review application if a 
denial of natural justice would occur if they were not granted leave. 
Vexatious and commercially-motivated applications 
Review processes can ensure accountability but they can also delay projects through 
vexatious review applications. What constitutes a vexatious application is not well 
defined, although objections which have little basis in planning regulations would 
likely be included (PC 2011c): 
… [vexatious litigation is] legal proceedings started with malice and without good 
cause. Vexatious litigation is meant to bother, embarrass, or cause legal expenses to the 
defendant. A plaintiff who starts such litigation either knows or should reasonably 
know that no legal basis for the lawsuit exists. (Legal Information Institute 2010) 
For example, vexatious reviews and appeals might be used as a deliberate strategy 
to delay a project, as the following excerpt from Stopping the Australian Coal 
Export Boom illustrates: 
Legal challenges can stop projects outright, or can delay them in order to buy time to 
build a much stronger movement and powerful public campaigns. … We will lodge 
legal challenges to the approval of all of the major new coal ports, as well as key rail 
links (where possible), the mega-mines and several other mines chosen for strategic 
campaign purposes. (Hepburn, Burton and Hardy 2010, p. 6) 
Some stakeholders expressed concern about vexatious litigation: 
Using third party merit appeal provisions as a tactic to delay development is simple and 
low risk … (NSW Minerals Council, sub. DR93, p. 7)  
Similarly: 
Vexatious appeals by third parties can be deliberately undertaken in order to create 
delays, increase costs and risk to the development assessment process. Third party 
considerations should instead be covered by rigorous approvals processes (including 
consultation mechanisms). (APPEA, sub. DR105, p. 15) 
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Further: 
Vexatious submissions and unfounded complaints are a regular feature of any public 
consultation in regard to major projects and to more general public enquiries relating to 
major project development. (QGC, sub. DR79, p. 2) 
However, litigation that imposes costs on participants is not, by definition, 
vexatious: 
Proponents are quick to dismiss any court action taken against their projects as 
‘vexatious’ and advocate for ‘certainty’ to be entirely one way in its flow: towards 
approval of controversial mining projects. And yet, communities need certainty as well. 
… mining proponents consider any decision against their interests as a temporary but 
outrageous infringement on their freedom, and considerably overstate the impacts of 
community-initiated court actions, out of all proportion to the overall costs of their 
projects. (Lock the Gate Alliance, sub. DR97, pp. 14–15) 
The courts already have the ability to summarily dismiss an action due to it being 
frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. Under the EPBC Act, there are no 
examples of summary dismissal for vexatious litigation (Edgar 2011), and no data 
has been provided for other jurisdictions. Courts can also award legal costs against 
vexatious applicants, which can help discourage vexatious applications (PC 2011c). 
(Appropriate costs provisions to discourage vexatious applications are discussed 
later.) Thus, it does not appear that the existing protections against vexatious 
litigation need to be strengthened.  
Review processes might also allow ‘gaming’ of the system, to prevent or delay a 
development by a would-be competitor (PC 2011c). Some jurisdictions have 
provisions designed to limit commercially-motivated reviews and appeals. For 
example, in South Australia, competitors must disclose their interest when bringing 
proceedings, and if the competitor’s case is unsuccessful, they will have to 
compensate the proponent for any economic loss caused by delays if the 
competitor’s sole or predominant purpose was to delay or prevent the development 
in order to obtain commercial benefit. Where commercially-motivated reviews and 
appeals are a problem for major project DAA applications, the provisions in South 
Australia are a good practice for combating them. 
9.4 Costs and time of review processes 
When legal action relating to a major project is brought, legal costs are incurred by 
the parties to the action. In most jurisdictions, the unsuccessful party in a review or 
appeal is required to pay both their own legal costs, and the costs of the successful 
party. In general, costs orders are made so that the winner does not suffer 
financially from vindicating their rights, but this can result in unfairness if the 
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losing party had a good legal argument and acted reasonably (Ruddock v Vardalis 
[2001] 115 FCR 229). In some jurisdictions, legislation dictates how courts must 
award costs to parties, whereas other jurisdictions allow courts discretion to 
determine this (table 9.2).  
Table 9.2 Default rules for major project DAA costs arrangements  
Jurisdictiona Merits reviewa Judicial reviewa 
New South 
Wales 
Each party bears their own costs 
unless ‘fair and reasonable’ to 
order otherwise 
Unsuccessful party bears the successful 
party’s costs. Discretion to order otherwise 
where cases are brought in the public 
interest 
Victoria Each party bears their own costs Unsuccessful party bears the successful 
party’s costs 
Queensland Costs are at the court’s discretion, 
but various factors the court may 
take into account (such as 
success, or improper purpose) 
Costs at court’s discretion 
South Australia As a general rule, the unsuccessful 
party bears the successful party’s 
costs, subject to a number of 
exceptions. 
Unsuccessful party bears the successful 
party’s costs 
Western 
Australia 
For most types of proceeding, each 
party bears their own costs 
although rejecting a settlement 
offer must be taken into account 
when making the order 
Unsuccessful party bears the successful 
party’s costs, unless the claim is 
unreasonably excessive 
Tasmania Each party bears their own costs, 
discretion to award costs against 
unsuccessful party if fair and 
reasonable to do so 
Costs at court’s discretion 
Northern 
Territory 
Each party bears their own costs 
unless ordered otherwise 
Costs at court’s discretion 
ACT Each party bears their own costs, 
with some exceptions 
Costs at court’s discretion 
Commonwealth No general power to award costs. 
Generally, each party must pay 
their own costs 
Costs at court’s discretion 
a Not all pathways allow review applications for major projects to be brought. Merits review bodies are the 
New South Wales Land and Environment Court, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the 
Queensland Planning and Environment Court, the South Australian Environment Resources and Development 
Court, the Western Australian State Administrative Tribunal, the Tasmanian Resource Management and 
Planning Appeal Tribunal, the Northern Territory Lands and Mining Tribunal, the ACT Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, and the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Judicial review bodies refer to the supreme 
courts in each State or Territory, except for the Commonwealth, which refers to the Federal Court of Australia.  
Sources: Robinson (1996); Australian Government and State and Territory Government legislative websites; 
ANEDO, sub. DR92; King & Wood Mallesons, sub. DR99.  
These costs can be funded in a number of ways. Where private individuals or 
organisations have sufficient financial resources, they can fund the costs out of their 
own pocket. However, legal costs can be prohibitively large (Watters 2010), 
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reaching several hundred thousand dollars, so funding them personally may not be 
possible for a number of private individuals or community groups. As Watters 
noted, ‘ … the impact of the ‘costs follow the event’ rule is, quite simply, to price 
the vast majority of ordinary people and environmental groups out of the courts’ 
(2010, p. 6). 
In recognition of this problem, governments provide funding for legal cases 
considered to be in the public interest. For example, the Australian Government 
Attorney-General’s Department provides financial assistance for cases that are of 
public importance — those that settle an uncertain area or question of 
Commonwealth law, or resolve a question of Commonwealth law that affects the 
rights of a disadvantaged section of the public (AGD (Cwlth) 2013). Similarly, the 
Australian Government and some State and Territory governments provide ongoing 
funding to the Environmental Defenders Offices for public interest environmental 
advocacy.  
Despite these funding mechanisms, the possibility of an award of costs can be 
prohibitive for many community or ‘public interest’ litigants (McGrath 2008). For 
example: 
Prudent litigants must always consider the possibility of an adverse cost award being 
made against them should they lose in the court. Recently we have seen clear examples 
that the NSW government … by pursuing costs against the Fullerton Residents Action 
Group Inc (September 2013) in what is arguably a public interest case, is demonstrating 
… a punitive approach to deter other would-be stakeholder litigants. (East End Mine 
Action Group, sub. DR68, pp. 9–10) 
For this reason, a ‘public interest’ exception to the general rule that costs will be 
awarded against an unsuccessful party (box 9.10) could be important: 
Costs should not act as an artificial barrier to access to justice, especially where 
proceedings are demonstrated to meet a ‘public interest’ test. Merits review, judicial 
review and third party enforcement should be ‘own costs’ proceedings, by default. At a 
minimum, courts in all jurisdictions should be empowered to grant ‘no costs’ or ‘own 
costs’ orders to protect public interest applicants. (ANEDO, sub. DR92, p. 41) 
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Box 9.10 Public interest costs orders 
• In Oshlack, a majority of the High Court held that the usual rule (the unsuccessful 
party bears the costs of the successful party) can be displaced in public interest 
litigation if ‘special circumstances’ are shown, for example, where the case raised 
‘significant issues’ as to the interpretation of statutory provisions.  
• However, interpretation of this decision, and the courts’ willingness to grant public 
interest costs orders, varies between jurisdictions. It also varies depending on the 
circumstances of the case. For example, in the first Blue Wedges case, the court 
granted a public interest costs order because the matter was of high public interest, 
and the application ‘raised novel questions of general importance as to the approval 
process’. 
• By contrast, in the Blue Wedges (No. 2) case, the court declined to grant a public 
interest costs order — despite finding that the litigation dealt with a matter in the 
public interest — because there were no ‘special circumstances’ in the case (the 
applicants had not raised a significant question of statutory construction), and the 
applicants had continued a case that they knew could not be justified. 
• In Fullerton Cove Residents Action Group, a resident action group was 
unsuccessful in challenging the validity of a decision by the NSW Department of 
Trade and Investment to approve a pilot coal seam gas exploration program 
consisting of two wells for a period of 50 days. As a consequence, the Department 
sought an order that the resident group pay the Department’s legal costs. The Land 
and Environment Court rejected the Department’s claim. It found that the 
proceedings had been brought in the public interest. The Department was criticised 
for pursuing a costs order and was instead ordered to pay the costs of the resident 
group. 
• Thus, the approach to public interest costs orders in the courts differs between 
jurisdictions, which can give rise to uncertainty. The Hawke Review recommended 
that a public interest costs order (determined at a pre-hearing), be introduced into 
legislation, but the Australian Government rejected this recommendation. 
Sources: Australian Government (2011); Blue Wedges Inc v Minister for Environment, Heritage and the 
Arts (2008) 165 FCR 211; Blue Wedges Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts (No. 2) 
[2008] FCA 1106; Fullerton Cove Residents Action Group Incorporated v Dart Energy Ltd (No. 3) [2013] 
NSWLEC 152; Hawke (2009); Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, Public Interest Law 
Clearing House (2011); Watters (2010).   
 
However, allowing costs to be awarded against third parties can create an important 
disincentive for vexatious applicants, and also allow successful parties to recoup 
their legal costs against unsuccessful parties (Xstrata Coal, sub. 50; ANEDO, 
sub. DR92). For example, King & Wood Mallesons argued that it is important to 
provide certainty for costs (through criteria governing the exercise of the court’s 
discretion) and to allow cost recovery: 
 … in our view, the [Sustainable Planning] Act model, with its greater specificity 
regarding relevant costs considerations may provide parties with more certainty … 
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[and] deter vexatious or commercially motivated litigants as well as unmeritorious 
cases being run to the door steps of the Court, but also promote access to justice for 
parties with legitimate issues of concern. … [For costs in the NSW Land and 
Environment Court], there is no cost recovery in circumstances where the person 
seeking the review, such as a third party objector, has not engaged in disentitling 
conduct. This is … the overwhelming majority of cases. (sub. DR99, pp. 3–4)  
It is important that litigation in the public interest is not discouraged through 
allowing public interest costs orders to be made in appropriate circumstances. The 
decision in Oshlack allows this to occur. However, this must be balanced against a 
range of other considerations, such as creating a disincentive for vexatious 
litigation. It is not possible to be prescriptive in legislation about all of the 
circumstances in which a public interest costs order will or will not be appropriate, 
and the decision in Oshlack allows the courts to award public interest costs orders 
on a case-by-case basis.  
Allocation of legal costs will be considered in greater detail by the Commission as 
part of the Access to Civil Justice Inquiry.9 
Should timelines be imposed on proceedings? 
Timelines also play an important role in review processes. Timelines are commonly 
imposed on the review application — for example, a proponent or third party might 
only have 90 days to apply for review. Statutory timelines can also be imposed on 
the duration of court or tribunal proceedings — for example, s. 44ZZOA of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cwlth) imposes a statutory timeline of 
180 days for the Australian Competition Tribunal to make a decision.  
The Queensland Resources Council argued that even informal statutory timelines 
can reduce unreasonable delays:  
In terms of applying timeframes for decisions, the Supreme and District Courts have 
processes to consider whether judges are taking too long to issue a decision. Whilst 
they are not prescriptive timeframes, they are a valuable tool in judging accountability. 
The Land Court performs a critically important function … but that does not mean that 
its members should not be accountable for unreasonable delays. Independence is not 
lost and the quality of work to be performed is not deteriorated by benchmarking 
performance and examining whether a reasonable or excessive period of time is being 
taken to deliver a judgment. (sub. DR91, p. 9) 
However, given the resource constraints of courts, it is also possible that timelines 
could have unintended consequences (such as inappropriate prioritisation of court 
                                              
9 http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/access-justice 
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resources) and actually delay decisions by leading to poor decisions that will only 
be appealed at a higher level. In the absence of further evidence, the Commission 
does not consider that court decisions should be subject to timelines. There may be 
scope for courts and tribunals to look at administratively improving their processes 
and giving consideration to forms of alternative dispute resolution — these issues 
are currently being considered by the Commission’s Inquiry into Access to Civil 
Justice. A number of jurisdictions, such as the New South Wales Land and 
Environment Court, are already moving in this direction. In a practical sense, 
administrative improvements are likely to create larger efficiency gains than 
imposing rigid timelines.  
9.5 Implications of the proposed reforms 
The Commission has proposed a number of changes to review rights for major 
project primary approval decisions (depending on who the decision maker is) and to 
standing rights (figure 9.2). 
Figure 9.2 Summary of the Commission’s review recommendations 
Proponents and third parties 
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The review rights for major project primary approval decisions vary significantly 
between jurisdictions and pathways. Table 9.3 compares these arrangements to the 
Commission’s recommended approach to review. In most cases, review rights are 
broadly consistent with the Commission’s recommendations — namely, where the 
primary approval decision is made by a Minister, judicial review should be allowed, 
and where the decision is not made by a Minister, merits review (along with judicial 
review) should be allowed.  
For some pathways, however, more substantial reform would be required to align 
review rights with the Commission’s proposed approach. This is particularly the 
case for pathways that do not currently allow any review, such as: 
•  major developments or projects in South Australia 
•  projects of state significance in Tasmania. 
Similarly, merits review rights for proponents under the priority development 
pathway in Queensland would need to be removed if consistency with the 
Commission’s model is sought. 
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Table 9.3 Comparing current review rights for major project primary 
approval decisions with the Commission’s recommended 
approach 
Jurisdiction Minister as decision 
maker? 
Merits review Judicial review 
Productivity 
Commission 
recommendations 
   
Minister decision maker     
Minister not decision 
maker 
 a   
New South Wales    
State significant 
development 
   (common law) 
State significant 
infrastructure 
Seldom   (common law) 
Victoria    
Planning permits    
Major transport projects    
Ministerial call-in    
Queensland    
Coordinated projects  b b 
Priority development    (proponents only)  
South Australia    
Major developments or 
projects 
Governor   
Crown development    (common law) 
Western Australia    
DAP decisions   (proponents only)  (common law) 
Tasmania    
Projects of State 
significance 
Parliament   
Major infrastructure 
projects 
   
Northern Territory    
Significant or 
exceptional 
development 
   (common law) 
ACT    
Ministerial call-in    
Commonwealth     
EPBC Act     
a Commission has recommended limited merits review. b Excluding Coordinator-General’s conduct and 
decisions. 
Source: Commission analysis. 
Existing standing rights are summarised in table 9.4 — while most jurisdictions 
exhibit elements of the Commission’s proposed standing test, none have all 
elements for both merits and judicial review.  
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Table 9.4 Comparing current standing rights for selected major project 
primary approval decisions and the Commission’s proposed 
reforms 
Jurisdiction Standing for 
proponents 
Standing for directly 
affected or person 
aggrieved 
Standing for 
objectors 
 Merits Judicial Merits Judicial Merits Judicial 
Productivity 
Commission’s 
recommendationsa 
      
New South Wales       
State significant 
development 
   c d c 
State significant 
infrastructure 
   c  c 
Victoria       
Planning permits   Leave  c  
Major transport projects       
Ministerial call-in       
Queensland       
Coordinated projects e e  e e  
South Australia       
Major developments or 
projects 
      
Crown development    Common 
law 
 Common 
law 
Western Australia       
DAP decisions    Common 
law 
 Common 
law 
Tasmania       
Projects of State 
significance 
      
Major infrastructure projects       
Northern Territory       
Significant/exceptional 
development 
   Common 
law 
 Common 
law 
ACT       
Ministerial call-in       
Commonwealth       
EPBC Act    b  b 
a Commission has recommended standing be granted to proponents, those who are directly affected or could 
potentially be directly affected, and those that have taken a substantial interest in the assessment process. 
Leave if a denial of natural justice would occur has not been included in the table because no jurisdiction 
currently has it. bPerson or organisation engaged in conservation activities in the preceding two years c Any 
person may bring proceedings to remedy or restrain a breach of the Act. d Only designated development. 
e Excluding Coordinator-General.  
Source: Commission analysis. 
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The Commission is recommending harmonising standing for merits and judicial 
review, consistent with the ARC’s (2012) recommendation. In practice, this is not 
generally the case: 
• Where merits review is available, proponents and objectors (that is, a person 
who made a submission to the assessment process) are generally given standing. 
• Where statutory judicial review is available, the legislation generally provides 
that a ‘person aggrieved’ or a person with a ‘special interest’ is given standing.  
• Where a jurisdiction relies on common law judicial review, standing varies 
depending on the remedy sought. Some remedies have more limited standing, 
other remedies have close to open standing. 
• Additionally, although some jurisdictions allow standing to be granted by leave 
in particular circumstances, no jurisdictions currently allow a leave application 
to be brought on the basis that a denial of natural justice would otherwise occur. 
 
   
 MONITORING OF 
COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
287 
 
10 Monitoring of compliance and 
enforcement 
 
Key points 
• Compliance with, and enforcement of, project approval conditions are essential to 
effective development assessment and approval (DAA) processes that protect 
social, economic, heritage and environmental assets. If compliance is inadequate, 
the integrity of DAA processes is undermined. If compliance arrangements are 
excessive they can add unnecessarily to project costs and weaken the viability of 
projects. 
• The ability of regulators to monitor compliance and enforce approval conditions in a 
way that is not excessive and does not add unnecessary costs while protecting 
Australia’s environmental and cultural assets depends on the: 
– clarity of regulatory agency responsibilities for monitoring compliance 
– transparency and effort put into compliance and enforcement activities by 
agencies 
– use of proportionate (risk-based) approaches where possible 
– practicality and enforceability of the approval conditions. 
• Drawing on various audit reports across agencies and jurisdictions, the Commission 
has identified a number of ways in which compliance and enforcement processes 
can be improved: 
– Agency responsibilities for compliance and monitoring activities are generally 
clear in legislation, but confusion can emerge, particularly for projects that are 
approved by various ‘fast tracking’ mechanisms or through special legislation. 
Governments should ensure agency responsibility for monitoring and compliance 
with project conditions is transparent and communicated to stakeholders. 
– At times, conditions placed on approvals have been impractical to comply with 
and difficult to monitor. Agencies should fully consider the practicality of 
monitoring compliance at the time of developing conditions, and governments 
should ensure there are transparent mechanisms for agencies to amend 
conditions where appropriate. 
– To ensure that compliance is feasible when conditions are initially set, and to 
promote transparency of regulatory oversight, agencies tasked with monitoring 
and enforcement of major project approval conditions should publish an annual 
compliance statement.  
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This chapter examines the monitoring and enforcement of compliance with 
conditions placed on major project approvals. These arrangements are essential for 
the approvals process to be effective. If they are inadequate, the integrity of 
development assessment and approval (DAA) regulatory processes is undermined. 
If they are excessive, compliance and monitoring arrangements can add 
unnecessarily to costs and weaken the viability of projects. Striking the appropriate 
balance is always a challenge, but leading practice regulatory processes help to 
make it possible to achieve an appropriate balance. 
Ensuring compliance with conditions is not simply about maintaining the integrity 
of the approvals process. Non-compliance with project conditions can result in 
adverse outcomes for the environment, heritage and public health and safety. It can 
also lead to significant financial losses for other members of the community, and 
loss of amenity. 
10.1 Approaches to monitoring of compliance and 
enforcement 
Policies for monitoring of compliance and enforcement are fairly standard across 
jurisdictions and agencies. Agency responsibilities are generally set out in 
legislation and usually rest with the agencies that recommend or impose the 
approval conditions or grant a licence (exceptions might be, for example, where 
central agencies impose conditions but leave monitoring or compliance 
responsibilities to specialised agencies). Appendix C summarises, by jurisdiction, 
the compliance responsibilities for the main development activities requiring an 
approval. 
While agencies typically take similar policy approaches, specific requirements for 
monitoring compliance with, and enforcement of, approval conditions vary between 
projects, agencies, jurisdictions and with the type of conditions imposed on a 
project. Conditions are generally set out at the approval stage as part of the 
requirements under which a project is permitted to proceed. Regulatory agencies 
rely heavily on self-reporting by project proponents, backed up by audits and 
inspections, and reports from members of the public or the media. 
Common methods for monitoring compliance include: 
• site visits and inspections (both scheduled and unannounced) 
• audits 
• sample collections 
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• use of agency websites 
• seeking information from the public 
• investigations 
• media monitoring 
• observations by agency staff or from other agencies 
• analysis of information, data and reports. 
The Commonwealth Environment Department’s approach is set out in its 
Compliance and Enforcement Policy, and is typical of those used across 
jurisdictions. The Department: 
… monitors compliance with, and detects potential contraventions … by analysing 
information from sources such as the general public, the media, industry, 
non-government organisations and other government agencies. [It also undertakes] 
regular monitoring and auditing of projects that have been referred under the EPBC Act 
to ensure that any requirements placed on those projects are being adhered to. 
(DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012d, p. 10) 
Non-environmental agencies take a similar approach. For example, the Queensland 
Petroleum and Gas Inspectorate, a health and safety regulator located within the 
Department of Natural Resources and Mines, monitors compliance through a 
combination of routine inspections, audits and investigation of complaints and 
incidents. Noncompliance is assessed ‘in accordance with the legislation, the 
analysis of facts and evidence, and the significance and severity of the level of total 
risk identified by the department’s petroleum and gas inspectors’ (DEEDI 
(Qld) 2011, p. 4). 
Proposed reforms to Aboriginal heritage protection in Tasmania are also designed to 
allow for risk-based enforcement. Authorised officers will have powers of entry, 
search and seizure to enforce permit conditions. They will also be able to initiate 
Aboriginal Heritage Audits, issue Interim Stop Orders when heritage is under 
immediate threat, and issue infringement notices for minor offences. For serious 
offences, more significant penalties (including imprisonment) can apply (DPIPWE 
(Tas) 2013). 
A risk-based approach is now commonly used to prioritise cases and identify those 
that warrant further investigation. For instance, the NSW Department of Planning 
and Infrastructure, which has responsibility for monitoring compliance regarding 
projects approved by the NSW Planning Minister, prioritises the monitoring of 
projects in sensitive environments or with a high risk of noncompliance. Inspections 
and audits generally fall into one of four categories: 
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• Strategic – to inform the Department’s assessment of proposed modifications to 
approved projects 
• Campaign – groups of projects based on industry type, geographical location or 
impact type 
• Ongoing – as part of the Department’s regular inspection program 
• Reactive – in response to reports or complaints alleging non-compliance. (DoP 
(NSW) 2010, p. iii) 
10.2 Monitoring of compliance and enforcement 
activities in practice 
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) states that a good monitoring policy: 
• is risk-based 
• can be implemented with available resources and with an acceptable level of 
residual risk 
• recognises the costs it imposes on regulated entities 
• is responsive to changing regulatory risks 
• is documented. (ANAO 2007a, p. 52) 
While much basic information is available from agencies about their monitoring of 
compliance activities (for example, the Commonwealth Environment Department 
provides information on audits undertaken and their outcome, and on court 
decisions under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (EPBC Act)), there is limited public information provided by agencies that 
would enable the Commission to draw conclusions about the appropriateness of 
these activities. 
Some agencies provide limited information about priorities. The Commonwealth 
Environment Department noted that during 2011-12, its strategic risk-based audit 
program (which operates alongside a random audit program and focuses on specific 
areas such as industry sectors, geographical areas and protected matters) focused on 
13 projects, seven in the mining and exploration industries, a residential 
development, an industrial development and a review of four approvals that 
included conditions requiring the establishment and management of habitat reserves 
and offsets (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012b). 
The WA Office of the Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) noted that during 
2012-13 it audited 7 per cent of approved projects overall, but 100 per cent of ‘high 
   
 MONITORING OF 
COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
291 
 
priority’ approved projects, with some guidance provided in the agency’s annual 
report about why some proposals are considered a priority (OEPA (WA) 2013a). 
Overall, however, there is little detailed information across agencies on why some 
projects were chosen for audit, while others were not, or about whether the 
approach of particular agencies is encouraging compliance. Similarly, while 
successful prosecutions for breaches of conditions and civil penalties are a matter of 
public record (box 10.1), there is inadequate information to place these prosecutions 
in context to make overall judgments about performance. 
There have been a number of reports from Auditors-General looking at agencies’ 
monitoring of compliance and enforcement activities. Reports of relevance to this 
study include: 
• the ANAO’s 2007 report The Conservation and Protection of National 
Threatened Species and Ecological Communities 
• the NSW Auditor-General’s 2010 report Protecting the Environment: Pollution 
Incidents 
• the NSW Auditor-General’s 2006 report Regulating the Clearing of Native 
Vegetation 
• the Victorian Auditor-General’s 2012 report Effectiveness of Compliance 
Activities: Departments of Primary Industries and Sustainability and 
Environment 
• the WA Auditor-General’s 2011 report Ensuring Compliance with Conditions on 
Mining. 
These (and other) audit reports have raised some doubts about the efficacy of the 
compliance and enforcement processes of regulatory agencies. However, most of 
these reports have assessed these processes generally (or for particular activities), 
rather than those specifically related to development approval conditions. One 
report specifically assessing monitoring of compliance with approval conditions, 
and focused on the mining industry, was the 2011 report of the WA 
Auditor-General (box 10.2). 
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Box 10.1 Examples of enforcement of approval conditions by 
government agencies 
In 2008, Coalpac was fined $200 000 in the New South Wales Land and Environment 
Court for exceeding a mining lease condition limiting production of coal to 350 000 
tonnes per year. The mine produced 635 277 tonnes in one year. The case was 
brought by the Planning Minister (NSW LEC 2008). 
In 2009, V/Line paid out $188 010 after an enforceable undertaking was agreed 
between it and the Commonwealth Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and 
the Arts following destruction without approval of 38 spiny rice-flower plants by 
contractors widening an access track next to the railway line near Bendigo 
(DEWHA 2009). 
In 2010, Moolarben Coal was fined $70 000 for breaching planning laws by clearing 
vegetation, including endangered native species, without planning approval. The 
company’s mine approval was subsequently modified, requiring the company to 
conserve 6.6 hectares of land (a larger area than the 4.1 hectares illegally cleared) 
(Kelly 2010b). 
In 2012, LQ Management Pty Ltd, manager of Laguna Whitsundays Resort, and its 
director, David Marriner were fined a total of $90 000 after pleading guilty to two counts 
of wilfully breaching a development approval condition and one count of wilfully 
causing environmental harm in the Mackay Magistrates Court after the resort’s sewage 
treatment system discharged raw effluent into nearby waterways. LQ Management was 
fined $70 000 and David Marriner was fined $20 000 (DEHP (Qld) 2012). 
In 2012, Barwon Region Water Authority was fined more than $6000 by EPA Victoria 
for failing to get a works approval before building a water reclamation plant in 
Birregurra. The company admitted to EPA Victoria their failure to get the required 
approvals for the plant (EPA (Vic) 2012). 
In 2013, the NSW Environment Protection Authority (NSW EPA) fined AGL $1500 for 
breaching the licence conditions at its Rosalind Park Gas Treatment Plant after 
emissions of nitrogen oxides were recorded above the limits permitted by its 
Environment Protection Licence. The NSW EPA noted AGL self-reported the incidents 
and the emission monitoring data, including the exceedances, were published on the 
AGL website as required by the NSW EPA (NSW OEH 2013). 
In 2013, Cougar Energy was fined $75 000 in the Brisbane Magistrates Court after 
pleading guilty to three breaches of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) 
following the rupture of a production well near Kingaroy in 2010. The well was not built 
to the standard required by its environmental conditions, and the rupture led to the 
release of the contaminants benzene and toluene to groundwater (Powell 2013). 
In 2013, OM Manganese Limited was fined $150 000 in the Darwin Magistrates Court 
for one count of desecration of, and one count of damaging, the Two Women Sitting 
Down sacred site at their Bootu Creek manganese mine on Banka Banka station, 170 
kilometres north of Tennant Creek. The site collapse totalled 10 000 cubic metres of 
ore, soil and vegetation (AAPA 2013).  
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The ANAO also made specific findings on compliance and enforcement processes 
relating to project approval conditions in two broader audits of the EPBC Act. The 
ANAO stated in the second audit: 
The department did not have sufficient information to know whether conditions on the 
decisions are generally met or not. There has been insufficient follow up on 
compliance by the department for those individuals or organisations subject to the Act 
and little effective management of the information that has been provided. 
Consequently, the department has not been well positioned to know whether or not the 
conditions that are being placed on actions are efficient or effective. This is not 
consistent with good practice and does not encourage adherence to conditions set by 
the Minister. (2007b, p. 25) 
 
Box 10.2 The Western Australian Auditor-General’s 2011 report 
Ensuring Compliance with Conditions on Mining 
In 2011, the Western Australian Auditor-General undertook an assessment of 
compliance with conditions placed on project approvals in the mining industry. The 
Auditor-General concluded: 
The legislation and powers are in place to enable agencies to monitor and enforce 
compliance with mining conditions. However, the way agencies have implemented this 
framework means they do not provide assurance on the overall levels of compliance with 
conditions, or whether the conditions deliver the desired outcomes. Responsibility for 
monitoring and ensuring compliance with conditions rests with several agencies, and 
performance varies significantly across these agencies, and across key conditions. (2011, p. 
7) 
With regard to the WA Department of Mines and Petroleum (DMP), the 
Auditor-General stated: 
DMP’s inspection regime does not deliver adequate coverage or assurance that mines meet 
their conditions … significant weaknesses in information management make it difficult for 
DMP to analyse and demonstrate the effectiveness of its inspections, or report accurately on 
how well operators comply with conditions. Information that is kept is inconsistent and the 
systems used to manage information are inefficient. (2011, p. 8) 
The review also found that the enforcement policies of DMP were theoretically sound, 
but let down by weaknesses in their implementation: 
DMP’s approach to environmental enforcement is appropriate and potentially successful. It 
establishes a hierarchy of actions based on the severity of the non-compliance and the 
response of the operators involved … However, two weaknesses decrease DMP’s ability to 
demonstrate that its environmental enforcement is consistent: 
• there are no clear established criteria for determining the severity of non-compliance. 
• DMP does not monitor the outcomes from inspections in a coordinated or comprehensive 
manner. (2011, p. 29)  
 
The findings of these audit reports have had an impact on agencies. For example, in 
response to the ANAO findings, the Australian Government allocated substantially 
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more resources to compliance and enforcement activities, and in 2007 established a 
dedicated Compliance and Enforcement Branch within the Commonwealth 
Environment Department to undertake a range of monitoring, audit, compliance and 
investigative functions. The Department has since achieved a number of successful 
investigative outcomes, including a successful criminal prosecution and several 
civil prosecutions. Use of administrative remedies has also increased (Hawke 2009). 
In the case of Western Australia, there have also been efforts made to improve 
monitoring and compliance in the mining sector, most particularly under the banner 
of Reforming Environmental Regulation. This includes the Department of Mines 
and Petroleum (DMP) moving to a risk- and outcome-based regulatory framework, 
improving interagency collaboration and information exchange, increasing 
transparency and improved agency resourcing to better perform regulatory functions 
(DMP (WA) 2013b). 
While there are signs of improvement in these, and in a number of other agencies, 
there is still room for further improvement. The following discussion relates to the 
major factors affecting the ability of regulators to implement monitoring of 
compliance and carry out enforcement activities that are not excessive or do not add 
unnecessary costs while meeting DAA regulatory objectives. These factors are the: 
• clarity of regulatory agency responsibilities for monitoring compliance 
• resources allocated for compliance and enforcement activities 
• use of proportionate (risk-based) approaches to monitoring of compliance and 
enforcement activities 
• practicality and enforceability of approval conditions. 
10.3 Clarity of regulators’ responsibilities 
For compliance and enforcement activities to be effective, it is important that 
agency responsibility for these activities is clearly assigned. It is also important that 
all approval conditions have an agency explicitly responsible for ensuring 
monitoring and compliance with them, and that overlap of these responsibilities is 
avoided to prevent confusion and duplication (or where some overlap is inevitable, 
that arrangements are in place to enable coordination). 
It has been suggested to the Commission that some misunderstanding about 
compliance and monitoring responsibilities can emerge when projects are approved 
through special legislation or fast tracking methods. For example, the audit report 
looking at the mining industry in Western Australia found that the Department of 
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State Development (DSD) and DMP seemed unclear about their respective roles in 
terms of monitoring conditions for projects taking place under State Agreements: 
There is a risk that non-compliance with environmental requirements will not be 
identified or addressed on all 26 State Agreement mines because DSD and DMP have 
clear but differing views of their roles. DSD does not conduct active monitoring and 
enforcement, and expects that DMP will do so. DMP considers that it does not have the 
legislative powers to fulfil a monitoring and enforcement role on State Agreement 
projects where the Mining Act is not specifically applied. (WA Auditor-General 2011, 
p. 9). 
The Commission understands that DSD and DMP have since reviewed 
environmental compliance monitoring and enforcement policies and practices for 
State Agreement projects (Government of Western Australia 2012). 
There is mixed evidence about how clearly defined are agency compliance and 
enforcement responsibilities. In areas where there is potential overlap within 
jurisdictions, such as, for example, between the environment protection agency and 
the environment department, legislation generally spells out the specific areas of 
responsibility. However, as highlighted in the example above from Western 
Australia, the allocation of responsibilities is not always clear. 
To ensure the monitoring of compliance with approval conditions does not ‘fall 
through the cracks’ when approvals are centralised, governments need to ensure that 
the responsibilities of their regulatory agencies are clearly defined. This is 
particularly important given that projects approved centrally are usually the most 
contentious and those perceived to have the most ‘downside risk’ to the community. 
To further ensure accountability, leading practice suggests there are benefits from 
making information about monitoring and enforcement responsibilities publicly 
available. 
The Office of the Coordinator-General in Queensland10 and the NSW Department 
of Planning and Infrastructure have dedicated compliance units to monitor and 
enforce conditions they place on projects. While these agencies liaise widely, and 
sometimes rely on other agencies to perform some monitoring tasks, they are still 
actively involved in ensuring compliance with approval conditions and are 
ultimately responsible for compliance outcomes (box 10.3). 
The Commission considers that the existence of centralised compliance units in 
coordinating agencies or planning departments could reduce the risk of 
non-compliance over a sustained period. However, as noted by the NSW 
                                              
10 The compliance unit for the Office of the Coordinator-General in Queensland is located in the 
Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning. 
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Department of Planning and Infrastructure in box 10.3, the creation of such units 
can also lead to a lack of clarity about the role of other agencies. It is important, 
therefore, for the lead agency to be proactive in coordinating with the other agencies 
with compliance responsibilities to avoid duplication of effort, or noncompliance 
continuing unchecked. 
 
Box 10.3 Approaches to compliance with approval conditions in 
Queensland and New South Wales 
The Queensland Office of the Coordinator-General — while able to nominate another 
agency such as the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection to take 
responsibility for monitoring conditions — maintains responsibility for the auditing and 
enforcement of the conditions it imposes. The Department of State Development, 
Infrastructure and Planning contains a unit specifically tasked to monitor and enforce 
compliance with conditions imposed by the Coordinator-General and ensure that any 
non-compliance is addressed. The unit works collaboratively with other administering 
authorities. Project proponents are required to engage independent parties to conduct 
third-party audits of compliance with imposed conditions, and to submit the audit 
reports to the Coordinator-General for review (DSDIP (Qld) 2013a). 
The NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure also has an active compliance 
unit. The unit conducts inspections and audits of approved projects, responds to 
concerns of other State agencies, local councils and members of the public, 
investigates potential breaches and takes enforcement action where considered 
necessary. The Department also publishes monthly compliance activity reports. The 
Department’s compliance and enforcement policy highlights the importance of working 
with other agencies: 
In identifying matters for compliance attention, the Department works closely with its 
regulatory ‘partners’, in particular local councils and State agencies administering 
environment protection legislation to ensure information about non-compliances is shared 
and investigations are not duplicated. (DoP (NSW) 2010, p. iii)  
 
The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia (CMEWA) agreed with 
the need to clearly articulate agency responsibility for compliance, noting there 
were also opportunities for agencies to work together to reduce the compliance 
burden associated with conditions: 
CME is not aware of a standardised approach across agencies in reporting on 
compliance and enforcement with project conditions and would support work to 
achieve alignment of these. As companies are required to report against project 
conditions in varying formats and frequency inefficiencies are created. (sub. DR85, 
attachment, p. 1) 
The Queensland Resources Council noted that duplication could take place where 
responsibilities were not clearly articulated: 
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Processes that don’t tend to have a ‘home’ are found to lead to duplication. One such 
example of this duplication is the reporting of CSG water and drilling. At present, CSG 
companies must report to three separate agencies on water and exploration 
drilling/fracking. The requirement for reporting is accepted, but not to three separate 
agencies in three formats. One agency should hold the database and share this 
information with the other agencies where expert advice might be needed. (sub. DR91, 
p. 3) 
The Australian Local Government Association was also supportive of clarifying 
enforcement responsibilities: 
ALGA supports this recommendation. Local governments understand that making 
decisions on development applications is futile if the approval authority does not 
monitor or enforce the subsequent approval conditions. (sub. DR71, p. 8) 
The Planning Institute of Australia also agreed, but highlighted that it was important 
that agencies ensure project conditions are actually enforced: 
PIA supports this recommendation, however, it could be strengthened to ensure that 
monitoring of compliance and enforcement of conditions is actually implemented by 
the responsible agencies as well. (sub. DR73, p. 3) 
NTSCORP stated there were significant issues with monitoring and compliance of 
Aboriginal cultural heritage approval conditions, with responsibility for monitoring 
them falling back on Aboriginal organisations: 
Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Management Plans are often created but not implemented 
or fully complied with, throwing into question the efficacy of project approvals 
designed to establish appropriate safeguards … These issues are exacerbated by a lack 
of both self-monitoring by proponents, and oversight … by regulatory agencies … 
monitoring of conditions regarding Aboriginal cultural heritage often falls back on 
Aboriginal organisations with limited resources and capacity. NTSCORP considers this 
a case of regulatory failure. (sub. DR104, pp. 4–5) 
RECOMMENDATION 10.1 
Governments should ensure that agency responsibilities and strategies for the 
monitoring of compliance and enforcement in relation to project conditions are 
clearly specified and communicated to stakeholders. 
10.4 Resource allocation for compliance and 
enforcement activities 
Many participants in this study identified resourcing as limiting the capacity or 
willingness of agencies to prioritise their enforcement responsibilities. For example, 
the Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices (ANEDO) highlighted 
   
298 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
‘evidence and submissions to the NSW CSG Inquiry … noted the limited resources 
available to monitor activities and enforce regulatory compliance’ (sub. 14, p. 22). 
King & Wood Mallesons saw resourcing issues as the main problem with 
monitoring of compliance, while also suggesting a reallocation of resources would 
be appropriate: 
In our view, it is not the lack of enforcement mechanisms themselves that reduces the 
effectiveness of the current DAA processes, but rather the lack of resources with which 
to effectively monitor and enforce. At all levels, we suggest that greater direction of 
resources towards monitoring and enforcement of conditions and less focus on detailed 
assessment would increase the effectiveness of conditions imposed on major projects. 
(sub. 39, p. 3) 
The Australian Local Government Association also highlighted resourcing issues: 
Given the life span and scale associated with major development projects, it is critical 
that both the State and Commonwealth Governments properly resource their 
monitoring and enforcement responsibilities. This includes regular liaising with local 
councils to ensure that major developments adhere to agreed environmental, social and 
economic approval conditions. (sub. DR71, p. 8) 
Other participants identified competing pressures for resources and the nature of 
approval conditions as factors that may act to compromise enforcement. For 
example, the WA Auditor-General made the following comment: 
We found throughout our audit that individual staff and agencies had separate roles 
competing for their effort. Individual staff had to assess project proposals for approval, 
as well as monitor and enforce compliance in existing projects. The same challenge 
faces agencies in balancing the use of resources between approvals and compliance … 
This can impact on the extent of agency activity in monitoring compliance with 
conditions. (2011, p. 17) 
The issue of agency resourcing — which potentially affects all aspects of the 
approvals process — is discussed more comprehensively in chapter 12. 
10.5 Risk-based approaches to enforcement 
In addition to concern about resourcing levels, there have been concerns about how 
resources are allocated within agencies. Some audit reports have questioned the 
efficacy of agencies’ monitoring of compliance and enforcement activities due to 
the lack of a framework to adequately determine those projects most likely to be 
appropriate for audit. For example, the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office (in a 
report looking at agency compliance processes generally, not just with regard to 
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approval conditions) said of the Department of Sustainability and Environment in 
2012: 
DSE’s regions rarely use a transparent, risk-based approach or any other clear rationale 
to inform the decisions they make about which compliance issues they will address, 
and how they will do it — even though its statewide compliance strategies have 
included a risk-based process for doing this since 2008. Instead, it conducts a series of 
largely reactive, one-off investigations and operations rather than adopting a targeted 
approach. (2012, p. xi) 
On the other hand, the WA Auditor-General was complimentary about the approach 
of Western Australia’s OEPA towards compliance with Environmental Protection 
Agency imposed-conditions: 
The OEPA is responsible for monitoring Ministerial conditions placed on projects as a 
result of environmental impact assessments by the EPA … In planning its compliance 
program the OEPA scans all reports it receives from operators, and uses this 
information as part of its risk assessment. This in turn drives the selection of sites for 
desktop audits which include assessing reports against approved conditions … With 
increasing numbers of projects, the OEPA believes it is unlikely to ever be able to audit 
or inspect all projects with Ministerial conditions. To mitigate this, the EPA has 
recently required managing directors of operating companies to formally approve 
reports submitted to the OEPA. The OEPA believes that this increases accountability 
and responsibility for compliance and non-compliance. We support this decision. 
(2011, p. 25) 
A number of participants in this study support moving towards risk-based 
approaches (box 10.4) to compliance and enforcement, and for DAA regulation and 
processes generally. For example, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) said: 
Jurisdictions should adopt a risk-based approach to regulation to ensure that regulatory 
effort is directed to the areas of development approvals where it will have most impact 
and that the costs of regulation are commensurate with the risks to be managed. 
(sub. 43, p. 2) 
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Box 10.4 Risk-based approaches to enforcement 
Agencies adopting a risk-based model will base their compliance requirements, 
incident responses and enforcement priorities on the likely risk of adverse outcomes, 
and the potential seriousness of adverse outcomes. Enforcement resources are 
targeted to those areas where the biggest difference can be made. 
A 2011 review of compliance and enforcement for EPA Victoria, for example, defined 
risk as a combination of two elements: consequence (the risk of harm to health and the 
environment) and likelihood (the chance that non-compliance will occur). Therefore, 
when EPA Victoria starts the enforcement process following an incident of risk or 
non-compliance, it considers risk or harm and also the circumstances and culpability of 
the offender. Culpability considers the offender’s history, how long the incident or 
non-compliance continued, whether or not the harm is still occurring or has been 
reduced, whether the risk was foreseeable and whether the act or omission was 
intentional (Krpan 2011). 
The Office of the Environmental Protection Agency in Western Australia states that it 
‘applies a priority rating to all proposals based on the condition of the receiving 
environment, potential environmental impact and level of stakeholder interest’ (2013a, 
p. 41).  
Under a risk-based approach, proponents with poor compliance records would be likely 
to be seen as more high risk than other proponents undertaking similar projects, and 
therefore be potentially subject to greater regulatory focus and more severe sanctions 
in the event of a breach.  
 
The Queensland Government noted benefits of a risk-based approach: 
By better managing risk, additional resources can be shifted from [less complex] 
applications to more complex high risk-high impact applications such as those that 
typically are major development applications. (sub. 47, p. 15) 
South Australian State Government Departments highlighted that they had moved 
to a risk-based approach to monitoring and compliance: 
Another initiative is the adoption of high and low level surveillance classifications that 
divides regulated activities carried out under the Act into those requiring a high level of 
regulatory oversight and those for which the licensee has demonstrated its competence 
and capability in achieving compliance with the Act and the [Statement of 
Environmental Objectives] through the implementation of effective management 
systems. Consequently the focus of agency resources is on compliance monitoring and 
proponent strategies to maintain compliance. (sub. 51, p. 29) 
While risk-based approaches can have significant benefits, there are challenges 
associated with their implementation. One area of concern is that regulators, by 
changing behaviour, will do some things less than previously and this could have 
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negative consequences. Cliff and Johnstone note, however, that this might be less of 
an issue depending on how risk-based regimes are implemented: 
If risk-based approaches are properly implemented, the firms that are not being 
inspected as frequently as they were in the past can be justified by their status of having 
achieved ‘earned autonomy’ through their past commendable compliance efforts 
resulting in good OHS performance. (nd, p. 10) 
Xstrata Coal highlighted that risk rating could be counterproductive if too many 
projects were rated as being of high risk: 
A major potential drawback of adopting a risk-based approach is that it will lead to 
even further delays due to a large number of projects being classified as high risk and 
being bogged down in further scrutiny and reporting requirements. In order for a 
risk-based approach to regulation to function properly, staff at the relevant government 
departments and agencies need to be properly qualified and trained in order to make 
accurate risk assessments. Furthermore, there should be clear guidelines as to how 
projects are classified on the risk scale. (sub. 50, p. 57) 
The Commission notes that many regulatory agencies are moving in the direction of 
developing better risk-based approaches to monitoring of compliance and 
enforcement activities. It is therefore important that agencies, in line with leading 
practice, ensure that their audit processes are also based on their determinations of 
risk. 
This is not always the case. For example, the WA Auditor-General suggested in 
2011 that although the WA DMP had adopted risk ratings, time between inspections 
was still used to guide where inspections should take place: 
Under DMP’s approach, how recently a site was inspected influences the assessment of 
the site risk. Thus, if a site has been given a high rating but was inspected recently it 
may be downgraded to medium and inspected less frequently. This is not sound risk 
assessment practice. How recently a site has been inspected does not change its 
intrinsic risk. In a fully risk based system this should not change how often a site is 
inspected. (2011, p. 27) 
Leading practice also suggests that agencies should ensure that their risk ratings are 
realistic to avoid the problem highlighted by Xstrata Coal of unnecessarily 
increasing the regulatory burden by inappropriately classifying projects as high risk. 
As noted by Xstrata Coal, this means agencies must ensure that their staff are 
appropriately qualified and trained to be able to accurately make these risk 
assessments. 
Given that there will always be limited resources for monitoring of compliance (and 
therefore some element of ‘rationing’), realistic risk ratings represent the most 
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effective way for these resources to be allocated, and would help assure the 
community that the downside risks associated with projects are properly managed. 
10.6 Practicality and enforceability of approval 
conditions 
The Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (AMEC) highlighted the 
importance of writing conditions in a manner that they could be complied with and 
enforced: 
Licence conditions are a necessary part of an approval. However they must only be 
used to manage the highest level of risk that the project has to the objectives of the 
regulatory agency. That is, risk-based conditions. They also must be written in a way 
that not only allows the proponent to be able to comply but for enforcement to occur. 
(sub. 42, p. 17) 
There is also a risk that agencies will impose an excessive number of conditions if 
they do not believe they will have to monitor compliance with them. Stakeholders 
have suggested that, in some cases, there are too many conditions for effective 
monitoring to occur. The BCA stated: 
There are too many conditions: too many ad hoc conditions are being attached to 
project approval, which not only add significant costs to proponents – which can be 
prohibitive – but also can be simply unmanageable and unable to be properly monitored 
by regulators, resulting in high cost from red tape for no real benefit. This is multiplied 
across jurisdictions. The approval of one large project came with more than 1,500 
conditions – 1,200 from the state and 300 from the Commonwealth. Those conditions 
have a further 8,000 sub-conditions attached to them. (sub. 43, p. 10) 
Some agencies appear to be changing their approach with regard to condition 
setting. For example, the Western Australian Department of Environment 
Regulation has moved to a system called REFIRE (Re-engineering for Industry 
Regulation and Environment), which seeks to employ similar conditions for similar 
facilities. The system involves use of common templates containing a series of draft 
conditions to guide regulators in choosing the most appropriate conditions for any 
particular plant. It is expected that standardised conditions would also facilitate 
more efficient monitoring of compliance and enforcement activities. 
Not every project would lend itself to common, template conditions but where this 
is feasible it should be encouraged. For projects where unique features make such 
an approach impractical, it is still important to ensure conditions can be both 
complied with by proponents and monitored and enforced by agencies. The 
CMEWA expressed support for this: 
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CME supports the PC’s observations on the benefits of a risk based approach to 
compliance and condition setting, in particular the observation the use of standardised 
conditions may facilitate more efficient monitoring and enforcement. (sub. DR85, 
attachment, p. 8) 
Should conditions be able to be varied over time? 
Even where leading practice condition-setting practices have been adopted, 
situations will emerge where approval conditions will subsequently need to be 
varied, removed or bolstered (for example, if compliance with a condition turns out 
to have unintended and adverse consequences or if unexpected circumstances arise 
that justify stricter conditions). 
In some jurisdictions, proponents can apply directly to the responsible Minister or 
regulator for conditions to be varied. For example, under section 143 of the EPBC 
Act, the Minister can ‘by written instrument, revoke, vary or add to any conditions’; 
division 1A of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) enables planning 
permits to be amended by the approval authority; and section 46 of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) enables Ministers to vary conditions. In 
other cases, variations may be sought via merits review of the original approval 
decision (chapter 9). However, straightforward mechanisms for revisiting 
conditions are not always available. 
Given the time and cost involved with merits review processes, mechanisms within 
agencies to allow conditions to be varied (‘internal variation’) are considered to be 
the most efficient way of varying conditions. Where this is not already the case, 
governments should amend relevant legislation to codify mechanisms for internal 
variation of approval conditions. 
A further way to ensure that conditions remain fit for purpose is for regulators to 
undertake periodic evaluations of approval conditions. However, this would 
generate significant regulatory uncertainty for proponents and is only likely to be 
efficient in a limited set of circumstances (for example, for very long-lived assets 
where the risk of out of date conditions emerging is high). However, the compliance 
statements discussed in section 10.7 would represent a suitable mechanism for 
identifying cases where there is a strong case for a review of conditions. 
The Conservation Council SA expressed concern about any mechanism that enabled 
conditions to be changed without adequate consultation: 
Such a loophole can undermine the integrity of the entire Project Development 
Approvals framework. For example, it could mean the changes of transfer from a 
closed conveyer system to an open conveyer system without any new EIS. Where is the 
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consultation with the environment sector or community with such amendments? 
(sub. DR76, p. 8) 
The Commission agrees that this is a legitimate concern, and envisages that any 
mechanism for varying conditions would only be used where there was a very 
strong case for change. Any variation to conditions should also be publicly 
announced. 
ANEDO saw a need for safeguards in any measure allowing for variation of 
conditions, but saw benefits of allowing conditions to change over time: 
First, safeguards must apply to modifications of conditions, to ensure these processes 
are not ‘gamed’ to reduce compliance obligations, avoid community transparency, or 
weaken environmental standards in favour of profitability … Second, regulators should 
have powers to reasonably increase environmental protections in project conditions 
over time. For example, in the pollution context, this may include requirements that 
operators adopt ‘best available technology’ when licences are renewed, to ensure 
continuous improvement … In sum, modification of conditions must allow for both 
genuine adaptive management and continuous improvement. (sub. DR92, pp. 29–30) 
The Commission also notes the Conservation Council SA’s concern that, in 
practice, agencies seem to quietly decide to no longer enforce some decisions: 
Currently, conditions of approval are often not met or enforced where no compliance 
penalties are identified. Environmental regulators appear to select only some 
environmental standards to be maintained during the life of the project, whilst many 
others can be quietly dropped. (sub. DR76, p. 7) 
The Commission considers this an inevitable consequence of the current practice of 
keeping conditions ‘in place’ long after they have ceased to be relevant (for 
example, those that might relate to a project’s construction phase). Having a 
mechanism that enabled agencies to remove such redundant conditions (in a public 
way) could improve transparency, while also highlighting that other conditions were 
still in place and proponents were expected to comply with them. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.2 
Governments should ensure legislation enables regulatory agencies to amend 
conditions and offsets, provided that there is a strong case, the proponent is 
consulted and the proposed change is publicly announced. 
10.7 Improving agency performance on compliance 
In view of the poor current reporting of compliance activities, and that there are 
legitimate concerns about the efficacy of performance of agencies with regard to 
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compliance and enforcement, the Commission considers regulatory agencies should 
publish an annual compliance statement. The statement should report the agency’s 
monitoring of compliance and enforcement activities relating to the major projects 
approved (in whole or part) by the agency, and identify redundant or ineffective 
conditions that no longer need to be enforced. 
To provide enough information to enable conclusions about performance to be 
drawn, the statement should identify activities by an agency relating to all 
conditions attached to a project for which the agency has compliance and 
enforcement responsibilities. This does not imply agencies would be expected to 
actively enforce all conditions annually through means such as inspections or 
audits: this would not be consistent with a risk-based approach. 
The Commission considers that such a statement would help to achieve four 
outcomes: 
• reduce the possibility of adverse impacts stemming from noncompliance 
• oblige agencies to give more consideration to the conditions placed on projects 
• provide transparency about the compliance and enforcement activities of 
agencies, and thereby assist government and the community in determining 
agency performance 
• demonstrate to the community that enforcement is a priority for agencies. 
While there might be concerns that a requirement for such a compliance statement 
could increase the regulatory burden for proponents and put further resource 
pressures on agencies, the Commission does not consider that this would be a major 
issue. The statement should not unduly burden proponents as it only describes 
whether they are complying with conditions they are already obliged to meet. Much 
of the information required would also be already retained by proponents for risk 
management purposes. Moreover, the Commission considers proponents would be 
less likely to be faced with impractical, ill-considered and onerous conditions were 
a requirement for such statements introduced. 
A number of stakeholders have expressed support for the Commission’s 
recommendation of an annual compliance statement, including the Local 
Government Association of Australia (sub. DR71), AMEC (sub. DR70), the 
CMEWA (sub. DR85), Origin Energy (sub. DR100) and the Conservation Council 
SA (sub. DR76). The Planning Institute of Australia noted the role such statements 
could play in providing the public with confidence in the approvals process: 
PIA strongly supports this recommendation and believes this will assist greatly in 
guiding strategic planning for the future of these projects as well as assist in public 
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consultation activities by demonstrating how the ‘system works’ and give them 
confidence that monitoring and compliance is undertaken. (sub. DR73, p. 9) 
RECOMMENDATION 10.3 
Regulators should produce an annual major projects compliance statement that 
reviews monitoring and compliance activities and identifies redundant or 
ineffective conditions on approvals. 
A range of enforcement options is preferable 
Leading practices with respect to enforcement point to the benefits of employing a 
graduated approach to non-compliance. Advantages of this approach have been 
highlighted by the ANAO (box 10.5). 
The Commission has also previously noted the benefits of maintaining a range of 
regulatory responses: 
The greater the range of enforcement instruments available to a regulator, the greater 
the scope for a more proportionate approach to dealing with businesses in breach of 
their requirements. (2010, p. xxii) 
A range of enforcement options also allows for changes of strategy. A regulator, for 
instance, might be initially cooperative and adopt a ‘soft’ approach to compliance, 
with the option to adopt more severe enforcement options if businesses fail to 
comply (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Such changes in strategy are likely to be 
appropriate from time to time, as a strong enforcement focus can meet resistance, 
while a cooperative approach can degenerate into laxity (Cliff and Johnstone nd). 
Conflicts of duty and the risk of industry capture 
Some participants raised the issue of conflicts of duty, where those agencies 
regulating an activity were also given the responsibility of promoting that activity. 
ANEDO stated: 
Questions of regulatory independence and ‘conflicts of duties’ have also been raised, 
particularly where agencies are responsible for ‘promoting and facilitating’ an industry, 
as well as licensing and enforcement action. (sub. 14, p. 22) 
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Box 10.5 Benefits of a graduated approach to compliance 
The Australian National Audit Office has highlighted the benefits of taking a graduated 
approach to compliance: 
A set of graduated responses enables a regulator to: 
• impose a response that is proportionate to the risk 
• escalate regulatory action 
• de-escalate regulatory action 
• minimise costs associated with a response. (2007a, p. 64) 
In determining the most appropriate measures to be employed in the event of 
breaches, agencies would typically take account of a number of factors. For example, 
the Commonwealth Environment Department considers factors such as: 
• the level of potential environmental damage or harm 
• the requirements placed on referred projects 
• changes to obligations (for example, the inclusion of new threatened species or the 
‘up listing’ of existing ones) 
• changes to enforcement measures or penalties 
• new scientific knowledge 
• emerging environmental issues 
• new industries 
• new developments or areas experiencing rapid growth 
• expectations of different members of the regulated community 
• international trends (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012d).  
 
In a 2008 report into the Queensland Mines Inspectorate (QMI), the Queensland 
Ombudsman, while not finding any evidence of the agency being inappropriately 
influenced, found a number of reasons for the perception of industry capture: 
There is a reasonable perception that the QMI is subject to inappropriate influence from 
the mining industry and from officers in the DME responsible for promoting and 
supporting mining in Queensland. The main reasons for the perception are: 
• lack of organisational autonomy having regard to its position within the 
administrative framework of the DME; 
• its compliance practices, especially the preference for informal compliance options, 
which are not recorded in a way that can be publicly reported on; 
• regional factors, leading to the development of social relationships and reliance on 
mine operators’ hospitality; and 
• staffing issues, including a high degree of mobility between the QMI and the 
mining industry. (2008, p. 127) 
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These factors apply equally to the agencies involved in compliance and enforcement 
activities. Agencies should be cognisant of those areas where there is potential for 
capture, and put mechanisms in place to minimise these risks. These measures could 
include review of regulatory decisions by peers or more senior agency staff, and 
regular rotation of inspectors. The latter measure, however, could be 
counterproductive at the approval stage, where officer continuity is important to 
prevent regulatory delays. 
Where conflict of duty within agencies is seen as a major problem, consideration 
should be given to separating the policy and regulatory functions of agencies. This 
has driven the decision to set up the National Offshore Petroleum Safety and 
Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) as a statutory authority, 
independent from the Department of Industry (previously the Department of 
Resources, Energy and Tourism) which has a focus on growing the offshore 
petroleum industry. 
While NOPSEMA was initially set up solely to regulate offshore petroleum safety, 
environmental regulation has recently been added to NOPSEMA’s areas of 
responsibility. Just as there are likely to be benefits of NOPSEMA being 
independent of the department promoting the offshore petroleum industry, it might 
also be the case that the agency could deal with environmental regulation more 
dispassionately than the Department of the Environment. 
The Commission’s proposals in chapter 6 to separate regulatory assessment and 
enforcement functions from environmental policy functions would also assist in 
dealing with potential conflicts of duty. 
10.8 Third party enforcement 
In addition to enforcement of conditions by agencies, there is also scope for third 
parties11 to undertake enforcement. One way this can be done is for aggrieved 
parties to initiate litigation to enforce common law or statutory rights. While 
common law torts (such as public or private nuisance) may provide a limited cause 
of action for some matters, the major third party enforcement issue for this study 
relates to the statutory rights of third parties to bring an enforcement action, 
including for the enforcement of approval conditions. 
                                              
11 There are various statutory definitions of third party. It is not limited to individuals or 
organisations and can also encompass local councils or assessment or referral agencies in some 
jurisdictions. 
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A role for third parties in enforcement is generally accepted 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (1996) in their report Beyond the 
Door-keeper - Standing to Sue for Public Remedies concluded that third party 
enforcement has a role to play in enforcement of legal obligations: 
Political, bureaucratic and financial constraints mean the Attorney-General and other 
government plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the public interest in all matters. 
There is an important role to be played by private plaintiffs in the maintenance of the 
rule of law through the review of government decisions and the enforcement of 
statutory rights and obligations. (1996, para. 4.15) 
Such rights exist to some degree in most jurisdictions (table 10.1). For example, in 
New South Wales there is the potential for members of the community to seek 
rulings from the Land and Environment Court regarding whether approval 
conditions are being breached. The Victorian Planning and Environment Act 1987 
also enables ‘any person’ to apply to the Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal for an enforcement order in the event that a use of land contravenes a 
condition of a permit. 
The 2013 NSW Planning White Paper re-iterated a continuing role for the 
community in ensuring compliance: 
The community needs its own right to ask an independent umpire to review the 
activities of developers, neighbours and planning authorities where there has been a 
breach of the planning legislation or where a breach appears likely. (NSW 
Government 2013, p. 147) 
Others have noted that even when the law might allow for third party enforcement, 
individuals might still face major problems. For example, in 2011 the Victorian 
Environment Defenders Office noted the difficulties for individuals in bringing a 
court action: 
[Taking] enforcement proceedings is not usually possible for community groups unless 
they can get legal representation … Furthermore, there is almost always a significant 
resource-imbalance between developers and government on the one hand, and members 
of the community trying to participate in decision-making processes on the other. 
(Millner 2011, pp. 200–201) 
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Table 10.1 Statutory third party enforcement of conditions, by jurisdictiona 
 Who can bring the 
action? 
What can be 
enforced? 
Remedy 
Commonwealth    
Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 
An interested person 
or a person acting on 
behalf of an 
unincorporated 
organisation that is an 
interested person 
Act or conduct 
consisting of an act or 
omission that 
constitutes an offence 
or other contravention 
of the Act or regulation 
Injunction 
New South Wales    
Planning and 
Assessment Act 
Any person A breach of the Act An order to remedy or 
restrain the breach 
Protection of the 
Environment Operations 
Act 
Any person A breach of the Act An order to remedy or 
restrain the breach 
Victoria    
Planning and 
Environment Act 
Any person A breach of the Act, a 
planning scheme, a 
condition of a permit or 
an agreement 
Enforcement order 
Queensland    
Nature Conservation Act A person A matter that has been, 
is to be or should have 
been done for this Act, 
the construction of a 
license or permit, or the 
lawfulness of an activity 
Court may make orders 
and declarations 
Environment Protection 
Act 
The Minister, the 
administering 
authority, someone 
whose interests are 
affected by the subject 
matter of the 
proceeding or 
someone else with the 
leave of the Court 
(even though the 
person does not have 
a proprietary, material, 
financial or special 
interest in the subject 
matter of the 
proceeding). 
An offence against this 
Act, or a threatened or 
anticipated offence 
against this Act 
An order to remedy or 
restrain an offence 
Sustainable Planning Act Any person or 
assessment manager 
(in certain 
circumstances) 
A matter done, to be 
done or that should 
have been done for 
this Act (other than 
about the lawfulness 
of land use or 
development) 
Declaration 
(continued next page) 
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Table 10.1 (continued) 
 Who can bring the 
action? 
What can be 
enforced? 
Remedy 
South Australia    
Development Act Any person An order to remedy or 
restrain a breach of 
this Act or a repealed 
Act 
An order to remedy or 
restrain the breach 
Environment Protection 
Act 
The EPA, an 
administering agency, 
a person directly 
affected by the 
subject matter or 
another person with 
the permission of the 
court 
Contravention of the 
Act or failure to do 
something required by 
the Act 
An order 
Tasmania    
Environmental 
Management and 
Pollution Control Act 
A council or a person 
who has a sufficient 
interest 
If a person is 
breaching the Act, 
failing to do anything 
required by the Act, or 
causing environmental 
harm 
An order 
ACT   
Environment Protection 
Act 
The EPA or any other 
person with leave of 
the court 
Contravention of the 
Act 
An order 
Planning and 
Development Act 
The planning and 
land authority or 
anyone else 
Contravention of a 
controlled activity 
order or prohibition 
notice 
Injunction 
Heritage Act The council or any 
other person with 
leave of the court 
Contravention of the 
Act 
A heritage order 
a There are no statutory third party enforcement provisions in Western Australia or the Northern Territory. 
Source: Commission analysis. 
It was also suggested individuals might find gaining expert opinion difficult: 
Finding experts willing to do work that may involve them giving evidence against large 
developers, mining companies, operators of industrial facilities and government bodies 
can be very difficult, because experts do not want to prejudice future opportunities for 
obtaining work from these companies and entities … In one instance, it was so difficult 
that in the end the client retained an expert from the USA. Obviously, this is usually not 
a feasible option for community groups. (Millner 2011, p. 201) 
Participants views on the role of third party enforcement 
A number of participants supported a role for third parties in enforcement, including 
the Australian Local Government Association (sub. DR71), the Planning Institute of 
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Australia (sub. DR73), the Nature Conservation Council of NSW (sub. DR94), Jim 
Leggate (sub. DR61), Amelia Thorpe (sub. DR98) and the Local Government 
Association of Queensland (sub. DR78). The Conservation Council SA envisaged 
an ongoing role for third parties with regard to enforcement, while seeing it as no 
substitute for the role of regulatory authorities: 
The Conservation Council strongly supports [a role for third party enforcement] but 
cautions that third party access should not be at the expense of adequate supervisory 
and enforcement controls for the authorities ultimately responsible for managing the 
approval and licence process. We could not accept any situation where the responsible 
agencies could be seen to be abrogating their responsibilities. (sub. DR76, p. 7) 
ANEDO saw third party enforcement provisions, with open standing (that is, all 
persons or organisations able to bring an action), as helping to redress areas of 
regulatory failure: 
Open standing for enforcement of major project compliance is most appropriate, as the 
number, size and complexity of such projects all increase the potential for non-
compliance to go undetected or unaddressed by the relevant state agency. The general 
importance of open standing for environmental justice is evident from successful third 
party enforcement actions addressing non-compliance that would have otherwise gone 
unenforced by regulators. This includes community actions under Queensland and 
Commonwealth legislation preventing the electrocution of flying foxes, and against 
pollution of the Coxs River in the NSW Blue Mountains (sub. DR92, p. 51) 
Other stakeholders were opposed to third parties having an enforcement role, 
including the Queensland Resources Council (sub. DR91), the BCA (sub. DR102), 
the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association (sub. DR105) and 
AMEC (sub. DR70). The Queensland Gas Company saw it as delaying approval 
processes: 
[The Commission’s draft recommendation] appears to entertain a broad right for 
anyone to initiate legal action to enforce conditions on primary approvals. It goes 
further to suggest that legal costs should not be allowed to present a barrier to any such 
action. QGC would be concerned that this could be an extremely dangerous outcome to 
the approval process in Australia. There are a number of recent court decisions that 
would support this view. (sub. DR79, p. 2) 
The CMEWA highlighted the importance of having an enforcement hierarchy, and 
thought third party enforcement was inconsistent with this: 
Any action on non-compliance should be the responsibility of the regulator. Third party 
concerns should be brought to the attention of the regulator to ensure the regulator can 
take a ‘graduated approach to non-compliance’ and utilise a range of regulatory 
responses as identified by the PC as best practice. (sub. DR85, attachment 1, p. 9) 
Origin Energy supported a role for third party enforcement, although they saw no 
reason to extend the current arrangements for standing: 
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Origin does not support [the Commission’s draft recommendation] that Governments 
should ensure that third parties can initiate legal action to enforce conditions on 
primary approvals. Whilst we agree that third party enforcement is an important part of 
the regulatory framework, again we are of the view that there are already sufficient 
provisions for this in the current rules. The Commission has raised the issue of legal 
costs acting as a barrier to third party enforcement – however it is also crucial that there 
is a reasonable threshold for those who wish to engage in this activity. Otherwise 
project proponents are likely to [be] subject to an increasing number of vexatious 
claims. (sub. DR100, p. 3) 
A number of other participants also commented specifically about who should have 
standing for third party enforcement actions. The Lock The Gate Alliance saw open 
standing arrangements as leading to better outcomes: 
We believe that open standing has been a crucial component of the NSW planning 
system, and the lack of standing in, for example Queensland, has contributed to poor 
outcomes and considerable imbalance in the system. We agree that in addition to 
allowing people directly affected by noncompliance to take enforcement action 
standing for both merits and judicial appeals should be available to people or 
organisations that have participated in the initial approval process for a project, 
interested persons that are affected by a project and any organisation whose objects and 
mission are consistent with matters of public interest at stake. (sub. DR97, p. 15) 
AGL noted that they had encountered few problems with standing being defined 
broadly for third party enforcement purposes: 
We support broad ‘standing’ arrangements for third party enforcement cases in relation 
to non-compliance by project proponents with conditions attached to project approvals. 
We note that this is the case in many jurisdictions in which AGL operates, and we have 
no concerns with the way this functions. (sub. DR96, p. 4) 
An ongoing role for third party enforcement 
Compliance with approval conditions is essential to ensure the credibility of 
approval processes and to prevent adverse outcomes. However, in practice, not even 
the best resourced and most diligent and competent of regulatory agencies could 
realistically be expected to deal with, or even be aware of, every significant act of 
noncompliance. The Commission therefore sees an ongoing role for third parties 
with regard to enforcement of primary approval conditions, and considers that this 
role, where not already the case, should be enshrined in legislation. 
While concerns about third parties using enforcement powers mischievously are 
understandable, in view of the difficulties for third parties in bringing court action 
highlighted above the Commission sees these risks as being overstated by some 
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participants. The role the Commission envisages for third party enforcement is to 
reinforce approval processes by ensuring conditions are complied with. 
Further, while use of measures such as injunctions can delay projects, these will 
only be provided where the court sees a strong reason to do so. Courts consider the 
potential damage to all parties when deciding whether to grant an injunction. For 
example, a recent application for an interlocutory injunction to stop work at the 
Maules Creek Coal development in New South Wales (Northern Inland Council for 
the Environment Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Water) was 
rejected in the Federal Court. In his judgment, Justice Griffiths highlighted that the 
potential financial impact on the project proponent weighed heavily in his decision: 
The consequence of that is that any delay occasioned by an interlocutory injunction 
which impacts upon Aston’s capacity to meet its contractual obligations to supply coal 
from the project as at 1 January 2015 will result in it incurring a cost of $4.48 million 
per month. That is a sizable financial prejudice … In my view, that prejudice is 
sufficient of itself to weigh heavily with the court, when it comes to assessing the 
hardship caused to the proponent by the grant of an interlocutory injunction. In fact, 
Aston also claims that it would suffer other prejudices of a commercial nature … 
Taking all … matters into account, I consider that the balance of convenience is 
weighed, comfortably, in favour of Aston. In those circumstances, on condition that the 
proffered undertaking is amended to reflect the revisions that were identified by its 
counsel before me today, I would dismiss the application for interlocutory relief and 
order that the costs of, and incidental to, the interlocutory application be costs in the 
cause.  
Third party enforcement should be seen as a last resort 
The Commission agrees that in some cases third party enforcement is inconsistent 
with the graduated approach to enforcement typically pursued by agencies, but 
notes that third party enforcement is likely to be limited to cases where agencies 
have failed to take action. The Commission thinks there is a strong argument for 
third party enforcement to be seen only as a last resort, available where parties can 
demonstrate they have previously taken their concern to regulators or where the 
court or tribunal is not satisfied that the regulator has dealt with the matter 
appropriately. (An exception to this would be interlocutory injunctions, where the 
possibility of immediate damage would make problematic the requirement to first 
speak to a regulator before being able to take legal action.) 
Further, if project operators have good ongoing consultative processes in place, 
potential for third party litigation should be diminished. Where third parties do feel 
it is necessary to take action, the Commission sees a role for mediation before any 
prospect of matters becoming enmeshed in prolonged legal action except in cases of 
immediate substantial harm. If third party enforcement was ever to become 
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commonplace in any jurisdiction, the Commission considers an inquiry into the 
reasons for this would be appropriate. 
Standing should be applied broadly 
The Commission considers that standing should be applied broadly in the case of 
third party enforcement because of the number of parties potentially adversely 
affected by breaches of conditions. Parties directly affected by noncompliance, such 
as property owners incurring property damage, should be given standing. However, 
the potentially diffuse impacts of noncompliance mean non-government 
organisations, such as environmental or heritage protection groups also have a role. 
In view of this, the ‘interested person’ arrangements for taking enforcement action 
under the EPBC Act, or similar arrangements, are seen as representing an 
appropriate basis for determining who should be able to take enforcement action. 
These arrangements would allow any person or group involved with ‘protection or 
conservation of, or research into, the environment’ (EPBC Act, s. 475) at any time 
in the past two years to take enforcement action (in addition to any person or 
organisation directly affected by a project). 
The Commission also considered extending provision of standing for third party 
enforcement cases to ‘any person’, as is already the case in some jurisdictions 
(table 10.1). On balance, the Commission does not consider the extension of 
standing to ‘any person’ is necessary once standing is extended to all interested 
persons as defined in the previous paragraph. However, the Commission considers 
legislation should enable courts to extend standing more broadly where it is likely in 
the view of the court that an injustice would otherwise take place. It is envisaged 
that such provisions would be used rarely. 
Allocation of costs is also important 
The allocation of the costs associated with third party enforcement actions is also 
important. As discussed in chapter 9, generally when legal action is brought the 
unsuccessful party is required to pay both their own legal costs and those of the 
other party. This is to ensure that successful parties are not financially penalised as a 
result of having their rights vindicated. 
In the case of third party enforcement, awarding costs to the successful party (and 
therefore potentially against the third parties bringing the action) provides an 
incentive for third parties to only bring actions with a high probability of success 
(and a strong disincentive against vexatious litigation). On the other hand, these 
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arrangements can also discourage litigation with a strong chance of success (and a 
‘public interest’ component) because the third party may not be able to risk losing 
the case. It is also sometimes argued that it is unfair for unsuccessful parties to be 
financially penalised where they have acted in good faith and had a strong case. 
Third party enforcement provisions will be ineffective if cost arrangements cause 
affected parties to be unwilling to exercise their rights for fear of losing and 
receiving a strong financial penalty. To ensure third party enforcement provisions 
are effective, governments need to develop cost arrangements that do not provide a 
barrier for legitimate enforcement actions, while simultaneously maintaining 
disincentives for cases with little merit. 
There are a number of mechanisms for reducing the costs associated with third party 
enforcement actions, including use of mediation, use of relatively informal 
tribunals, provision of legal aid or government assistance for environmental groups, 
or provision for courts to vary costs on ‘public interest’ grounds. The Commission 
will explore these issues further in its current Access to Justice inquiry. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.4 
Governments should ensure that third parties are able to initiate legal action to 
enforce the conditions that have been placed on primary approvals, and that legal 
costs do not present a barrier to legitimate actions of this type being brought by 
individuals or bona fide community groups. 
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11 Strategic approaches 
 
Key points 
• Development assessment and approval processes (DAA) in Australia predominantly 
involve project-level assessment. Strategic planning and assessment are not being 
used to their full potential at present. 
• The Commission considers greater use of strategic (or higher-level) approaches 
would be beneficial. Strategic assessment and strategic planning are tools for doing 
this. 
• While the term ‘strategic assessment’ is most commonly used within the planning 
sphere, assessments of a strategic nature are also important to the development of 
sound environmental and resource management policies. Such policies can 
improve the operation of DAA systems and there are examples of this occurring. 
• Both environmental and business groups participating in this study generally favour 
giving strategic assessment an enhanced role in the DAA system. 
• Strategic assessment and strategic planning can take into account the cumulative 
impacts of projects and have the potential to reduce the scale and cost of 
subsequent project-level assessment of major projects. They can also improve 
environmental outcomes by considering cumulative impacts at the appropriate 
scale. 
• However, strategic assessments can also be time consuming and costly. And 
benefits are only achieved where there is integration with planning and project-level 
processes. Without such integration, strategic assessments can increase, rather 
than reduce, regulatory burdens. 
• Strategic assessments under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) have become more widespread. These have 
removed the need for Australian Government approval of some subsequent projects 
and reduced costs for proponents, and have the potential to lead to improved 
environmental outcomes. 
• State and Territory Governments should continue to improve the quality of their 
strategic planning by placing greater emphasis on: strategic decision making; 
effective community consultation; gathering and disseminating baseline 
environmental and heritage data; and analysis of the environmental and other 
impacts of plans.  
 
Development assessment and approval (DAA) processes in Australia predominantly 
involve project-level assessment and previous chapters have highlighted a number 
of shortcomings with these processes. While many of these problems can be 
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remedied through the reforms proposed elsewhere in this report, it is worthwhile 
also considering whether greater reliance on strategic (or higher-level) approaches 
would be beneficial. 
The main way to do this is to undertake strategic assessment prior to the assessment 
of individual projects. Strategic assessments focus on the potential impacts of plans, 
policies and programs, rather than individual projects. Strategic assessment can 
reduce or remove the need for subsequent project-level development assessment 
and approval. 
Strategic planning is another tool that can help to improve the way DAA regulations 
and processes operate. Strategic plans can indicate broad preferences for the 
location of particular types of developments. Where such plans are underpinned by 
community consultation and consideration of environmental, heritage and other 
values, they can reduce the number of issues that need to be considered at the 
project level, and the bounds of appropriate review processes on project approvals. 
Strategic assessment can inform the development of strategic plans, and so the two 
approaches are related. 
11.1 What is strategic assessment and how can it help? 
Strategic assessment means different things to different people. In Australia, it is 
often used to refer specifically to a procedure that can be used under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (the 
EPBC Act) to facilitate the concurrent consideration of the environmental concerns 
of different levels of government. There is also an international literature that 
focuses on strategic environmental assessment (SEA) as a means of incorporating 
environmental factors into planning frameworks. But ‘strategic assessment’ can also 
refer more broadly to assessments that take place above the individual project level, 
including those done in the normal course of developing environmental and 
resource management policies. 
In the Commission’s view, strategic assessment is best understood as a broad 
concept that covers assessments of the potential impacts of plans, policies and 
programs across an entire region, catchment area, activity or industry. The scope 
and complexity of a strategic assessment depends on the plans, policies and 
programs involved. Strategic assessment of a particular environmental policy would 
generally be a much simpler exercise than strategic assessment of the broad range of 
plans, policies and programs that influence development across a region. 
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Table 11.1 outlines some of the key differences between project-level assessment 
and strategic assessment. However, it should be noted that the differences are not 
always clear-cut. For example, some recent project-level impact assessments have 
required the consideration of cumulative impacts, such as for the Arrow Energy 
LNG project (formerly known as the Shell Australia LNG project) in Gladstone 
(Coordinator-General (Qld) 2010b). 
Table 11.1 Differences between project-level assessment and strategic 
assessment 
Project-level assessment Strategic assessment 
Is reactive to development proposals and 
typically begins at a late stage of decision 
making 
May proactively inform development proposals 
and typically begins at an early stage of decision 
making 
Is narrowly focused Is broadly focused 
Assesses the impacts of a development Assesses the impacts of one or more policy, plan 
or program 
Focuses on a specific project at a specific 
location 
Focuses on regions, catchments, activities or 
industry sectors 
Assesses the direct impacts and benefits of a 
development 
Assesses cumulative impacts and identifies 
implications and issues for sustainable 
development 
Focuses on the mitigation of impacts Focuses on achieving policy objectives or targets 
Has a well-defined beginning and end Can be a continuing process 
Source: adapted from Parliament of Victoria (2011). 
As noted by the OECD (2006, p. 34), there is no ‘recipe approach’ to strategic 
assessment, with the diversity of applications reflecting the need to adapt the 
concept to the need being addressed and the circumstances in which the assessment 
is being applied. Common elements of the strategic assessment process include: 
• consulting stakeholders 
• identifying likely effects (be they environmental, economic and/or social) 
• evaluating the significance of impacts 
• determining measures to mitigate adverse impacts or enhance positive ones 
• reporting the findings to decision makers (Sadler 2011). 
Strategic assessment has been used in a range of countries (appendix F). Much of 
this experience relates to the European Union, where SEAs have been mandatory 
for certain types of plans and programs since 2001. Some lessons that can be drawn 
from the international experience are given in box 11.1. 
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Environmental and business groups favour strategic assessment 
Environmental and business groups participating in this study generally favour 
giving strategic assessment an enhanced role in the DAA system. Most submissions 
that discussed this topic focused on the role of strategic assessment in dealing with 
overlapping Commonwealth and State environmental concerns under the EPBC 
Act, but there was also support for strategic assessment more generally. 
 
Box 11.1 Lessons from the international use of strategic assessment 
The Commission has examined the use of strategic assessment in the European Union 
(focusing mainly on the United Kingdom), Canada and the United States. Lessons 
relevant to Australia that can be drawn from the use of strategic assessment in these 
countries are as follows. 
Consultation is important to achieve stakeholder ‘buy-in’ 
It is important that communities are engaged in the strategic assessment process from 
an early stage. By ensuring adequate consultation, both with the broader community 
and with planning experts, feedback may be incorporated into the assessment of 
policies, plans and programs. Without proper engagement with the community and 
incorporation of feedback, strategic assessments are unlikely to lead to more efficient 
development assessment and approval processes for major projects, as stakeholders 
lack ‘buy-in’ to decisions. 
Need to consider alternative options 
Strategic assessment provides an opportunity to evaluate and compare the impact of 
alternative options in the development of a new policy, plan or program. This might 
involve, for example, examining the impacts of locating key infrastructure in a number 
of alternative locations. For the proper consideration of alternatives it is essential that 
strategic assessment be undertaken in the early stages of the planning process. The 
consideration of alternative options is assisted by the availability of high quality 
baseline data on environmental, heritage and other assets. 
Benefits come from integration with the broader planning process  
Rather than running strategic assessment as a parallel but separate process, which 
can lead to duplication of effort, it should be integrated with the planning process. This 
will help to ensure that environmental, cultural and economic impacts are properly 
considered, which should help to ensure better outcomes for the community. To avoid 
wasting time and resources, it is critical to ensure that strategic assessment focuses on 
the key issues early in the process. By integrating strategic assessment into the 
planning process, efficiencies may be generated through the pre-assessment of certain 
types of development. Where there is a lack of integration, stakeholders may view 
strategic assessment as a burden with little or no added value. 
Source: Appendix F.  
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The Nature Conservation Society of South Australia (NCSSA) commented: 
The NCSSA supports the proposal to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
DAA processes through the use of strategic assessments. … The NCSSA considers the 
current arrangements, in relation to assessments of the cumulative impact of major 
projects on protected species, grossly inadequate. (sub. 37, p. 3) 
The Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists argued that strategic assessments 
could be used to consider all environmental values together: 
Strategic assessments can be used to identify matters of both national and state 
environmental significance therefore streamlining and simplifying development 
planning by enabling all environmental values to be considered together. (sub. 1, p. 7) 
The Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices (ANEDO) argued 
that strategic assessment presented both opportunities and risks: 
ANEDO is concerned that the Australian Government’s intent to increase the use of 
strategic environmental assessment (or SEA) may place emphasis on ‘streamlining’ 
approvals, without the additional safeguards recommended in the Hawke Review. As 
an emerging field with a variety of implementation options, SEA presents new 
opportunities, but also a number of risks. (sub. 14, pp. 26–7) 
Further, in response to the draft report, ANEDO stated: 
SEA should not replace individual project assessment. The use of SEA in conjunction 
with project assessment will still lead to efficiencies because major environmental 
issues are identified and considered upfront. (sub. DR92, p. 8) 
A number of business groups pointed to the potential for strategic assessments to 
reduce regulatory burdens. The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western 
Australia stated that it: 
… support[s] the use of strategic assessments where these approaches reduce regulatory 
burden and provide for positive environmental outcomes. Ideally, these strategic 
environmental approaches should be integrated with strategic planning at the landscape 
scale. (sub. 18, p. 5) 
The Business Council of Australia supported strategic assessments, but also argued 
that they can have a downside: 
Strategic assessments, as are occurring in environmental regulation, are also a good 
alternative [to project based assessment], and should be prioritised. The strategic 
assessments can, however, take a long time to complete, sometimes many years, and 
would need to be regularly updated to incorporate new information or changed 
circumstances. (sub. 43, p. 15) 
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Advantages and disadvantages 
There can be significant advantages in undertaking strategic assessments. As 
discussed below, they can lead to improvements in policies, plans and programs that 
in turn produce better environmental outcomes. They can also enable project-level 
DAA processes to be cheaper, faster and more certain. But there are some potential 
disadvantages, mainly associated with the time and cost of conducting a strategic 
assessment and problems that arise where there is a lack of integration with 
planning and project-level processes. Ultimately, how a strategic assessment is 
designed and conducted, and how it is integrated with the overall DAA process, will 
determine whether it is beneficial.  
Better understanding and management of cumulative impacts 
The ability of strategic assessments to consider cumulative environmental (and 
other) impacts is widely recognised. For example, the Hawke Review found that: 
… strategic assessments and other landscape-approaches offer feasible, equitable and 
cost-effective ways of addressing the cumulative impacts of actions in an area or 
region. (Hawke 2009, p. 78) 
Macintosh (2013) argued that project-based assessment was incapable of dealing 
adequately with cumulative impacts and that an important benefit of strategic 
assessment was that: 
… it can capture the cumulative impacts of multiple actions and ensure that there is an 
alignment of objectives at all levels of government decision making (ie. policy, 
planning, program and project). (2013, p. 543) 
Noble (2008, p. 68) also noted that it is difficult to properly assess cumulative 
impacts within the constraints of the individual project approval process, and that 
having a strategic assessment framework is useful to ‘address the nature and 
underlying sources of cumulative change’. 
There are two main elements to this advantage. First, strategic assessments can 
consider all sources of cumulative effects on the environment. For example, the 
Great Barrier Reef strategic assessment draft report has found that activities 
contributing to a decline in water quality (which has a range of impacts on the reef) 
include agriculture (very high effect), urban and industrial development (high 
effect) and tourism development and use (low effect) (Queensland 
Government 2013a). Such information can be used to develop an integrated policy 
response focused on achieving better outcomes in a cost-effective manner. 
Project-level assessment, by focusing only on one new development at a time, can 
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lead to higher cost mitigation actions that may be insufficient to properly address 
the problem. 
Second, strategic assessments can focus attention on overall effects, sensitivities, 
and capacities of the receiving environment (Dales 2011). For example, a strategic 
assessment of a groundwater resource might determine that a certain quantity of 
water can be extracted sustainably, but that above this threshold the ecological 
health of wetlands will begin to deteriorate. Such an assessment can lead to the 
setting of an overall extraction limit that strikes a balance between the benefits from 
extraction and the benefits from conserving groundwater. By contrast, project-level 
assessments may be unnecessarily duplicative because the effect of extraction on 
wetlands needs to be revisited for each new project. Also, due to time and other 
constraints, they may fail to identify important thresholds or properly assess costs 
and benefits.  
However, it should be noted that the assessment of cumulative impacts is an area 
where methodology is still developing, and it can be challenging even within a 
strategic assessment framework (Stoeglehner 2010). For instance, it may be difficult 
to assess cumulative impacts where there are a range of individual projects (either 
planned or completed) with uncertain impacts, or where future development is 
uncertain. One potential solution to this problem, as suggested by the Queensland 
Coordinator-General, is to use a scenario-based approach to cumulative impact 
assessment: 
In this approach certain defined scenarios, based on the current portfolio of projects, 
and making reasonable estimations for known projects, are developed for alternative 
analysis to determine a range of credible impacts. This would be used as a more 
reliable guide to impact mitigation and conditioning. (2010a, p. 72) 
In the view of the Commission, considering cumulative impacts is a leading practice 
appropriate for major project assessment and approval processes. In most cases this 
is best done as part of a strategic assessment process. Where this is not feasible, 
project-level assessment should attempt to consider cumulative impacts to the 
extent possible. As more robust frameworks for cumulative impact assessment are 
developed, these should be incorporated into the assessment process. 
More streamlined project-level DAA processes 
Strategic assessments can lead to greater certainty, lower costs and shorter 
timeframes for project-level DAA processes in three main ways. First, strategic 
assessments conducted under the EPBC Act can remove the need for Australian 
Government assessment and approval of some subsequent projects (section 11.2). 
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Second, strategic assessments used to guide planning (conducted either under the 
EPBC Act or by individual jurisdictions) can help to resolve tradeoffs between 
development and environmental and other values, and provide more certainty about 
which areas are suitable for development. By raising the discussion above the 
individual project level, the appropriate level of development can be considered 
from a strategic perspective. 
In some cases, this could lead to pre-approval for some developments. For example, 
the Melbourne Urban Growth Boundary strategic assessment (discussed later) 
delivered a single environmental approval for both Victorian and Commonwealth 
environmental regulations (DEPI (Vic) 2013a). In others, project-level DAA 
processes would still apply, but may be less extensive. This streamlining of DAA 
processes would create efficiencies for proponents, community stakeholders and 
governments. 
The extent to which project-level assessment can be reduced will depend on the 
scope and nature of the strategic assessment, as well as the specific nature of the 
proposed development. Where the range of possible future developments in a region 
being strategically assessed is more predictable, it may be easier to generate 
efficiency savings through pre-approval. For example, within and around 
Australia’s capital cities, planners can have reasonable confidence that there will be 
continued growth in housing stock, as well as of roads, airports, public transport, 
hospitals, schools and other infrastructure necessary to facilitate urban development. 
Accordingly, in these regions strategic assessment can be used to provide 
pre-approval for the more predictable and planned elements of urban development. 
In regional and remote areas, the type and location of possible developments may 
be less certain. For instance, the location, size and nature of future resource projects 
may be difficult to predict, particularly as new extraction technologies such as coal 
seam gas develop. In addition, government plans for infrastructure in regional and 
remote areas may be less developed. As a result, strategic assessment may be less 
likely to provide opportunities to pre-approve activities in some cases. However, 
strategic assessment may be able to be usefully employed in the lead up to a series 
of identified resource-related projects in a region. 
Third, strategic assessments conducted in the development of environmental and 
resource policy can establish clear requirements that projects need to meet, and 
remove the need for detailed assessment of particular issues at the project level. For 
example, strategic assessment of biodiversity values can reduce the need for on-site 
assessment, lead to greater certainty about which areas of native vegetation can be 
cleared, and the likely cost of any compensating actions (such as providing offsets). 
These issues are discussed further in section 11.2 and appendix F. 
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Better outcomes due to early consideration of issues 
The potential environmental benefits from the early consideration of issues were 
recognised by the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists: 
Rather than leaving the assessment until after a plan, policy or program has been 
finalised and actions set in place, strategic assessments completed either before, or even 
at the same time as, the development of a major plan or policy are more likely to 
deliver better environmental outcomes. (sub. 1, p. 7) 
Macintosh (2013, p. 544) also refers to the potential for strategic assessments to 
provide benefits because ‘environmental issues, and less environmentally damaging 
alternatives, are considered throughout the decision making chain’. 
By incorporating the consideration of project alternatives at an earlier stage in the 
decision-making process, strategic assessment potentially allows for a broader 
consideration of development options than project-based assessment. Significantly, 
strategic assessment allows for assessment of alternatives to a project, rather than 
just of alternative options for a project. This may allow environmental problems to 
be avoided through planning and design, rather than relying on mitigation measures 
to reduce the impact of development on the environment. 
Provision of better baseline data 
To manage environmental and other assets well, it is necessary to understand the 
effect of development and other processes on their condition. This gives rise to a 
need for baseline data on the condition of assets in the absence of new development. 
Preferably, this dataset would cover not just natural assets, but also economic, 
historical and cultural assets where present. In many cases, monitoring programs 
already exist at national, regional and local levels, but there are often important gaps 
in the information collected through these processes. 
Donnelly, Prendergast and Hanusch (2008) found that it is not always clear what 
data are required to monitor and manage environmental assets, or who should be 
responsible for collecting data. In these cases, the strategic assessment process can 
be useful for identifying information gaps and establishing processes to collect the 
relevant data to establish an environmental baseline. For strategic assessments under 
the EPBC Act, the availability of information and data requirements are generally 
considered at an early stage (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012a). 
Without strategic assessment, data gaps may only be identified during the 
assessment of an individual project, and surveys to collect data at this stage can be 
costly and time consuming. For example, some environmental data are best 
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collected at a particular time of year and this can add to delays. A further issue is 
that data collected for a project may not be available to subsequent project 
proponents, leading to a duplication of effort. In outlining their support for strategic 
assessment, the Business Council of Australia stated: 
… baseline environmental data that can be shared and which can avoid costly new 
research is useful if it is robust and independent and updated. (sub. 43, p. 15) 
The Commission considers that the collection of baseline data is an important 
leading practice for both improving environmental outcomes and improving the 
efficiency of DAA processes. Strategic assessment can be a useful means for 
improving baseline data and making it available to both governments and 
proponents to assist them plan for the future. That said, the cost and benefits of data 
collection need to be considered and strategic assessments can still be worthwhile 
even where environmental baseline data are not comprehensive. 
Costly and time consuming process 
One of the potential disadvantages of strategic assessment is that it can be costly 
and time consuming. For example, more than five years after agreement was 
reached to conduct the Browse Basin LNG Precinct strategic assessment, the 
Australian Government has not verified whether the requirements of the strategic 
assessment have been met (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012j). The Australian 
Government’s Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities (DSEWPAC) reported that a number of factors have contributed to 
the delays and that the foundation proponent has now withdrawn (sub. DR88). 
Some other more recent strategic assessments have been completed in under two 
years (table 11.2). 
Strategic assessment may also be problematic for project development. As 
previously noted by the Commission (PC 2011c), the benefits of strategic 
assessment to all stakeholders are likely to be highest if it is undertaken in 
conjunction with the broader strategic land use planning for an area and completed 
before anyone seeks to commence development in that area. However, an 
assessment that takes several years to complete may end up costing more than 
allowing the relevant area to be developed through individual project approval 
processes if development is delayed while the assessment takes place. 
Governments can, therefore, face a difficult choice when considering how to 
manage development during a strategic assessment process. One option is to place a 
moratorium on development during the assessment process, which is likely to 
maximise the potential environmental benefits of the assessment but potentially 
delay the development of specific projects. An alternative option is to allow 
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development to continue, subject to project-by-project approval while the strategic 
assessment takes place. However, this may diminish the value of the strategic 
assessment process as it limits its capacity to consider cumulative effects and 
alternative development options. 
Additional layer of regulation 
There is a risk that where strategic assessment is not undertaken with a focus on 
reducing the unnecessary regulatory burden of the DAA process for major projects, 
that it may lead to an additional layer of ‘green tape’. For instance, a government 
that undertakes a strategic assessment while retaining all the requirements of its 
existing project-based DAA process may increase costs for both project proponents 
and the government itself, while not necessarily producing better outcomes.  
Some participants were generally supportive of strategic assessments, but retained 
concerns about the possibility of them increasing regulatory burdens. For example, 
the Metropolitan Redevelopment Authority of Western Australia stated:  
There is a concern that strategic assessment may create another layer of regulatory 
control, further reducing the efficiency of development assessment without providing 
significant benefit. (sub. DR66, p. 2) 
The Queensland Government submitted: 
Few of the strategic assessments undertaken to date have delivered significant classes 
of action and most have taken years and years and delivered little benefit. In many 
ways, strategic assessments simply duplicate the existing state and local planning 
processes. (sub. 47, p. 3) 
However, DSEWPAC (sub. DR88) reported that this does not reflect its experience 
with strategic assessments. Evidence presented later in this chapter demonstrates 
that at least some strategic assessments under the EPBC Act have delivered 
significant benefits. 
Limited potential to reduce the need for subsequent consultation 
Strategic assessments often entail broad community consultation, and this enables 
stakeholders to be engaged in the decision-making process at an early stage. 
However, this may not substantially reduce subsequent consultation regarding 
individual projects. For example, Runhaar and Driessen in an analysis of four Dutch 
case studies found that: 
The cases did not provide any evidence of SEAs making project environmental impact 
assessments redundant in subsequent decision-making. In all cases, the struggle with 
stakeholders will start or continue in the implementation stage of the plan. (2007, p. 11) 
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One possible reason for this occurring is that members of the public may regard 
strategic assessments as being abstract, and so may prefer to engage with the more 
concrete nature of project-level issues (Shi 2011). More generally, evidence 
suggests that this outcome most commonly occurs where stakeholders lack ‘buy-in’ 
to the strategic assessment process. This can result in limited community acceptance 
of the strategic assessment, and also poor integration of the assessment into the 
decision process. Commenting on the use of SEA in Ireland, the Irish 
Environmental Protection Agency found: 
Many people perceive SEA as being time- and resource-intensive, and a check list to be 
completed in order to advance a plan. Where this happens, the SEA and plan-making 
processes may run in parallel but there is no meaningful integration of SEA and 
plan-making. Getting buy-in from managers and decision-makers is crucial to SEA 
integration and effectiveness. (2012, p. 51) 
Cost recovery can be impractical 
As a general rule, cost recovery for government products and services is desirable 
where: it can be achieved efficiently and cost effectively; the beneficiaries of the 
product or services are a narrow and identifiable group; and charging is consistent 
with policy objectives. Under a project-by-project assessment process it is relatively 
simple to identify the party from which costs can be recovered, as the proponent is 
clearly the party receiving the private benefit. However, it is more challenging to 
identify the beneficiaries of a strategic assessment as these assessments apply to 
future actions and may be carried out by proponents that are not yet known. 
Given the nature of strategic assessment, it is often undertaken by government on 
behalf of the community. As such, the strategic assessment process shifts the cost of 
environmental assessment from individual project proponents to the government. 
This may be partially justified on efficiency grounds — one holistic assessment for 
a potentially large region as opposed to a number of individual assessments that 
may duplicate the same information, and may not consider cumulative impacts of 
development. 
The Hawke Review suggested that it was challenging to identify the beneficiaries of 
a strategic assessment and that: 
While it is possible to charge State, Territory or local governments for the assessment 
of plans, there is a real chance that introducing cost recovery would be a disincentive to 
undertaking strategic assessments. If the Australian Government decides that 
encouraging strategic assessment is a policy objective, cost recovery may not be 
appropriate at this stage. (Hawke 2009, p. 288)  
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In the view of the Commission, while it may be appropriate for governments to seek 
to recover some of the costs of strategic assessments where they generate a private 
benefit for developers, implementing cost recovery in an efficient and cost-effective 
manner may be difficult. The process of determining the shares of benefits accruing 
to developers and the community more broadly from a successful strategic 
assessment, and then allocating that proportion of the total cost across developers is 
likely to be impractical in most cases. 
11.2 Strategic assessments in practice 
The variety of terms used to describe strategic assessment-type processes is broad 
and there are a number of policy frameworks at the Commonwealth, state and 
territory level that allow for different strategic assessment approaches. However, as 
noted by a number of commentators, there are few mechanisms for formal strategic 
assessment in Australia, and those that do exist tend to be discretionary rather than a 
compulsory part of the planning process (Ashe and Marsden 2011; Kelly, Jackson 
and Williams 2012).  
Strategic assessment under the EPBC Act 
The main avenue for strategic assessments to occur under Commonwealth 
jurisdiction is through the provisions of the EPBC Act (box 11.2). This provides an 
alternative pathway to project-level assessment for considering matters of national 
environmental significance. Strategic assessments conducted under the EPBC Act 
can remove the need for further Commonwealth approval of some subsequent 
projects in a defined region. They may also reduce the need for project-level 
assessment and approval by State and Territory Governments.  
A number of reviews have highlighted how strategic assessments can provide a 
benefit to the community. These include the Hawke Review, which recommended 
that they play an expanded role, finding that: 
Compared to project-specific assessment, these [strategic assessment] approaches have 
the capacity to address multiple impacts on matters of national environmental 
significance by different parties or projects, and consider impacts over longer temporal 
or larger spatial scales. (Hawke 2009, p. 162)  
The Australian Government’s response to the Hawke Review noted: 
… strategic approaches will better protect matters of national environmental 
significance, while supporting sustainable development. Strategic approaches also have 
significant benefits to proponents by increasing certainty and improving investment 
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opportunities at an early stage, and by reducing the need for individual project referrals. 
(Australian Government 2011, p. 10)  
 
Box 11.2 Strategic assessments under Commonwealth law 
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (the EPBC 
Act) provides the opportunity for an assessment of policies, plans and programs 
(commonly referred to as a strategic assessment). It does this thorough the operation 
of s.146 of the Act, whereby the Minister may agree with a person responsible for the 
adoption or implementation of a policy, plan or program that an assessment be made 
of the impacts of actions under the policy, plan or program on a matter protected by 
Part 3 of the EPBC Act (that is, a matter of national environmental significance). 
Section 146(1A) of the Act also allows for the assessment of the impacts of actions not 
protected by Part 3 which are to be taken in a state or territory, provided there is 
agreement between the Environment Minister and the appropriate State or Territory 
Minister to do so. While s.146 allows for a strategic assessment, its use is 
discretionary. 
In addition, there are some other mechanisms available under Commonwealth law that 
allow for certain types of developments to be assessed in a strategic manner. These 
include the airport Master Plans required under the Airports Act 1996 (Cwlth). An 
airport Master Plan is a blueprint for the future coordinated development of an airport, 
and must be approved by the Minister for Transport. The Minister has access to expert 
independent advice in the assessment of airport Master Plans, particularly in relation to 
the alignment of a plan with other plans for the region, and other technical advice 
relating to areas such as environmental issues (especially noise), traffic, economic or 
urban planning impacts.  
 
EPBC Act strategic assessment process 
Strategic assessments under the EPBC Act are typically undertaken by the 
Department of the Environment and the relevant State or Territory Government. 
However, the Australian Government can also partner with local governments, 
members of the urban development industry and mining and resource companies. 
For example, two strategic assessments have commenced in which resource 
companies are the partners (table 11.2). 
Before a strategic assessment begins, a scoping exercise is generally undertaken to 
develop a common understanding on expectations of the assessment, the availability 
of information, data requirements and other matters. Following scoping, the terms 
of reference for the strategic assessment report is negotiated between the partners 
and may be put out for public comment before being finalised. The terms of 
reference forms part of the strategic assessment agreement, along with other 
elements, such as the process for preparing the policy, plan or program to be 
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assessed and governance arrangements for the assessment (DSEWPAC 
(Cwlth) 2012a). 
Next, there is an assessment and endorsement of the policy, plan or program. A 
requirement for endorsement is that adequate monitoring, reporting and 
enforcement provisions are in place to demonstrate that commitments to protect and 
manage matters of national environmental significance will be met. 
Following endorsement, the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment may 
approve actions (or classes of actions) that are associated with the endorsed policy, 
plan or program. It is this step that potentially allows development to proceed across 
a large area without further need for individual developments to be referred to or 
approved by the Commonwealth Minister. The approval of actions may be iterative, 
with different classes of actions approved over time, as science or management 
evolves (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012a). 
As of November 2013, 16 strategic assessments had been commenced, six of which 
have been endorsed and had at least some classes of action approved (table 11.2). 
DSEWPAC (sub. 55) reported that the number of strategic assessments had doubled 
over the past two years. This increase followed the Hawke Review’s 
recommendation for greater use of strategic assessments. 
Outcomes of EPBC Act strategic assessments 
DSEWPAC reported that over 850 EPBC Act referrals have been avoided through 
the strategic assessments completed to date (sub. 55, p. 14). According to Access 
Economics (2011), the strategic assessment undertaken for Melbourne’s Urban 
Growth Boundary removed the need for referral of approximately 252 individual 
projects over the life of the approved program, and also reduced the monitoring and 
compliance costs for those individual projects. The Victorian Department of 
Environment and Primary Industries reported that these cost savings were in the 
order of $500 million (box 11.3). The assessment process was also reported to have 
provided a useful framework to consider cumulative environmental impacts, as well 
as facilitating community participation in the planning process (DSE (Vic) 2009). 
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Table 11.2 Strategic assessments under the EPBC Act 
Commenced Jurisdiction Strategic assessment Status Approval of 
classes of action 
6 Feb. 2008 WA Browse Basin LNG Precinct In progress .. 
16 Sep. 2008 ACT Molonglo Valley Plan Endorsed:  
7 Oct. 2011 
20 Dec. 2011a 
4 Mar. 2009 Vic Melbourne Urban Growth 
Boundary 
Endorsed: 
2 Feb. 2010 
11 Jun. 2010b, 
 8 Jul. 2010c, 
 5 Sep. 2013d 
11 Nov. 2009 NSW Western Sydney growth centres Endorsed: 
20 Dec. 2011 
28 Feb. 2012 
15 Jan. 2010 SA Fire management policy In progress .. 
5 Feb. 2010 Tas Midlands Water Scheme Endorsed: 
11 Apr. 2011  
31 May 2011e, 
18 Apr. 2012f, 
13 Nov. 2012g 
25 Feb. 2010 Qld Mount Peter Master Planned 
Area 
In progress .. 
18 Aug. 2011 WA Perth and Peel Region In progress .. 
16 Nov. 2011 NSW Heathcote Ridge, West Menai Endorsed: 
30 May 2013  
24 Jun. 2013 
16 Feb. 2012 Qld Great Barrier Reef (marine & 
coastal) 
In progress .. 
14 Aug. 2012 NSW Lower Hunter (sustainable 
regional development) 
In progress .. 
18 Sep. 2012 WA BHP Billiton Iron Ore Expansion 
for the Pilbara Region 
In progress .. 
20 Sep. 2012 NSW Upper Hunter (biodiversity plan 
for coal mining) 
In progress .. 
2 Oct. 2012 ACT Gungahlin Urban Development Endorsed: 
20 Jun. 2013 
17 Jul. 2013 
18 Dec. 2012 WA Hammersley Iron Pty Ltd (Rio 
Tinto) iron ore expansion for the 
Pilbara 
In progress .. 
16 Aug. 2013h Cwlth Offshore petroleum activities In progress .. 
a East Molonglo component. b Regional rail link project. c 28 precincts within Melbourne’s urban growth 
boundary. d Western, North-western and Northern growth corridors (approvals are still outstanding for the 
South-eastern growth corridor and the Ring Road) e Lower South Esk component. f Arthur’s Pipeline Irrigation 
Scheme component. g Water Access System component. h Date that the draft terms of reference were 
released for public comment. .. Not applicable. 
Sources: DSEWPAC (2013c, 2013d). 
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Box 11.3 Melbourne Urban Growth Boundary strategic assessment 
The Commonwealth Environment Minister signed an agreement with the Victorian 
Government in 2009 to undertake a strategic assessment of the expansion of 
Melbourne’s urban growth boundary. The assessment covered impacts on matters of 
national environmental significance covered by the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (EPBC Act) for a number of ‘small’ 
site-based actions across a large urban area, as well as two large infrastructure 
projects: the Tarneit section of the Regional Rail Link; and the Outer Melbourne 
Ring/E6 Transport Corridor (these actions are referred to collectively as the Program). 
The goal of the assessment was to cut red tape and streamline environmental 
assessments in implementing the Program. The strategic assessment approach also 
provided a framework to account for long-term and cumulative environmental impacts 
and facilitate community participation in the planning process. 
Assessment process 
The assessment considered a broad range of environmental assets within the study 
area. All listed threatened species and ecological communities that could potentially 
occur within the study area and surrounds were considered. A total of 25 fauna species 
and 32 flora species listed or nominated for listing under the EPBC Act were identified 
as potentially occurring within the Program area. Most of these were considered to 
have a low likelihood of occurrence, while the impact of the Program on others was not 
considered to be significant. However, for two ecological communities and six 
threatened species, a significant impact was considered likely. 
Both the potential impacts of the Program and mitigation options were considered as 
part of the assessment process. The mitigation of impacts was based on a hierarchy of 
avoidance, minimisation, rehabilitation, re-establishment, and offset. 
The assessment process also involved substantial public participation. This included 
the establishment and regular meetings of an environmental reference group, letters 
being sent to 15 000 landowners and occupiers affected by the Program and the 
holding of eight public information sessions, with participation by over 2000 people. 
Outcomes 
In February 2010, the Commonwealth Environment Minister endorsed the Program 
covering the expansion of the Urban Growth Boundary and the alignments for the 
Regional Rail Link and the Outer Metropolitan Ring. To enable urban development to 
occur, actions for the development of section 2 of the Regional Rail Link and the 
28 precincts within the current Urban Growth Boundary were approved.  
The Minister also approved prescriptions for seven separate matters of national 
environmental significance (covering the six species identified as likely to experience a 
significant impact, and a separate prescription for migratory species). 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 11.3 (continued) 
These prescriptions set out the requirements for protection that must be followed in 
preparing precinct structure plans and for individual developments. Approvals are still 
outstanding for the South-eastern growth corridor and the Ring Road. 
The Victorian Government states that the key outcomes of the strategic assessment 
have been: 
• a single, simplified approvals process under State and Commonwealth legislation 
applied early in the planning cycle 
• increased certainty and reduced cost for development proposals that meet the 
approval conditions (with estimated cost savings of $500 million over 30 years, 
arising from reductions in holding costs, information costs and administrative 
burden) 
• a supply of native vegetation and species offsets that developers in the growth 
areas can purchase from the Victorian Government 
• creation of 15 000 hectares of new grassland reserve west of Melbourne and a 
1200 hectare grassy woodland reserve north-east of Melbourne, to offset clearing 
for Melbourne’s growth 
• adherence to the principles and standards required under Victoria’s Native 
Vegetation Management Framework and species regulations. 
The Victorian Government has committed to monitoring and full public reporting on the 
implementation of the Program and its approval conditions under the EPBC Act. 
Implementation has been progressed through the Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 
for Melbourne’s Growth Corridors. Habitat compensation arrangements and fees 
relating to this strategy were published in August 2013. 
Sources: DEPI (2013a); DSE (Vic) (2009, 2013); DSEWPAC (2012i).  
 
A strategic assessment may also be undertaken to investigate the adequacy of 
existing policies, plans and programs, as is the case for the Great Barrier Reef 
strategic assessment that is currently underway (box 11.4). This assessment is 
considering matters of national environmental significance in the Great Barrier Reef 
World Heritage Area and adjacent coastal zone. The strategic assessment will be 
used to identify, plan for and manage existing and emerging risks to assist in the 
ongoing management of the Great Barrier Reef and adjacent coastal zone. The 
assessment also addresses the UNESCO World Heritage Committee’s 
recommendation of July 2012 that the Australian Government undertake a 
comprehensive strategic assessment of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area 
(GBRMPA nd). 
One challenge that this assessment faces is that some projects have commenced in 
and around the Great Barrier Reef, and approval decisions for further developments 
on a project-by-project basis will continue while the strategic assessment is 
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undertaken. There are also long-established activities, such as grazing and cropping, 
that can have environmental impacts that need to be considered. Another challenge 
is integrating the coastal and marine components of the assessment. 
 
Box 11.4 Great Barrier Reef strategic assessment 
In February 2012, the Australian and Queensland Governments agreed to undertake a 
strategic assessment of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area (GBRWHA) and 
adjacent coastal zone. The assessment has a marine component and a coastal 
component. The marine component is being undertaken by the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA), and looks at arrangements to manage and protect 
the Great Barrier Reef. The Queensland Government is leading the coastal 
component, which looks at coastal development (such as planning for urban, industrial 
and port development).  
According to the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities (2013b), the assessment will: 
… help identify, plan for and manage existing and emerging risks to ensure ongoing 
protection and management of the unique environmental values of the Great Barrier Reef 
World Heritage Area (GBRWHA) and adjacent coastal zone. This will be achieved by: 
• investigating the adequacy of the existing management arrangements for the GBRWHA 
• assessing current and future development policies and planning in the GBRWHA and the 
adjacent coastal zone and analysing likely direct, indirect and cumulative impacts. 
The Queensland Government has suggested that the assessment has the potential to 
streamline decision making for development within and adjacent to the GBRWHA by 
removing the need for Commonwealth approval of individual projects. 
In February 2012, the Queensland Government and GBRMPA sought public comment 
on the draft terms of reference for the assessment. The Queensland Government 
noted that many of the submissions did not address the terms of reference directly but 
instead argued for a moratorium on development while the strategic assessment was 
completed. In response, the Government stated that proponents would not be 
prevented from referring individual projects for assessment under the existing 
processes while the strategic assessment was underway. However: 
Proponents who refer an action during this period will be expected to meet a high standard 
of assessment in terms of the level and rigour of information provided, including the 
consideration of cumulative impacts. (Queensland Government 2012, p. 18) 
A final terms of reference was approved by the Commonwealth Environment Minister 
in August 2012. Draft Program and Strategic Assessment reports were published for 
each component of the assessment in November 2013. These reports examine the 
effectiveness of measures that are currently in place to protect matters of national 
environmental significance, and set out new (or revised) measures and a range of 
forward commitments (such as the development of a long-term sustainability plan for 
the GBRWHA). Consultation on the draft reports will run until 31 January 2014. 
Sources: DSEWPAC (2013b); GBRMPA (2013); Queensland Government (2012).  
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The Commission notes that only a small number of EPBC Act strategic assessments 
have so far been completed. This makes it difficult to fully evaluate the role that 
they can play in improving the approval process for major projects. One observation 
is that, of the strategic assessments under the EPBC Act successfully approved so 
far, all except one (the Midlands Water Scheme) have been of urban areas, or areas 
of proposed urban development. This supports the Commission’s earlier 
observations on the importance of baseline data (as data on environmental assets 
within or near urban areas is at a relatively high level of resolution), and that future 
developments are usually more predictable in an urban context. However, this is not 
to suggest that strategic assessment is not worthwhile in a rural or remote context, 
but the process may take longer to complete. 
Since the Hawke Review was completed, DSEWPAC has published a guide to 
undertaking strategic assessment (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012a). This is a positive 
development, but it will be important that this document is further developed as 
experience is gained and new issues arise. For example, the NSW Minerals Council 
has identified what they see as the need for guidelines specifically addressing issues 
for strategic assessments in brownfield areas (sub. DR93). 
Overall, early results, while limited, would suggest that EPBC Act strategic 
assessments can play a positive role in improving social, economic and 
environmental outcomes and help create a more efficient DAA process. Similar to 
the Hawke Review, the Commission considers that strategic assessments are more 
likely to generate positive outcomes when they are integrated with the early stages 
of the planning process. 
State and Territory Government approaches to strategic assessment 
The use by jurisdictions of strategic assessments as an input to planning, and as an 
input to environmental and resource management policy, is considered below. 
Use in planning 
The application of strategic assessment by State and Territory Governments to help 
factor environmental considerations into strategic land-use and development plans 
is limited and uneven (table 11.3). While environmental and heritage issues are 
often considered in strategic planning processes, this is usually done in a partial 
way. Some formal mechanisms exist for strategic assessment, but these are 
generally infrequently used. Consequently, project-level assessment remains the 
cornerstone of DAA processes in Australia. 
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Table 11.3 Use of strategic assessment in Australian States and Territories 
 NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT 
Jurisdiction has been involved in a completed 
strategic assessment under the EPBC Act         
Jurisdiction is currently involved in a strategic 
assessment under the EPBC Act         
Jurisdiction has a legislative mechanism that 
compels the use of strategic assessment         
Jurisdiction has a formal, discretionary 
mechanism to initiate a strategic assessment 
or SEA 
    a    
Jurisdiction incorporates some aspects of 
strategic assessment into its DAA process         
a In Western Australia, this is referred to as a ‘strategic proposal’, undertaken by the Western Australian 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
Western Australia and the ACT are the only jurisdictions that have a formal 
mechanism for initiating a strategic assessment. In Western Australia, the 
Environmental Protection Authority can assess a ‘strategic proposal’ 
(compromising a number of individual projects) as an alternative to 
project-by-project assessment. In the ACT, a strategic assessment may be 
undertaken when a major policy matter is proposed, such as a major variation to the 
Territory Plan. Appendix F provides further details. 
Use in environmental and resource management policy 
While most of the focus on strategic assessment relates to planning, it is also 
important for the development of sound environmental and resource management 
policies. Often, the type of assessment required is not commonly termed ‘strategic 
assessment’, but rather is simply considered part of best practice policy making. 
Assessments of this kind have been used to improve regulations that impact on the 
assessment and approval of major projects. 
For example, through the National Water Initiative (NWI) considerable effort has 
been put into increasing the number and quality of water plans across Australia, 
which has required a strategic approach to assessing water resources. High-quality 
water plans can ensure an appropriate balance between economic, social and 
environmental outcomes, and reduce the need for detailed assessment of the 
water-related impacts of individual projects (particularly for resource-related 
projects). The Minerals Council of Australia stressed the importance of the NWI: 
 … adequate resources must be provided to fully implement the NWI, including the 
development of ‘fit for purpose’ planning and entitlement arrangements for the 
minerals industry where these are not adequately addressed by the existing generic 
water policies and practices. (sub. 33, p. 30) 
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Another example is the ‘strategic assessment’ conducted for the review of 
Victoria’s native vegetation clearing regulations (which involve the use of offsets, 
as discussed in chapter 8). This assessment resulted in the development of a model 
that brings together information about species presence, habitat quality and 
connectivity, to determine relative environmental value across the landscape. While 
the Commission has not independently evaluated the model, it would appear that it 
has enabled the regulations to be reformed in ways that are likely to improve the 
predictability and speed of decision making and ensure that offsets more 
cost-effectively target environmental benefits. This has the potential to provide 
benefits to proponents of major projects and to the wider community. 
Appendix F provides more information on strategic approaches to both water 
planning, and native vegetation clearing regulations.  
The Commission’s assessment 
While strategic assessment is still a developing area of policy, there is evidence to 
suggest that it can be a valuable tool for improving DAA processes for major 
projects. It has the potential to reduce the scale and cost of subsequent project-based 
assessments of major projects. Strategic assessment can also improve environmental 
outcomes by considering cumulative impacts at the appropriate scale. Consistent 
with the Hawke Review, the Commission acknowledges that there are potential 
risks, but if properly managed these are likely to be outweighed by the benefits of 
strategic assessment in many circumstances. 
The use of strategic assessment under the EPBC Act has increased over recent 
years, which is a positive development. It is important to learn from this experience 
to enable strategic assessment to more fully realise its potential in Australia. As 
discussed in chapter 7, there is merit in pursuing both strategic assessments and 
bilateral agreements so as to reduce duplication between State and Commonwealth 
processes. 
Under the EPBC Act, strategic assessments are used to try to reconcile the 
overlapping objectives of different levels of government. This gives them a 
particular character and adds to the difficulty of the task. Strategic assessments 
conducted solely under State and Territory Government jurisdiction are freer of this 
type of political tension and may, in time, prove to be highly worthwhile. 
While strategic assessment and strategic environmental assessment are terms most 
commonly used within the planning sphere, assessments of a strategic nature are 
also important to the development of sound environmental and resource 
management policies. Such policies can improve the operation of DAA systems by 
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establishing clearer and more predictable requirements for projects and by reducing 
assessment times. 
RECOMMENDATION 11.1 
Drawing on the lessons learned to date from the use of Strategic Assessments, 
governments should employ the tool in circumstances where it is likely to produce 
a reduction in the costs of project approval, while delivering environmental and 
other regulatory outcomes that are equal or superior to those that are achieved 
under other processes. 
11.3 Strategic planning 
Government planning systems guide decision making about the future allocation 
and development of land. Strategic planning gives structure to this process by 
identifying long-term goals and targets, and then determining the best approach for 
achieving them (PC 2011c). The Development Assessment Forum offered the 
following perspective: 
Strategic planning, the level at which long-term objectives, policies and directions are 
chartered, precedes development planning and operational planning … [It is] a way of 
achieving a balance between conflicting objectives or priorities and resolving the 
conflicts between economic, social, environmental and cultural imperatives. (2001, 
p. 8) 
Strategic planning is relevant to this study because it can assist in streamlining and 
strengthening major project DAA processes. Strategic planning can also facilitate 
major projects where it safeguards corridors for future use (for transport or green 
space for example), or where it prevents encroachment around strategic 
infrastructure (for example, by providing a buffer zone around ports and airports). 
What is strategic planning and how can it help? 
Typically a project proponent must have ‘regard’ to the relevant strategic plans in 
their project application or environmental impact statement. To illustrate, Centrex’s 
public environment report concerning a proposal to develop a port at Sheep Hill in 
South Australia included discussion of how the project was consistent with the 
objectives of the SA Strategic Plan, the Regional Plan of the Eyre Peninsula and 
other related plans (Golder 2012). The South Australian Government’s subsequent 
assessment report on the project included similar assessments on consistency with 
these plans (DPTI (SA) 2012). 
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Comparable requirements operate in other jurisdictions. For example, the 
Queensland Government (sub. 47) reported that proponents in that State are 
required to incorporate and respond to strategic planning objectives in their 
environmental impact statement. 
This process of considering the consistency of a project with strategic plans can be a 
positive one. In some cases, proponents may be able to use strategic plans to help 
them design projects that are likely to be less contentious and have fewer 
assessment issues than otherwise. Business SA stated: 
Transparent strategic planning by governments could assist some proponents of major 
projects, particularly in terms of knowing where their project fits in terms of broader 
economic growth and development goals, as well as possible constraints. (sub. 4, p. 5) 
Similarly, ElectraNet argued: 
Greater use of pre-planning and infrastructure corridor / site reservation through 
strategic land use planning processes should reduce the level of uncertainty and risk for 
both proponents and other stakeholders in respect to final assessment and approval 
processes. (sub. DR63, p. 3) 
NCSSA (sub. DR95) and ANEDO (sub. DR92) pointed out that strategic plans can 
also be used to establish protected areas where certain types of development are 
prohibited, and set environmental limits on development in other areas. 
There is the possibility that strategic planning can result in some types of 
development not needing to go through DAA processes (so called ‘as of right’ 
development). While this is less likely to be feasible or desirable for major projects, 
there may be aspects of such projects that, if consistent with strategic plans, could 
be made exempt from the need for assessment and approval. 
However, strategic planning does not always lead to more efficient DAA processes 
for major projects, as pointed out by South Australian State Government 
Departments: 
Strategic planning is a statutory requirement of the Development Act 1993 in South 
Australia, however this does not necessarily assist in reducing the time and cost of 
major development processes. (sub. 51, p. 27) 
Further, the potential for strategic planning to assist with subsequent DAA 
processes can be lower for resource-related major projects. The Northern Territory 
Government observed: 
In the case of mining projects, and to a lesser extent mineral processing projects the site 
of development is driven by the location of the resource to be developed, which cannot 
be predicted and planned for ahead of discovery and appraisal. (sub. 46, p. 5)  
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This assessment was shared by Xstrata Coal: 
Whilst strategic plans have the potential to provide more certainty and ensure that land 
uses are appropriately located, the primary limitations of such plans are that they can 
take many years to prepare and can never fully contemplate or predict the likely 
demand for or use of land.  
 … economically-mineable resources of coal and other mineral resources are contained 
in a limited number of fixed locations across Australia. A mining company cannot 
simply pick up its project and take it elsewhere. This is one of the reasons that strategic 
land-use plans must be flexible in their application and should not prohibit land uses in 
particular areas. (sub. 50, p. 22) 
Sometimes a major project may conflict with a strategic plan, but still be found to 
be in the public interest. Resolution commonly involves rezoning or amendment to 
the relevant development plan (often a lengthy process, usually requiring initial and 
final ministerial agreement to the changes). 
Strategic planning in practice 
Strategic planning is significantly more developed for urban than rural areas, with 
all jurisdictions having strategic plans for their capital city regions. Commonly the 
capital city strategic plan forms the apex of the planning hierarchy, with a range of 
more specific plans sitting underneath (which are meant to be consistent with the 
goals and targets established by the overarching strategic plan). Some jurisdictions 
also have a statewide plan, while many have strategic plans for certain regional 
areas (though coverage varies).  
South Australia, for example, has a statewide plan, a 30-year plan for greater 
Adelaide and plans for regional South Australia. The SA State Government 
Departments described South Australia’s strategic planning process as follows: 
South Australia’s Strategic Plan (SASP) is the state’s primary directional document. 
SASP has 100 specific targets grouped under six interrelated pillars. Progress against 
SASP targets is reported every two years and the plan is updated every four years. 
‘Beneath’ SASP sit specific ‘action’ plans which facilitate achieving SASP targets, 
including the Strategic Infrastructure Plan for South Australia and the South Australian 
Planning Strategy. The Department for Planning, Transport and Infrastructure has lead 
responsibility for both of these documents. (sub. 51, p. 26) 
The full range of strategic policies, plans and programs that apply to activities in 
most jurisdictions is vast. Box 11.5 illustrates the complexity of this strategic 
planning context by outlining the hierarchy of plans applying to the key regional 
city of Townsville.  
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Box 11.5 Strategic planning is complex: the case of Townsville  
Townsville, with a population over 180 000 people, is the largest city in north 
Queensland. A major service centre and the main centre for government administration 
outside Brisbane, the city is also a key port and rail transport hub for the region’s 
agricultural and mining industries (including sugar, copper, zinc and nickel). It also 
hosts significant numbers of Defence personnel at Lavarack Barracks and Royal 
Australian Air Force Base Townsville. 
A selection of strategic plans that may influence project planning in and around the city 
are outlined below. The selection illustrates the wide array of geographic and sectoral 
plans and strategies that can comprise a region’s strategic planning context. 
Australian Government 
• National Ports Strategy  
• Townsville Airport 20 year Master Plan (under the Airports Act 1996 (Cwlth)) 
• Great Barrier Reef Marine Park heritage strategy 2005 
• 2013 Defence White Paper: Australian Defence Force Posture (covering base 
expansion) 
• Mount Isa–Townsville Corridor Strategy 2007 (covering transport) 
• National Cycling Strategy 
State and/or Local Government 
• Townsville State Development Area Development Opportunities Strategy and 
Development Scheme 
• Northern Economic Triangle Infrastructure Plan 2007–2012 (for the Mount Isa, 
Townsville and Bowen area) 
• Great Barrier Reef ports strategy (2012–22) 
• Townsville City–Port Strategic Plan 2007 
• Port of Townsville Master Plan 
• Townsville–Thuringowa Strategy Plan 
• Townsville Economic Gateway Strategy 2007 
• Townsville City Plan 2005  
• Townsville North Queensland Region Destination Tourism Strategy (2012–16) 
• Townsville Digital Economy Strategy 
• Townsville Coastal Hazard Adaptation Strategy 
Other 
• Mount Isa to Townsville Economic Zone (MITEZ) 50 year freight infrastructure plan 
(MITEZ is the peak regional development organisation)  
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Findings of previous studies 
Three previous studies have recommended wider (or better) use of strategic 
planning (COAG Reform Council 2011; LGPMC 2009; PC 2011c). 
In 2011, the COAG Reform Council reviewed capital city strategic planning 
systems across Australia. This involved assessing each city’s system against a set of 
criteria agreed by COAG. The Council reported mixed results across jurisdictions 
(table 11.4). Adelaide was assessed as consistent with most of the criteria, on the 
evidence presented. Melbourne received no fully consistent assessments, and one 
‘not consistent’ assessment (although Melbourne’s results were affected by it being 
in the process of revising its metropolitan plan following a change of government). 
While noting progress in improving strategic planning systems, the Council 
suggested more work needed to be done: 
To differing degrees, all State and Territory Governments have long term, 
whole-of-government and goal-oriented strategic plans, and all have exhibited strengths 
and weaknesses in their capital city strategic planning systems. No system has been 
found wholly consistent with the criteria, which means that further work is needed on 
the institutional arrangements to deliver integration. (COAG Reform Council 2011, 
pp. 3–4)  
One notable criterion on which consistency was generally low was ‘accountabilities, 
timelines and performance measures’. On this criterion, the Council found: 
Most jurisdictions were either partially or not consistent … In many cases, 
governments only had partial forms of accountability, timelines and performance 
measures. This was particularly the case for performance measures. (COAG Reform 
Council 2011, pp. 51–2) 
The Commission’s 2011 report on Planning, Zoning and Development Assessments 
advocated determining as much planning policy as possible early in the 
planning-to-approval chain. Some key elements towards achieving this were having 
strategic land-use plans that are: 
• not just aspirational but also make broad decisions about where future urban growth 
will occur, alternative land uses, timing, infrastructure and the provision of services 
(to contribute to social, economic and environmental objectives) 
• integrated across different levels of government and across different government 
departments and agencies to make consistent decisions about relevant matters, 
ranging over infrastructure, environment, housing and human services (PC 2011c, 
p. XLIV) 
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Table 11.4 Consistency of capital city strategic plans with COAG criteria, 
COAG Reform Council findingsa 
Criterion Syd Melb Bris Perth Adel Hobart Canb Darwin 
Integration across  
functions & agencies 
R     R  R 
Consistent hierarchy of plans      R   
Nationally significant 
infrastructure 
        
Nationally significant  
policy issues 
        
Strengthen networks  
between capital cities 
        
Planning & sequencing  
for future growth 
     R   
Investment priorities & 
frameworks 
        
Urban design & architecture      R   
Accountabilities, timelines & 
performance measures 
R   R  R  R 
Intergovernmental cooperation         
Evaluation & review cycles    R  R  R 
Consultation & engagement         
 = not consistent;  = partially consistent;  = largely consistent;  = consistent; R indicates that a 
reform is pending that may lead to a system that the Council would consider more consistent than the current 
finding indicates. 
a The COAG Reform Council noted its assessments should be interpreted with caution, as they primarily 
measured consistency with criteria not system outcomes. It considered that consistency with the criteria is 
necessary but not sufficient for successful strategic planning to achieve productive, liveable and sustainable 
cities. The Council also noted that its assessments had not been adjusted for the scale of the challenges 
facing each city and that this was a limitation on comparing results across cities.  
Source: COAG Reform Council (2011). 
The approach advocated by the Commission would tend to reshape resource 
allocation across the planning system towards the goal shown in figure 11.1, with 
greater emphasis on strategic planning. The Commission noted that the States and 
Territories had indicated that their reform efforts had been directed at focusing more 
on the earlier stages of planning, including strategic planning. 
The Local Government and Planning Ministers’ Council has noted a long list of 
weaknesses across the planning system. These ranged from a lack of understanding 
of planning’s role, through to governance, coordination and harmonisation issues, to 
capacity, skills and knowledge issues and a lack of well-structured community 
engagement (LGPMC 2009). A further weakness identified by the Council was: 
Lack of consensus on appropriate planning horizons to deal with key planning issues, 
leading to either a short-term focus aligned with political cycles, or a lack of clarity and 
focus due to unrealistically long planning horizons and commitments to outcomes far in 
advance of need. (2009, p. 5) 
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Figure 11.1 Changing the focus of planning efforts 
 
Source: PC (2011c, p. XLIII). 
The Commission’s assessment 
The Commission considers that the COAG Reform Council review was a 
significant milestone in efforts to improve all aspects of strategic planning for 
capital cities, and that its findings should be used to help guide reform efforts. In 
one sense, the current study has a narrower perspective, because the primary interest 
is in how strategic planning influences major project DAA processes. For this 
reason, the areas for improvement considered here focus on this concern as it relates 
to both urban and rural/remote areas. In identifying and analysing possible 
improvements to strategic planning, the Commission has drawn on the above 
studies, submissions, overseas experiences with strategic planning (box 11.6) and a 
range of other sources. 
Greater emphasis on strategic decision making 
There is widespread agreement that planning systems should have greater emphasis 
on strategic decision making. When decisions are made at the strategic level this 
can improve the timeliness of project-level DAA processes because more of the 
important and difficult decisions have already been resolved. Good strategic 
planning can also ‘provide prospective proponents with greater clarity and 
understanding of the issues pertaining to their development proposal’ (Planning 
Institute of Australia, sub. DR73, p. 4). 
To achieve this change in emphasis, there are difficulties that need to be overcome. 
Some of these relate to institutional arrangements and politics, as illustrated by the 
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challenges of finding new airport sites in Sydney since the 1970s. Infrastructure 
Australia argued: 
Planning agencies tend to be outside the central part of government, and their influence 
on reform is modest. Metropolitan plans get changed when it suits the political interests 
of the government of the day or the policy interests of another part of the government. 
New governments often feel obliged to distance themselves from their predecessor’s 
plans, even though there may be elements in those plans that are worthwhile. This calls 
into question the long-term integrity and durability of the metropolitan planning 
process. (2012, p. 49) 
There are also challenges in better integrating strategic planning with the rest of the 
planning process, so that strategic decisions are reflected in lower-level decisions. 
The sectoral approach to infrastructure policy and plan development used in the 
United Kingdom has potential to assist in this regard (box 11.6). 
As pointed out by a number of participants, moving to more streamlined DAA 
processes may not be desirable if this increases the risk of poor environmental or 
social outcomes (for example, ANEDO, sub. 14). This insight leads to the 
remaining two areas for improvement, which are in part about reducing these risks. 
Improved consultation 
Genuine engagement and consultation with the community and business is essential 
for effective strategic planning. The finding of the COAG Reform Council suggests 
that there is considerable scope for improvement, at least in relation to capital cities 
(table 11.4). Other research suggests that the breadth and depth of consultation in 
some other countries, particular parts of Canada, substantially exceeds that typically 
conducted in Australia (Kelly 2010a). It is evident in cities, such as Vancouver, that 
this can help produce better outcomes by promoting broad community support for 
decisions made at the strategic level.  
The effectiveness of consultation was a theme addressed by Amelia Thorpe from 
the University of New South Wales (sub. 16), who argued that there is a need for 
research into effective consultation methods. Specifically, Thorpe highlighted 
Western Australia’s ‘Dialogue with the City’ consultations for praise, noting the 
wide range of techniques it deployed.  
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Box 11.6 Lessons from international strategic planning experiences 
Public participation is important to developing enduring plans 
A Grattan Institute report examined city governance in eight cities in North America and 
Europe that were considered to have been successful in meeting residents’ needs 
(Kelly 2010a). One of the aims of the research was to identify the kinds of 
decision-making arrangements associated with sustained success in cities. The report 
highlighted the importance of public participation: 
Those cities that made tough choices and saw them through had early, genuine, 
sophisticated, and deep public engagement. This level of engagement is an order of 
magnitude different from what happens in Australia today. (Kelly 2010a, p. 4).  
For example, Kelly (2010a) found that extensive public engagement that asked people 
‘what they wanted’ had been critical to developing a well-supported vision and plan for 
Vancouver. It was also reported that having only limited opportunity to appeal against 
planning decisions made it much easier for Vancouver to set a direction and follow it 
through. 
Sectoral plans can help streamline approval processes for major projects 
Planning reforms established in the United Kingdom since the passage of the Planning 
Act 2008, provide lessons of direct relevance to major project DAA processes. These 
reforms launched National Policy Statements, which provide guidelines for the 
assessment of nationally significant infrastructure projects in specific sectors. 
These statements provide clear guidance to authorities (such as the Planning 
Inspectorate) on how the national Government considers assessment should occur (for 
example, how to assess and balance impacts), and outline relevant policies for 
consideration. For example, the Energy National Policy Statement identifies a need to 
invest over £100 billion in the electricity sector by 2020 and outlines the United 
Kingdom’s climate change emissions reduction targets (DECC (UK) 2011). 
They also indicate, at a high level, the Government’s predisposition for assessment, in 
light of its overall policy direction. Examples include: 
[The Planning Inspectorate] should start with a presumption in favour of granting consent to 
applications for energy [related] nationally significant infrastructure projects. (DECC 
(UK) 2011, p. 44) 
[The Planning Inspectorate] should start with a presumption in favour of granting consent to 
applications for ports development (DfT (UK) 2012, p. 17). 
Additionally, the application of conditions to projects is restrained: 
[The Planning Inspectorate] should only impose requirements in relation to a development 
consent that are necessary, relevant to planning, relevant to the development to be 
consented, enforceable, precise, and reasonable in all other respects. (DECC (UK) 2011, 
p. 45) 
The sectoral model used in the United Kingdom has the potential to increase certainty 
and understanding in the community, and usefully guide development assessment 
authorities.   
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Thorough analysis of impacts 
For strategic planning to produce good results it must be based on the best possible 
information, including about the environmental impacts of different development 
scenarios. ANEDO (sub. 14, p. 24) argued that environmental matters were given 
insufficient attention in strategic planning and that ‘independent baseline studies of 
catchments’ environmental qualities, such as water, soil, vegetation, biodiversity, 
minerals, [and] air quality’ should be undertaken for strategic planning purposes. 
In the Commission’s view, environmental issues are often not adequately 
considered in strategic planning. Strategic assessment (which is discussed 
extensively in the earlier sections of this chapter) is a promising tool for analysing 
environmental and other plan impacts. 
RECOMMENDATION 11.2 
State and Territory Governments should make more use of strategic planning, so 
as to reduce the number of issues that need to be considered at the project level, 
by: 
• expanding the scope of decisions about development at the strategic level  
• using more effective public consultation techniques 
• collecting and disseminating baseline environmental and heritage data 
• using Strategic Assessments to analyse plan impacts. 
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12 Implementation of reform 
 
Key points 
• The Commission has recommended in this study a suite of measures that would 
improve development assessment and approval (DAA) processes and, in turn, 
contribute to the facilitation of investment and the protection of environmental and 
other standards. 
• Each of the Commission’s recommendations alone would have only a limited 
impact, since any regulatory system is only as good as its weakest link. Partial 
reform efforts are, therefore, unlikely to achieve meaningful and sustained 
improvements. 
• Careful and deliberative implementation of reform will be needed to successfully 
deliver more timely, cost-effective, rigorous and transparent regulatory decision 
making. To do this, all governments in Australia should: 
– prioritise the reforms and set timeframes and key milestones for their 
implementation 
– build momentum by pursuing immediate ‘early win’ reforms while laying the 
groundwork for more challenging reforms  
– work closely with regulatory agencies in their jurisdictions, to address gaps in 
regulator resourcing, capabilities, performance and culture 
– work together with other governments to address interjurisdictional matters, such 
as duplication of assessment and approval requirements on proponents while 
also fostering intrajurisdictional cooperation among regulatory agencies 
– agree on monitoring and public reporting of the progress of the reforms.  
 
Without careful and considered implementation planning, leading practice 
development assessment and approval (DAA) processes will not be achieved and 
the problem areas identified in this report would persist. This chapter provides 
guidance on how to develop a roadmap for the broad implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations.  
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12.1 The importance of ‘making it happen’ 
Capturing the reform dividend 
Implementing the Commission’s recommendations should deliver benefits for all 
stakeholders. Improved major project DAA processes would enable new projects 
that are viable under current arrangements to come to fruition in a more timely and 
cost-effective manner, and potentially facilitate additional major developments. At 
the same time, improved DAA processes for major projects should promote the 
protection of environmental, heritage and other assets as well as providing greater 
confidence in the regulatory system (box 12.1).  
 
Box 12.1 Broader benefits of the Commission’s reformsa 
Protection of environmental, heritage and other assets 
Protection of environmental, heritage and other assets would be promoted through 
greater use of strategic approaches (plans and assessments) (recommendations 11.1, 
and 11.2); separation of environment policy from regulatory functions (6.5); better 
targeted project approval conditions and offsets (8.1 and 8.2); risk-based approaches 
(6.6), together with improved compliance and enforcement activities by regulators, 
including legislated third-party rights for enforcement (10.2, 10.3 and 10.4). 
Accountability and transparency of decision making 
Decision makers would be more accountable through, for example, binding criteria for 
regulatory pathway determination; limited ministerial discretion (5.2); publication of 
reasons for decisions and conditions and offsets (7.7, 7.3 and 5.2). Data publication 
(for example, timelines for decision making) would help accountability, and potentially 
drive greater efficiency in delivering robust outcomes (7.3 and 11.2). 
Social acceptance  
Greater social acceptance and cohesion for communities directly impacted by a major 
project could be promoted by clarification and guidance on regulatory objectives 
(4.1 and 4.2); public participation (5.3); and greater use of strategic approaches that 
examine broader impacts of major projects and alternative uses of natural and other 
resources (11.1 and 11.2). 
Confidence in the regulatory system 
Appropriate resourcing and improved capabilities of regulatory agencies (12.1 and 
6.4); introduction of meaningful compliance statements for major projects (10.3); 
transparency in setting conditions and offsets (8.1 and 8.2); and clarity of review rights 
(9.1 and 9.2) could result in more consistent decisions and improve confidence of all 
stakeholders in the regulatory system. 
a Recommendation numbers in parentheses.  
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Delivery of previous reform efforts has been patchy 
While governments across Australia have often pursued reform of major project 
assessment and approval processes, outcomes have not always matched ambition. 
Some of the issues identified in this study, such as duplication and unnecessary 
costs of approval processes, have been previously identified. For example, in 1991 
the Industry Commission examined construction costs of major projects and stated:  
Despite frequent reviews and commitments by governments to change, approval 
processes continue to impose an unnecessary cost burden on proponents of major 
projects (1991, p. 4) 
Since this 1991 finding, numerous other public inquiries, Parliamentary committees, 
studies and departmental reviews have attempted to address the efficiency and 
efficacy of aspects of major project regulatory requirements and processes. These 
include: 
• the report by Infrastructure Australia, Building Australia’s Future: A Review of 
Approval Processes for Major Infrastructure (2009) 
• the Commission’s Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business 
Regulation: Planning, Zoning and Development Assessments (2011) 
• work led by the Commonwealth Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
during the course of 2012 to negotiate, through COAG, bilateral arrangements 
for accreditation of State and Territory Government environmental assessment 
and approval processes 
• the Independent Review of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth) (‘the Hawke review’) (2009). 
The recurring identification of similar deficiencies with major project regulatory 
processes, together with the complexity of the underlying regulatory systems 
themselves, suggests successful delivery of reform in this area is difficult. This 
reinforces the importance of efforts to drive implementation.  
The Commission’s recommendations provide an agenda to raise Australia’s major 
project DAA frameworks toward leading practice. They build on the direction of 
previous reviews and reforms initiated by different jurisdictions (some of which are 
currently being implemented).  
Consequences associated with not pursuing reform  
There are negative consequences for Australia in not pursuing reform, including 
potentially putting into jeopardy worthwhile investment with high community-wide 
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net returns and failing to provide regulatory systems that will deliver the high 
environmental and other standards the Australian community expects of DAA 
processes.  
Other countries, notably Canada, have improved their regulatory framework for 
resource project assessment and approval. Broader changes in the economic and 
technological basis of the energy sector have also driven change. The boom in 
natural gas extraction in the United States has led to calls for the lifting of US LNG 
export restrictions. These developments mean Australia’s position as a preferred 
destination for major resources projects can no longer be taken for granted.  
12.2 A roadmap for implementation 
The Commission has framed its recommendations taking into consideration existing 
DAA practices and recognising that jurisdictions’ histories and starting points will 
influence how they assess and approach reform. This section covers the factors that 
may impinge on reform prioritisation and delivery, as well as the key impediments 
to implementation and options to address them. 
Prioritising and sequencing the reforms 
The Commission’s recommendations are extensive and, as previous chapters have 
demonstrated, no jurisdiction is precisely in line with the recommendations. As 
such, jurisdictions will need to consider prioritising and sequencing the reforms.  
Priorities will vary by jurisdiction, depending on jurisdictions’ existing DAA 
regulatory settings. They will also depend on the specific nature of the 
Commission’s recommendations, including their ease of implementation, 
complementarity and/or overlap with existing reform programs. 
To assist jurisdictions in prioritising and sequencing the implementation of the 
reforms, the Commission has grouped its key recommendations according to three 
broad categories (figure 12.1): 
• Internal process reforms — primarily administrative (non-legislative) changes 
that are able to be implemented unilaterally. These could be delivered relatively 
quickly and build the momentum for further reforms by achieving ‘early wins’. 
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Figure 12.1 Key recommendations by broad descriptive categorya 
 
a Numbers in this figure represent the Commission’s recommendations (see pages accompanying Overview 
for descriptions). 
– Examples of these reforms include the Commission’s recommendations for 
the publication of guidance for proponents; enhancing public participation in 
DAA processes; and establishing cooperative arrangements between 
regulators within a jurisdiction for joint or substitute assessment processes. 
– Such reforms are largely uncontroversial and can be enacted administratively 
by State and Territory Governments. Some could potentially be first 
introduced administratively with legislative changes to entrench them 
proceeding later. 
• Reforms involving legislative change — reforms that either require legislative 
change or that could be best implemented (or further entrenched) by legislation. 
– Examples of legislative reforms include the Commission’s recommendations 
to clarify legislative objectives; changes to review and appeal rights; and 
establishing binding criteria for regulatory pathway determination, while 
limiting ministerial discretion on project call-in. 
• Broader policy reforms — those likely to require consultation, coordination and 
cooperation across jurisdictions. They require time to involve stakeholders and 
   
354 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
to study the costs and benefits of specific options and thus take longer to put in 
place. 
– Examples of these reforms include the Commission’s recommendations for 
increased use of strategic planning and assessments and pursuing bilateral 
approval agreements for matters of national environmental significance under 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth). 
Reforms complementary to each other should ideally be pursued together. Examples 
of these reforms include the Commission’s recommendations to establish time 
limits at the assessment and approval decision stages and putting in place clear 
triggers and limits for ‘stop the clock’ provisions for regulatory decisions. 
Overcoming barriers to implementation 
Consideration of barriers to reform and a commitment to overcome them is likely to 
strengthen the possibility of successful implementation. Past experience provides 
lessons that will assist in successfully implementing reform. 
Broad community and political support required 
Broad community and political support is essential to successful implementation of 
the Commission’s reforms because DAA processes are about balancing often 
competing and contested interests.  
Lack of broad community and political support may occur for a number of reasons, 
including where the case for reform has not been clearly made and accepted, or 
where affected communities have not been sufficiently consulted. In the context of 
reforms to DAA objectives, the Australian Local Government Association argued:  
The planning legislation at the jurisdictional level has been under constant review over 
the past decade and … amending or introducing new legislation and policies regularly 
can lead to reform fatigue and confusion. Any reviews must be done after consulting 
widely with local government. (sub. DR71, p. 7) 
Implementation efforts will be more successful and enduring where they gain the 
support of the broad community. Genuine engagement with the community by 
governments will build this support and bring stakeholders along. As noted by 
Amelia Thorpe, DAA processes are about community preferences: 
The design of DAA processes needs to recognise that communities, and their 
preferences, are multiple, overlapping and dynamic. Meaningful public participation 
processes are a vital mechanism to respond to this complexity, and in turn to ensure 
that major projects do indeed serve the public interest. (sub. DR98, pp. 2–3) 
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Garnering political support and achieving successful implementation of reform will 
be more likely where governments develop a compelling narrative for reform 
(’t Hart and Uhr 2008). Such a narrative is particularly important given project 
assessments and approvals are embedded within broader environmental and 
planning regulatory frameworks that are sometimes contested by stakeholders with 
entrenched positions. 
State and Territory Governments could lower risks to legislative reforms through 
genuine and thorough early stakeholder consultation, including green and white 
paper processes and draft Bills for comment. Public participation in shaping reforms 
is likely to yield more lasting and stable outcomes.  
The success of even the best-designed policies depends ultimately on the motivation 
and capabilities of those assigned to deliver the reforms, which potentially includes 
other governments (for example, for bilateral reforms) and non-governmental 
stakeholders. Successful implementation of reforms requires strong leadership by 
governments and implementation agencies. Leadership by governments and heads 
of agencies responsible for implementation has been identified as a critical factor in 
determining the ultimate success of reforms. The Australian Petroleum Production 
and Exploration Association reiterated the importance of leadership, specifically in 
relation to bilateral agreements: 
It is important that there is a strong commitment from all levels of Government to 
ensure that cooperative arrangements are … not bogged down in overly bureaucratic 
processes. (sub. DR105, p. 2) 
Accountabilities must be clearly allocated 
Clarity regarding roles and responsibility of individuals and agencies for reform 
improves accountability, and makes successful implementation more likely. 
Governments should therefore specify responsibilities for reform implementation, 
and ensure those people and agencies tasked with these responsibilities are 
accountable for its success or failure.  
To promote clear accountabilities and allocation of responsibilities, States and 
Territories should consider establishing cross-ministerial or agency taskforces for 
implementation. The Western Australian Government has initiated a ministerial 
taskforce on approvals, development and sustainability that is considering various 
reforms, including a consistent risk-based approach in approvals processes and 
removing duplication and overlap in DAA processes (Government of Western 
Australia, sub. DR103). 
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Collaboration, coordination, monitoring  
Cross-jurisdictional coordination can present difficulties where different 
jurisdictions with overlapping responsibilities disagree, or where interests diverge. 
This has been most evident with the breakdown of negotiations through COAG in 
2012 between the former Australian Government and the States and Territories to 
achieve bilateral approval agreements for environmental matters, as well as the 
lapsing of bilateral assessment agreements: 
Some proponents of major projects have essentially been left in regulatory limbo upon 
the expiry / non-renewal of existing bilateral agreements in NSW and other states. 
(King & Wood Mallesons, sub. DR99, p. 2). 
Cross-jurisdictional coordination difficulties can also occur where there is a 
disparity in the distribution of the costs and benefits of reform. In regard to major 
project DAA reforms, this issue is sometimes framed in terms of whether States and 
Territories should be funded for administering federal environmental protection 
laws under bilateral agreements. Similarly, there may be questions about who 
should fund any expansion of strategic assessments. 
As collaboration between Commonwealth and State and Territory Governments will 
be required to advance a number of key reforms, the Commission sees merit in 
reinstating major projects DAA reform on the COAG agenda. The recent 
experience with negotiations on bilateral agreements has, however, made some 
stakeholders cautious. For example, the Chamber of Minerals and Energy (CME) 
Western Australia said: 
CME questions the effectiveness of COAG as an implementation and 
compliance/monitoring body for approval bilateral agreements given the loss of 
momentum in 2012. (sub. DR85, p. 3 attachment) 
Despite this recent history, the Commission sees COAG as the most appropriate 
forum to discuss issues relating to duplication and overlap across levels of 
government. The involvement of COAG would not prevent the Australian 
Government from negotiating bilateral agreements with individual States or 
Territories. 
In addition, the Commission considers that there is merit in the COAG Reform 
Council being tasked with monitoring and reporting on jurisdictions’ progress in 
implementing the Commission’s recommendations over the next five years. At the 
end of this period, the Commission envisages the COAG Reform Council would 
produce a State of Play report on overall progress across jurisdictions. 
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Financial incentives to secure implementation 
In the past, the Australian Government has provided financial incentives to State 
and Territory Governments to initiate productivity-enhancing reforms. This was the 
case, for example, with the National Competition Policy reforms beginning in the 
mid-1990s. The concept of ‘productivity payments’ to jurisdictions that make 
reforms has been raised by participants in this study (Business Council of Australia 
sub. DR102). 
With regard to DAA reform the Commission does not see a strong case for the 
Australian Government providing incentive payments to States and Territories. 
However, there is a role for Commonwealth funding in assisting with the reform 
process. The Commission sees a potentially beneficial role for Commonwealth 
funding to improve the availability and quality of consolidated baseline 
environmental data (particularly with regard to water resources and species 
biodiversity). A ministerial council (or similar body) could oversee improvements 
in this area. There is also a case for the Commonwealth to provide funding for 
monitoring the progress of reforms across jurisdictions, and the Commission 
suggests the COAG Reform Council play this role.  
Transitional challenges and unexpected roadblocks 
Reform will often be confronted with unexpected obstacles or complexities. 
Transitional challenges are always likely when implementing new approaches. For 
example, when the National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental 
Management Authority’s role was extended to environmental regulation, the shift 
towards a more risk-based regime led to uncertainty for many proponents about 
what was expected of them, with calls for greater guidance from the regulator. 
Similarly, the WA Government is moving to increased tracking of project approval 
processes within and across departments, and this is creating significant IT 
challenges for agencies. 
A number of the Commission’s recommendations would be likely to meet similar 
transitional challenges. However, the Commission considers it is unlikely that these 
challenges undermine the case for their implementation. Governments should 
consider, in advance, what the likely transitional issues associated with particular 
reforms will be, and develop strategies for overcoming them (such as providing 
information to stakeholders, or training to regulators) and maintaining support for 
reforms.  
Reforms may be adopted slowly, or not at all, where they challenge existing norms 
and operational cultures within agencies. For example, in 2011 the WA 
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Auditor-General noted that although the WA Department of Mines and Petroleum 
had adopted a risk-based approach to inspections, in practice how recently a site had 
been inspected still played a role in decisions about risk ratings despite this not 
changing a site’s intrinsic risk (chapter 10). 
12.3 Ensuring long-term reform success  
Beyond the implementation phase, the success of reforms to DAA regulatory 
frameworks depends on the performance of regulatory agencies. 
Resourcing and expertise 
Throughout the study, participants have detailed concerns about the resourcing, 
expertise and performance of regulatory agencies (box 12.2). There are two aspects 
of resourcing that are particularly important for major project DAA processes: the 
expertise, skills and judgment of regulatory staff, and the number and availability of 
those staff. 
Is funding adequate? 
An adequate level of funding is required to enable regulators to administer DAA 
regulations efficiently and effectively. Clarity about regulators’ funding levels and 
sources is also necessary to ensure their ongoing independence and objectivity. 
The consequences of inadequate resourcing can be significant. Pressures are 
particularly acute during investment booms, when the scale and complexity of 
major resource project applications increase rapidly and competition for skilled staff 
intensifies. Government agencies are typically less able than private enterprise to 
adjust to these pressures by, for instance, hiring more staff and offering more 
attractive remuneration. Given Australia’s economic history, these pressures are 
likely to recur. 
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Box 12.2 Participants’ concerns regarding regulatory agencies 
resourcing and capabilities 
The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia was concerned about lack 
of regulatory staff: 
The extent to which sufficient resources are available to approval agencies is critical to the 
timely arrival of approval decisions. The resource sector’s general experience with the 
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Population and Communities (DSEWPAC) is a 
lack of staff resources to effectively manage the DAA process. (sub. 18, p. 4) 
The Queensland Resources Council noted the mining boom had diminished staff 
retention for regulatory agencies: 
QRC agrees wholeheartedly that regulatory agencies need to have the resources, capacity 
and skills to effectively implement, operate and enforce their legislation. QRC does 
recognise that industry has played a role in the diminished retention rates of skilled staff 
within regulatory agencies. The extent to which sufficient resources are available to approval 
agencies is critical to the timely arrival at approval decisions. The complexity of the 
regulatory environment certainly adds to the issue as it takes many years for staff to become 
familiar with the legislation and have the experience to apply it effectively. (sub. DR91, p. 3) 
The Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices noted resources had to 
keep pace with regulatory activity:  
Regulatory resources must keep pace with industry expansion, to avoid increased risks to 
communities and the environment. In 2009, a Senate committee called for urgent review of 
under-resourcing of federal environmental regulation. (sub. DR92, p. 24) 
Business SA was also concerned about staff turnover: 
One of the issues raised by business is that while they might find an effective liaison within 
Government, whenever that person is absent on leave, issues of business continuity arise. 
Further, high staff turnover within Government can create delays and uncertainty for 
business. (sub. DR74, p. 2) 
Peabody Energy suggested the number of requests for additional information related to 
resourcing problems: 
… regulators need to be adequately resourced and equipped to properly digest and assess 
[Environmental Impact Statement documents] in a timely manner. … the number of requests 
from departments for information already clearly outlined in EIS documents suggests a 
possible deficit in this area. (sub. DR81, p. 2) 
Lock the Gate expressed concern that under-resourcing of Queensland regulatory 
agencies could lead to regulatory error: 
Poorly resourced bureaucracies operating under tight timelines are at risk of poorly 
considered decision-making. (sub. DR97, p. 6)  
 
Under-resourcing of regulatory agencies can lead to unnecessary delays, increased 
compliance costs for proponents, and potentially poor decisions. One possible effect 
of a lack of staff or expertise within regulators might be the placing of excessive 
conditions on a project because staff lack the expertise to accurately assess risks 
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associated with a project, or knowledge of specific solutions (effectively putting 
quantity of conditions in place of quality). As noted by the Commission in its recent 
report Regulator Engagement with Small Business, where regulators are 
inadequately resourced, either some risks to communities will go unmitigated or the 
costs of mitigation will be pushed onto those regulated (PC 2013b). 
A risk-based approach can alleviate some resource constraints 
Adoption of risk-based approaches should help alleviate resourcing pressures by 
ensuring resources are used more efficiently and effectively. Under a risk-based 
approach, resources are proportionately allocated to those activities perceived to 
represent the greatest risk. For example, in its compliance program, the WA Office 
of the Environmental Protection Agency scans all reports it receives from project 
operators and uses the information provided to drive the selection of sites for 
desktop audits based on an assessment of risk. However, a shift to a risk-based 
approach to regulation is not without transitional challenges, and could involve 
missteps and upfront costs. Xstrata Coal noted: 
The want and desire of the current regulatory agencies to pursue risk-based approaches 
is far less apparent, with many Government agency staff seeing themselves or being 
instructed to act as project facilitators and mediators, rather than drivers of the project 
approvals process, and staff are not being required to understand the overall scope of 
the projects they are “regulating” nor where they fit in the approval processes to which 
they are meant be follow. Risk-based assessment has been substituted by ‘risk averse’. 
(sub. 50, pp. 30–31). 
When the WA Environmental Protection Authority first experimented with a 
risk-based approach, many stakeholders thought it had been too precise in trying to 
allocate risk. Improvements have since been made and its modified ‘significance 
framework’ approach (EPA (WA) 2013a), while still in its early stages, is an 
example of ‘leading practice’. 
A role for cost recovery? 
Cost recovery mechanisms can in some circumstances be a source of funding for 
regulators. However, such an approach needs to be considered in the light of agency 
roles that are not amenable to cost recovery (such as monitoring, enforcement and 
educative activities) and to ensure that agency finances are robust across the 
economic cycle. 
The Australian Government has announced it will apply cost recovery to aspects of 
federal environmental assessment from 1 July 2014, on the basis that: 
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Cost recovery will improve the department’s ability to meet statutory timeframes and 
respond to changes in demand for its services. It will also provide incentives to industry 
to undertake early engagement and incorporate the most environmentally acceptable 
outcomes into their business planning, as this may reduce the level of assessment 
required and therefore the costs payable. (DSEWPAC (Cwlth) 2012e, p. 7) 
Targeted cost recovery can be consistent with the user-pays principle, and should 
make funding arrangements more equitable in cases where benefits to an applicant 
clearly outweigh community-wide benefits, although such assessments, as a 
practical matter, are often difficult to make.  
Should governments pursue cost recovery, they should ensure that charges are 
genuinely reflective of costs incurred and be subject to regular review through a 
Cost Recovery Impact Statement, in line with current Australian Government 
practice. This should ensure that cost recovery charges remain appropriate for the 
activity; that the design of cost recovery charges is efficient and equitable; and that 
charging does not lead to over or under recovery. 
Cost recovery should also be restricted to areas where it is suitable. For example, 
the Commission considers that some use of cost recovery for environmental impact 
assessments and strategic assessments would be consistent with the principles of 
cost recovery proposed by the Commission in its Cost Recovery by Government 
Agencies report (PC 2002), and contained in the Australian Government’s Cost 
Recovery Guidelines. However, there need to be mechanisms to discourage ‘gold 
plating’ of regulatory activities that add unnecessarily to the quantum of costs 
recovered. 
Improving regulatory agency performance and culture  
The implementation of regulations and ongoing performance of regulatory agencies 
is crucial to the long-term success of DAA systems. As the Commission has 
recently noted in its report on small business regulation: 
The way regulations are implemented is often as important to small business and to 
compliance outcomes as the content of the regulations themselves. Regulators, by their 
conduct in interpreting, administering and enforcing regulatory requirements, can take 
considered, well designed regulation and produce regimes which discourage 
compliance, squander government resources or add to business costs and delays. 
Alternatively, a regulator might take an unwieldy accumulation of regulation and, by 
choosing judiciously what, when and how to enforce, deliver the desired regulatory 
outcomes in an efficient manner. (PC 2013b, p. 3) 
The culture of regulatory agencies and the attitude of staff to their functions and 
responsibilities have a significant impact on the performance of regulatory agencies, 
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particularly given the interface between proponents and regulators throughout the 
DAA process: 
An organisation’s culture is regarded as a critical determinant of performance and as 
one of the most promising mechanisms management can use to achieve control and 
coordination. (Sinclair 1991, p. 321) 
While there is no single regulatory culture that best delivers regulatory outcomes 
and avoids unnecessary burdens for those regulated (PC 2013b), concerns about 
culture raised by stakeholders to this study included excessive risk aversion, a lack 
of service focus, perceptions of a lack of objectivity and a lack of peer learning.  
The Commission was also made aware of instances where some agencies develop 
an ‘us and them’ culture based around formal rules, including conditions, with 
adversarial and punitive enforcement and an underlying distrust of the regulated 
proponents. Other participants typically raised the opposite concerns, suggesting 
environmental, heritage and cultural concerns were often swept aside as agencies 
sought to approve projects. 
There are tangible actions that Governments, working with their regulators can take 
to improve the performance and culture of regulatory agencies responsible for DAA 
processes. 
Clear objectives of regulation 
Having clearly defined objectives of regulation is the starting point for improving 
implementation by regulatory agencies by: 
• ensuring that the reach of regulation does not extend beyond what Parliament 
intended 
• reducing uncertainty about how regulation will be interpreted and what is needed 
for compliance 
• making clear to regulatory agency officers that the ultimate responsibility for 
assessing the tradeoffs between economic, environmental and social values rests 
with Ministers 
• establishing the basis for assessing the performance of regulators and holding 
them accountable 
• guiding the resource allocation of regulators and their development of expertise 
(VCEC 2010). 
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Setting a statement of expectations  
One opportunity for government to influence regulatory agency culture is through 
Ministerial Statements of Expectations (and corresponding agency Statements of 
Intent) that are consistent with setting clear objectives of regulation. Statements of 
Expectations typically outline the Government’s objectives that are relevant to the 
agency, establish the level of information that should be provided to Ministers 
regarding issues facing the agency, and the Government’s expectations of how the 
agency should conduct its operations.  
As noted by the Regulation Taskforce in 2006, such statements can ‘be helpful and 
transparent vehicles for guiding a regulator’s approach — and simultaneously 
educating the community — without infringing on a regulator’s essential 
independence’ (2006, p. 161). The Victorian Competition and Efficiency 
Commission (VCEC) has suggested that performance reporting could be combined 
with the issuing of statements of expectations by Ministers. This would provide 
clarity for the regulator about what it is expected to achieve, and yield information 
about the extent to which the regulator has met these expectations.  
The [VCEC] considers it would be good practice for every regulator to receive a 
Statement of Expectations from the relevant minister. … a regulator must respond to a 
minister’s Statement of Expectations, and explain how it will meet the minister’s 
expectations. The [VCEC] also considers Victorian regulators should reduce 
applicants’ uncertainty about timeliness, either by publishing or directly advising 
applicants of the target or expected timeframes (the timeframes that would apply if the 
regulator has received all required information). Moreover, to promote accountability 
and improved performance, regulators should be encouraged to collect and report 
timeliness data. (VCEC 2011, pp. 102–103) 
Statements of Expectations also give governments an opportunity to guide agencies 
with regard to the level of risk they might tolerate, as the VCEC has noted: 
The ministers’ Statements of Expectations could provide an appropriate avenue to give 
regulators high level guidance on the expected treatment of risk and use of risk-based 
approaches — including accepting that some risk is unavoidable (2011, p. 114). 
Statements of Expectations are commonly used in the Commonwealth and in some 
States for regulatory agencies. For example, the current Ministerial Statement of 
Expectation for the Tasmanian Planning Commission includes clear expectations 
regarding policy development and community stakeholder engagement 
(Government of Tasmania 2012). Statements of Expectations could be more 
comprehensively used for all regulatory agencies involved in DAA processes, 
especially the State and Territory based regulators.  
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Moving from prescriptive to outcomes focused regulation 
The Commission favours outcomes focused regulation, including outcomes-based 
conditions that require the proponent to achieve particular performance standards or 
measurable outcomes, but do not prescribe how to do so.  
Moving away from prescriptive regulation does, however, impose an additional 
responsibility on regulatory staff to provide advice about whether proposed actions 
comply with regulatory requirements. Agencies can help their staff to do this by, for 
example: 
• ensuring their staff have the necessary technical and other knowledge 
• clarifying the roles of staff 
• supporting staff by providing clear guidance 
• developing internal quality controls on advice provided to business, such as 
requiring advice to be written down, and peer review of advice (VCEC 2012, 
p. 12). 
Commonwealth agencies with responsibility for business regulation are required to 
publish annual regulatory plans on their websites each year. The regulatory plan 
details any changes within the agency’s area of responsibility and contains 
information about: 
• changes to business regulation which have occurred since the beginning of the 
previous financial year 
• activities planned for the current financial year which could lead to changes in 
business regulation. 
The Commission considers such plans could be expanded to include information 
about the activities the agency has undertaken to improve the implementation of 
regulation. 
Investment in staff competencies 
Enhancing regulatory agency performance involves investment in staff, including 
having in place programs to identify staff skill gaps and processes to address them 
through formal and informal training. Peer learning is an important element of this 
initiative and forums such as the Australasian Environmental Law Enforcement and 
Regulators Network and the previous work of the Development Assessment Forum 
(Property Council of Australia sub. DR106) represent useful opportunities for peer 
learning.  
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Stakeholder engagement and feedback 
Stakeholder confidence in a regulator’s performance is enhanced when the regulator 
communicates effectively with the public using targeted communication 
mechanisms (ANAO 2007a). 
There are a number of mechanisms for such effective communication. For example, 
the EPA in Victoria has recently formalised its EPA Victoria Engagement Policy 
which aims to improve regulations, programs and services and bring stakeholders 
together in resolving issues. Progress against the engagement policy will be 
reported publicly. The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), 
responsible for some approvals, engages with stakeholder groups through a variety 
of avenues, including management advisory committees. It also has a client service 
charter that it monitors and publicly reports on, setting out the standards that all 
clients or stakeholders can expect from AFMA. These mechanisms help to maintain 
an open dialogue between AFMA and stakeholders.  
Ongoing monitoring and broader review 
The pressures on regulators engaged in DAA processes, and the context within 
which they are operating are likely to change over time; for example, as community 
expectations change, new types of major projects emerge, and related legislation 
evolves. To ensure that DAA processes remain fit for purpose, governments should 
undertake periodic reviews to ensure that regulatory agencies have the necessary 
governance frameworks, resources, capacity and skills to efficiently administer 
major development assessment and approval processes. 
RECOMMENDATION 12.1 
Governments should undertake periodic reviews to ensure that regulatory 
agencies have the necessary governance frameworks, resources, capacity and 
skills to efficiently administer the development assessment and approval processes 
of major projects.  
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A Public consultation 
This appendix lists the organisations and individuals that have participated in the 
study.  
• Following receipt of the terms of reference on 7 December 2012, an 
advertisement was placed in newspapers and a circular was sent to identified 
interested parties. 
• The Commission released an issues paper on 11 February 2013 to assist 
interested parties in preparing their submissions. Some 60 written submissions 
were subsequently received.  
• A draft report for the study was released on 5 August 2013 and a further 46 
submissions were received. All submissions are listed in table A.1 and available 
online at: www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/major-projects. 
• The Commission met with a wide range of stakeholders across Australia, 
including government departments12, companies, industry associations, 
non-government organisations and academics (table A.2). 
• In addition, teleconferences and meetings were undertaken with various 
government departments, industry associations, non-government organisations 
and academics in the United States, the United Kingdom, France (OECD) and 
Canada. Meetings were also held with relevant parties in New Zealand following 
the release of the draft report (table A.3). 
• A pre draft report roundtable was held in Melbourne on Friday 24 May. Post 
draft report roundtables were also held in Brisbane (2 September), Melbourne 
(3 September) and Sydney (6 September). A list of roundtable participants is 
provided in table A.4. 
The Commission would like to thank all who have contributed to the study. 
                                              
12 A number of Commonwealth department and agency names have changed since the draft report, 
following the 2013 federal election. 
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Table A.1 Submissions 
Participant Submission no. 
ACIL Tasman 29 
AGL Energy 27, DR96 
Association of Mining and Exploration Companies  42, DR70 
Australian Airports Association 41 
Australian Local Government Association DR71 
Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices 14, DR92 
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association  17, DR105 
Australian Uranium Association 34, 52, DR62 
Blue Mountains Conservation Society DR86 
Brisbane Airport Corporation DR69 
Brisbane City Council 60 
Business Council of Australia 43, DR102 
Business SA 4, DR74 
Canberra Airport 31, DR75 
Capricorn Conservation Council 12 
Cardno HRP 20 
Cement Concrete and Aggregates Australia 49 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia 44 
Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia 18, DR85 
Clowes, Richard DR65 
Conservation Council SA DR76 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport 59 
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities 55, DR88 
Derrington, Theresa 35 
Doctors for the Environment Australia 48 
East End Mine Action Group 38, DR68 
Economists at Large 13 
Economists at Large and The Australia Institute DR83 
ElectraNet DR63 
Enthalpy 21 
Faldt, Kathy DR82 
General Electric 9, DR89 
Government of Western Australia DR103 
Hunter, Dr Tina 58 
Hunter Valley Coal Chain Coordinator  56 
King & Wood Mallesons 39, DR99 
Leggate, Jim DR61 
Local Government Association of Queensland DR78 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Participant Submission no. 
Local Government Association of South Australia 25 
Local Government NSW 36 
Lock the Gate Alliance DR97 
Mackay Conservation Group 7 
Master Builders Australia 24, DR80 
Medical Association for the Prevention of War 45 
Metropolitan Redevelopment Authority of Western Australia DR66 
Minerals Council of Australia 33 
Mueller, Otto 5, 54 
NTSCORP DR104 
Nature Conservation Council of NSW 22, DR94 
Nature Conservation Society of South Australia  37, DR95 
North Queensland Conservation Council 10, DR64 
Northern Territory Government 46 
NSW Minerals Council 23, DR93 
Origin Energy DR100 
Peabody Energy Australia DR81 
Planning Institute of Australia DR73 
Project Management Institute 32, DR84 
Property Council of Australia DR106 
QGC DR79 
Queensland Conservation DR77 
Queensland Government 47 
Queensland Resources Council 19, DR91 
Regional Development Australia Far North Queensland and Torres Strait 26 
Roads Australia DR90 
Scott-Kemmis, Don, Pacific Innovation 6 
Schinkel, Maurice 28 
South Australian State Government Departments 51 
Spiers, John DR67 
SRA Information Technology 57 
Tager, Jeremy 8, DR72 
Tasmanian Department of Premier and Cabinet DR101 
Tasmanian Government 53 
The Warren Centre for Advanced Engineering  11 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Participant Submission no. 
Thorpe, Amelia 16, DR98 
Urban Taskforce Australia 15, DR87 
UrbanGrowth NSW 40 
Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists 1 
Whan, Ian 3 
Woodward, Dr Ian  2 
WWF Australia 30 
Xstrata Coal 50 
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Table A.2 Meetings 
Participant 
New South Wales 
Infrastructure Australia 
Infrastructure NSW 
Roads and Maritime Services  
Sydney Water 
Transport for NSW 
Endeavour Energy 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (NSW) 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure (NSW) 
Department of Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services (NSW) 
Environmental Defender’s Office (NSW) 
Environment Protection Authority (NSW) 
NSW Minerals Council 
Property Council of Australia 
Sydney Ports 
Wentworth Group 
Xstrata Coal 
 
Victoria 
Australian Conservation Foundation  
Port of Melbourne 
Business Council of Australia  
Department of Planning and Community Development (Vic) 
Department of Treasury and Finance (Vic)  
Major Projects Victoria  
Department of Premier and Cabinet (Vic)  
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 
AGL 
WWF Australia 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (teleconference) 
BHP Billiton 
World Bank 
Dr Matthew Currell (RMIT) 
 
Queensland 
Brisbane 
Brisbane City Council 
Local Government Association of Queensland 
Queensland Government 
Queensland Resources Council 
Brisbane Airport Corporation 
Port of Brisbane Corporation 
Queensland Conservation Council 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.2 (continued) 
Participant 
Brisbane 
Environmental Defender’s Office (Qld) 
World Wildlife Fund 
Department of Transport and Main Roads (Qld) 
BG Group (owner of Queensland Gas Company) 
 
Gladstone 
Capricorn Conservation Council and Gladstone Conservation Council 
Gladstone Airport 
Gladstone Ports Corporation  
Gladstone Regional Council 
QER Shale Oil  
Santos 
 
South Australia 
Australian Rail Track Corporation 
Department of Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, Resources and Energy (SA) 
South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy 
Rex Minerals Ltd Hillside Mine  
 
Western Australia 
Perth 
Office of the Environmental Protection Authority (WA) 
Chamber of Minerals and Energy (WA) 
Conservation Council of Western Australia 
Department of State Development (WA) 
Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA) 
Yamatji Marpla Aboriginal Corporation 
Chevron Australia 
Cameco 
Herbert Smith Freehills 
Sinosteel Midwest 
Crosslands Resources 
Rosslyn Hill Mining 
DLA Piper 
National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority 
National Native Title Tribunal 
AngloGold Ashanti Australia 
BHP Billiton — Iron ore  
SRA Information Technology 
Karratha 
Dampier Port Authority 
Rio Tinto – Cape Lambert Port Operations 
Woodside Energy – North West Shelf Project 
(Continued next page)  
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Table A.2 (continued) 
Participant 
Tasmania 
Pitt and Sherry 
Mineral Resources Tasmania 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tas) 
Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources (Tas) 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment (Tas) 
Department of Treasury and Finance (Tas) 
Tasmanian Planning Commission 
Tasmanian Irrigation 
 
Northern Territory 
NT Government 
 
Australian Government and national bodies 
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association  
Department of Infrastructure and Transport  
Minerals Council of Australia 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
The Treasury 
Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism 
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities 
Table A.3 International meetings and teleconferences 
Participant 
Canada 
Edmonton 
Alberta Energy 
Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Relations 
Ecojustice 
Pembina Institute 
Athabascas Chipeweyan First Nation NGO 
Calgary 
National Energy Board  
Explorers and Producers Association of Canada  
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers  
Fraser Institute 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
Participant 
Ottawa 
Major Projects Management Office  
Canadian Environmental Network 
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada 
The Mining Association of Canada  
Canadian Electricity Association  
Sierra Club 
Natural Resources Canada 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 
Environment Canada 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
Teleconferences 
Alberta Government Policy Management Office  
Major Projects Management Office  
 
France 
Paris  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
International Transport Forum  
Conseil d'analyse économique 
 
Mexico 
Teleconference 
Centro Mario Molina  
 
United Kingdom 
London 
DLA Piper  
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs — Major Infrastructure and Environment Unit 
Major Projects Authority 
Planning Inspectorate 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
Participant 
United States 
Washington 
World Bank 
US Department of Transportation (and related agencies) 
US Department of the Interior (and related agencies, including the Bureau of Land Management) 
White House Council on Environmental Quality 
National Mining Association 
Edison Electric Institute 
Teleconferences 
California State Lands Commission  
California Energy Commission  
Office of California Governor 
Federal Bureau of Land Management – California State Office 
 
New Zealand 
Environment Court of New Zealand 
NZ Environmental Protection Authority 
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand 
NZ Ministry for the Environment 
Wind Energy Association 
New Zealand Transport Agency 
Transpower 
 
Table A.4 Roundtable participants 
Participant and location Organisation 
Melbourne — 24 May 2013  
John Short Aurizon Holdings  
Ben Stewart ANZ 
Phil Montgomery BHP Billiton 
Emma Covacevich Clayton Utz 
Mike Rollo Leighton Holdings  
David Stuart-Watt Parsons Brinckerhoff 
Sam Maresh Rio Tinto Australia 
Hilary Mercer Shell Australia  
Cassandra McCarthy Glencore Xstrata 
Steve Bridger Glencore Xstrata 
Jennifer Westacott Business Council of Australia 
Simon Pryor Business Council of Australia 
Matt Garbutt Business Council of Australia 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
Participant and location Organisation 
Brisbane — 2 September 2013  
Clare Andersen Qld Dept. of Premier and Cabinet 
Roger Black Projects Queensland/Queensland Treasury & Trade 
Michael Allen Coordinator-General 
Sally Noonan Qld Dept. of State Development, Infrastructure & Planning 
Andrew Broadbent Qld Dept. of State Development, Infrastructure & Planning 
Alex Ackfun Qld Dept. of State Development, Infrastructure & Planning 
Lindsay Delzoppo Qld Dept. of Environment & Heritage Protection 
John Lane Qld Dept. of Environment & Heritage Protection 
Vishal Jaitley Qld Dept. of Natural Resources & Mines 
Tom Orr Qld Dept. of Transport & Main Roads 
Jim Hefferan Brisbane City Council 
Coenraad Groenewald Brisbane City Council 
Andrew Barger Queensland Resources Council 
Katie Mulder Queensland Resources Council 
Melanie Stutsel Minerals Council of Australia 
Pat Fiore Rio Tinto 
Nicole Buchanski Santos 
David Shankey Santos 
Terry Rossitto Brisbane Airport Corporation 
Emma Covacevich Clayton Utz 
Jo-Anne Bragg Environmental Defender’s Office (Qld) 
Richard Leck WWF (Qld) 
Dr Tina Hunter Centre for International Minerals & Energy Law  
  
Melbourne — 3 September 2013  
Corey Hannett Victorian Regional Rail Link Authority 
Simon Pryor Business Council of Australia 
Jennifer Westacott Business Council of Australia 
Matt Garbutt Business Council of Australia 
Sean Myers Parsons Brinckerhoff 
Philippa Forge Parsons Brinckerhoff 
John Whittington Tas Dept. of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and 
Environment 
Murray Arthur-Worsop SA Dept. of Premier and Cabinet 
Tristan Knowles Economists at Large 
David Byers APPEA 
Keld Knudsen APPEA 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
Participant and location Organisation 
Chuck Berger Australian Conservation Foundation 
Nicola Rivers Vic Environmental Defender’s Office 
Corinne Cadilhac Vic Dept. of Premier and Cabinet 
Trevor Blake Vic Dept. of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure 
Rod Hook SA Dept. of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure 
Brad Ostermeyer Regional Development Victoria 
  
Sydney — 6 September 2013  
Steve Alchin Infrastructure Australia 
Oliver Steele Infrastructure NSW 
Adrian Dwyer Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 
David Frith NSW Minerals Council 
Andrew Rode NSW Minerals Council 
Steve Reid Origin Energy 
Debra Townsend King & Wood Mallesons 
Guy Templeton Parsons Brinckerhoff 
Rachel Walmsley NSW Environmental Defender’s Office 
Chris Johnson Urban Taskforce 
Andrew MacIntosh ANU 
Amelia Thorpe UNSW 
Steve Hulton Wood MacKenzie 
Caryn Kakas Property Council of Australia 
Charlie Thomas Property Council of Australia 
Martin Hoffman Commonwealth Dept. of Resources, Energy & Tourism 
Richard Niven Commonwealth Dept. of Resources, Energy & Tourism 
Benjamin Arnold Commonwealth Dept. of Infrastructure & Transport 
Chris Wilson NSW Dept. of Planning and Infrastructure 
Matthew Dunn NSW Treasury 
Tim Hampton NSW Dept. of Premier & Cabinet 
Rod Stolorz Tas Dept. of Economic Development, Tourism and the Arts 
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B Benchmarking and good regulatory 
practice 
 
Box 1.2 (chapter 1) set out 13 regulatory principles that constitute a benchmark of 
good regulatory governance and conduct. This appendix describes these principles. 
B.1 Regulator governance 
Governance frameworks provide a structure through which the objectives of 
regulators are set and the means of attaining these objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. Governance principles, such as those outlined below, 
should provide incentives for regulators to pursue objectives that will lead to 
broader community benefits and build confidence in the operation of the regulatory 
system. 
Clear, well-defined regulatory objectives 
Development assessment and approval (DAA) processes address situations where 
the private and social costs and benefits of development diverge, by imposing 
conditions on projects that are intended to remove, or at least reduce, this 
divergence. However, regulation in this (or any) area can be over used or poorly 
directed. This is less likely to happen when regulatory objectives have been clearly 
defined through a process that has established a robust rationale for intervention. 
Such a process should specify precisely the problem that regulation is intended to 
address and identify why there is a role for government to address that problem.  
Having clear objectives has other benefits, as it:  
• diminishes regulators’ discretion to extend their activities beyond what 
Parliament intended (known as regulatory creep) 
• reduces uncertainty about how regulation will be interpreted and what is needed 
for compliance  
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• establishes the basis for assessing the performance of regulators and holding 
them accountable 
• provides a focus for regulators and so guides their resource allocation and 
development of expertise (Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission 
2010). 
Clarity in roles and responsibilities 
With objectives clearly defined, there needs to be clarity about who is responsible 
for delivering them. All levels of government, and different agencies within each 
level of government, can be involved in DAA processes. This creates scope for 
problems such as:  
• overlap and shared responsibilities between different agencies 
• conflicts between the roles performed by different agencies 
• conflicts of interest in the roles performed by an agency. 
These problems are less likely to be present when the roles and responsibilities of 
all entities involved in DAA processes are set out clearly. For example, it may be 
useful if statutory referrals are set out in one document and specify the role of the 
referral agency (Development Assessment Forum 2009).  
Accountable decision makers 
When decision makers have clear objectives and their roles and responsibilities 
have been well specified, there is a basis for accountability. The prospect of being 
held to account creates incentives to carry out roles and responsibilities in line with 
specified requirements. 
The accountability of participants in DAA processes is strengthened when there is 
clear specification of authority for: 
• assessors to make recommendations 
• approval authorities to make decisions based on those recommendations.  
If decision making is delegated, accountability can be diminished, unless the 
conditions under which delegation is made and the scope of the authority that is 
devolved, are both carefully specified. 
The last major step in the DAA process is the approval decision, which is typically 
made by a Minister or delegate and involves regulatory agencies, government 
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departments, project proponents and other stakeholders. While a Minister is often 
ultimately accountable for the approval decision, other entities may have roles and 
responsibilities in the process for which they are accountable. If the process leads to 
a decision that is seen to be deficient, it is simplistic to hold only the Minister to 
account for this. Applying the accountability criterion requires defining the 
responsibilities for which participants in the process can be held to account. 
Appropriately independent regulators 
While Ministers often make approval decisions, regulators may manage the 
assessment process and enforce approval conditions. The OECD (2013) points out 
that regulators’ decisions need to be ‘objective, impartial, consistent and expert’ and 
that having decisions made by an independent regulator rather than a Minister or 
officer of the Ministry should be considered where: 
• there is a need for the regulator to be seen to be independent, to maintain public 
confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of decisions; 
• both government and non-government entities are regulated under the same 
framework and competitive neutrality is therefore required; or  
• the decisions of the regulator can have a significant impact on particular interests 
and there is a need to protect its impartiality (OECD 2013, p. 33). 
Independence is never absolute but is rather a matter of degree. Even separately 
constituted regulators with statutory independence normally depend on government 
funding. On the other hand, regulators located within departments can have 
arrangements that provide some independence from ministerial direction. The 
amount of independence that a regulator has will depend on factors such as the 
extent to which a Minister can direct it; its staffing flexibility; and the processes for 
appointment, termination of appointments of board members and the personal 
character of the individual concerned. The regulator’s independence from those it is 
regulating is also important, and may be managed by, for example, mandatory time 
gaps or cooling-off periods between leaving a regulator and working in the 
regulated industry (OECD 2013). 
Suitably skilled and resourced institutions 
It is unreasonable to hold institutions accountable for their contribution to DAA 
processes if they have insufficient resources to develop and maintain the skills to 
perform their responsibilities. The adequacy of resourcing influences whether the 
DAA process will lead to desired outcomes. Funding levels need to be:  
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adequate to enable the regulator, operating efficiently, to effectively fulfil the 
objectives set by government, including obligations imposed by other legislation. 
(OECD 2013, p. 58)  
Opportunities for public participation and review of decisions 
DAA processes allow evidence to be sought from interested parties that informs the 
assessment of the project. Public participation, involving some form of dialogue 
between the public and the state, can generate evidence and identify options for 
addressing problems. It also promotes transparency by exposing the merits of 
decisions, assumptions and the analysis used to make those decisions.  
Participation is important in all stages of the DAA process. Amelia Thorpe 
suggested:  
… Public participation can offer many benefits, including improving the content of 
decision-making by providing decision makers with information about potential 
benefits and impacts of projects, possible alternatives, and the different perspectives of 
the many groups that form the public. Participation can increase the legitimacy of 
decision-making, thus reducing opposition to projects and making implementation 
easier. Participation is also valuable for its educative potential, as a means to raise 
awareness among the public about the tradeoffs involved in planning for the future. 
(sub. 16, p. 4) 
In the application stage, consultation helps to identify the issues that need to be 
addressed, while in the assessment stage it provides evidence about these issues. 
Further consultation may be needed in the approval stage if there are gaps in the 
information that the decision maker needs. How much consultation may be needed 
at this stage depends on the effectiveness of consultation earlier in the process. 
Participation is more likely to be effective if: 
• public input has a real impact on decision-making 
• information is given in a wide range of formats 
• a variety of forums are used 
• it occurs when there is still scope to affect the outcomes 
• there is clarity about the consultation process 
• the process is accessible to those it is intended to reach 
• feedback is provided to those who have made an input (Cabinet Office (UK) 
2012); sub. 16, p. 5). 
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The choice of participation methods is evolving, reflecting the fact that the internet 
has reduced the cost of new forms of engagement, such as electronic polling, 
deliberative polls, and online tools that can illustrate the consequences of choices, 
and engage a wider cross-section of the community and draw out tacit community 
opinion. 
Consistency with other regulations and higher level planning 
strategies 
Major developments require approvals under different Acts and regulations. When 
they have different objectives or impose dissimilar approval processes, this can 
increase both the cost of securing approval and the probability of inconsistent 
decisions that do not achieve regulatory outcomes. Consistency is enhanced by 
integrating objectives in different Acts and regulations or by governments providing 
guidance on how different priorities should be weighted, where conflicting 
objectives are unavoidable.  
Regular review and evaluation 
DAA processes operate within competing pressures that continually adjust as the 
nature and number of projects change, as technology develops, and as community 
expectations evolve. Approaches to regulation also develop as there is more 
experience with, for example, outcome-based regulation or self-accreditation. 
Evaluating current practices and looking for ways to improve them can: 
• indicate whether regulations are working as intended and, if they are not, suggest 
ways to address problems 
• keep regulation up to date when technological or social forces change 
• improve legislation, because the knowledge that legislation will be formally 
reviewed may increase the quality of initial drafting  
• improve the allocation of responsibilities for regulation, if it demonstrates 
weaknesses and suggests improvements 
• build stakeholder support for regulation, if regulators demonstrate a willingness 
to learn from experience (Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission 
2008). 
Good practice regulatory frameworks normally build in evaluation procedures and 
mechanisms for building on the lessons from these reviews. 
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B.2 Regulator conduct 
Governance frameworks leave considerable discretion as to how regulators 
administer regulation. Participants in this study had diverse views about how this 
discretion is exercised, but agreed that the impacts could be considerable. The 
Minerals Council of Australia (sub. 33), for example, cited a survey that found 
monitoring or enforcement regimes were either impractical or unduly focused on 
dictating process rather than outcomes. On the other hand, the Nature Conservation 
Society of South Australia (sub. 37) considers that the interpretation of criteria 
under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC 
Act) has not been sufficiently rigorous and cautious. The Commission has found 
that regulator conduct has a significant impact in other areas as well (box B.1). 
 
Box B.1 The impact of regulator conduct: examples from other areas 
In its study into regulator engagement with small business, the Commission concluded: 
… The way regulations are implemented is often as important to small business and to 
compliance outcomes as the content of the regulations themselves. (2013, p. 3)  
The Council of Small Business of Australia noted in its submission to that study that the 
majority of small business respondents to its survey reported that regulator behaviour 
is just as important as the design of regulation in contributing to compliance costs: 
… respondents [business] indicated that they overwhelmingly considered BOTH regulatory 
design and regulator behaviour contributed equally to regulatory compliance cost. (2013, p. 
3) 
Similarly, Business SA submitted: 
… it is often the approach and behaviour of regulators that can have a direct impact on how 
onerous or not the regulation and reporting requirements are for small business. (2013, p. 1) 
And in an urban planning context, the Australian Hotels Association has argued: 
… it is most often the interpretation of planning laws, rather than the laws themselves, that 
are the source of obstruction to the desirable improvement of licensed premises which serve 
the local community. (2010, p. 4) 
 
 
This section outlines five criteria, which identify conduct by regulators that lead to 
more efficient and effective outcomes. 
Clear and predictable processes 
Clear and predictable processes build confidence in the legitimacy of the regulatory 
framework and reduce the costs of engaging with it. Given that tradeoffs between 
competing objectives are the focus of DAA processes, there needs to be clear and 
predictable processes for managing these tradeoffs. Regional Development 
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Australia Far North Queensland and Torres Strait (sub. 26, p. 5) submitted that 
‘providing certainty of processes and relevant industry policy is critical to securing 
investment and economic development’. Business SA (sub. 4) considered that DAA 
regulation and processes need to be predictable, transparent and easy to understand; 
and there should be certainty about information requirements.  
Clarity and predictability are more likely to be achieved when regulators use 
decision criteria that are stable, well understood and lead to decisions that could 
have been predicted on the basis of the evidence that is available. When more than 
one regulator is involved, clarity is assisted if they use the same set of decision 
criteria. Predictability does not mean that criteria never change. However, changes 
to criteria should be limited to those that are a logical development of existing 
methodologies or could have been predicted on the basis of new evidence.  
Regulatory outcomes consistent with objectives 
This criterion is significant because applying it seeks to reveal the extent to which 
the DAA process delivers intended outcomes. For example, it would be expected 
that Commonwealth environmental decisions will be made in accordance with the 
principles of ecologically sustainable development as set out in section 3 of the 
EPBC Act. 
In addition, by focusing on the link between objectives and outcomes, this criterion 
directs attention to compliance. For example, there is little to be gained in regulating 
projects through conditions that are not capable of being enforced. Regulatory 
outcomes are more likely to be consistent with objectives when approval conditions 
are in line with the objectives of regulation, are enforceable and are enforced. 
Open and transparent processes  
Open and transparent processes increase accountability and lead to decisions that 
more closely reflect community preferences. Such processes also mitigate concerns 
that regulators may be captured by regulated entities. Transparency is enhanced by 
opportunities for public participation and review and by publishing the reasons for 
approval decisions. Publication: 
• strengthens incentives for decisions to be evidence-based and rigorous 
• is consistent with procedural fairness 
• demonstrates how decision makers have balanced competing priorities. 
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Proportionate and flexible regulatory requirements 
Regulation uses government authority to change behaviour. It typically imposes 
costs on entities that are regulated, as well as delivering benefits through the 
consequent change in behaviour. There are usually many different ways to bring 
about that change in behaviour. 
Proportionality is present when: 
• alternatives to a particular regulatory approach have been considered and the 
option that yields the largest community benefits has been chosen  
• there are no unnecessary obligations 
• regulatory decisions, including conditions that are imposed before approval is 
given, impose costs that are proportionate to the impacts they are intended to 
address.  
A risk-based approach to regulation can be a proportionate approach when it is well 
designed.  
The case for a risk-based approach to regulation can be easily made on efficiency and 
effectiveness grounds. Regulation should be proportionate to the problem that it seeks 
to address; therefore a risk-based approach would be underpinned by scientific 
evidence and a robust decision methodology. This is necessary if governments are to 
balance the tension towards reactive regulation to public responses to risk. (Bounds 
2010, p. 23) 
No unnecessary costs 
Administering and participating in approval processes imposes costs on government 
departments, regulators, the project proponent, and other participants (as well as 
creating benefits). Types of costs include:  
• the costs of administering the process, such as determining the scope of the 
assessment, preparing impact assessments and running participation processes 
• the costs of complying with conditions and offsets that are imposed through 
approval decisions, and which are borne in the first instance by project 
proponents 
• delay costs that arise if the process delays project planning and implementation, 
which may take the form of additional holding costs, lost profits and lost interest 
on foregone profits. Delay costs may not be confined to the project in question. 
(The Hunter Valley Coal Chain Coordinator (sub. 56) pointed out that because 
projects in the coal chain are interdependent, the capacity benefits of other 
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infrastructure projects cannot be fully realised until a delayed project is 
commenced.) 
Comparing jurisdictions draws attention to potentially unnecessary regulatory 
burdens, given policy objectives, by identifying: 
• differences between jurisdictions in regulatory requirements for achieving 
similar objectives 
• the extent of regulatory duplication and inconsistency 
• poor practice in the design, administration or enforcement of regulation. 
Costs that exceed those that are needed for an effective approval process are 
wasteful. Such costs are less likely to occur in a regulatory framework that exhibits 
the other criteria outlined in this appendix, where there are clearly specified 
objectives linked to outcomes, and the process is run by skilled and accountable 
regulators, who operate transparently and adopt a proportionate approach to 
administering regulatory requirements. 
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C Australian DAA arrangements 
This appendix summarises development assessment and approval (DAA) 
arrangements for major projects in each jurisdiction. Section C.1 describes the 
arrangements in each jurisdiction. Section C.2 contains a series of tables on 
assessment and approval authorities, compliance and enforcement responsibilities, 
and legislation relevant to DAA processes. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the material in this appendix is based on Commission 
analysis of legislation in each jurisdiction, or the Commission’s correspondence 
with individual agencies. 
C.1 Overview of major project DAA arrangements by 
jurisdiction 
Commonwealth 
Major projects that are likely to have a significant impact on a matter of national 
environmental significance (MNES), or that are undertaken on Commonwealth 
land, or by a Commonwealth agency, may be subject to the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act). Under the EPBC Act, there 
are no assessment and approval pathways of the type existing under State and 
Territory arrangements, although actions that are likely to have a significant impact 
on an MNES must be referred to the relevant Commonwealth Minister to determine 
whether the action is ‘controlled’ by the Act. If an action is controlled, the Minister 
determines what assessment process should be used. 
The Minister can decide that the action is: unacceptable (and cannot proceed as 
planned); a controlled action (subject to the full assessment and approval process 
under the EPBC Act); not a controlled action (provided the action proceeds in the 
manner specified by the Minister); or not a controlled action (no further action 
required under the EPBC Act). For actions deemed ‘unacceptable’, the proponent is 
notified and may withdraw the action, modify and resubmit, or request the Minister 
reconsider the decision. 
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For controlled actions, the next step is to determine the assessment approach. There 
are seven possible options open to the Minister: 
• an assessment under a State or Territory bilateral assessment agreement 
accredited under the EPBC Act 
• an assessment under a State or Territory assessment process accredited under the 
EPBC Act on a case-by-case basis 
• assessment on referral information (that is, assessment is undertaken solely on 
the information provided on the referral form) 
• assessment on preliminary documentation (this includes information on the 
referral form and any other relevant material identified by the Minister as being 
necessary to adequately assess a proposed action) 
• assessment by environmental impact statement (EIS) 
• assessment by public environment report (PER) 
• assessment by public inquiry. 
Table C.1 shows State and Territory processes accredited for EPBC Act purposes. 
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Table C.1 Accredited State and Territory assessment processes 
Jurisdiction  Accredited processes Legislation 
New South Walesa This agreement has expired - 
Victoria Environmental effects statement  Environment Effects Act 1978 
 Assessment by an Advisory Committee 
or a joint Advisory Committee/Panel  
Planning and Environment Act 1987 
 Assessment by permit application Planning and Environment Act 1987 
 Works approval application Environment Protection Act 1970 
 Bulk water entitlement assessment Water Act 1989 
Queensland Environmental impact statement for 
coordinated projects 
Sustainable Planning Act 2009 
State Development and Public 
Works Organisation Act 1971 
Environment Protection Act 1994 
South Australia Environmental impact statement, 
public environment report or 
development report for ‘major projects’ 
Development Act 1993  
Western Australia Assessment by public environmental 
review  
Environment Protection Act 1986 
Tasmania Integrated assessment process for 
projects of state significance 
State Policies and Projects Act 1993 
 Assessment of development proposal 
and environmental management plan 
Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994 
 Assessment process for projects of 
regional significance 
Land Use Planning and Approvals 
Act 1993 
Northern Territory Assessment by environmental impact 
statement public environmental review 
Environmental Assessment Act 
 
 Assessment by inquiry Northern Territory Inquiries Act 
ACT Environmental impact statement Planning and Development Act 2007 
a The New South Wales agreement expired in 2012. The Australian and New South Wales Governments 
have indicated that this agreement will be renewed by 2014. 
A major project can also be subject to a range of other Commonwealth regulations 
requiring assessment and approval relating to environment, heritage, native title and 
land rights protections, as well as some regulations specific to offshore petroleum 
extraction and pipeline construction (table C.2). 
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Table C.2 Commonwealth legislation affecting major projects 
 Act Agency Process/approvals 
Environment Environment 
Protection and 
Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 
1999 (EPBC Act) 
Dept of the 
Environment 
Under the EPBC Act, there are two ways of 
achieving approval for actions that are likely to 
have a significant impact on a matter of national 
environmental significance (MNES): 
Assessment of individual actions 
An individual action that will have, or is likely to 
have, a significant impact on a MNES (or any 
action that will have a significant impact on the 
environment on Commonwealth land or which is 
taken on Commonwealth land or by a 
Commonwealth agency that is likely to have a 
significant impact on the environment) must be 
referred to the Minister to determine if it requires 
assessment and approval under the EPBC Act.  
Strategic assessments 
These examine the potential impacts of actions 
under a policy, plan or program (for example, 
local government plans, regional plans and 
infrastructure plans). The Minister may endorse 
the plan and/or approve actions under the plan. 
The EPBC Act provides several other ways to 
strategically protect MNES including: 
• conservation agreements 
• bilateral agreements 
• providing the Ministers advice in relation to 
particular activities (s. 160) 
• bioregional planning 
• World and National Heritage plans. 
 Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park 
Act 1975 
Dept of the 
Environment 
Permits are required for particular activities 
undertaken in the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park. 
 Environment 
Protection (Sea 
Dumping) Act 
1981 
Dept of the 
Environment 
Permits are required for sea dumping activities 
undertaken in Commonwealth waters. 
 Protection of the 
Sea (Prevention 
of Pollution from 
Ships) Act 1983 
DIRD/ 
AMSA 
This Act sets standards for sea 
pollution/discharge and imposes fines and 
penalties for breaches of those standards. 
 Sea Installations 
Act 1987 
Dept of the 
Environment 
Permits are required to construct sea 
installations in Commonwealth waters. 
 Environment 
Protection 
(Alligator Rivers 
Region) Act 1978 
Dept of the 
Environment 
This Act imposes requirements on proponents of 
uranium mining projects in the Alligator Rivers 
region. 
(Continued next page)  
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Table C.2 Commonwealth legislation affecting major projects (continued) 
 Act Agency Process/approvals 
Heritage Australian Heritage 
Council Act 2003 
Dept of the 
Environment 
This Act establishes the Australian Heritage 
Council, which advises the Minister responsible 
for heritage matters (including the significance of 
heritage places being considered for listing by 
the Minister under the EPBC Act). 
 Environment 
Protection and 
Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 
1999 (EPBC Act) 
Dept of the 
Environment 
World Heritage properties and National Heritage 
places are identified as MNES under the EPBC 
Act. Accordingly, any action that will have, or is 
likely to have, a significant impact on the 
heritage values of these places must be referred 
to the Minister to determine if it requires 
assessment and approval under the EPBC Act.  
 Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander Heritage 
Protection Act 
1984 
Dept of the 
Environment 
The Minister can make a declaration to protect 
an area or object of Indigenous heritage from a 
threat of injury or desecration if a request is 
made by an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
person. 
 Protection of 
Movable Cultural 
Heritage Act 1986 
AGD Permits are required to export items of cultural 
heritage from Australia. 
 Historic 
Shipwrecks Act 
1976 
Dept of the 
Environment 
Permits are required to damage or disturb 
historic shipwrecks or relics, to enter a protected 
zone around an historic shipwreck site, to 
transfer possession of an historic shipwreck relic 
and to remove an historic shipwreck relic from 
Australia. 
Petroleum 
and 
pipelines 
Offshore 
Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2006 
Dept of 
Industry/ 
NOPSEMA 
Authorisation is required to conduct petroleum 
exploration and recovery operations, and to 
construct and operate petroleum and 
greenhouse gas pipelines, in Commonwealth 
waters. Authorisations (titles) are granted by the 
Joint Authority. Petroleum projects undertaken 
in Commonwealth waters are regulated by 
NOPSEMA. Approvals and requirements under 
this regime include an environment plan 
(including an oil spill contingency plan), a well 
operations management plan, well activity 
approvals and a safety case.  
 Offshore Minerals 
Act 1994 
Dept of 
Industry 
This Act applies to (non-petroleum) mining 
projects undertaken in Commonwealth waters. 
There are five different mining authorisations 
that can be granted by the Joint Authority. 
(Continued next page)  
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Table C.2 Commonwealth legislation affecting major projects (continued) 
 Act Agency Process/approvals 
 Petroleum (Timor 
Sea Treaty) Act 
2003 
Dept of 
Industry 
Petroleum production activities in the Joint 
Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) (an area in 
the Timor Sea in which Australia and Timor-Leste 
jointly manage exploration and development of 
petroleum resources) are subject to approvals by 
the Autoridade Nacional do Petroleo (the ANP) 
(the Timor-Leste National Petroleum Authority) 
which regulates operations in the JPDA on behalf 
of both Australia and Timor-Leste. 
 Submarine Cables 
and Pipelines 
Protection Act 1963 
DIRD Permits are required for activities that may impact 
on cables and pipelines in Commonwealth 
waters. 
Native 
title and 
land 
rights 
Native Title Act 
1993 
DPM&C This law allows for recognition of the native title 
rights of Indigenous people through a claims and 
mediation process. Determinations are made by 
the Federal Court of Australia. Other processes 
are administered by the Native Title Tribunal. 
 Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976 
DPM&C This Act provides for the transfer of land in the 
Northern Territory to Aboriginal people, who are 
represented by Aboriginal Land Councils. Permits 
are required to access land held under 
inalienable freehold title. 
Others Airports Act 1996 DIRD Masters Plans, Environment Strategies and Major 
Development Plans are subject to approval by the 
Commonwealth Transport Minister. 
 Fisheries 
Management Act 
1991 
Dept of 
Agriculture/ 
AFMA 
Permits are required for taking fish and using 
boats and equipment in Commonwealth fisheries. 
DIRD = Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. NOPSEMA = National Offshore Petroleum 
Safety and Environmental Management Authority. DPM&C = Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. AGD 
= Attorney-General’s Department. AFMA = Australian Fisheries Management Authority. AMSA = Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority. 
New South Wales 
The NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPA Act) currently 
establishes two pathways for major project assessment in NSW: 
• the state significant development pathway (SSD) (under Part 4.1 of the EPA 
Act) is primarily for large-scale private sector projects usually greater than 
$30 million 
• the state significant infrastructure pathway (SSI) (under Part 5.1 of the EPA Act) 
is primarily for large public infrastructure projects where a government agency 
is the proponent. 
The NSW State Environmental Planning Policy (State and Regional Development) 
2011 sets out a range of criteria defining the types of projects that must be subject to 
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the SSD or SSI pathway. A proponent who believes that their project meets the SSD 
or SSI criteria typically lodges a preliminary online development application with 
the NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure (the Department). The 
Department makes a preliminary assessment of the project against the criteria and 
confirms whether the proposal qualifies. 
In certain circumstances, the Minister for Planning (the Minister) can ‘declare’ or 
‘call-in’ projects that do not meet the criteria as a SSD or SSI. For example, the 
Minister can ‘call-in’ a project as a SSD, but only after the Minister has obtained, 
and made public, advice from the Planning Assessment Commission about the state 
or regional planning significance of the development. 
Development applications are processed and assessed within the Department. Once 
the pathway is confirmed, the Department begins the process for determining the 
Director-General’s Environmental Assessment Requirements (DGRs) for the 
project. These specify the scope of issues and other information requirements that 
must be addressed in the project’s environmental impacts statement (EIS). In setting 
the DGRs, the Department seeks input from the referral agencies and public 
authorities (including local councils) that would normally have statutory regulatory 
and approval responsibilities for the proposed project. 
While the Minister is technically the consent authority for SSD and SSI 
applications, in practice the Department has delegation to make decisions where: 
• there are less than 25 objections 
• there is local council support 
• a reportable political donation has not been made. 
The Planning Assessment Commission has delegation to make decisions on 
applications made by proponents as follows (excluding applications made by, or on 
behalf of, a public authority): 
• there are more than 25 objections 
• the local council has objected, or 
• a reportable political donation has been made. 
A declaration of SSI means certain permits or approvals are not required by 
proponents, such as: 
• an approval under Part 4, or an excavation permit under section 139, of the 
Heritage Act 1977 
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• an Aboriginal heritage impact permit under section 90 of the National Parks and 
Wildlife Act 1974 
• an authorisation referred to in section 12 of the Native Vegetation Act 2003 (or 
under any Act repealed by that Act) to clear native vegetation or State protected 
land. 
A declaration of SSI also means there are some permits or approvals which, while 
proponents still need to obtain them, cannot be refused by agencies because their 
refusal would be inconsistent with the development consent. These include: 
• an aquaculture permit under section 144 of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 
• an approval under section 15 of the Mine Subsidence Compensation Act 1961 
• a mining lease under the Mining Act 1992 
• a production lease under the Petroleum (Onshore) Act 1991 
• an environment protection licence under Chapter 3 of the Protection of the 
Environment Operations Act 1997 
• a licence under the Pipelines Act 1967. 
The Minister can also declare any SSI project as critical state significant 
infrastructure (CSSI) if he or she considers it is essential for economic, 
environmental or social reasons. A CSSI declaration means a development 
application can be lodged without the consent of landowners, exempts the 
development application from additional environmental laws, and restricts the 
availability of merits review. The EPA Act prohibits ministerial delegation of CSSI 
projects. 
The NSW Government is seeking to implement a number of reforms to the NSW 
planning system. The Planning Bill 2013 is before the NSW Parliament at the time 
of completion of this report (and has passed the Legislative Assembly). The 
proposed reforms seek to place greater reliance on strategic planning, reduce 
assessment times for straightforward applications, simplify the planning process and 
reduce the costs associated with planning decisions. Proposed reforms continue the 
existing major project pathways (SSD and SSI), while introducing a new pathway 
for infrastructure projects identified by the State Government as ‘essential’ (Public 
Priority Infrastructure). 
Under the proposed reforms, projects can be declared Public Priority Infrastructure 
by a published ministerial order containing reasons for the declaration. Once 
declared, such projects will not require further planning approval, and will not be 
subject to a number of other provisions of the proposed Act (including the 
environmental impact assessment requirements). However, a project definition 
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report is required to be made public. The report must set out a description of the 
development, the measures that the proponent will take to avoid, minimise or 
mitigate any adverse impacts of the development, and the monitoring, auditing and 
reporting that the proponent will undertake in relation to the environmental impacts 
of the development. 
The Planning Bill 2013 will repeal the EPA Act if passed by both houses of 
parliament in its current form. 
Victoria 
A major project in Victoria can be assessed and approved under a range of regular 
and designated major project pathways depending on the characteristics of the 
project and the requirements under the Planning and Environment Act 1987 
(Planning and Environment Act) and other legislation. In particular, the DAA 
processes for a given project will depend on: 
• whether it requires a planning permit, an amendment to a local planning scheme, 
or a Ministerial Permit under the Planning and Environment Act 
• whether the ‘responsible authority’ under the Planning and Environment Act — 
the authority in charge of administering a planning scheme and granting permits 
— is a local government, the Minister for Planning (through use of ‘call-in’ 
powers or Ministerial Permits), or some other authority 
• what other DAA processes are required under other state legislation (such as for 
mining projects under the Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 
1990) 
• whether an environmental assessment is required under the Environment Effects 
Act 1978 (Environment Effects Act). 
For major projects that require a planning permit, a project proponent lodges a 
planning permit application with the local council which assesses and approves the 
application in accordance with a local planning scheme following processes set out 
in the Planning and Environment Act. 
A major project may also require an amendment to a local planning scheme to allow 
a planning permit to be approved by a local government. The amendment can be 
requested by a project proponent, the local government or another planning 
authority, but must be decided by the Minister for Planning following processes set 
out in the Planning and Environment Act. 
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The Minister for Planning can call-in a planning permit application that would 
otherwise be assessed and approved by a local government (under Section 97 of the 
Planning and Environment Act) or an application to amend a planning scheme 
(under processes laid out in the Planning and Environment Act, Heritage Act 1995 
and Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998). The criteria for 
exercising this call-in power include where a project is of State or regional 
significance. 
Certain large-scale developments or developments in specified areas require a 
Ministerial Permit from the Minister for Planning. This pathway has been used 
frequently in recent years, predominantly for large commercial and residential 
buildings in the City of Melbourne and its surrounds and developments in the 
State’s alpine areas. 
Environmental impacts are assessed under a separate environmental assessment 
process established under the Environment Effects Act. Any responsible authority 
(local government, Minister or other) that believes a project they are assessing may 
have significant effects on the environment must refer the planning permit 
application to the Minister for Planning for a decision on whether an environment 
effects statement (EES) is required. Where the Minister determines an EES is 
required, the proponent must prepare and submit the EES to the Minister for 
assessment under processes set out in the Environment Effects Act. The Minister’s 
assessment report is sent to the relevant decision making authority to inform them in 
making a final decision on whether or not to approve the project. 
Major transport projects in Victoria are assessed under a dedicated DAA pathway. 
They must be declared by the Governor under a process set out in the Major 
Transport Projects Facilitation Act 2009. 
A project is eligible to be declared if it is: road infrastructure; rail infrastructure; 
infrastructure that can be used for the movement of persons or goods; a port; a 
facility at which goods can be loaded or unloaded or temporarily stored; or any 
project that incorporates one of these types of infrastructure. 
The Premier must prepare, and publish in the Government Gazette, project 
declaration guidelines which are used to determine whether the project is of 
economic, social or environmental significance to the State or a region. 
The Premier, in consultation with the Minister for Planning, assesses the project 
against the guidelines and if they find it to be of significance, the Premier can 
recommend declaration to the Governor, who then formally declares the project a 
major transport project. 
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Once the project has been declared, the process depends on the level of assessment. 
For impact management plans, the Minister for Planning assesses and approves the 
development. For comprehensive impact statements, a committee assesses the 
development, and the Minister for Planning approves it. 
The Victorian Parliament recently passed an Act amending these processes, the 
Major Transport Projects Facilitation (East West Link and Other Projects) Act 
2013. This Act, among other things, provides increased flexibility to proponents 
(for example, with regard to allowing variations to project designs); allows some 
early works to commence sooner; shortens statutory timelines; provides for more 
risk-based assessment processes and streamlines administrative arrangements 
(Napthine 2013). 
Queensland 
Major projects in Queensland can be assessed and approved under various 
designated pathways under the State Development and Public Works Organisation 
Act 1971 (SDPWOA). These pathways include the following: 
• Coordinated projects: developments with complex approval requirements, that 
are of strategic significance, or that have significant environmental effects, or 
significant infrastructure requirements (for example, large LNG and mining 
projects, industrial installations, resorts, ports and transport infrastructure). 
• Prescribed developments: mineral or energy projects of major economic 
significance, or that require provision of infrastructure which would place an 
excessive financial burden on the State, or that significantly affect provision of 
services and facilities by the Government. 
• prescribed projects: coordinated projects, projects in a state development area, 
or projects considered to be economically or socially significant to Queensland 
or the region in which the project is to be undertaken, or that affect an 
environmental interest of Queensland or a region, can be declared prescribed 
projects by the Minister for Planning. 
• Projects in declared state development areas: clearly defined areas of land 
established by the Coordinator-General to promote economic development in 
Queensland (for example, industrial hubs for large-scale, heavy industry, 
multi-user infrastructure corridors and major public infrastructure sites). 
• Private infrastructure facilities: projects that are of economic or social 
significance and have economic or social benefits to a region, or that satisfy an 
identified need or demand for services (for example, road, railway, bridge or 
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other transport infrastructure, electricity generation, transmission or distribution 
facilities, oil or gas storage, transmission or distribution facilities). 
Major projects with a ‘state interest’ can be called-in and assessed by the Minister 
for Planning under the Sustainable Planning Act 2009. Major urban developments 
in priority development areas can be assessed under processes set out in the 
Economic Development Act 2012. 
Under the SDPWOA, a project might be declared a coordinated project if it has: 
• complex approval requirements, involving local, State and Australian 
Governments 
• significant environmental effects 
• strategic significance to the locality, region or State, including for the 
infrastructure, economic and social benefits, capital investment or employment 
opportunities it may provide 
• significant infrastructure requirements. 
The Coordinator-General can make a declaration in response to an application from 
a proponent or can declare any project he or she considers justified.  
When an environmental impact statement (EIS) is required under the SDPWOA, 
terms of reference must be developed. The Queensland Government has recently 
reformed this process by developing shortened, standardised terms of reference for 
the EIS and by reducing state agency input into the draft terms of reference.  
Once the EIS has been conducted, the EIS report is publicly exhibited and public 
submissions can be made. The Coordinator-General is responsible for evaluating the 
EIS, taking into account public submissions and other material, before preparing an 
assessment report, which is also made public. The proponent may propose changes, 
which if substantial may prompt the Coordinator-General to require a further EIS 
assessment with public notice period. The Coordinator-General will then prepare a 
‘Change Report’ which is also made public. 
The Coordinator-General provides an assessment report to the decision maker 
(ordinarily the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (DEHP)) that 
recommends whether or not the project should proceed, sets out conditions and 
offsets for the development approval, and can also recommend conditions that 
should be imposed on subsequent environmental authorities/permits. DEHP is also 
responsible for granting some environmental authorities and permits, and imposing 
conditions on these permits. DEHP can only decide whether or not the project 
should proceed. If the development is approved, DEHP must accept all the 
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conditions recommended by the Coordinator-General. Any additional conditions it 
imposes must be consistent with these conditions. 
Coordinated projects are also required to conduct a social impact assessment. 
Recent reforms mean proponents are no longer required to prepare a social impact 
management plan, instead the focus is on outcomes-based commitments and 
mitigation strategies. 
Coordinated project proponents are still required to obtain all other secondary 
development approvals and licences from local authorities and State Government 
agencies. 
On 1 July 2013, Queensland established the State Assessment and Referral Agency 
(SARA) to create a central point for development applications, resulting in one 
application and one response from Government. The reform means the Department 
of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning (as the SARA) will coordinate 
assessment and referrals across government (but this will not apply to the 
Coordinator-General’s processes). 
The Queensland Government is also developing a ‘Common Resources Act’ to 
replace the State’s current resources legislation (Mineral Resources Act 1989; 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004; Petroleum Act 1923; 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009; Geothermal Energy Act 2010), which will be 
implemented in stages and finalised by 2016. This is to simplify resources industry 
regulation to bring it into line with comparable jurisdictions. (For example, the 
Queensland Government suggests that Alberta, Canada has 27 per cent of 
Queensland’s regulatory volume (DNRM 2013). 
South Australia 
The two pathways for assessing major projects in South Australia are set out in the 
Development Act 1993: 
• the major development or project pathway (under section 46). Major 
development proposals include a range of private and some publicly funded 
projects including the desalination plant, port facilities, commercial and 
residential buildings, and mining operations 
• the Crown development and public infrastructure pathway (under section 49). 
These provide for the streamlined assessment of public infrastructure projects 
(advanced by either public or private proponents). The Crown development and 
public infrastructure pathway is used primarily for government infrastructure 
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projects but is also available for private projects that are sponsored by a 
Government agency. 
The major developments process is accredited under the Commonwealth EPBC Act 
bilateral assessment agreement (although the Crown development and public 
infrastructure pathway process is not). Once a proposal has been declared a ‘major 
development’ by the Minister under section 46, the development application is 
referred to the Development Assessment Commission (DAC) — a statutory body 
established under the Development Act 1993. 
The DAC then determines which of three levels of further detailed assessment is 
required: 
• an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the most complex proposals, where 
there are a wide range of issues to be investigated in depth 
• a public environmental report (PER) where the issues surrounding the proposal 
need investigation in depth but are narrower in scope and relatively well known 
• a development report (DR), the least complex level of assessment, which relies 
principally on existing information. 
Typically where an EIS is required, the proponent would prepare the EIS and the 
Department would prepare an assessment report for the Minister, ahead of a 
decision on the development application by the Government (although some 
decisions could be delegated to a Minister or the DAC). For Crown development 
and public infrastructure, the DAC assesses all applications and provides a report to 
the Minister for Planning, who makes the final decision. If the Minister approves a 
development that the DAC considers to vary significantly from the local 
development plan, or if the local council objects, the Minister must submit a report 
on the matter to Parliament. There are no merit appeal rights for the major 
developments or Crown development and public infrastructure pathways. 
Where a project includes one or more activities of environmental significance 
(Environmental Protection Act 1993 Schedule 1), assessment documents must be 
referred to the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) for deliberation and 
comment. Where such an activity is not proposed, assessment documents may still 
be referred to the EPA should the assessment authority decide such a referral is 
necessary to fully understand the potential impacts of a proposal. The EPA also 
issues environmental permits (although after a development approval has been 
obtained under section 46, the EPA cannot refuse a required permit). 
In South Australia, case management facilitates access to regulatory agency 
personnel on behalf of the proponent, enabling regulatory agencies to be aware of 
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the potential project and to assign resources from the beginning of the assessment 
process. Case managers typically have established networks within the relevant 
regulatory agencies. 
In February 2013, South Australia announced the formation of an Expert Panel on 
Planning Reform to review the State’s planning system. While focused on South 
Australia’s planning legislation, it will also look carefully at all legislation that 
intersects with planning, and other factors that impact on the planning system. Final 
recommendations are scheduled for December 2014. 
Western Australia 
Major projects1 in Western Australia can be assessed and approved as a: 
• development that must be approved by Development Assessment Panels (DAPs) 
• development for which the proponent may elect to have the DAPs or another 
body determine it 
• development that is not eligible to be determined by the DAPs, in which case it 
will be assessed and approved by the local council and/or the Western Australian 
Planning Commission (WAPC). 
With some exceptions (such as single dwellings), applications for which the 
estimated cost of development is $7 million or more ($15 million or more in the 
City of Perth) are mandatory DAP applications. There are 15 DAPs, each dealing 
with a specific region. DAPs comprise a mix of local government representatives 
and technical experts. Local government representatives are nominated by the 
relevant local government, and appointed by the Minister. Specialist members are 
appointed by the Minister. 
A project subject to an ultimate approval decision by a DAP may be assessed by the 
local council, the WAPC, or both, depending on the provisions of the regional 
planning scheme. 
The local government and/or the WAPC assesses the application in accordance with 
the relevant local or regional planning scheme, including public advertising of the 
application (if required) and referral to internal and external departments and 
agencies. The local government and/or the WAPC prepares a ‘responsible authority 
                                              
1 The thresholds used to determine who assesses and approves projects are not considered by the 
Western Australian Government to be thresholds for attaining major project status. Projects are 
categorised as major based on their size, complexity or environmental, economic or social 
impact (rather than solely by capital values) (sub. DR103). 
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report’ containing its recommendations on how the DAP application should be 
determined and provides it to the DAP. This is intended to be a technical report by 
their planner, and not an expression of a council’s view as to whether they think the 
application should be approved. 
The DAP is required to determine applications in accordance with the provisions of 
the relevant planning instrument. The DAP is required to determine the application 
within 60 days (if the application does not require public advertising) or within 
90 days (if the application does require public advertising) from the date the DAP 
development application was received and acknowledged by the local government. 
The DAP must have regard to, but is not bound to give effect to, the 
recommendations included in the report. However, the planning scheme applies to 
the DAP as to other bodies. The meeting at which the DAP makes its decision is 
public. 
The applicant can seek a review of the DAP’s decision by the State Administrative 
Tribunal. If there is an application before the State Administrative Tribunal, the 
Minister may call-in this application and determine it him or herself. The Minister is 
not bound by planning considerations but may make the determination having 
regard to any other matter, including the public interest, and this decision is not 
appellable.  
The assessment manager (WAPC or the local council) does not conduct the 
environmental impact assessment associated with major projects. These are the 
responsibility of the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) in Western 
Australia. The EPA processes are separate from the development approval process. 
Once a significant or strategic proposal has been referred, the EPA has 28 days to 
decide whether or not to assess it. When it completes an assessment, it will provide 
a report to the Minister and the decision making authority. The report is also made 
public. The Minister for the Environment will then consult with relevant Ministers 
(for example, Planning and Mining) and if possible, agree with them on whether, 
and how, the proposal should be implemented. If the Ministers cannot agree, the 
matter is referred to Cabinet, and its decision cannot be appealed. 
Western Australia has adopted a Lead Agency Framework to assist in facilitating 
the approval of major projects. This means one government agency, such as the 
Department of Mines and Petroleum for a mining project, assists with or 
coordinates approvals for a project proposal. 
The lead agency is responsible for: 
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• providing proponents with information on statutory requirements through agency 
guidelines and referrals 
• case-managing and coordinating approvals applications across government for 
proposals, where appropriate 
• assisting proponents to identify the potential impacts of the proposal on matters 
such as infrastructure, the environment and regional communities, as well as the 
social considerations that arise from the proposal. 
Tasmania 
Tasmanian legislation establishes three main pathways for major projects: 
• projects of state significance (under the State Policies and Projects Act 1993) 
• projects of regional significance (under the Land Use Planning and Approvals 
Act 1993) 
• major infrastructure development projects (under the Major Infrastructure 
Development Approvals Act 1999), used primarily for large public infrastructure 
projects such as roads, railways or power lines. 
If a project is declared a project of state significance, the Environment Protection 
Authority (EPA) will not conduct an environmental impact assessment. Instead, the 
Tasmanian Planning Commission (TPC) conducts an integrated assessment of all 
the environmental, social, economic and community issues relevant to that project, 
as well as any other issues as may be prescribed by the Minister. The TPC reports to 
the Minister ‘as soon as practicable’ on whether the project should proceed and 
under what conditions. This report is publicly available. 
The Minister must make a decision, which can differ from the TPC’s 
recommendation, within 28 days of receiving the report. There are no criteria in 
legislation to guide decisions. However, they need to be approved by both Houses 
of Parliament to take effect. The TPC can subsequently specify additional 
conditions in a report (which also must be publicly available). The Minister must 
respond to this report within 28 days. If the new decision diverges from the previous 
one, it must be provided to both Houses of Parliament. 
If a project is declared as a project of regional significance, the TPC appoints a 
Development Assessment Panel (DAP) to undertake the assessment, including the 
setting of the scope of the environmental assessment (the Assessment Guidelines), 
and also refers the project to the EPA. A DAP comprises a representative from the 
TPC, a person nominated by relevant councils and a person considered to be an 
expert by the TPC. The DAP (and the Minister) receive advice from the EPA on 
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whether the project will be assessed under the Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994, the class of assessment required, and the scope of the 
Assessment Guidelines. The DAP must make a decision about whether to grant a 
development permit for the project (and under what conditions) as soon as 
practicable. 
If the Minister decides to declare a project to be a major infrastructure project (a 
decision which is disallowable by Parliament), a combined planning authority is 
then set up with representatives from relevant planning authorities. It assesses the 
project and decides whether to grant permits to the project and under what 
conditions. The role of the EPA is the same as for projects of regional significance. 
Northern Territory 
Approval procedures for major projects in the Northern Territory are consistent with 
the approval process operating more generally in the Territory. There are major 
project teams in the Department of Business and the Department of the Chief 
Minister, that perform a ‘lead agency’ role facilitating approvals through 
government (but not doing assessments or providing approvals directly). 
The NT Planning Act defines activities requiring a ‘development consent’. 
Divisions of the Development Consent Authority assess and approve development 
applications within their division area. Outside of these areas, the consent authority 
is the Minister. The Minister may also ‘call-in’ applications. 
The Planning Minister can also grant Exceptional Development Permits to allow 
projects that would otherwise be a prohibited development under the Planning 
Scheme, and this instrument has been used for some major projects. 
Zoning maps show the zoning of land in the Northern Territory, and there is a 
defined range of uses permitted for each zone under the Planning Scheme. Uses in a 
particular zone may be permitted without the consent of the consent authority, 
permitted with the consent of the consent authority, or prohibited. There are large 
areas of the Northern Territory that are unzoned. In the unzoned areas, development 
provisions of the Planning Scheme do not apply, although land use controls 
sometimes do. 
Environmental assessments are overseen by the NT Environment Protection 
Authority. Where a project is likely to have a significant impact on the environment, 
some form of environmental assessment is required. This will take the form of 
either an environmental impact statement (EIS) or public environmental report 
(PER), depending on the scale, complexity and impact of the project. The PER 
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process is more limited than for an EIS except where the proposal is being assessed 
under the bilateral assessment agreement between the Northern Territory and 
Australian Governments. 
The NT EPA assesses the PER or EIS and makes recommendations to the 
Environment Minister, who passes on the NT EPA’s assessment and 
recommendations to the responsible portfolio Minister, who makes the final 
decision. In providing it to the responsible Minister, the Environment Minister may 
make comment on the NT EPA’s assessment report. If the comment is contrary to 
the assessment report, the Environment Minister must provide notice to the NT EPA 
of the comment and the reason for it, and table this notice in the Legislative 
Assembly. 
If the responsible Minister makes an approval decision that is contrary to the NT 
EPA’s assessment report, he or she must provide notice to the NT EPA of the 
decision with reasons and table this notice in the Legislative Assembly. 
Mining projects are regulated under the Mining Management Act. For mining 
projects, following an environmental impact assessment that takes place in the same 
way as for non-mining projects, all proposed disturbance to the environment must 
be assessed and approved through a Mining Management Plan overseen by the 
Department of Mines and Energy. The plan includes responses to recommendations 
of the environmental impact assessment. 
Australian Capital Territory 
Under the Planning and Development Act 2007, the requirements for assessing 
development depend on which assessment track the development falls under. When 
an application for development is made, it can fall under one of three assessment 
tracks: code track, merit track or impact track. 
The code track is the least onerous. Development proposals are approved if they 
comply with the rules that apply to the proposal. 
Development applications in the merit track are considered by the Planning and 
Land Authority which must consider: 
• the objectives for the zone in which the development is proposed to take place 
• the suitability of the land for the proposed development 
• each representation received in relation to the development 
• the advice of any entity to which the application was referred 
   
432 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
• any management plan for public land 
• the probable impact of the proposed development, including the nature, extent 
and significance of probable environmental impacts. 
Merit track applications must also be referred to a number of other agencies as 
prescribed by the Territory Plan (the key statutory planning document in the ACT), 
unless their endorsement has been lodged with the development application. 
In addition to decision requirements that apply to merit track assessments, 
development applications in the impact track must include a completed 
environmental impact statement (EIS). However, the Minister may exempt an 
application from having to complete an EIS where he or she is satisfied that the 
expected environmental impact of the development proposal has already been 
sufficiently addressed by another study. An EIS is also not required if the ACT 
Conservator of Flora and Fauna or the ACT Heritage Council provides advice that 
the proposal is not likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact. Where 
an EIS is required from a proponent, the Planning and Land Authority must prepare 
an assessment report responding to the EIS. 
If a development application is in the impact track, The Planning and Land 
Authority must refer the application to a number of other agencies, and must take 
into account any advice received from entities to which the application was referred. 
Development approval must not be given if this would be inconsistent with any 
advice given by a referral entity, unless the person approving the application is 
satisfied that the approval is consistent with the objects of the Territory Plan and 
that other options, design solutions and alternatives have been considered. 
The Territory Plan usually dictates which track the application will fall into, but the 
application can be allocated to the impact track regardless of what the Territory Plan 
dictates, if: 
• the Minister with planning responsibilities makes a declaration under section 124 
• the Health Minister makes a declaration under section 125 
• the development is not prohibited or exempt and the Territory Plan does not 
specify which track is applicable 
• the development is a controlled action under the EPBC Act and a bilateral 
agreement allows the proposal to be assessed by the Territory. 
The Minister may call-in any decision if, in the Minister’s opinion: 
• the application raises a major policy issue 
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• the application seeks approval for a development that may have a substantial 
effect on the achievement or development of the object of the Territory Plan 
• the approval or refusal of the application would provide a substantial public 
benefit. 
C.2 Jurisdictional tables 
The following tables highlight key aspects of the assessment and approval process. 
Table C.3 provides information about the assessment and approval authorities in 
each jurisdiction. 
Table C.4 details the Commission’s analysis of responsibility for compliance and 
enforcement of approval conditions in each jurisdiction. 
Table C.5 lists the legislation most likely to impact on major projects. This list is 
not intended to be fully comprehensive. Importantly, the table highlights legislation 
potentially affecting any major project, and should not be read as being 
representative of the regulatory burden affecting any one project. 
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Table C.3 Assessment and approval authorities 
Selected pathways, by jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Assessment manager Approval authority Is the assessor 
also the approval 
authority? 
New South Wales    
State significant 
developments 
Department of Planning Minister delegates to the 
Planning Assessment 
Commission or 
Department of Planninga 
Sometimes 
State significant 
infrastructure 
Department of Planning Minister delegates to the 
Planning Assessment 
Commission or 
Department of Planninga 
Sometimes 
Critical state 
significant 
infrastructure 
Department of Planning Minister for Planning No 
Victoria    
Ministerial call-in Minister for Planning Minister for Planning Yes 
Major transport 
projects 
Assessment committee or 
Minister for Planning 
Minister for Planning  
(on advice from the EPA) 
Sometimes, 
depending on the 
pathway 
Queensland    
Coordinated 
projects 
Department of Environment 
and Heritage Protection is 
the assessment manager. 
However, in practice, the 
Coordinator-General, as a 
concurrence agency, 
conducts the environmental 
impact assessment and 
imposes conditions which, if 
the project is approved, bind 
the approval authority.b  
Department of 
Environment and Heritage 
Protection 
In practice, no 
Urban 
development 
Minister for Economic 
Development 
Minister for Economic 
Development  
Yes 
South Australia    
Major 
development 
Minister Government, but may 
delegatec 
Sometimes 
Crown 
development and 
public 
infrastructure 
Development Assessment 
Commission 
Minister No 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.3 Assessment and approval authorities (continued) 
Jurisdiction Assessment manager Approval authority Is the assessor 
also the approval 
authority? 
Western Australia   
Development 
Assessment panel 
(DAP) projectsd 
Local government/ 
Western Australian 
Planning Commission 
Development Assessment 
Panel 
No 
 
Tasmania    
Projects of state 
significance 
Tasmanian Planning 
Commission 
Minister and both Houses 
of Parliament 
No 
Projects of regional 
significance 
Development 
Assessment Panel 
Development Assessment 
Panel 
Yes 
Major infrastructure 
projects 
Combined Planning 
Authority 
Combined Planning 
Authority 
Yes 
Northern Territory   
Development 
permits 
Development Consent 
Authority 
Development Consent 
Authority 
Yes 
Exceptional 
Development 
Permits (EDPs)e 
Minister for Planning Minister for Planning Yes 
Ministerial call-inf Minister for Planning Minister for Planning Yes 
ACT    
Ordinary 
development 
ACT Planning and Land 
Authority 
ACT Planning and Land 
Authority 
Yes 
Ministerial call-in Minister for Planning  Minister for Planning  Yes 
Commonwealth    
Matters of national 
environmental 
significance (Dept of 
the Environment) 
Secretary of the 
Department of the 
Environment 
Minister for the 
Environment 
No 
a While section 23 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) allows the Minister to 
delegate to the Planning Assessment Commission, the Director-General of the Planning Department, or any 
other public authority, in practice the Minister for Planning has issued two instruments of delegation clarifying 
when this delegation will occur. The Department of Planning has delegation to make decisions on state 
significant development or state significant infrastructure applications where there are less than 25 objections, 
the local council has not objected, and a reportable political donation has not been 
made. http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=5ILFYmn9OAY%3d&tabid=514&language=e
n-US. The Planning Assessment Commission makes decisions on applications for state significant 
infrastructure or state significant development made by private proponents where there are more than 25 
objections, a local council has objected, or a reportable political donation has been 
made, http://www.pac.nsw.gov.au/Portals/0/Documents/instrument_of_delegation_pac.pdf. Delegation of 
critical state significant infrastructure projects is prohibited. b The approval authority cannot impose any 
conditions that are inconsistent with the conditions imposed by the Coordinator General. c May delegate to 
Minister or Development Assessment Commission below size limits specified in the Development Act 1993 
(SA). d A development application with an estimated cost of $7 million or more (and $15 million or more in the 
City of Perth), unless an exclusion, must be determined by a DAP. e EDPs can be granted when a 
development application is inconsistent with a planning scheme. f Ministerial call-in operates when the 
Minister gives a direction to the consent authority, after which the Minister becomes the consent authority. 
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Table C.4 Monitoring of compliance and enforcement responsibilities by 
jurisdiction 
Area of responsibility Agencies involved 
New South Wales  
Approvals from Planning 
Department or Minister 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure 
Mining and petroleum approvals Division of Resources and Energy 
Heritage Office of Environment and Heritage 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Indigenous heritage Office of Environment and Heritage 
Crown Land access Division of Crown Lands 
Transport infrastructure Roads and Maritime Services 
Environmental works approvals Environment Protection Authority 
Threatened species Office of Environment and Heritage 
Environment approval conditions 
and offsets 
Office of Environment and Heritage 
Explosives and dangerous goods Environment Protection Authority 
Water licences Office of Water 
Noise pollution Environment Protection Authority 
Victoria  
Mining and petroleum approvals Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
Heritage Heritage Victoria 
Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Indigenous heritage Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Environmental works approvals Environment Protection Authority 
Threatened species Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
Environment approval conditions 
and offsets 
Environment Protection Authority 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Explosives and dangerous goods Worksafe Victoria 
Water licences Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
Noise pollution Environment Protection Authority 
Queensland  
Coordinator-General Approvals Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning 
Mining and petroleum approvals Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
Heritage Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Indigenous heritage Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Environmental works approvals Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
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Table C.4 Monitoring of compliance and enforcement responsibilities by 
jurisdiction (continued) 
Area of responsibility Agencies involved 
Threatened species Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
Environment approval conditions 
and offsets 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Explosives and dangerous goods Department of Transport and Main Roads 
Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
Water licences Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
South Australia  
Mining and petroleum approvals Department for Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, 
Resources and Energy 
Heritage Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources  
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Indigenous heritage Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation Division, Department 
of the Premier and Cabinet 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Crown Land access Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources 
Environmental works approvals Environment Protection Authority 
Threatened species Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources 
Environment approval conditions 
and offsets 
Environment Protection Authority 
Department for Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, 
Resources and Energy 
Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources 
Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Explosives and dangerous goods SafeWork SA 
Water licences Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources 
Western Australia  
Mining and petroleum approvals Department of Mines and Petroleum 
Heritage State Heritage Office 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Indigenous heritage Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Crown Land access State Land Services 
Environmental works approvals Department of Environment and Conservation 
Threatened species Department of Environment and Conservation 
Environment approval conditions 
and offsets 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Explosives and dangerous goods Department of Mines and Petroleum 
Water licences Department of Water 
Local content Department of State Development 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.4 Monitoring of compliance and enforcement responsibilities by 
jurisdiction (continued) 
Area of responsibility Agencies involved 
Tasmania  
Mining and petroleum approvals Mineral Resources Tasmania 
Heritage Tasmanian Heritage Council 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Indigenous heritage Aboriginal Heritage Tasmania 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Crown Land access Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water & Environment 
Environmental works approvals Environment Protection Authority 
Threatened species Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water & Environment 
Environment approval conditions 
and offsets 
Environment Protection Authority 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water & Environment 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Explosives and dangerous goods Workplace Standards 
Water licences Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water & Environment 
Northern Territory  
Mining and petroleum approvals Department of Mines and Energy 
Heritage The Northern Territory Heritage Council 
Department of Lands, Planning and the Environment 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Indigenous heritage The Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Crown Land access Land and Planning Services 
Environmental works approvals Northern Territory Environment Protection Agency 
Threatened species Department of Land Resource Management 
Environment approval conditions 
and offsets 
Northern Territory Environment Protection Agency 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Explosives and dangerous goods NT WorkSafe 
Water licences Department of Land Resource Management 
Australian Capital Territory  
Heritage ACT Heritage 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Indigenous heritage ACT Heritage 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Environmental works approvals Environment Protection Authority 
Threatened species Environment and Sustainable Development Directorate 
Environment approval conditions 
and offsets 
Environment and Sustainable Development Directorate 
Environment Protection Authority 
Department of the Environment (Cwlth) 
Explosives and dangerous goods WorkSafe ACT 
Water licences Environment and Sustainable Development Directorate 
Source: Commission analysis. 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Energy and minerals 
Minerals 
NSW Mining Act 1992 NSW Trade and Investment 
 Coal Industry Act 2001 NSW Trade and Investment 
 Mine Subsidence Compensation Act 
1961 
NSW Trade and Investment 
Vic Gas Industry Act 2001 Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Mineral Resources (Sustainable 
Development) Act 1990 
Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
Qld Mineral Resources Act 1989 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Offshore Minerals Act 1998 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
SA Mining Act 1971 Department of Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, 
Resources and Energy 
 Offshore Minerals Act 2000 Department of Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, 
Resources and Energy 
 Opal Mining Act 1995 Department of Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, 
Resources and Energy 
WA Mining Act 1978 Department of Mines and Petroleum 
 Offshore Minerals Act 2003 Department of Mines and Petroleum 
 Mining on Private Property Act 1898 Department of Mines and Petroleum 
Tas Gas Act 2000 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources 
 Mineral Resources Development Act 
1995 
Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources 
 Mining (Strategic Prospectivity Zones) 
Act 1993 
Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources 
NT Mineral Royalty Act 1982 Department of Treasury and Finance 
 Mineral Titles Act 2010 Department of Mines and Energy 
 Mining Management Act 2001 Department of Mines and Energy 
 Mineral Titles Act 2010 Department of Mines and Energy  
Petroleum and pipelines 
NSW Petroleum (Offshore) Act 1982 NSW Trade and Investment 
 Petroleum (Onshore) Act 1991 NSW Trade and Investment 
 Pipelines Act 1967 NSW Trade and Investment 
Vic Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse 
Gas Storage Act 2010 
Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
1982 
Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Petroleum Act 1998 Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Pipelines Act 2005 Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
Qld Petroleum Act 1923 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Petroleum and pipelines 
Qld Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) 
Act 2004 
Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
SA Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 Department of Manufacturing, Innovation, 
Trade, Resources and Energy 
 Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 Department of Manufacturing, Innovation, 
Trade, Resources and Energy 
WA Barrow Island Act 2003 Department of Mines and Petroleum 
 Petroleum and Geothermal Energy 
Resources Act 1967 
Department of Mines and Petroleum 
 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 Department of Mines and Petroleum 
 Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969 Department of Mines and Petroleum 
Tas Gas Pipelines Act 2000 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
 Mineral Resources Development Act 1995 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
 Petroleum Products Emergency Act 1994 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
NT Energy Pipelines Act 1983 Department of Mines and Energy 
 Petroleum Act 1984 Department of Mines and Energy 
 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1981 Department of Mines and Energy 
 Geothermal Energy Act 2009 Department of Mines and Energy  
Cwlth Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2006 
Department of Industry 
 Petroleum (Timor Sea Treaty) Act 2003 Department of Industry 
Energy 
Vic Geothermal Energy Resources Act 2005 Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries 
 Victorian Renewable Energy Act 2006 Essential Services Commission 
Qld Clean Energy Act 2008 Department of Energy and Water Supply 
 Geothermal Energy Act 2010 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
WA Energy Coordination Act 1994 Office of Energy 
Nuclear 
NSW Uranium Mining and Nuclear Facilities 
(Prohibitions) Act 1986 
NSW Trade and Investment 
 Mining Legislation Amendment (Uranium 
Exploration) Act 2012 
NSW Trade and Investment 
Vic Nuclear Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983 Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Nuclear 
Qld Nuclear Facilities Prohibition Act 2007 Department of Energy and Water Supply 
SA Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982 Environment Protection Authority 
 Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) 
Act 2000 
Environment Protection Authority 
WA Radiation Safety Act 1975 Department of Health 
 Nuclear Activities Regulation Act 1978 Department of State Development 
 Nuclear Waste Storage and Transportation 
(Prohibition) Act 1999 
Department of Health 
Cwlth Atomic Energy Act 1953 Department of Industry 
 Uranium Royalty (Northern Territory) Act 
2009 
Department of Industry 
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 
1987 
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation 
Office 
 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear 
Safety Act 1998 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear 
Safety Agency 
 Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers 
Region) Act 1978 
Department of the Environment 
Transport projects 
NSW Transport Administration Act 1988 Roads and Maritime Services 
 Roads Act 1993 Roads and Maritime Services 
Vic Major Transport Projects Facilitation Act 
2009 
Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
 Major Transport Projects Facilitation (East 
West Link and Other Projects) Act 2013 
Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
 Road Management Act 2004 VicRoads 
Qld Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 Department of Transport and Main Roads 
 Airport Assets (Restructuring and Disposal) 
Act 2008 
Queensland Treasury 
WA Main Roads Act 1930 Commissioner of Main Roads 
 Transport Coordination Act 1966 Department of Transport 
Tas Highways Act 1951 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
 Rail Infrastructure Act 2007 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
ACT Public Roads Act 1902 ACT Planning and Land Authority 
Cwlth Airports Act 1996 Department of Infrastructure and Regional 
Development 
Local government 
NSW Local Government Act 1993 Department of Premier and Cabinet 
Vic Local Government Act 1989 Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Local government 
Qld Local Government Act 1993 Department of Local Government, Community 
Recovery and Resilience 
SA Local Government Act 1999 Office for State/Local Government Relations 
WA Local Government Act 1995 Department of Local Government and 
Communities 
Tas Local Government Act 1993 Department of Premier and Cabinet 
NT Local Government Act  Department of Local Government 
Development assessment, planning and zoning 
Vic Planning and Environment Act 1987 Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
 Regional Development Victoria Act 2002 Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
 Urban Renewal Authority Victoria Act 2003 Places Victoria 
 Project Development and Construction 
Management Act 1994 
Department of Treasury and Finance 
Qld State Development and Public Works 
Organisation Act 1971 
Department of State Development 
Infrastructure and Planning 
 Sustainable Planning Act 2009 Department of State Development, 
Infrastructure and Planning 
 Integrated Planning Act 1997 Department of State Development, 
Infrastructure and Planning 
 Economic Development Act 2012 Minister for Economic Development 
SA Development Act 1993 Department of Planning, Transport and 
Infrastructure 
WA Planning and Development Act 2005 Department of Planning 
Tas Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 Department of Justice 
 Tasmanian Planning Commission Act 1997 Department of Justice 
 State Policies and Projects Act 1993 Department of Premier and Cabinet; 
Department of Justice 
 Approvals (Deadlines) Act 1993 Department of Justice 
NT Lands, Planning and Mining Tribunal 
Act 1998 
Department of Justice 
 Planning Act 1993 Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
 Northern Territory Environment Protection 
Authority Act 2012 
Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
 National Environmental Protection Council 
(Northern Territory) Act 1994 
Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
ACT Planning and Development Act 2007 ACT Planning and Land Authority 
 Australian Capital Territory (Planning and 
Land Management) Act 1998 
ACT Planning and Land Authority 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Crown Land access 
NSW Crown Lands Act 1989 Department of Primary Industries 
 Crown Lands (Continued Tenures) 
Act 1989 
Department of Primary Industries 
 Western Lands Act 1901 Department of Primary Industries 
Vic Land Act 1958 Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
SA Crown Land Management Act 2009 Department for Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources 
 Pastoral Land Management and 
Conservation Act 1989 
Department for Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources 
WA Land Administration Act 1997 Department of Lands 
Tas Crown Lands Act 1976 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and 
Environment 
NT Crown Lands Act 1992 Department of Lands, Planning and the Environment 
 Pastoral Land Act 1992 Department of Land Resource Management 
Native title, land rights and land acquisition 
Native title 
NSW Native Title (NSW) Act 1994 Department of Attorney General and Justice 
Vic Land Title Validation Act 1994 Land Titles Office 
Qld Native Title (Queensland) Act 1993 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
SA Native Title (SA) Act 1994 Attorney-General’s Department 
WA Titles (Validation) and Native Title 
(Effect of Past Acts) Act 1995 
Department of the Attorney General 
Tas Native Title (Tas) Act 1994 Department of Premier and Cabinet 
NT Validation (Native Title) Act 1994 Department of the Attorney-General and Justice 
Cwlth Native Title Act 1993 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Land rights/access 
NSW Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 Office of Communities, Aboriginal Affairs 
Vic Aboriginal Lands Act 1970 Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
 Aboriginal Lands Act 1991 Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
 Aboriginal Land (Manatunga Land) 
Act 1992 
Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
Qld Aboriginal Land Act 1991 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Land Act 1994 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Torres Strait Islander Land Act 1991 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Sugar Industry Act 1999 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
SA Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966 Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
 Anangu Pitjantjatjara 
Yankunytjatjara Land Rights Act 
1981 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Land rights/access 
SA Maralinga Tjarutja Land Rights Act 1984 Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
WA Regional Development Commissions Act 
1993 
Department of Regional Development 
 Land Administration Act 1997 Department of Lands 
 Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
 Aboriginal Communities Act 1979 Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
Tas Aboriginal Lands Act 1995 Department of Premier and Cabinet 
NT Aboriginal Land Act 1978 Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
 Coburg Peninsula Aboriginal Land, Sanctuary 
and Marine Park Act 1981 
Parks and Wildlife Commission of the 
Northern Territory 
 Nitmiluk (Katherine Gorge) National Park Act 
1989 
Parks and Wildlife Commission of the 
Northern Territory 
 Parks and Reserves (Framework for the 
Future) Act 2004 
Parks and Wildlife Commission of the 
Northern Territory 
 Minerals (Acquisition) Act 1953 Department of Mines and Energy 
 Crown Lands Act 1992 Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
 Northern Territory Land Corporation Act 1995 Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment  
ACT Community Title Act 2001 ACT Planning and Land Authority 
Cwlth Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) 
Act 1976 
Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 
 Aboriginal Land Rights (Lake Condah and 
Framlingham Forest) Act 1987 
Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 
 Aboriginal Land Grant (Jervis Bay Territory) 
Act 1986 
Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 
 Ashmore and Cartier Islands Acceptance Act 
1933 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional 
Development 
Land acquisition 
NT Lands Acquisition Act 1979 Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
ACT Lands Acquisition Act 1994 ACT Planning and Land Authority 
Indigenous heritage 
Vic Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 Department of Transport, Planning and 
Local Infrastructure 
Qld Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act 2003 Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander and Multicultural Affairs 
 Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage Act 
2003 
Department of Natural Resources and 
Mines 
WA Aboriginal Heritage (Marandoo) Act 1992 Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
 Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Indigenous heritage 
SA Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
Tas Aboriginal Relics Act 1975 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and 
Environment 
NT Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred 
Sites Act  
Minister for Regional Development 
Cwlth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Heritage Protection Act 1984 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Heritage 
NSW Heritage Act 1977 Office of Environment and Heritage 
Vic Heritage Rivers Act 1992 Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Heritage Act 1995 Heritage Victoria 
Qld Queensland Heritage Act 1992 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
 Cape York Peninsula Heritage Act 
2007 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
SA Heritage Places Act 1993 Department for Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources  
 Historic Shipwrecks Act 1981 Department for Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources 
WA Heritage of WA Act 1990 Heritage Council of Western Australia 
 Maritime Archaeology Act 1973 Western Australian Museum 
Tas Historic Cultural Heritage Act 1995 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and 
Environment 
NT Heritage Act 2011 Department of Lands, Planning and the Environment 
ACT Heritage Act 2004 ACT Planning and Land Authority 
Cwlth Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 Department of the Environment 
Environmental protection and impact assessment 
NSW Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act 1982 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure 
 Protection of the Environment 
Operations Act 1997 
Environment Protection Authority 
Vic Environment Protection Act 1970 Environment Protection Authority 
 Victorian Environmental Protection 
Council Act 2001 
Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Environment Effects Act 1978 Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
 Environment Protection Act 1978 Environment Protection Authority 
 Planning and Environment Act 1987 Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure 
Qld Environment Protection Act 1994 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
 Environmental Protection 
(Greentape Reduction) and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2012 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
SA Environment Protection Act 1993 Environment Protection Authority 
WA Environmental Protection Act 1986 Department of Environment Regulation 
Environmental protection and impact assessment 
Tas Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and 
Environment 
NT Environmental Assessment Act 1982 Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
 Environmental Offences and 
Penalties Act 1996 
Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
Cwlth Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
Department of the Environment 
Natural resource management 
NSW National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 Office of Environment and Heritage 
 Threatened Species Conservation Act 
1995 
Office of Environment and Heritage 
 Water Act 1912 NSW Trade and Investment 
 Water Management Act 2000 NSW Trade and Investment 
Vic Conservation, Forests and Lands Act 
1987 
Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Wildlife Act 1975 Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
 Parks Victoria Act 1998 Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
Qld Nature Conservation Act 1992 Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection; Department of National Parks, 
Recreation, Sport and Racing 
 Fisheries Act 1994 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 Wild Rivers Act 2005 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
 Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Recreation Areas Management Act 
2006 
Department of National Parks, Recreation, Sport 
and Racing 
 Biodiscovery Act 2004 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
 Plant Protection Act 1989 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 Vegetation Management Act 1989 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Fisheries Act 1994 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 Forestry Act 1959 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 Land Protection (Pest and Stock 
Route Management Act) 2002 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 Soil Conservation Act 1986 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
SA Adelaide Dolphin Sanctuary Act 2005 Department for Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources 
 River Murray Act 2003 Department for Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Natural resource management 
SA Wilderness Protection Act 1992 Department for Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources 
SA Public and Environmental Health Act 1987 Department of Health 
 National Parks and Wildlife Act 1972 Department for Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources 
 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 Department for Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources 
WA Soil and Land Conservation Act 1945 Department of Agriculture and Food 
 Parks and Reserves Act 1895 Department of Lands 
 Reserves (National Parks and Conservation 
Parks) Act 2004 
Department of Parks and Wildlife 
 Reserves (National Parks, Conservation Parks, 
and Other Reserves) Act 2004 
Department of Parks and Wildlife 
 Reserves (National Parks, Conservation Parks, 
Nature Reserves and Other Reserves) Act 2004 
Department of Parks and Wildlife 
 Reserves and Road Closure Act 1977 Department of Lands 
 Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 Department of Parks and Wildlife 
 Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 Department of Parks and Wildlife 
 Land Drainage Act 1925 Department of Water 
 Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 Department of Water 
Tas  Natural Resource Management Act 2002 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, 
Water and Environment 
 National Parks and Reserve Management Act 
2002 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, 
Water and Environment 
 Forest Practices Act 1985 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
 Forestry Act 1920 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
 Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, 
Water and Environment 
 Water Management Act 1999 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, 
Water and Environment 
NT Fisheries Act 1988 Department of Primary Industry and 
Fisheries 
 Weeds Management Act 2001 Department of Land Resource 
Management 
 Waste Management and Pollution Control Act 
1998 
Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
 Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation Act 1969  Department of Land Resource 
Management 
Marine and coastal environment 
NSW Marine Parks Act 1997 Office of Environment and Heritage 
(Continued next page) 
   
448 MAJOR PROJECT 
ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES 
 
 
Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Marine and coastal environment 
NSW Coastal Protection Act 1979 Office of Environment and Heritage 
 Marine Pollution Act 1987 Roads and Maritime Services 
 Land and Environment Court Act 1979 Department of Attorney General and Justice 
Vic Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994 Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries 
 Coastal Management Act 1995 Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries 
 Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious 
Substances Act 1986 
Environment Protection Authority 
 Marine (Drug, Alcohol and Pollution Control) 
Act 1988 
Transport Safety Victoria 
Qld Marine Parks Act 2004 Department of National Parks, Recreation, 
Sport and Racing 
 Coastal Protection and Management Act 
1995 
Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection 
 Transport Operations (Marine Pollution) Act 
1995 
Maritime Safety Queensland 
 Wet Tropics World Heritage Protection and 
Management Act 1993 
Wet Tropics Management Authority 
 Marine Parks Act 2004 Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection 
 River Improvement Trust Act 1940 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Water Act 2000 Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection 
Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
SA Coast Protection Act 1972 Department for Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources 
 Marine Parks Act 2007 Department for Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources 
 Protection of Marine Waters (Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships) Act 1987 
Department of Planning, Transport and 
Infrastructure 
WA Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious 
Substances Act 1987 
Department of Transport 
 Western Australian Marine (Sea Dumping) 
Act 1981 
Department of Transport 
 Western Australian Marine Act 1982 Department of Transport 
 Marine and Harbours Act 1981 Department of Transport 
Tas Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious 
Substances Act 1987 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, 
Water and Environment 
NT Marine Pollution Act 1999 Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Marine and coastal environment 
Cwlth Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
 Protection of the Sea (Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships) Act 1983 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 Attorney-General’s Department 
 Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) 
Act 1981 
Department of the Environment 
Occupational health and safety 
NSW Work Health and Safety Act 2011 Department of Finance and Services 
 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 NSW Trade and Investment 
 Mine Health and Safety Act 2004 NSW Trade and Investment 
 Explosives Act 2003 Department of Finance and Services 
 Dams Safety Act 1978 Department of Primary Industries 
 Dangerous Goods (Road and Rail 
Transport) Act 2008 
Department of Finance and Services 
Vic Rail Safety Act 2006 Transport Safety Victoria 
 Dangerous Goods Act 1985 WorkSafe Victoria 
 Marine Safety Act 2010 Transport Safety Victoria 
 Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 WorkSafe Victoria 
 Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994 WorkSafe Victoria 
Qld Work Health and Safety Act 2011 Workplace Health and Safety Queensland 
 Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health 
Act 1999 
Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Transport (Rail Safety) Act 2010 Department of Transport and Main Roads 
 Explosives Act 1999 Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
 Gene Technology Act 2001 Department of Science, Information 
Technology, Innovation and the Arts 
 Biological Control Act 1987 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries 
 Waste Reduction and Recycling Act 2011 Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection 
 Public Health Act 2005 Department of Health 
SA Dangerous Substances Act 1979 SafeWork SA 
 Work Health and Safety Act 2012 SafeWork SA 
 Mines and Works Inspection Act 1920 Department of Manufacturing, Innovation, 
Trade, Resources and Energy 
 Explosives Act 1936 Department of Manufacturing, Innovation, 
Trade, Resources and Energy 
WA Jetties Act 1926 Department of Transport 
 Port Authorities Act 1999 Department of Transport 
 Rail Safety Act 2010 Department of Transport 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Occupational health and safety 
WA Contaminated Sites Act 2003 Department of Environment Regulation 
 Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 Department of Mines and Petroleum 
 Gas Standards Act 1972 Department of Commerce 
 Energy Safety Act 2006 Department of Commerce 
 Dangerous Goods Safety Act 2004 Department of Mines and Petroleum 
 Carbon Rights Act 2003 Department of Environment Regulation 
 Occupational Health and Safety Act 1984 Department of Commerce 
Tas Port Companies Act 1997 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and 
Resources 
 Irrigation Clauses Act 1973 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, 
Water and Environment 
 Drains Act 1954 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, 
Water and Environment 
 Dangerous Goods (Road and Rail Transport) 
Act 2010 
Department of Justice 
 Work Health and Safety Act 2012 Workplace Standards Tasmania 
NT Dangerous Goods Act 1998 Department of Business  
 Work Health and Safety (National Uniform 
Legislation) Act 2011 
Department of Business 
 Radioactive Ores and Concentrates 
(Packaging and Transport) Act 1980 
Department of Business 
 Waste Management and Pollution Control Act 
1998 
Department of Lands, Planning and the 
Environment 
 Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and 
Rail (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2010 
Department of Business 
 Marine Act 1981 Department of Transport 
ACT Work Health and Safety Act 2011 Chief Minister and Treasury Directorate 
 Dangerous Substances Act 2004 Chief Minister and Treasury Directorate 
 Machinery Act 1949 Chief Minister and Treasury Directorate 
Cwlth Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 ComCare 
 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 ComCare 
Other 
Qld Queensland Competition Authority Act 1987 Queensland Competition Authority 
 Electricity Act 2004 Department of Energy and Water Supply 
 Gas Supply Act 2003 Department of Energy and Water Supply 
 Queensland Reconstruction Act 2011 Queensland Reconstruction Authority 
SA AustralAsia Railway (Third Party Access) Act 
1999 
Essential Services Commission of South 
Australia 
WA Railways (Access) Act 1998 Economic Regulation Authority 
(Continued next page) 
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Table C.5 Legislation relevant to major project DAA processesa (continued) 
Scope  Legislation Responsible department/agency 
Cwlth Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act 1990  Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
 Coastal Waters (Northern Territory Powers) Act 1980 Attorney-General’s Department 
 Coastal Waters (Northern Territory Title) Act 1980 Attorney-General’s Department 
 Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 Attorney-General’s Department 
Other 
Cwlth Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 Attorney-General’s Department 
 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 
 Clean Energy Act 2011 Clean Energy Regulator 
 Customs Act 1901  Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection 
 Defence Act 1903 Department of Defence 
 Energy Efficiency Opportunities Act 2006 Department of Industry 
 Fair Work (Building Industry) Act 2012 Department of Employment 
 Fair Work Act 2009 Department of Employment 
 Foreign Takeovers and Acquisitions Act 1975 Foreign Investment Review Board 
 Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security 
Act 2003 
Department of Infrastructure and 
Regional Development 
 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 Department of the Environment 
 Navigation Act 1912 Department of Infrastructure and 
Regional Development 
 Quarantine Act 1908 Department of Agriculture 
 Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1963  Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
a This list is not intended to be fully comprehensive. 
Sources: ComLaw; State and Territory legislation databases; various departmental websites. 
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D International DAA processes 
This appendix provides an overview of development assessment and approval 
(DAA) processes for major projects in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and New Zealand. These countries were chosen because they have similar 
political systems to Australia, are at roughly equivalent stages of development, and 
face broadly equivalent challenges in making tradeoffs between commercial, 
environmental and heritage concerns.  
D.1 Canada 
Jurisdictional overview 
Under the Constitution Act, 1867, there are three levels of government in Canada 
with different areas of regulatory responsibility for activities related to major 
projects (box D.1). Responsibility for areas, such as the environment, is not 
specifically identified and assigned to a level of government under the Act. It may 
be addressed under various federal and provincial legislative powers depending on 
the nature or scope of the issue.  
The jurisdictional division of regulatory powers means that major projects wholly 
within a Canadian province are typically assessed and determined using provincial 
government processes. Projects beyond the boundaries of a province, or that are 
deemed likely to have significant adverse environmental effects, may also be 
subject to a federal environmental assessment and approval process. 
Major projects in Canada can require a wide range of permits, licences, agreements 
and approvals from federal, provincial and municipal regulatory bodies and other 
stakeholders (including Indigenous peoples and landholders and users). This section 
gives an overview of key federal and provincial DAA processes applying to major 
projects with a focus on environmental assessments. 
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Box D.1 Division of regulatory powers in Canada  
Canada has three levels of government — federal, provincial and municipal — with 
different areas of legislative responsibility under the Constitution Act, 1867.  
Federal Government regulatory powers relevant to the assessment and approval of 
major projects include those relating to: 
• navigation/shipping 
• sea coast and inland fisheries 
• ferries (interprovincial and international) 
• Indians/Indian reserves 
• works connecting provinces; beyond boundaries of one province; within a province 
but to the advantage of Canada or more than one province. 
Provincial Governments’ regulatory powers relevant to the assessment and approval of 
major projects include those relating to:  
• natural resource uses 
• management of public lands belonging to a province 
• property and civil rights 
• municipalities. 
In addition to 10 provinces, there are three territories with limited regulatory 
responsibilities granted to them by the Federal Government. 
Municipal Governments receive authority from Provincial Governments to enable the 
provision of a range of local services such as libraries, parks, community water 
systems, local police, and roads. 
Across Canada there are also ‘band councils’, which govern First Nations communities. 
These elected councils are similar to municipal councils and make decisions that affect 
their local communities.  
 
Features of federal processes for major projects  
Federal environmental assessments 
Any project in Canada classified as a ‘designated project’ can require a federal 
environmental assessment (EA) and approval before it can proceed. Designated 
projects include: 
• projects of a type listed in the Regulations Designating Physical Activities 
• projects declared by the Federal Minister of the Environment (CEAA 2013). 
Regulations Designating Physical Activities made under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act 2012 list project types that are likely to have 
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significant adverse environmental effects and therefore may be subject to a federal 
EA. These project types include: electrical generating stations or transmission lines; 
dams, oil or gas facilities or pipelines; mines or mills; marine terminals, railway 
lines, public highways, aerodromes or runways; and waste management facilities. 
The Federal Minister of the Environment may also ‘designate’ a project not 
identified in the regulations if he or she believes the project may cause adverse 
environmental effects or if there are public concerns about such effects 
(CEAA 2013). 
There are three statutory bodies that can undertake a federal EA for a designated 
project.  
• The Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) administers the EA 
process for designated projects subject to the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act 2012 (the CEA Act). The CEAA prepares an EA report for the 
Minister for the Environment who makes the final determination.2  
• The National Energy Board (NEB) undertakes EAs for designated projects 
involving activities regulated under the National Energy Board Act 1959 (the 
NEB Act) or the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act 1985 (box D.2). 
• The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) undertakes EAs for 
designated projects involving activities regulated under the Nuclear Safety and 
Control Act 2000 (CEAA 2013). 
Direction of reforms to federal environmental assessments  
The Canadian Parliament legislated a range of reforms to federal EA processes in 
June 2012 through the Jobs and Growth Act, 2012, which narrowed the scope of the 
types of projects that could face a federal EA. Key changes include: 
• narrowing the definition of lakes and waterways upon which a federal EA can be 
required  
• expanding the types of works that can be pre-approved, allowing more ‘low risk’ 
works (such as docks and boathouses) to proceed without further assessment and 
approval (Parliament of Canada 2013). 
                                              
2 The Minister of the Environment can refer an EA to a review panel if the Minister is of the 
opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The review panel is a group of ‘independent 
experts’ appointed by the Minister who are responsible for managing the EA process. The panel 
prepares a report that includes its rationale, conclusions and recommendations and submits it to 
the Minister of the Environment for a final determination (CEAA 2013).   
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Box D.2 National Energy Board of Canada 
The National Energy Board (NEB) — an independent federal statutory agency 
established under the National Energy Board Act, 1959 — regulates international and 
interprovincial aspects of the oil, gas and electric utility industries in Canada, including 
assessments and approvals for interprovincial and international pipelines and power 
lines. Projects wholly within a province are not regulated by the NEB. 
Key features of the National Energy Board process 
Proponents wishing to develop a project must apply to the NEB for an assessment and 
determination. This process includes a number of steps.  
• A ‘planning and pre-application’ phase, which aims to improve proponents’ and 
other stakeholders’ understanding of the regulatory processes and requirements 
before an application is lodged. Pre-application meetings give stakeholders and the 
regulator the opportunity to: share and process information and establish contacts; 
discuss application requirements; and identify resources relevant to the process. 
• A range of public consultation requirements across the regulatory stages including 
at the project design, construction, operation and maintenance, and abandonment 
stages. Some proposed projects also require the NEB to hold public hearings.  
• An environmental impact assessment undertaken by the NEB (this replaces the 
environmental assessment process normally undertaken by the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency). 
• A determination of whether a project is denied or can proceed, and if any terms or 
conditions must be applied. In making a decision, the NEB considers the economic, 
technical and financial feasibility, and the environmental and socioeconomic impacts 
of the project.  
• Monitoring and enforcement of conditions the NEB attaches to a project from 
approval to decommissioning stages (including auditing and inspecting construction 
activities, maintenance and monitoring procedures during operation, and 
procedures during cessation).  
Sources: NEB (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d).  
 
Further reforms legislated in December 2012 through the Jobs, Growth and 
Long-term Prosperity Act, 2012 established a new truncated federal EA process. 
Key changes include: 
• reducing the possible levels of review for an EA from three to two 
• allowing the CEAA to screen designated projects to determine whether they 
require an EA at all3  
                                              
3  Screening does not apply to projects regulated under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, 2000, 
the National Energy Board Act, 1959 or the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, 1985. Such 
designated projects are automatically required to undergo a federal environmental assessment. 
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• reducing the number of government agencies involved in carrying out federal 
EAs from approximately 40 to three — the CEAA, the NEB and the CNSC  
• focusing federal EAs on federal aspects of designated projects by limiting the 
statutory definition of ‘environmental effects’ 
• imposing statutory time limits for EAs. Most standard EAs must be completed in 
one year, while panel reviews — the alternative federal EA pathway — are 
limited to two years 
• authorising the Minister of the Environment to establish a committee to conduct 
regional environmental assessment for regions that are entirely composed of 
federal lands (discussed in appendix F) 
• allowing (in prescribed circumstances) all or part of the federal EA to be 
delegated to, or substituted for, a provincial EA, and allowing (in prescribed 
circumstances) federal approval authority to be delegated to a provincial 
decision maker (see section on delegation, substitution and equivalency below) 
(Parliament of Canada 2013).4  
Reforms to National Energy Board processes 
A range of reforms to the NEB processes was initiated in 2012 through the Jobs, 
Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, 2012 and through amendments to the NEB 
Act. Key reforms include: 
• establishing time limits of 18 months for most NEB applications. This includes 
15 months from the date the NEB determines an application is complete until it 
completes its assessment  
• requiring both approvals and denials of projects to go to the Governor in Council 
(the federal cabinet) for a decision. The NEB’s report on a project must also 
include any conditions to be attached to an approval  
• requiring that, for projects identified by the CEA Act, the NEB must conduct an 
EA pursuant to that Act. For projects not covered under the CEA Act, the NEB 
will continue to conduct EAs under the NEB Act  
• making hearings for gas export licences no longer mandatory. In deciding 
whether to issue a gas export licence, the NEB can no longer consider 
environmental matters in export applications (Parliament of Canada 2013). 
                                              
4  Substitution and replacement provisions do not apply if a project is being assessed by the 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission or the National Energy Board, or if the project has been 
referred to a review panel. 
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Delegation, substitution and equivalency for federal environmental assessments 
The delegation, substitution and equivalency provisions in the CEA Act aim to 
reduce duplication in regulatory processes where a single project requires more than 
one EA under federal law and provincial law or under an environmental impact 
assessment regime established under an Aboriginal land claims agreement.  
• Delegation allows the responsible federal authority to delegate to a province the 
carrying out of any part of the federal EA (apart from the final decision making). 
• Substitution (similar to an Australian bilateral assessment agreement) allows the 
Federal Minister for the Environment to substitute a provincial EA process for a 
federal EA if: 
– requested to do so by a province, and  
– the Minister is of the opinion that the provincial process is an appropriate 
substitute for a federal EA under the CEA Act, and that conditions contained 
in the CEA Act regarding factors to be considered, public participation and 
the submission of an EA report will be fulfilled (CEAA 2013).  
• Equivalency (similar to an Australian bilateral approval agreement) allows the 
Governor in Council (the Federal cabinet), on the recommendation of the 
Minister for the Environment, to exempt a designated project from the CEA Act, 
if the Governor in Council is satisfied that: 
– after completion of the assessment, the provincial government will determine 
whether the designated project is likely to cause significant adverse 
environmental effects, taking into account appropriate mitigation measures  
– the provincial government will ensure that mitigation measures and a 
follow-up program are implemented  
– any other conditions that the Minister of the Environment establishes will be 
met (Parliament of Canada 2013). 
Under the equivalency provision, the province carries out the EA and makes the 
final determination, including any measures to protect components of the 
environment under federal authority. 
In March 2013, the CEAA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office outlining the process by which 
the Province of British Columbia can substitute its EA process for the federal EA 
process where a project requires both. As of October 2013, the Federal Minister of 
the Environment had approved the substitution of the British Columbia EA process 
for the federal EA process for three projects (a liquefied natural gas export terminal 
and two coal mines) (Osler Legal 2013).  
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The Major Project Management Office 
The Major Project Management Office (MPMO) — established in 2007 — aims to 
provide overarching project coordination, management and accountability for 
‘major resource projects’ operating within the federal regulatory review process 
(Government of Canada 2012). 
Major resource projects eligible for MPMO assistance are defined (under a Federal 
Cabinet Directive) as large resource projects that are subject to a comprehensive 
study, a panel review, or a large or complex multi-jurisdictional screening, as 
defined under the CEA Act. Typically, these projects involve extracting, processing, 
refining, producing, distributing, or disposing of natural resources, as well as 
decommissioning and reclaiming sites used for any of these activities (Government 
of Canada 2012).  
The MPMO’s main roles and responsibilities are to: 
• provide a single point of entry into the federal regulatory system for proponents 
of major resource projects 
• engage in early discussions, distribution of guidance materials and information 
exchanges with proponents on proposed projects 
• develop in collaboration with relevant federal departments and agencies, 
consensus-based Project Agreements that articulate the roles and responsibilities 
of each department and timeline-based performance targets for delivery of 
process milestones 
• track and monitor the government’s Aboriginal consultation requirements related 
to the review of major resource projects and maintain the official record of 
Aboriginal/Crown consultation for the Canadian Government 
• implement and manage a transparent monitoring and tracking system for major 
resource projects as a mechanism by which to monitor and track the progress of 
any specific project through the regulatory process 
• lead collaborative research and policy analysis on short, medium and longer term 
initiatives to improve the performance of the regulatory system, including 
legislative options, cost recovery, cumulative effects, energy infrastructure 
corridors, regional assessment and capacity building initiatives or processes 
(Government of Canada 2012). 
The MPMO process includes the development of a Project Agreement — a 
coordinating tool between interested federal departments — committing to a 
timeline and schedule for the completion of the EA, with regular milestones to 
allow tracking of progress. All agreements contain coordinated work plans that 
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outline the particular roles and responsibilities of federal departments and agencies 
throughout the entire life cycle of a particular regulatory review process. 
Agreements can include the following coordinated work plans: 
• an Environmental Assessment work plan 
• an Aboriginal Consultation and Engagement work plan  
• a Permitting, Authorizations and Approvals work plan 
• a Follow-Up and Monitoring work plan. 
Project Agreements are posted on the internet to promote transparency and the 
MPMO tracks and reports on the progress of the EA and other regulatory processes, 
and also assists in the resolution of issues to avoid delays (Government of 
Canada 2012). 
Features of provincial processes for major projects 
Major projects wholly within a Canadian province are typically assessed and 
determined using provincial level DAA processes, but may also be subject to a 
federal EA where they meet the ‘designated project’ criteria set out in the 
Regulations Designating Physical Activities or are declared by the Federal Minister 
of the Environment (CEAA 2013). This section gives an overview of recent reforms 
to DAA processes in the Province of Alberta for upstream oil and gas projects. 
Until 2012, responsibilities for the assessment and approval of upstream gas and oil 
projects in Alberta were spread between various bodies. 
• The Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) — an independent 
provincial regulator — granted primary approvals for oil and gas projects. 
• The Alberta Ministry of Sustainable Resource Development (SRD) managed the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process (in parallel with ERCB 
processes) and granted a range of secondary approvals.  
• The Alberta Ministry of the Environment (Alberta Environment) developed 
policies regarding air and water resources and the reclamation and remediation 
of oil and gas facilities and regulated these areas. 
• The Alberta Ministry of Energy (Alberta Energy) developed policies regarding 
energy resources and was responsible for managing Crown mineral rights and 
royalties (Alberta Energy 2013).  
In December 2012, the Alberta Parliament passed the Alberta Responsible Energy 
Development Act, 2012 reforming these arrangements (box D.3).  
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Box D.3 Key Alberta reforms (as at October 2013) 
A new policy coordination office  
The Policy Management Office was established to work with existing policy 
departments (Alberta Environment, Alberta Sustainable Resource Development (SRD), 
and Alberta Energy) to: 
• integrate and align policy in the Province and between Canadian jurisdictions 
• provide clear and consistent policy direction to proponents, regulators and the public 
• develop a more effective public consultation process  
• develop a performance measurement framework to assess the new regulations. 
A new single independent regulator 
The Alberta Energy Regulator was established with unified responsibility for 
development assessment and approval (DAA) processes (taking powers held by 
Alberta Environment, the SRD, and the Energy Resources Conservation Board 
(ERCB)). Its functions include:  
• acting as a single point of contact for assessing and determining applications, 
including Environmental Impact Assessments  
• making decisions regarding the disposition of public lands and licensing of water 
(consistent with public lands and water allocation policies) 
• post-approval activities (including variances, compliance and monitoring, overseeing 
suspension, abandonment, and closure and remediation) (details to be finalised) 
• establishing a single process for appeals (details to be finalised) 
• establishing standards for regulatory processes (such as approval timelines) to 
provide more predictability to applicants (details to be finalised). 
Streamlined public engagement processes 
A report reviewing the previous system — Enhancing Assurance — found that the 
effectiveness of public consultation was limited as it was difficult for interested parties 
to determine when and how to provide input into policy development and policy 
assurance processes. The new approach aims to address this by having separate 
processes for stakeholders with a ‘common interest’ and those with a ‘private interest’.  
• Common interest stakeholders wishing to influence general policy questions (such 
as province-wide land use, water use and environmental management) will be 
‘channelled’ into policy development consultations.  
• ‘Specified parties’ with private interests who stand to be impacted directly by a 
specific project will be able to provide input during the DAA processes for an 
individual project. This will help make project-specific consultations more focused 
and relevant to the merits of a particular project.  
(Continued next page)  
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Box D.3 (continued) 
Integrated risk management framework  
The Enhancing Assurance report found that the previous system predominantly used 
prescriptive ‘command and control’ regulations that did not allow for advances in 
technology or improved industry practices, and that while Alberta Environment, the 
SRD, Alberta Energy and the ERCB used risk-management processes to varying 
degrees, they did so in an inconsistent way.  
An Integrated Risk Management Framework based on the international ISO 31 000 
Risk Management Standard has been developed.  
• At the policy development stage, the Framework will be used to evaluate new and 
existing natural resource policies. It will help assess risks to Alberta’s social, 
economic and environmental outcomes and assist in determining the best policy 
approaches to manage those risks. 
• At the policy assurance stage, the Framework will be used to identify and assess 
risks associated with specific oil and gas developments. It will guide regulators’ 
selection of appropriate policy tools to manage those risks, monitor industry 
compliance and achievement of desired outcomes. 
Performance measurement framework 
A performance measurement framework with public reporting requirements is being 
developed to provide feedback about how the reformed system is performing against 
objectives. The framework will measure and report the performance of the new 
regulations publicly and will include: 
• defined performance measures that consider the economy, society and the 
environment 
• system benchmarks established internally and through comparison with other 
jurisdictions 
• a system for monitoring and reporting performance measures 
• establishment of an arm’s length environmental monitoring agency. 
Sources: Alberta Energy (2013); Alberta Government (2010); Responsible Energy Development Act, 2012 
(Alberta).  
 
D.2 United Kingdom 
Major project assessment and approval processes 
In the United Kingdom, a separate approval process is used for projects deemed to 
be nationally significant infrastructure. To qualify, projects must be of a particular 
type (for example, an airport, harbour, reservoir or various types of land transport 
and energy infrastructure) and be above a minimum size threshold (for example, gas 
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pipelines must be at least 40 kilometres in length) (Planning Inspectorate 
(UK) 2012c). In all, there are 16 types of projects that can be deemed nationally 
significant infrastructure. 
The legislative basis for the planning application process for nationally significant 
infrastructure projects is the Planning Act 2008 (as amended by the Localism Act 
2011). The Planning Act was introduced to streamline decision making. The Act 
sets out fixed time frames for the examination and decision making stages of the 
process. 
In April 2012, the Planning Inspectorate became the agency responsible for 
operating the process in England and, for some types of infrastructure, in Wales 
(Planning Inspectorate (UK) 2012c). Other arrangements apply in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. 
Following the Planning Inspectorate’s examination, it makes a recommendation to 
the appropriate Secretary of State (a Secretary of State is a Cabinet Minister in 
charge of a government department), who makes the decision to grant or refuse 
development consent (Barclay 2012). The process is summarised in box D.4. 
Pre-application 
Before submitting an application to the Planning Inspectorate, the developer is 
required under the Planning Act to carry out consultation on their proposal. The 
pre-application process is considered a crucial part of the overall assessment process 
(DCLG (UK) 2013a). 
Without adequate consultation, the subsequent application will not be accepted when it 
is submitted. If the Secretary of State determines that the consultation is inadequate, he 
or she can recommend that the applicant carries out more consultation activity before 
the application can be accepted. Once a scheme is in examination there is limited scope 
to make changes to what has been included in the draft Development Consent Order. 
This is why it is important that issues are made known and explored during the 
pre-application consultation … (DCLG (UK) 2013a, p. 5) 
National Infrastructure Planning Portal 
Before carrying out this consultation, the developer notifies the Planning 
Inspectorate that they intend to submit an application in the future. The Inspectorate 
will then add the project to the Programme of Projects on the National Infrastructure 
Planning Portal, a publically accessible website (Planning Inspectorate 
(UK) 2012c). The Portal is used to record details of the project, application 
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documents, procedural advice given by the Inspectorate in relation to the project, 
and key project approval milestones. 
 
Box D.4 Planning application process for nationally significant 
infrastructure projects in the United Kingdom 
 
Source: Planning Inspectorate (2012b)  
 
Consultation 
The Planning Act requires certain bodies and groups of people to be consulted at the 
pre-application stage. The Act allows for flexibility in the precise form that 
consultation may take, depending on local circumstances and the needs of the 
project itself (DCLG (UK) 2013a). The developer may be required to consult with: 
• relevant local authorities 
• persons who own, occupy or have an interest in the land in question where the 
development is proposed, or who could be affected by the project in such a way 
that they may be able to make a claim for compensation 
• local communities that may be affected by the proposed project. 
For offshore projects that do not feature any terrestrial development (such as 
offshore wind farms), there are no statutory requirements to consult specific local 
authorities. However, applicants for offshore projects should consider and consult 
   
 INTERNATIONAL 
DAA PROCESSES 
465 
 
with communities in the vicinity of the proposed project about its potential visual, 
economic and social impacts (DCLG (UK) 2013a). 
Before formally consulting people living in the vicinity of the project, the developer 
is required to prepare a Statement of Community Consultation (SOCC), having first 
consulted with the relevant local authorities about what it should contain. The 
SOCC details the consultation the developer intends to undertake with the local 
community about their project. The developer is required to publish a notice stating 
where and when the SOCC can be inspected (Planning Inspectorate (UK) 2012c). 
The Planning Act provides a minimum 28 days for consultation. However, this 
period of consultation may be longer for larger or more complex projects. Where 
responses from those consulted are not received within the set deadline for 
consultation, the applicant is not obliged to take these responses into account in 
their application (DCLG (UK) 2013a). 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
Most nationally significant infrastructure projects will fall within the scope of the 
EIA Directive, and will require an Environmental Statement to be prepared and 
submitted as part of the application pack. Under the Planning Act, the EIA process 
is governed by the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) 
Regulations 2009. These regulations ensure that the pre-application publicity and 
consultation requirements for the EIA are consistent with those of the Planning Act 
(DCLG (UK) 2013a). 
Acceptance 
Acceptance means that an application can proceed to examination. The acceptance 
stage begins when a developer submits a formal application for development 
consent to the Planning Inspectorate. There follows a period of up to 28 days for the 
relevant Secretary of State to consider whether the application meets the standards 
required for formal examination (Planning Inspectorate (UK) 2012a). Applicants 
are required to produce a consultation report as part of their application, detailing 
how they have complied with the consultation requirements of the Planning Act. 
The Secretary of State will consider this report when deciding whether or not the 
applicant has complied with the pre-application consultation requirements, and 
ultimately, whether or not an application can be accepted (DCLG (UK) 2013a). 
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Pre-examination 
If an application is formally accepted by the Secretary of State, then the 
pre-examination phase will commence. The applicant (developer) is required to 
publicise the fact that their application has been accepted and the arrangements for 
interested parties to make representations about the proposed development. 
At this stage, interested parties must register with the Planning Inspectorate to have 
their views considered by the Examining Authority. At least 28 days must be 
provided for people to register. As part of the registration process, parties may 
provide a written summary of what they agree and/or disagree with in the 
application. This is known as a ‘representation’. The Examining Authority may 
disregard representations that are vexatious or frivolous, or deal with the merits of 
national policy rather than the project under application. The Examining Authority 
may also disregard representations that relate just to compensation for compulsory 
acquisition (rather than the justification or need for such acquisition). After the 
deadline for registration has passed, the Examining Authority has 21 days to review 
the application and all relevant representations and identify the principal issues for 
examination. The Planning Inspectorate will publish all relevant representations on 
the National Infrastructure Portal (Planning Inspectorate (UK) 2012c). 
Examination 
The examination of applications for development consent can be conducted either 
by a group of three or more appointed persons (‘Inspectors’), or by a single 
Inspector, depending on the complexity of the project and the level of public 
interest in the outcome. The Secretary of State makes this decision.  
Where it seems likely that evidence to be given about an application will be of a 
level of complexity outside the normal experience of the persons appointed to 
examine the application, one or more assessors may be appointed to advise and 
assist the Inspectors (DCLG (UK) 2012). 
The Examining Authority is required to invite the applicant, local authorities and 
other interested parties to a preliminary meeting to help determine how the 
application should be examined (DCLG (UK) 2012). The Examining Authority has 
a statutory duty to complete its examination within six months of the Preliminary 
Meeting. The examination is a form of legal process, during which consideration is 
given to relevant matters, including the representations of all interested parties, any 
evidence submitted and answers provided to questions set out in writing and 
explained at hearings (Planning Inspectorate (UK) 2012c). 
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During the examination stage, all interested parties are invited to provide further 
written evidence, if they wish, about the issues identified in their representations. 
The Examining Authority is likely to put written questions to the applicant and 
other interested parties to clarify points made or to seek additional information. All 
interested parties also have the opportunity to comment on the representations of 
others, and to respond to any comments made on their representations. While the 
examination is mainly a written process, in certain circumstances the Examination 
Authority may decide to hold hearings (Planning Inspectorate (UK) 2012c). It is 
also common practice for Inspectors to make site visits during this process (DCLG 
(UK) 2012). 
Decision 
The Examining Authority has three months from the end of the examination to 
make a recommendation to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State then has a 
further three months to take a decision. The Secretary of State does not have to 
abide by the recommendation of the Examining Authority. The Secretary of State 
may disagree on any matter of fact mentioned in, or appearing to be material to, a 
conclusion reached by the Examining Authority, or may consider new evidence or 
any new matter of fact (DCLG (UK) 2012). For example, recently the Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate Change refused approval for a proposed gas storage 
facility in Lancashire, despite a recommendation for approval from the Planning 
Inspectorate. Consent was refused on the grounds that the application ‘failed to 
demonstrate the suitability of the site’s geology’ (BBC 2013). 
Post-decision 
There is no right of appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision. However, once 
a decision has been issued, there is a six week period in which an application may 
be made to the courts for judicial review (Planning Inspectorate (UK) 2012b).  
Views on the performance of the system 
Time frames are largely being met 
The Planning Inspectorate’s 2012-13 annual report stated: 
In 2012-13, formal applications were submitted on 16 projects and we received 
notification of 19 pre-application projects. We issued Environmental Impact 
Assessment scoping opinions on 30 applications and screening opinions on 2 further 
cases. 13 applications were accepted for examination (acceptance decisions) and 
15 completed the examination — recommendations were submitted to the Secretary of 
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State on 9. All these were within the statutory time limits set down. (Planning 
Inspectorate (UK) 2013, p. 16) 
The report indicates that Secretary of State decisions were also being made within 
statutory time limits. 
Walker (2013a) reported that ‘from the start of the examination until a decision is 
issued takes up to a year, which is how the regime was intended to work, and should 
provide comfort to future users of the regime’. 
However, judicial review challenges are quite common and this is adding to time 
frames in some cases. Recent projects subject to judicial review include the Hinkley 
Point C nuclear power station in Somerset, the Heysham to M6 link road in 
Lancashire and the Rookery South ‘energy from waste’ project in Bedfordshire. The 
Hinkley Point decision is being appealed by An Taisce, an Irish heritage charity, on 
the grounds that the UK Government had not consulted with the Irish people before 
granting consent (Geoghegan 2013). 
Environmental and other regulations are imposing relatively high costs 
A recent review of major infrastructure projects in the United Kingdom found that 
the United Kingdom ‘is an expensive place in which to build infrastructure’ (HM 
Treasury 2010, p. 7), with the United Kingdom consistently ranked among the most 
expensive countries in Western Europe to build infrastructure. These higher costs 
are largely due to factors other than higher labour, plant and material input costs: 
Comparison of labour, plant and material input costs with Northern European countries 
indicate the UK is generally comparable and that input costs are not a significant driver 
of higher infrastructure costs. (HM Treasury 2010, p. 8) 
While the report noted that in some instances the higher costs were a result of the 
United Kingdom’s greater density of population and high land costs, as compared to 
other European countries, the report also noted that some of the higher costs could 
be attributed to policy. Specifically, the report cited the United Kingdom’s approach 
to addressing environmental and ecological concerns, noting that: 
[w]hile these systems [compliance and consent regimes] are individually designed to 
protect the environment, heritage, the rights of citizens and ensure high quality, safe 
infrastructure, the cumulative cost impact is considerable. (HM Treasury 2010, p. 12) 
Compliance with environmental regulations and related third party constraints was 
estimated to add as much as 10 to 15 per cent to the cost of infrastructure 
(HM Treasury 2010). 
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Recent and prospective reforms 
The UK Planning Act 2008 was introduced to speed up approval processes for key 
infrastructure following a series of high profile proposals that took several years to 
be approved. For example, consent for Terminal 5 at Heathrow airport took 
eight years from the time a planning application was formally lodged 
(Falconer 2001). The reforms included: 
• developing a series of National Policy Statements, that set out in advance 
government objectives for the development of nationally significant 
infrastructure in particular sectors 
• requiring consultation be undertaken before an application was submitted 
• reducing the use of public inquiries and hearings, and relying more on written 
submissions 
• introducing fixed time frames for considering applications 
• approval by the examining body, rather than a Minister (Walker 2013b). 
The Localism Act 2011, reinstated Ministerial approval, but left many other aspects 
of these reforms unchanged. 
Recently, the UK Government published draft regulations that would extend the 
nationally significant infrastructure regime to cover the most significant business 
and commercial projects (DCLG (UK) 2013b). Under the regulations, proponents 
would be able to choose to be subject to the regime, provided their project met 
certain criteria. Various types of construction projects potentially qualify, including 
offices, research and development, manufacturing, distribution, sport and tourism, 
and mining projects.  
D.3 United States 
Context 
As a federation, most powers related to regulating aspects of major projects are 
reserved to the states. Planning powers, however, are predominantly applied by 
local government through the exercise of zoning (which is given effect under the 
policing head of power reserved for the states but delegated to the municipal level 
(Cullingworth and Caves 2009, pp. 78–79). 
Further, two particular features of United States (US) land ownership are notable for 
their implications for major project assessment and approval. First, activities on 
Native American lands can be regulated differently, as tribes are considered 
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‘domestic dependent nations’ and operate as sovereign governments subject to 
Federal authority. Second, mineral rights are not always reserved to the State. 
Individual surface owners often own the subsurface mineral rights (though they may 
have on-sold or leased them separately from the surface rights). Mineral rights are 
also frequently owned by the Federal Government, especially in western states. 
(The Federal Bureau of Land Management manages around 13 per cent of the total 
US land surface, mostly in western regions.) 
Key features of assessment and approval processes  
The regulatory regimes that can apply to major projects in the US are 
extraordinarily complex, and can depend on which levels of government are 
involved (box D.5). The following section focuses primarily on the key 
environmental assessment processes that may apply. 
 
Box D.5 US regulatory complexity — geothermal road mapping project 
Against the backdrop of uncertainty around the US geothermal permit process, in April 
2012 the US Government established a project team to develop working roadmaps of 
existing relevant permitting processes (for agency, industry and policymaker use).  
As of mid-October 2013, the team had published over 460 different flow charts 
detailing potential processes or permits that a geothermal project may have to comply 
with, including: 
• 20 general process flow charts (ranging from exploration to water access overviews) 
• over 40 US Government flow charts (ranging from ‘Tribal Land Leasing’ to ‘Bald & 
Golden Eagle Permits’) 
• over 390 state process flow charts (ranging from Alaskan ‘Right of Ways’ to Idaho’s 
‘Well Abandonment Process’). In California alone, 31 flowcharts were listed. 
These processes just cover the geothermal relevant processes of the US Government 
and ten largely western states (where most geothermal resources are). Additional or 
altered processes can apply for non-geothermal projects. 
Source: US Department of Energy (2013b).   
 
Key Federal processes  
While the States have the most prominent role in regulating major projects, the 
Federal Government also plays a part in certain circumstances. Most prominently 
this occurs through the need for a Federal EIA. This can occur where Federal land 
or any Federal decision maker or agency is involved.  
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The National Environmental Policy Act 1970  
A highly influential and much replicated statute, the National Environmental Policy 
Act 1970 (NEPA) was legislated to protect and enhance the environment. It 
established a series of national environmental policies and related action-forcing 
provisions, and created the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) (an agency in 
the Executive Office of the President). CEQ is responsible for environmental policy 
coordination, monitoring and reporting, and the operation of the Act. It advises the 
President on environmental matters and sets the regulations for how NEPA 
operates, including the EIA process. 
NEPA’s action-forcing provisions are primarily procedural, and most obviously 
manifest in a requirement for Federal agencies to conduct an EIA for Federal 
actions that significantly affect the environment. NEPA requires that Federal 
decision makers consider the potential environmental consequences of their 
proposed action, and any reasonable alternatives, before deciding whether and in 
what form to take an action. While this EIA process provides more information on 
environmental impacts, it does not require decision makers to choose a project 
formulation with the least environmental impacts. The US Environmental 
Protection Agency, a sister agency of CEQ, has a role in reviewing EIAs. EIAs 
deemed inadequate are referred to CEQ. Federal agencies complying with NEPA 
often require the proponent to prepare and submit adequate application information 
to help in preparing the NEPA analyses and documentation.  
Collaboration with tribal, state and local governments is encouraged to reduce 
duplication. Regulations ‘explicitly provide for Federal agencies to conduct joint 
planning processes, joint environmental research … and joint environmental 
assessments’ (DOE (US) 2013c). State and Federal EIAs are thus sometimes 
combined into one document (since they can have similar elements for the most 
part). 
Key State law  
As the most populous State, and one with a prominent environmental regulatory 
regime, California has been chosen as an illustrative example for relevant state 
regulatory regimes. 
The California Environmental Quality Act 1970 
Similar to NEPA, the California Environmental Quality Act 1970 (CEQA) has been 
a significant influence on environmental law in other jurisdictions. A number of 
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other US States have laws similar to CEQA (although their scope is usually 
narrower). 
CEQA requires State Government agencies to consider (primarily through EIA) the 
environmental consequences of certain projects before approving their plans. It 
applies to any action when a project requires discretionary approval by a state or 
local governmental body. 
CEQA is wider in scope than NEPA. NEPA applies only to projects receiving 
Federal funding or approval by federal agencies, while CEQA applies to projects 
receiving any form of state or local approval, permit, or oversight. (Thus, 
development projects in California funded only by private sources and not requiring 
approval by a Federal agency would be exempt from NEPA, but would likely be 
subject to CEQA.) 
Moreover, unlike the NEPA process, CEQA has: 
… substantive provisions beyond mere procedural requirements which means the State 
may halt a project that on balance is not advantageous for the environment and human 
health. (DOE (US) 2013a) 
That said, a State agency may sometimes approve a project which causes significant 
environmental damage. In this case: 
… the agency must make findings which clearly explain the circumstances surrounding 
the project analysis and the approval. Then, the agency must explain their decision to 
approve the project, despite expected environmental damage, by adopting a Statement 
of Overriding Considerations. This type of statement points out the reasons why a 
project’s benefits outweigh its environmental costs. (San Luis Obispo County 2013) 
Reform directions 
The Commission understands reforms to CEQA were contained in a Bill the 
California legislature passed in September 2013 (SB-743 Environmental quality: 
transit-oriented infill projects, judicial review streamlining for environmental 
leadership development projects, and entertainment and sports center in the City of 
Sacramento). While it seems the primary motivation of the new law is to provide 
exemptions from permitting processes for a Sacramento basketball arena 
redevelopment, other changes include: removing certain urban parking and 
aesthetics matters as CEQA triggers; a new expedited 270 day period for judicial 
review; and other changes to facilitate urban infill. It is not clear how material the 
changes will be on implementation. Commentators have suggested the law is more 
incremental and narrow than earlier proposed statewide CEQA reforms, which 
failed to gain sufficient political support (Ewers 2013). 
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At a Federal level, the Commission is aware that legislative reforms have been 
mooted, but have yet to gain enough support for passage. For example, as of 
mid-October 2013, the US Senate had yet to consider H.R. 761: The National 
Strategic and Critical Minerals Production Act of 2013, which aims to streamline 
Federal permitting for resources projects (and was passed by the House on 
18 September 2013). This Act supersedes an analogous Act (H.R. 4402) that 
similarly passed the House in 2012, but was never passed by the Senate.  
In the absence of legislative reform, the US Administration has focused on both 
administrative changes and efforts to enhance access to information. For example, 
in February 2013, President Obama announced a goal of cutting timelines in half for 
major infrastructure projects (such as highways, bridges, railways, ports, 
waterways, pipelines and renewable energy):  
[The] modernization effort will achieve time savings … while ensuring projects create 
better outcomes for communities and the environment. The effort will … [expand the] 
use of integrated planning, landscape and watershed-level mitigation, information 
technology, and publication of public timelines for permitting and review decisions to 
improve transparency and predictability. (White House 2013) 
The changes have also occurred against the backdrop of the President signing a 
number of key orders to promote streamlined Federal permitting, including: 
• the Presidential Memorandum — Speeding Infrastructure Development through 
More Efficient and Effective Permitting and Environmental Review (31 August 
2011) 
• the Executive Order — Improving Performance of Federal Permitting and 
Review of Infrastructure Projects (22 March 2012) 
• the Presidential Memorandum — Modernizing Federal Infrastructure Review 
and Permitting Regulations, Policies, and Procedures (17 May 2013). 
Administrative changes  
Other reforms to Federal US DAA processes involving administrative changes have 
been implemented recently. 
• Reforms to promote internal coordination within government, particularly 
amongst Federal agencies with a notable role in permits.  
– Specific examples, include a 2009 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between nine Federal Agencies to speed approval of new transmission lines. 
This was followed by the interagency ‘Rapid Response Team for 
Transmission’ initiative, which aims ‘to improve the overall quality and 
timeliness of electric transmission infrastructure permitting, review, and 
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consultation by the Federal government on both Federal and non‐Federal 
lands’ (CEQ nd). 
– There have also been efforts to increase federal–state coordination, 
particularly through the use of MOUs. For example, CEQ has worked with 
the Western (States) Governors Association to reduce duplication on 
assessments and other permitting matters. Also, the Department of the 
Interior has signed a 2009 MOU with the State of California, which is 
assisting in the development of renewable energy projects. 
• Greater reporting and transparency requirements have been introduced. 
– A new annual report to the President on approaches to cut timelines and 
improve outcomes for Federal permitting of infrastructure projects has been 
initiated.  
– The Office of Budget Management now tracks the progress of large scale 
projects, like transmission lines and highways, which has helped put pressure 
on agencies to improve performance in providing approvals.  
– A new ‘Federal infrastructure permitting dashboard’ website has enhanced 
public transparency.  
• Evaluations of internal processes are being undertaken. 
– Collectively, the above initiatives have increased pressure on agencies to 
examine their own procedures. For example, the Department of 
Transportation initiated an internal improvement program called ‘Every Day 
Counts’ in 2010 to shorten ‘the time needed to complete highway projects 
through the use of new technologies and innovative processes’ (DOT 
(US) 2012). This initiative has led the department to systematically review 
the efficiency of their permitting processes. 
– CEQ is also working with the relevant Federal agencies to track five selected 
pilot projects which are utilising innovative environmental review methods, 
‘in an effort to evaluate their outcomes, and highlight and promote lessons 
learned on time and cost saving approaches to replicate across the 
government’ (Council on Environmental Quality, White House 2013). 
Information provision 
Reforms to Federal US DAA processes involving information provision have also 
been implemented recently. 
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• Better baseline data collection (including accessible electronic information 
systems) have been introduced. 
– US agencies have developed web tools to access geospatial databases in real 
time to help facilitate the environmental review process.  
– While certain databases and inventories are currently only available to 
government users, the US Environmental Protection Agency’s ‘NEPAssist’ 
tool is publicly accessible. This ‘provides immediate screening of 
environmental assessment indicators for a user-defined area of interest. These 
features contribute to a streamlined review process that potentially raises 
important environmental issues at the earliest stages of project development’ 
(EPA (US) 2012).  
• Better information on regulatory processes at the pre-application stage (to assist 
applicants to have everything in place before actually putting in an application) 
is being provided. 
– Regulatory roadmaps and handbooks are being developed to help proponents 
(and regulators) understand permitting requirements (for example, the 
Geothermal Regulatory Roadmap (box D.5)). 
– CEQ is working on a pre-application tool kit to make Federal processes 
easier to navigate.  
– CEQ is also apparently progressing efforts to encourage pre-application 
meetings and coordination amongst Federal agencies and applicants, to 
provide greater regulatory certainty and encourage early information 
provision. 
D.4 New Zealand 
Key features of the DAA framework 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) is the key legislation governing the 
assessment and approval of development in New Zealand, including major projects. 
It replaced in whole or part more than 20 major statutes and 50 other laws related to 
the environment: ‘a collection of uncoordinated approaches, with many conflicts, 
gaps and overlaps’ (MfE (NZ) 2013b, p. 12).  
Introduced in 1991, the RMA was ‘in international terms … the first real attempt to 
institute a planning system that was built on a concept of sustainability’ 
(Miller 2011, p. 1). Its purpose is ‘sustainable management’ — that is, the use, 
development and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, 
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which enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic and 
cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety — while: 
• sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations 
• safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosytems 
• avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment (s. 5).  
In addition, the principles of the RMA include:  
• matters of national importance that must be recognised and provided for, 
including:  
– the preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment, wetlands, 
lakes and rivers and protection of them from inappropriate subdivision, use 
and development 
– the protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes from 
inappropriate subdivision, use and development  
– the protection of areas of significant Indigenous vegetation and significant 
habitats of Indigenous fauna 
– the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral 
lands, water and sites  
– the protection of historic heritage from inappropriate subdivision, use and 
development 
– the protection of protected customary rights (s. 6). 
• matters that all decisions shall have particular regard to, including:  
– kaitiakitanga5  
– efficient use and development of natural and physical resources 
– efficiency of the end use of energy 
– amenity values 
– finite characteristics of natural and physical resources 
– the habitat of trout and salmon (a proxy for water quality) 
– climate change 
– renewable energy (s. 7). 
                                              
5 The traditional Maori system of environmental guardianship is kaitiakitanga, which is a way of 
managing the environment based on the traditional Maori world view.  
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• taking into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (s. 8). 
Most decisions under the RMA are made by local government, but within a 
framework that flows from the national level (via statements determined by the 
Central Government, such as national environmental standards and national policy), 
through to regional policy statements and plans, and then to district plans and rules 
(determined by local government).  
The RMA: 
• imposes a statutory requirement on regional councils to prepare regional policy 
statements and regional coastal plans, which must give effect to national policy 
statements 
• requires territorial councils to prepare district plans for resource management 
within their local areas, which must not only give effect to national policy 
statements of Central Government but also regional policy statements by 
regional councils. 
The RMA allows all consent decisions about a project to be considered in one 
process. This aims to reduce costs otherwise associated with applications for 
multiple permits. It brings together in one Act broader coverage of the social, 
environmental, heritage and Indigenous issues than is the case in Australian 
legislation.  
Nevertheless, the RMA has been criticised: 
The Government continues to hear concerns that resource management processes are 
cumbersome, costly and time consuming, and that the system is uncertain, difficult to 
predict and highly litigious. The system seems to be difficult for many to understand 
and use, and is discouraging investment and innovation. The outcomes delivered under 
the RMA are failing to meet New Zealanders’ expectations. (MfE (NZ) 2013b, p. 6) 
Proposals of national significance 
While local authorities are the principal decision makers under the RMA, the Act 
provides for the Minister for the Environment to make a direction that a proposal is 
of national significance and refer it to a board of inquiry (appointed by the Minister) 
or to the Environment Court for a decision. The Minister does not decide whether 
these proposals should be approved.  
Factors the Minister may consider, when deciding whether the proposal has national 
significance, include whether the matter has: 
• aroused widespread public concern  
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• involves significant use of natural and physical resources  
• is relevant to New Zealand’s international obligations  
• will help the Crown fulfil public health, welfare, security or safety obligations or 
functions  
• is likely to contribute to significant changes to the environment  
• relates to network utilities extending to more than one district or region 
(s. 142(3)).  
For nationally significant proposals that have been lodged with a local authority, the 
Minister can be formally requested to intervene in a decision-making process by 
either the applicant for the proposal or the local authority that would normally make 
the decision. Alternatively, the Minister can choose to intervene on his or her own 
volition. Applicants with proposals that they consider are of national significance 
can also lodge directly with New Zealand’s recently established Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA).  
If the Minister calls in a proposal that has been lodged with a local authority, he or 
she can make a direction that the matter is referred for consideration and decision to 
an independent board of inquiry (the Minister appoints members to the Board), or to 
the Environment Court. In either case, the local authority will no longer have the 
role of deciding the matter. Examples of call-ins in the last five years include 
proposals for the Turitea, Waikato and Te Waka wind farms, the Upper North 
Island Grid Upgrades and the Te Mihi geothermal power station (MfE (NZ) 2011). 
If the matter has been lodged with the EPA, the EPA must make a recommendation 
to the Minister on whether it considers the proposal to be of national significance, 
and whether it should be referred to a Board of Inquiry, the Environment Court or 
the local authority for consideration and decision.  
If the Minister decides to call-in a proposal, he or she must give a direction in 
writing, stating the reasons for referring the matter to a Board of Inquiry or to the 
Environment Court. The EPA serves the Minister’s direction on the local authority 
and applicant. The EPA also gives public notice of the Minister’s direction and 
receives submissions on the proposal. 
If the Minister makes a direction that the matter will be processed by the local 
authority, the Minister may still intervene in the process. For example, the Minister 
may make a submission on the matter for the Crown, appoint a project coordinator 
to advise the local authority on anything relating to the matter, or appoint an 
additional hearings commissioner. 
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If the matter is referred to a Board of Inquiry, as soon as practicable after the 
inquiry has been completed, the Board prepares a draft decision and produces a 
draft report which states the reasons for its decision. After inviting comments on 
‘minor or technical’ aspects of the report, the Board produces a final report and 
decision. That is, the Board is the ultimate approval authority. 
If the matter is referred to the Environment Court, the Court must have regard to the 
Minister’s reasons for making a direction in relation to the matter, and must apply 
relevant sections of the RMA as if it were a consent authority.  
A Board of Inquiry must make its final decision within nine months of the public 
notification of the Minister’s decision to call-in the matter. However, the Minister 
can extend this timeframe to 18 months if special circumstances exist. The 
timeframe can be extended beyond 18 months only with the applicant’s agreement. 
The nine month decision making timeframe does not apply to the Environment 
Court. 
Many of the costs that the EPA or a Board of Inquiry incur to review proposals of 
national significance are recovered from the proponent (MfE (NZ) 2013a). 
A decision by a Board of Inquiry or the Environment Court may be challenged only 
by an appeal to the High Court on a question of law. If that decision is challenged, a 
further appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal on a 
question of law, but only with the leave of the Supreme Court. 
Reporting on implementing the RMA 
Every two years the Ministry for the Environment surveys local authorities in New 
Zealand about key aspects of RMA implementation. The survey does not separate 
the processing of proposals of national significance, but has data about the approval 
process in general. 
Five key facts from the 2010–11 survey were: 
• 36 154 resource consent applications were processed through to a decision  
• 0.56 per cent (203) of resource consent applications were declined  
• 6 per cent (2263) of resource consent applications were notified in some way 
(publicly notified or limited notified)  
• 95 per cent of resource consent applications were processed on time. 
Section 37 was used to extend the time limits for 15 per cent of all resource 
consent applications 
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• 68 per cent of consents that required monitoring were actually monitored. 
The survey also monitors the use of good practice by local authorities to improve 
performance in resource management functions (MfE (NZ) 2011).  
Reform directions 
There have been 18 amendment Acts for the RMA since 1993. The New Zealand 
Government has a program for further streamlining the RMA and improving 
decision making: 
… the Government is hearing that, in practice, every step of the current resource 
management system has become overly complex and unclear. There is a concern that 
focus under the RMA has shifted too far towards avoiding effects on the environment 
and that too little emphasis is being placed on using planning to deliver positive 
outcomes — this is a particular concern in urban areas. (MfE (NZ) 2013b, p. 12)  
Phase One 
The first phase was completed in 2009 and streamlined decision making for projects 
of national significance (MfE (NZ) 2013b). One main element of these reforms was 
the establishment of an EPA, as previously there was no dedicated authority to 
receive or process applications that were of national significance. Other elements 
included providing more guidance about what would likely be of national 
significance — in particular those projects involving key infrastructure — and 
making some procedural changes to one of the decision pathways. 
Phase one involved a range of other changes.  
• The Environment Court can award security for costs, in order to make appellants 
think carefully about the merits of their appeal. 
• Parties that are trade competitors of an applicant cannot make a submission, 
except when they are affected by an environmental effect and this is not related 
to trade competition. Damages can be awarded against parties who participate 
for trade competition reasons. 
• Councils’ ability to stop the clock has been reduced except with the agreement 
of the applicant. The council must consider the interests of those affected by the 
extension and its duty to avoid unreasonable delay. 
• Councils must discount charges for processing resource consents outside of 
statutory timeframes. 
• Fines for noncompliance with the RMA have been increased. 
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• Applicants can choose whether their application is considered by elected 
representatives or by independent commissioner(s) (MfE (NZ) 2009).  
Phase two 
Phase two of the reforms aims to improve the operation of the RMA and resource 
management more broadly, including in freshwater management and use, planning 
for natural hazards and for urban land supply. 
In 2011, the New Zealand Government established a Technical Advisory Group to 
provide independent advice to the Minister for the Environment on any changes 
needed to sections 6 and 7 of the RMA, to improve the functioning of the legislation 
in the light of: 20 years’ experience of its operation; the Government’s 
environmental and economic objectives; and the broader second phase of resource 
management reforms.  
The Technical Advisory Group found: 
• the RMA’s principles give greater weight to the sustainable management of natural 
and physical resources, than to social, cultural and economic matters. As well, some 
ambiguity in the wording of sections 6 and 7 makes it unclear whether and how to 
weight the matters within or between the sections. 
• sections 6 and 7 do not include nationally significant matters — such as natural 
hazards, urban design and related housing affordability issues — or investment in 
major infrastructure beyond renewable energy. Each of these is important to 
consider in present day planning, and a national view is needed because their 
impacts cross regional and local boundaries. One result is uncertainty for local 
decision makers who may then turn to the courts to make final decisions. (MfE 
(NZ) 2013b, p. 20) 
In addition to these broad issues, the New Zealand Government sees a range of 
process-oriented problems that need to be resolved (box D.6). 
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Box D.6 Areas targeted for further reform in New Zealand 
The Government has identified problems that need to be resolved: 
• inefficient duplication of effort in developing plans, and unnecessary variation and 
complexity in planning documentation, creating problems for engagement, 
understanding and compliance 
• a lack of clear, up-to-date national guidance on matters of national importance, 
leaving such issues to be resolved at local levels, coupled with a highly devolved 
decision making system, that has led to tension between national and local 
objectives and the development of inconsistent approaches to these matters across 
the country 
• insufficient attention being paid to meeting future needs as opposed to mitigating 
impacts 
• overreliance on consents and Environment Court appeals in attempting to resolve 
fundamental tensions over resource uses and values that would be better 
addressed at the plan stage 
• high costs of securing and complying with decisions, particularly consent decisions 
that are not commensurate with actual impacts 
• a lack of predictability in decision making — in both plans and consents — 
particularly affecting those needing decisions 
• inflexibility in the application and enforcement of the Resource Management Act 
processes, leading to disproportionate costs and requirements, particularly for small 
projects. 
Source: MfE (NZ) (2013b).  
 
The New Zealand Government initiated a consultation process on a package of 
reforms in February 2013 (MfE (NZ) 2013b) and, in August 2013, published a 
summary of reform proposals, including: 
• combining sections 6 and 7 of the RMA (matters of national importance and 
other matters, respectively) into a single list, to remove the current hierarchy 
between the two sections, in order to support more balanced decision making 
• including three new matters of national importance in the new combined section:  
– effective functioning of the built environment 
– management of significant risks of national hazards 
– efficient provision of infrastructure 
• creation of a new section 7, which will set clear expectations of best-practice 
approaches to resource management decisions for stakeholders, including:  
– endeavouring to use timely, efficient and cost-effective resource management 
processes 
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– promoting collaboration between or among local authorities on common 
resource management issues 
– ensuring that restrictions are not imposed under this Act on the use of private 
land except to the extent that any restriction is reasonably required to achieve 
the purpose of the Act 
• reduced regulatory requirements for minor and less complex projects 
• changes to reduce the cost and complexity of the EPA’s processing of 
applications for nationally significant proposals, including: 
– simplifying the requirements for public notification 
–  requiring boards of inquiry to have regard for cost-effective processes when 
determining their procedures 
– improving the ability for electronic provision of information related to the 
proposal 
– enabling the EPA to stop processing a proposal where there are unpaid debts 
and clarifying the EPA’s ability to recover debts 
• measures to resolve appeals to the Environment Court more quickly, including 
judicial conferences and mediation 
• requirements that councils monitor how they are delivering their functions and 
duties under the RMA, against measures such as timeliness, cost and overall user 
satisfaction, and performance against environmental and economic indicators 
(MfE (NZ) 2013c). 
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E Overview of international rankings 
reports 
There are a number of publicly available reports that rank Australia or its States and 
Territories against other jurisdictions in areas related to development assessment 
and approval (DAA) processes. Most of these reports adopt a perception survey 
approach and attempt to translate this information into some sort of comparative 
quantitative indicator(s) that can be used to rank jurisdictions.  
Some of the reports survey broad regulatory performance, while others take an 
industry perspective (for example, attractiveness of jurisdictions for mining 
investment). Most of the reports do not directly measure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of DAA processes.  
Australia compares favourably with other countries. Australia ranks 10th out of 185 
countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (a proxy for the efficiency of 
regulatory processes) and 20th out of 144 countries in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report. Resource-related surveys also indicate that 
Australia is a preferred location for mining investment and has a regulatory 
framework that is supportive of investment. For example, Behre Dolbear’s Ranking 
of Countries for Mining Investment ranked Australia as the best destination (out of 
25 countries) for mining investment for the last three years. 
Within Australia, surveys that compare the regulatory performance of Australian 
jurisdictions generally rank Western Australia, South Australia or the Northern 
Territory highest.  
Table E.1 summarises the focus and key findings of these surveys.  
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Table E.1 An overview of international surveys that rank regulatory performance 
Report Focus Key findings 
Survey of Mining 
Companies 2012-13 
Fraser Institute  
 
 
This survey ranks the mining investment climate of 96 
jurisdictions around the world. Jurisdictions are assigned 
scores for each of 17 policy factors, covering: 
• regulatory certainty 
• regulatory duplication and inconsistencies 
• uncertainty with respect to land use or claims 
• infrastructure (access to roads, power availability and 
so on) 
• political stability and level of corruption. 
The factors are aggregated for each jurisdiction into a 
Policy Potential Index to provide an overall score.  
 
The top ranked jurisdictions were Finland, Sweden and 
Alberta (Canada).  
 
The best ranked Australian jurisdiction was Western 
Australia (15th overall) and the lowest ranked Australian 
jurisdiction was Tasmania (49th overall).  
 
Western Australia and the Northern Territory scored 
relatively well as jurisdictions that encourage investment by 
reducing uncertainty concerning the administration, 
interpretation, and enforcement of existing regulations, but 
generally Australia does not rank as well on avoiding 
regulatory duplication and inconsistencies. 
 
Global Petroleum Survey 
2012 
Fraser Institute  
 
This survey ranks 147 jurisdictions around the world in 
relation to the barriers to investment in upstream oil and 
gas exploration and production.  
 
Jurisdictions were assigned scores for each of 18 factors, 
covering:  
• regulatory uncertainty 
• cost of regulatory compliance 
• trade barriers 
• infrastructure 
• political stability and corruption. 
The All-Inclusive Composite Index for each jurisdiction is 
derived from the equally-weighted scores for each factor. 
The top ranked jurisdictions were Oklahoma (USA), 
Mississippi (USA) and Texas (USA).  
 
The highest ranked Australian jurisdiction was South 
Australia (29th overall) and the lowest ranked Australian 
jurisdiction was New South Wales at 63rd. In general, 
Australian jurisdictions performed relatively poorly in terms 
of regulatory environment, with the highest performing 
jurisdiction (New South Wales) ranked 47th and the lowest 
performing jurisdiction (South Australia) ranked 116th.  
 
  (Continued next page) 
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Table E.1 (continued) 
Report Focus Key findings 
2013 Ranking of Countries 
for Political Risk: Where Not 
to Invest  
Behre Dolbear  
This report ranks 25 countries on their attractiveness as 
global mining investment destinations. Seven criteria are 
used: 
• economic system 
• political system 
• social issues affecting mining in the country  
• delays in receiving permits 
• the degree of corruption  
• stability of currency 
• competitiveness of the country’s tax policy. 
 
Australia ranks as the ‘best destination’ for mining 
investment of all 25 countries. Its position as the best 
destination is unchanged over the last three years. 
 
Within the specific criteria, Australia is also ranked as: 
• being the most effective at managing social issues 
• having the fewest permitting delays. 
  
National audit of regulations 
influencing mining 
exploration and project 
approval processes (draft) 
URS Australia Pty Ltd  
(cited in MCA, sub 33) 
This report covers the scope and application of laws that 
affect the minerals sector in Australia and New Zealand.  
 
Each jurisdiction was rated out of five for various criteria, 
covering the design of policies and regulations and the 
administration of the process for each approval/ 
permitting/access requirement. The scores are 
aggregated to yield rankings, including an overall ranking 
of individual jurisdictions.  
 
Unnecessary delays and duplication in processes were 
found to negatively impact mining projects in Australia. 
Overall, the ratings of all Australian jurisdictions fell 
between 2006 and 2012, which is attributed to the increase 
in the amount of legislation applicable to the minerals 
sector. 
 
South Australia ranks the highest, with an average score of 
3.7 out of 5 across all criteria. This is closely followed by 
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and New Zealand.  
  
Doing Business 2013 
World Bank and International 
Finance Corporation 
This report ranks 185 economies in terms of ease of 
doing business generally as well as an assessment of 11 
specific regulatory areas, including the ease of: 
• starting a business  
• dealing with construction permits 
• getting credit 
• enforcing contracts 
• trading across borders. 
The highest ranked economies were Singapore, Hong 
Kong and New Zealand. Overall, Australia ranked 10th. 
 
On dealing with construction permits, Australia is ranked 
11th. It was estimated that the process of dealing with 
construction permits in Australia involved 11 procedures 
and took 112 days.  
  (Continued next page) 
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Table E.1 (continued) 
Report Focus Key findings 
The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2012-13  
World Economic Forum 
This report calculates a Global Competitiveness Index for 
144 countries as a weighted average of different ‘pillars’, 
including:  
• institutions 
• infrastructure 
• macroeconomic environment  
• health and primary education 
• higher education and training 
• goods market efficiency  
• labour market efficiency  
• financial market development 
• technological readiness  
• market size 
• business sophistication  
• innovation. 
 
The best ranked jurisdictions were Switzerland and 
Singapore. Overall, Australia was ranked 20th.  
 
However, Australia performs relatively poorly on individual 
measures related to development assessment and 
approval processes. Australia is ranked: 
• 96th on the burden of complying with government 
regulation 
• 29th on the transparency of government policymaking  
• 56th on government provision of services to help 
businesses boost their economic performance 
• 18th on the efficiency of the legal framework in settling 
disputes  
• 19th on the efficiency of the legal framework in allowing 
private businesses to challenge the legality of 
government actions and/or regulations.  
Development Assessment 
Report Card 2012 
Property Council of Australia  
 
This report evaluates each Australian jurisdiction’s 
planning system against the Development Assessment 
Forum (DAF) leading practice principles, namely: 
• effective policy development 
• objective rules and tests 
• built-in improvement mechanisms 
• track-based assessment 
• single point of assessment 
• notification 
• private sector involvement 
• professional determination for most applications 
• applicant appeals 
• third-party appeals. 
The Northern Territory was ranked the best of the 
Australian jurisdictions in terms of a consistent 
improvement program and commitment to the DAF 
principles. Western Australia also made significant 
improvement between 2010 and 2012. 
 
  (Continued next page) 
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Table E.1 (continued) 
Report Focus Key findings 
DAF Reform Implementation 
Report Card (2012) 
Property Council of Australia 
The progress of each Australian jurisdiction in 
implementing the planning reforms outlined by the DAF 
leading practice principles.  
The Northern Territory was ranked the best jurisdiction 
overall, which is largely attributed to its single level of 
planning control. South Australia made the most advances 
by setting policies and strategies and providing planning 
direction to local government. New South Wales scored 
the lowest, notwithstanding the major reforms already put 
in place, but has the most potential for improvement if 
announced reforms are implemented.  
 
Sources: Behre Dolbear (2013); Fraser Institute (2012, 2013); PCA (2012a, 2012b); URS Australia Pty Ltd (nd); WEF (2013); World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation (2013). 
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F National and international use of 
strategic assessment 
This appendix provides information on the use of strategic assessment by Australian 
States and Territories and selected overseas jurisdictions. This information supports 
the analysis contained in chapter 11. 
F.1 Australian States and Territories 
Strategic assessment in land-use and development planning 
New South Wales 
The implementation of formal strategic assessment mechanisms in New South 
Wales has been a difficult process. For example, prior to July 2009, the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) had allowed for the 
development of regional environmental plans (REPs). REPs were considered by 
some commentators (Ashe & Marsden 2011; Kelly, Jackson & Williams 2012) to 
constitute a framework for strategic assessment-type processes. However, REPs are 
no longer part of the hierarchy of environmental planning instruments in New South 
Wales. The NSW Government states that ‘the removal of the REP layer is intended 
to simplify the State’s planning system’ (Department of Planning and Infrastructure 
(NSW) 2009). 
Although the State currently lacks a formal mechanism for strategic assessment, the 
NSW Government has instigated a number of metropolitan and regional plans that 
have elements of strategic planning and strategic assessment. For instance, the 
Metropolitan Plan for Sydney 2036 will be implemented through detailed 
sub-regional plans that will include ‘upfront consultation with communities about 
what culture and heritage they want to protect in their area’ (Department of 
Planning and Infrastructure (NSW) 2013, p. 18). 
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In addition, there are also ‘regional strategies’ in place for eight areas of regional 
New South Wales that have been prepared in partnership with local governments. 
These are intended to identify strategic priorities that will direct land use planning at 
the regional level and are to be updated every five years. 
The NSW Government has also recently put in place a ‘Gateway process’ to 
provide independent assessment of how mining or coal seam gas proposals would 
impact the agricultural values of the land on which it is proposed to be located 
(NSW Government nd). However, this assessment is quite narrow in focus, 
considering only one dimension of impacts (agricultural land values), whereas a full 
strategic assessment would consider a broader range of environmental, economic 
and social values. 
Victoria 
Victoria lacks a formal framework for strategic assessment. Neither the 
Environmental Effects Act 1978 (Vic) or the Planning and Environment Act 1987 
(Vic) explicitly provide for strategic assessment. However, section 12 of the 
Planning and Environment Act provides a mechanism for examining strategic 
proposals that require amendments to planning schemes, while section 151 of the 
Act allows the Minister for Planning to appoint an advisory committee to advise on 
the merits of a proposal or planning policy issue. Section 151 has been used several 
times to investigate the merit of strategic proposals (Parliament of Victoria 2011). 
Queensland 
In Queensland, the Coordinator-General undertakes strategic planning through the 
creation and planning of State Development Areas (SDAs). SDAs are specific areas 
created under the State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 
(Qld) to facilitate industrial development, infrastructure corridors and major public 
infrastructure (Queensland Government, sub. 47). The planning process for the 
creation of SDAs contains elements of strategic assessment. Each SDA is subject to 
a development scheme, a regulatory document that controls land use and 
infrastructure planning and development in the SDA. The development scheme is 
prepared and administered by the Coordinator-General and covers the following 
broad areas. 
• Compatibility of land uses with the objectives of the SDA. 
• The processes and procedures for the assessment of development, or material 
change of use, applications. 
• Avoiding or minimising environmental impacts. 
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Once complete, the scheme overrides local and Queensland Government planning 
instruments related to the use of land. The Coordinator-General may also prepare 
policies to assist in the implementation of an SDA’s development scheme 
(Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning (Qld) 2012). 
Western Australia 
In Western Australia, the Environment Protection Act 1986 (WA) was amended in 
2003 to allow the WA Environmental Protection Authority to assess ‘strategic 
proposals’. A strategic proposal is a proposal that identifies one or more future 
proposals that may, either individually or in combination, have a significant effect 
on the environment. According to the Environmental Protection Authority (2012b), 
strategic proposals can be used as an alternative to project-by-project assessment 
and are useful to ensure community involvement in the early stages of planning and 
for the consideration of cumulative impacts. The process may also give rise to more 
streamlined consideration of future ‘derived’ proposals that fall within the 
parameters of the strategic proposal.  
However, the Environmental Protection Authority has noted the limited use of these 
provisions as an alternative to project-based assessment (Environmental Protection 
Authority (WA) 2012a). In light of this, it has published a bulletin to describe its 
approach and its expectations of proponents of strategic proposals.  
South Australia 
South Australia is currently in the process of developing a Regional Mining and 
Infrastructure Plan. The plan covers three regions: the Far North; Eyre and Western; 
and Yorke and Mid North/Braemar provinces. The regions have been selected as 
they cover the majority of mining projects in South Australia. The Plan will 
consider the infrastructure that is best able to facilitate the development of the 
mining sector in South Australia, and help articulate the means of delivering this 
infrastructure. As part of the process, stakeholder feedback will be sought on a 
number of issues that would be included in a strategic assessment, including the 
regional and community impacts of mining (both positive and negative), the 
contribution of mining to the economy and any environmental costs. This feedback 
will be used to develop a priority list of infrastructure projects (Department of 
Planning, Transport and Infrastructure (SA) 2013). 
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Tasmania 
The Tasmanian Government has introduced a planning reform program, a key 
feature of which is the introduction of regional land use strategies (Tasmanian 
Government, sub. 53, attachment 1). The development of these strategies has 
employed elements of strategic assessment. However, the lack of consistent and 
accurate environmental data has, in some cases, hampered attempts to develop a 
pro-active planning approach to the protection of environmental values (Southern 
Tasmanian Councils Authority 2011) 
ACT 
Under the Planning and Development Act 2007 (ACT), a strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) may be undertaken when a major policy matter is proposed, such 
as a major variation to the Territory Plan (the key statutory planning document in 
the ACT). The ACT Minister for Planning can request a SEA, or the ACT Planning 
and Land Authority may decide that one is needed. Under the ACT approach, a 
SEA can be used to: 
… assess the environmental benefits and impacts on an area [of the proposed policy or 
plan], which is an important part of any decision about an area’s suitability for future 
development. It can also recommend how the finding of the assessment should be 
considered in future planning. (Environment and Sustainable Development Directorate 
(ACT) 2013) 
Northern Territory 
The Commission is not aware of strategic assessment being used in a land-use or 
development planning context in the Northern Territory. 
Strategic assessment in environmental and resource management 
policy 
Water planning 
Under the COAG National Water Initiative (NWI), considerable effort has been put 
into increasing the number and quality of water plans across Australia. An 
NWI-consistent water plan: appropriately balances economic, social and 
environmental considerations; draws on the best available science, socioeconomic 
analysis and community input; and provides a clear basis for water access 
entitlements and allocations (National Water Commission 2011). As such, water 
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planning clearly requires a strategic approach to be taken to the assessment of water 
resources. 
The latest biennial assessment of the NWI reported that progress has been made in 
increasing the proportion of areas covered by water plans and in improving their 
quality, but that further improvements could be made (National Water Commission 
2011). Fermio and Hamstead reported:  
There is a view amongst mining stakeholders that water allocation planning has been 
focused on agricultural and urban water use; and that remote areas where mines are the 
only significant water-using activity have not been prioritised for investment in water 
planning. (2012, p. 55) 
There are regions where water planning can enable decisions about resource 
developments to be better informed about cumulative impacts on water resources. A 
possible example is the Fortescue Marsh area in Western Australia, where there is 
potential for the cumulative impacts of dewatering by iron ore mines to affect the 
groundwater-dependent ecosystem of the marsh (Fermio & Hamstead 2012). 
Regulation of native vegetation clearing 
A review of Victoria’s native vegetation clearing regulations commenced in 2012. 
Part of the review involved developing an interactive model (called NaturePrint) 
that: 
… brings together large amounts of information collected about species presence, 
habitat quality and connectivity, to determine relative environmental value across the 
landscape. This model ranks locations for their potential to contribute to the efficient 
conservation of the full range of Victoria’s biodiversity. (Department of Sustainability 
and Environment (Vic) 2012, p. 23) 
The development of this model entailed a strategic approach to the assessment of 
biodiversity values. 
Reforms to Victoria’s native vegetation clearing regulations that incorporate the use 
of NaturePrint have been announced (Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries (Vic) 2013). While the Commission has not independently evaluated the 
model, it would appear that it has enabled the regulations to be reformed in ways 
that are likely to improve the predictability and speed of decision making and 
ensure that offsets more cost-effectively target environmental benefits. For example, 
maps generated by the model will in some cases be able to be used in assessing a 
clearance application as low risk, thereby avoiding the need for on-site assessment. 
Proponents will also be able to more readily obtain information about the 
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biodiversity value of different parcels of land, which could assist them to reduce 
their costs by siting developments in less environmentally sensitive locations. 
F.2 Selected overseas jurisdictions 
European Union 
Within the European Union, SEA has been mandatory for certain types of plans and 
programs since 2001 under Directive 2001/42/EC, known as the ‘SEA Directive’. A 
directive is a legislative Act of the European Union that requires member states to 
achieve a particular result, but typically does not dictate the means of achieving that 
result. Failure to comply with the Directive may result in the European Commission 
initiating legal action against the member state in the European Court of Justice. 
The SEA Directive covers plans and programs that are prepared for agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, energy, industry, transport, waste, waste water management, 
telecommunications, tourism, town and country planning or land use. For plans and 
programs not covered by these categories, EU member states have to carry out a 
screening procedure to determine whether the plans and programs are likely to have 
significant environmental effects. 
Governments within EU member states can choose to go further than the minimum 
requirements of the SEA Directive, as for example Scotland has (see below). Other 
EU member states, such as Sweden, have chosen to only comply with the minimum 
requirements of the Directive. Since July 2004, Swedish law has contained 
provisions requiring certain government plans and programs to be subject to SEA 
(Environmental Protection Agency (Sweden) 2010).  
(Sadler & Jurkeviciute 2011) noted a number of leading practices that have 
contributed to successful SEA outcomes in the European Union, including: 
• adequate procedural and methodological guidance is provided to practitioners 
• proper public consultation is undertaken 
• checks and balances for SEA quality, such as independent review, are used 
• reasonable alternatives are identified and considered (for example, alternative 
locations for development should be genuinely considered, rather than 
undertaken during report preparation to meet requirements) 
• cumulative and large-scale impacts are considered. 
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However, they suggested that there are some areas where EU nations need to 
improve, such as monitoring and compliance: 
Not much seems to be known about practice in monitoring environmental effects of 
plans and programs … or reviewing environmental reports to ensure they are of 
‘sufficient quality to meet the requirements of the Directive’ – both of which are 
critical to gaining a firmer understanding of SEA effectiveness. (Sadler & Jurkeviciute 
2011) 
Overall, they found that the implementation of the SEA Directive in the European 
Union has been mixed, ‘proceeding at very different speeds in member states’ 
(Sadler & Jurkeviciute 2011). This accords with the observations of the 
Commission. The Commission has focused on the application of the SEA Directive 
in the United Kingdom, and more specifically, Scotland, which is considered by 
some researchers to have the most comprehensive application of SEA (Kelly, 
Jackson & Williams 2012). 
United Kingdom 
As an EU member state, the United Kingdom has legislation in place that addresses 
the requirements of the SEA Directive. The UK (Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister (UK) 2005) reported that the UK SEA approach places an emphasis on the 
following areas in particular. 
• Collecting and presenting information on the environmental baseline and current 
problems, and their likely future evolution. 
• Predicting significant environmental effects of the plan or program, including those 
of strategic alternatives. 
• Addressing adverse environmental effects through mitigation measures. 
• Consulting the public and authorities with environmental responsibilities as part of 
the assessment process. 
• Monitoring the environmental effects of the plan or program during its 
implementation. 
However, SEA regulations and practice differ between England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland and consequently the types of plans and programs that require 
a SEA varies across the UK (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (UK) 2005). For 
example, in England the Department of Communities and Local Government is the 
lead department on SEA and has prepared regulations to implement the SEA 
Directive. In Wales, the National Assembly for Wales has prepared Regulations for 
SEA of Welsh plans and programs, while in Northern Ireland, the Department of the 
Environment for Northern Ireland has prepared regulations to implement the SEA 
Directive (Environment Agency (UK) 2013). 
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Of all the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, Scotland has the most 
comprehensive application of strategic assessment techniques. In Scotland, the 
Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005 (EA Act), an Act of the Scottish 
Parliament, governs the implementation of the SEA Directive. This Act makes SEA 
a statutory requirement for virtually all aspects of Scottish policy formation. Kelly, 
Jackson and Williams (2012) argued: 
[Scotland] currently represents the most comprehensive application of this technique to 
public sector policies, plans and programs, not just within the EU but across all the 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (p. 1) 
The Scottish SEA experience 
The Scottish Government has been an advocate of the value of the SEA approach. It 
argues that it has been an ‘important statutory step’ that can add value to 
development planning ‘by stimulating creative and lateral thinking, helping to 
challenge traditional views and facilitating fuller consideration of the environmental 
effects of policies and proposals’ (Scottish Government 2010). The Scottish 
Government (2006, p. 4) argued that SEA achieves this by: 
• systematically assessing and monitoring the significant environmental effects of 
public sector strategies, plans and programs 
• ensuring that expertise and views are sought at various points in the process from 
Scottish National Heritage, Scottish Environment Protection Agency, Historic 
Scotland and the public 
• requiring a public statement as to how opinions have been taken into account. 
From July 2004 to 1 January 2011, some 555 policies, plans and programs affecting 
Scotland were subject to at least one formal stage of SEA. Of these, 159 were 
screened out on the basis that they are unlikely to lead to significant environmental 
effects, while 396 went on to be subject to a full SEA (Environment Protection 
Agency (Scotland) 2011).  
The Scottish SEA process involves a number of steps with formal requirements that 
must be undertaken according to statutory or agreed timelines. A SEA is instigated 
by a responsible authority, that is, the authority responsible for the policies, plans 
and programs as determined by the EA Act (such as the Scottish Government or a 
local council). The responsible authority must consult with the statutory 
consultation bodies under the Act and a report must be produced on how their 
responses have been taken into account (Environment Protection Agency (Scotland) 
2011). The stages of the Scottish SEA process are described in box F.1. The 
progress of all Scottish SEA consultations can be tracked through a publically 
accessible online portal, the SEA Database. The SEA Database also holds all formal 
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submissions to the assessment, and the government responses to those submissions 
(Historic Scotland nd). 
 
Box F.1 Main stages of the Scottish SEA process 
The Scottish strategic environmental assessment (SEA) process has a number of 
steps. 
• Screening: the responsible authority establishes whether the policy, plan or strategy 
is likely to have a significant environmental impact. Having formed an opinion, it 
must formally consult with the consultation authorities to seek their views prior to 
making a determination about undertaking a SEA. The consultation authorities are 
Scottish Natural Heritage, Scottish Environment Protection Agency and Historic 
Scotland. Certain categories of policies, plans and programs automatically require a 
SEA and therefore screening is not required. 
• Scoping: formal consultation is undertaken with the consultation authorities to 
identify the scope and level of detail needed in the assessment, including the 
proposed period of consultation. 
• Assessment: the assessment has to describe the effects on the environment of the 
policies, plans or programs and their reasonable alternatives. Environmental data 
collection will have been ongoing through these stages and an environmental report 
must be prepared. 
• Stakeholder engagement: formal public consultation is required on the draft 
environmental report and on draft policies, plans and programs. 
• Post-adoption: the responsible authority is required to make a statement on how the 
consultation responses and findings have been taken into account in the 
preparation of the policies, plans and programs. 
• Monitoring: to ascertain the effectiveness of mitigation measures, as well as 
providing for the identification of any unforeseen adverse effects at an early stage. 
Source: SEPA (2011).  
 
A recent review of the SEA process found that, while it was not as efficient as it 
could be, SEA had considerable potential to improve the quality of Scottish 
policies, plans and programs (Environment Protection Agency (Scotland) 2011). 
The report identified a number of positive aspects of the Scottish approach, 
including: 
• improved transparency of decision making in respect of environmental issues 
• clearly defined requirements and procedures of the EA Act 
• regular consultation (a requirement considered important by stakeholders). 
However, the report also identified a number of negative aspects to the Scottish 
SEA process, including: 
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• some stakeholders perceived that SEA had limited influence over policies, plans 
and programs 
• consideration and evaluation of the effect on the environment of different 
alternatives is not undertaken in a rigorous manner 
• SEA is sometimes treated as a ‘bolt-on’ process rather than being effectively 
integrated, and stakeholder engagement may be poor 
• benefits are not always clear and immediate and this can lead to a lack of ‘buy 
in’ to the process by some stakeholders, or it may potentially be viewed as an 
inconvenience rather than an opportunity 
• considerable resources are required to undertake a SEA appropriately, the 
process is time consuming, and the output is often complex. 
A survey of Scottish SEA practitioners undertaken as part of the review found that 
around 40 per cent believed that SEA led to better environmental outcomes, around 
35 per cent were unsure and 25 per cent disagreed that the process led to better 
outcomes (Environment Protection Agency (Scotland) 2011). 
Canada 
In Canada, regional environmental assessments incorporate aspects of strategic 
assessment, as they focus on the development potential of a geographic area, and 
include an examination of cumulative impacts under different development 
scenarios. The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012 provides the Minister 
of the Environment with authority to establish a committee to conduct a regional 
assessment for areas that are entirely composed of federal lands. The Minister may 
also establish a committee jointly with one or more provincial governments to 
conduct a regional study outside of federal lands (Natural Resources Canada, pers. 
comm., 8 June 2013). 
At this stage, no regional environmental assessments have been started under the 
Environmental Assessment Act. However, a regional environmental assessment of 
the Beaufort Sea in Canada’s far north was instigated by the Canadian Government 
in August 2010 to facilitate socioeconomic and scientific research to inform 
regulatory decisions for potential offshore exploration and development activities in 
the region. It is a multi-stakeholder initiative, involving Inuvialuit communities, 
industry, federal and territorial governments, academia and regulators. The intention 
is to support effective and efficient regulatory decision making by providing the 
necessary scientific and socioeconomic information to all stakeholders (Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2012). The assessment is currently in 
progress and is expected to be completed within the next two years. 
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In addition, some Canadian provinces undertake SEAs for offshore developments. 
In these cases, SEAs must be undertaken prior to issuing exploration licences for oil 
and gas. These assessments are undertaken by the jurisdictions’ petroleum board 
(the Canada–Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board and the 
Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board are two examples). These boards 
have used the SEA tool to analyse broad geographic areas and identify areas of 
particular environmental sensitivity that should be avoided or protected through 
mitigation measures. Assessments are also used to identify information gaps, and 
can assist efforts to assess project-specific environmental effects (Natural Resources 
Canada, pers. comm., 8 June 2013). 
Alberta 
The Government of Alberta intends to develop regional plans for seven different 
regions. These plans are intended to set environmental limits, conserve sensitive 
land from development and provide certainty to developers. The plans are also 
intended to assist in a shift to ‘cumulative effects management’ (Environment and 
Sustainable Resource Development Alberta 2013). The plans are legally binding. 
Only one regional plan (for the Lower Athabasca Region) has been approved, with 
the regional planning process not yet commenced for five of the seven regions.  
The Lower Athabasca Regional Plan became effective 1 September 2012. The 
Albertan Government (Environment and Sustainable Resource Development 
Alberta 2012) has reported the successful outcomes of the plan as follows. 
• More than 10 000 Albertans, including individuals and representatives from 
Aboriginal organisations, industry, municipalities and environmental 
organisations, were engaged in land-use planning over a three year period. 
• The plan sets regional environmental limits for air and surface water quality and 
groundwater management. It also establishes six new conservation areas and 
protects important caribou habitat. The plan also establishes environmental 
monitoring frameworks, and commitments to engage with the Indigenous 
population in environmental planning decisions. 
• The plan addresses infrastructure challenges and sets strategies to plan for both 
urban growth and the continued growth of the oil sands industry within the 
region. 
United States 
While the United States was the first country to require the use of environmental 
impact assessments for individual major projects through the National 
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Environmental Policy Act 1969, to date, strategic assessment in the United States 
has been relatively underused (Clark, Mahoney & Pierce 2011). Clark, Mahoney 
and Pierce (2011) outlined a number of challenges to the wider application of 
strategic assessments in the United States. 
• US regulatory organisations are not sufficiently cohesive to work together at a 
strategic level. 
• Current organisational frameworks do not support cohesive consideration of 
projects that have cross-jurisdiction impacts. 
• There are limited environmental data available at the regional level to support 
strategic decision making. 
• Decision makers are risk averse in situations where future developments are 
uncertain. 
• There is a limited pool of professionals qualified to prepare strategic 
assessments. 
• There is a risk of litigation if strategic assessment is flawed. 
Overall, Clark, Mahoney and Pierce (2011) concluded that strategic assessment may 
result in improved decision making in the United States, but there would need to be 
more acceptance of the process by those involved in environmental impact 
assessments before it becomes more widely used. 
